


Report

West Point Undergraduate Historical Review



*Spring 2012*

*Volume 2, Issue 2*



# REPORT

WEST POINT UNDERGRADUATE

HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 2, ISSUE 2

SPRING 2012

# REPORT

WEST POINT UNDERGRADUATE HISTORICAL REVIEW  
VOLUME 2, ISSUE 2; SPRING 2012

## EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Steven Stringfellow  
*Military History*

## EDITORS

Ellen Chamberlain  
*Literature; Russian*

Tara Lacson  
*International History*

Sean McQuade  
*International History*

Peter Mitchell  
*International History*

Kevin Rutherford  
*Military History*

Julia Schemel  
*American History*

Austen Boroff  
*International History*

Erin Mauldin  
*International History*

Tyler Mazda  
*Military History*

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Editorial Board would like to thank the faculty of the History Department for their submission recommendations, all the students who submitted papers, and Major Gregory Tomlin for his extensive guidance and technical support. Without their help, *Report* would not have been possible.

## ABOUT THE REVIEW

*Report* is a non-profit publication produced by undergraduate cadets at the United States Military Academy. It accepts and encourages submissions from undergraduates year-round. Reproduction in whole or in part without written permission is prohibited.

## ON THE INTERNET

<http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/report%20history%20journal.aspx>

## DISCLAIMER

The contents of *Report*, including words, images, and opinions, are unofficial and not to be considered as the official views of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense. Readers accept and agree to this disclaimer in the use of any information obtained from *Report*.

## COPYRIGHT AND PHOTOCOPYING

© 2012 Department of History  
United States Military Academy  
West Point, New York 10996

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

FROM THE EDITOR  
*Steven Stringfellow*

1

EVOLUTION OF THE ETHNIC POLICY OF THE CHINESE  
COMMUNIST PARTY

*Erin Mauldin*

3

COLUMBIA'S WASHINGTON:  
HOW SIMON BOLIVAR DEFEATED THE SPANISH EMPIRE

*Brad Neaton*

9

FROM CHIVALRY TO CAVALRY:  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH CAVALRY DURING THE EARLY  
MODERN PERIOD

*Thomas Milligan*

13

CONTROLLED CHAOS:  
WHY THE REVOLUTION IN ZANZIBAR WAS NOT GENOCIDE

*Carl Rios*

21

SANCTIONED DISCRIMINATION:  
CHURCH COMPLICITY IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

*Tara Lacson*

29

WINNING OVER THE TRIBES IN MANDATE TRANS-JORDAN:  
SECURITY, ECONOMICS, IDENTITY, AND CHANCE

*Karl Schoch*

35

TO HELL WITH INTEGRITY:  
WHY MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S LACK OF SELF-REGULATION  
FORCED CONGRESS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ITS DRUG  
TESTING POLICY

*Dan Prial*

63



## FROM THE EDITOR

The cadet editorial staff is pleased to present the spring issue of *Report*. Every semester, cadets produce exemplary historical works which deserve a greater readership than they receive, too often lost in the hectic shuffle of West Point life. We are proud to showcase the following articles, whose authors' dedication and insight might have otherwise gone unnoticed. Our writers exemplify the commitment to detail and devotion to the truth which typifies both good historians and good military officers.

These works differ in subject and style yet all pursue a single goal: shedding light on a commonly-misunderstood subject. Erin Mauldin's analysis of the Chinese Communist Party's formation of ethnic groups reveals a more multifaceted, self-determined China than we as Americans often care to recognize. Brad Neaton and Thomas Milligan analyze two entirely different historical changes: the liberation of Columbia and the disappearance of the French medieval knight, yet they uncover the underlying social circumstances which prompted both. Carl Rios and Tara Lacson each study conflicts defined by violence against civilians, Zanzibar and Rwanda, and present original interpretations of what really happened in each. Karl Schoch traveled to Jordan to find the sources necessary to understand that country's birth as a nation, which he uses to reveal the dangers of eagerly drawing conclusions from a seemingly perfect case of nation-building. Finally, Daniel Prial showcases how the historical method of analyzing evidence and seeking the truth impartially is applicable to nearly any field of study: his senior thesis reveals how the Major League Baseball's highly-publicized steroid debacle snowballed out of control.

We would like to thank the History Department for its continued leadership and financial support for our publication, and we extend a grateful farewell to Colonel Lance Betros, who is departing West Point with the Class of 2012 after serving for seven years as department head.

Steven J. Stringfellow  
Editor-in-Chief  
West Point, NY



# EVOLUTION OF THE ETHNIC POLICY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

BY  
ERIN A. MAULDIN

*Erin A. Mauldin is a sophomore studying International History at the United States Military Academy. She wrote this paper in partial fulfillment of course requirements for a survey of the history of China. She studied the development of the Chinese Communist Party's ethnic policy in order to better understand the current disputes and controversial policies concerning China's minorities.*

At a dinner on October 1, 1950, to celebrate the first anniversary of the People's Republic of China, Premier Zhou Enlai announced that "not only have all ethnic groups been united, but love of the motherland has also been growing in their hearts."<sup>1</sup> The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) classified the state's ethnic groups as fifty-six distinct *minzu* (nations) in 1953-1954, with the fifty-five ethnicities other than the Han constituting six percent of the total population.<sup>2</sup> In the 1920s and early 1930s, the leaders of the CCP had originally advocated for the right of each *minzu* to self-determination, but in 1954, they denied the right of the ethnic groups to independence. Instead, they incorporated a system of ethnic representation in the national government and established autonomous ethnic areas. These strategies represent one stage in the development of CCP ethnic policy – a means by which the leaders met the political needs of the party from 1921 to their establishment of the People's Republic of China. The policy went through three phases, each reflecting the response of the CCP leaders to the pressures the party confronted: as it first emerged and was establishing itself politically, then as it struggled for survival against the Kuomintang and the Japanese invaders, and finally as it consolidated power as the legitimate government. The leaders of the CCP ultimately decided to adopt an ethnic policy involving *minzu* recognition, representation, and autonomous areas as part of their effort to create a secure, unitary state while appeasing ethnic aspirations that would undermine that effort.

---

<sup>1</sup> Guojia jiaoyu wiyuanhui (State Education Commission), ed. *Guoqing* (National conditions). Beijing Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1994, quoted in Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 178.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China* (London: University of California Press, 2011), 4.

The earliest policies of the Chinese Communist Party's leaders concerning ethnic minorities were underdeveloped, reflected their urban focus and the influence of Stalin-Marxist theories of nationalities, and served as a response to Kuomintang (KMT) policy.<sup>3</sup> With little to no exposure to minorities in the cities from which the CCP emerged, the leaders relied upon the Soviet model for a multi-national federation. According to that model, all nationalities, as defined by a common territory, language, economic mode, and culture, have the right to self-government and self-determination.<sup>4</sup> Hence the CCP leaders, as espoused by Mao Tse-tung in a letter in 1920, supported the right of China's nationalities, in areas like Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Qinghai, to achieve "self-government and self-determination."<sup>5</sup> However, early CCP leaders did not consider ethnic minority policy to be a major concern, trusting that the issues of the minorities would be unimportant in the face of a communist revolution.<sup>6</sup>

Very quickly, though, the leaders of the CCP realized that taking a stronger stance on the right of ethnic minorities to independence would differentiate the party from its rival, the KMT. The KMT, struggling to unify China and consolidate power in the early 1920s, promoted a policy of ethnic assimilation and the idea of one great Chinese ethnicity within a singular Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*).<sup>7</sup> However, ethnic minorities fiercely resisted the KMT's Hanification (*Hanhua*) policy because it equated Chinese nationalism with being Han Chinese.<sup>8</sup> The CCP, in response, emphatically declared that it was "the only party capable of granting the nationalities self-rule" and promoted a federalist system to counter the KMT's unitary state.<sup>9</sup> Its potency as a policy drew upon its ability to appear as both anti-imperialist and anti-KMT oppression.<sup>10</sup> The need to appeal to minorities increased acutely with the dissolution of the First United Front in 1927, the subsequent flight of the CCP members into the countryside, the

---

<sup>3</sup> This concept of ethnicity itself was relatively new to the Chinese. Only during the late nineteenth century did a concrete definition of ethnic differentiation truly emerge as a result of European influence and dissatisfaction with the Manchu ruling dynasty and imperialism. Previously, the Chinese constantly had to reconcile the concept of ethnic "Han" Chinese with assimilated foreigners who had conquered and led dynasties. This precedent of foreign rule meant that the idea of "Chinese" went beyond ethnic definitions. By the early twentieth century, this changed, and groups within China identified based on ethnicity. Rong Ma, "The Soviet Model's Influence and the Current Debate on Ethnic Relations," *Global Asia* (June 2010: 1): 3.

<sup>4</sup> Ma, "The Soviet Model's Influence and the Current Debate on Ethnic Relations," 4.

<sup>5</sup> Hao Shiyuan, "Mao Zedong dui jie jue zhongguo minzu wenti de lishi gongxian," *Minzu yanjiu* 5 (1993): 1, quoted in Katherine Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 66.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 65.

<sup>7</sup> Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction*, 166.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.

<sup>9</sup> Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang*, 69.

<sup>10</sup> Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction*, 173.

establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet in 1931, and the Long March in 1934-1935. KMT extermination attempts throughout the Long March forced CCP members to take refuge in minority regions, forcing the leaders to “relate to interests of the nationalities.”<sup>11</sup> By necessity, the objective of the CCP’s ethnic policy became to mobilize ethnic groups to resist the KMT, or in the words of a CCP Sichuan provincial committee document, “to establish a united front with ethnic minority lower classes” against the KMT.<sup>12</sup> As a result of their struggle to survive in response to KMT threats, culminating in the Long March, “the issue of national minorities took on strategic, real-world consequences” for the CCP, spurring the communists to “propagandize their policies of national equality and self-determination.”<sup>13</sup>

The balance of this struggle between the KMT and the CCP changed with the increasingly aggressive territorial grabs of Japan in the late 1930s. These led to the first major shift of the CCP’s evolving ethnic policy. Emerging from the Long March severely weakened in 1935, the CCP faced further attempts by Chiang Kai-Shek to eliminate the rival party. Japan, however, had invaded Manchuria in 1931, forcing the KMT and CCP to contend with both the Japanese threat and the threats posed by each other. In order to resist the Japanese in 1935, and, more importantly, to secure the party’s survival, the leaders committed the CCP “to a willingness to join in a government of national defense” with the KMT.<sup>14</sup> Reluctantly, the KMT joined in a Second United Front with the CCP in 1937. They were spurred by popular support of a national salvation movement triggered by the Japanese invasion and by the end of the civil war following the release of Chiang Kai-Shek from kidnapping.<sup>15</sup> The CCP leaders stressed national salvation rather than communism and no longer emphasized the right of ethnic minorities to secede.<sup>16</sup> Advocacy of independence remained dangerous to China’s stability in light of unrest in the northwest. Ethnic Turkis, rebelling in Xinjiang against misrule by the KMT-appointed government, established an East Turkestan Republic in 1933, then again in 1937.<sup>17</sup> Moscow had, in response, deployed Russian troops to secure the area under the guise of overthrowing the rebel leaders. By the late 1930s, the region was “economically and politically a dependent of the Soviet

---

<sup>11</sup> Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang*, 68.

<sup>12</sup> *Minzu wenti wenxian* (Collections of documents on nationality issues), Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1991, quoted in Zhao, *A Nation State by Construction*, 174.

<sup>13</sup> Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation*, 27.

<sup>14</sup> Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China: From War to Peace 1894-1972* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1975), 424.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 425.

<sup>16</sup> Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction*, 175.

<sup>17</sup> Gardner Bovington, *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 36.

Union.”<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, the CCP leaders continued to use their recognition of the existence of diverse ethnicities, in contrast to the KMT’s new policy of denying the existence of distinct ethnicities within a unitary China, as a means of winning the favor of the minorities. The communists argued that political recognition of diversity was “essential to state legitimacy and anti-colonial resistance,” but they no longer advocated the right of minorities’ to gain independence.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the CCP leaders changed their policy from one supporting ethnic self-determination to one with a more unified nationalist message in response to the threats posed by Japan, the Soviets, and rebellious minorities, while they still retained a stance counter to KMT policy.

After benefiting from Japanese aggression and the resulting fervent Chinese nationalism, the CCP emerged from WWII a strong contender to the KMT government. In 1949, members of the CCP captured Peking and declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.<sup>20</sup> As the CCP asserted itself as the legitimate governing source of China, its party concerns changed dramatically. No longer the underdog agitating for overthrow of the entrenched power, the new leaders of the PRC were now responsible for securing China from external and internal threats and for consolidating power. With this new responsibility and shift in concerns, the leaders of the CCP asserted a new ethnic policy. That reversed their previous stance on self-determination and the formation of a federation, yet still reflected an acknowledgement of the need for the support of the minorities. Self-determination became untenable now that the CCP was obligated to maintain China’s borders by a need for legitimacy. The CCP leaders previously supported self-determination with the intent of forming a federation (similar to the Soviet Union). However, the Republic of China under the KMT had already recognized the plebiscite outcome for independence in Outer Mongolia in 1946. Further, the Soviets had made it clear that they would keep Outer Mongolia independent as a buffer, thus defeating the possibility of a federation. Article 50 of the Common Program, which the first Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference adopted on September 29, 1949, outlined the CCP’s new stance:

All nationalities within the boundaries of the PRC are equal. They should establish unity and mutual aid among themselves, and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the PRC will become a big fraternal and cooperative family composed of all its

---

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>19</sup> Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation*, 29.

<sup>20</sup> Jansen, *Japan and China*, 444.

nationalities. Nationalism and chauvinism shall be opposed. Acts involving discrimination, oppression, and disrupting the unity of the various nationalities shall be prohibited.<sup>21</sup>

To justify this reversal of position regarding the right to self-determination, the leaders of the CCP recast their rise to power as the achievement of self-determination and liberation for all Chinese people from foreign imperialism, reinterpreting it in “the context of China’s right to win freedom from foreign imperialist interference.”<sup>22</sup> In a cable from the New China News Agency to a branch in northwest China, a Beijing CCP leader explained that the party had advocated self-determination “for the sake of strengthening the minorities’ opposition to KMT reactionary rule.”<sup>23</sup> Though that was “correct at the time,” the CCP announced that it would now “emphasize cooperation and unity among all nationalities in order to complete the great cause of national unification and to defeat the conspiracy of imperialists.”<sup>24</sup> The fact that the leaders of the CCP tried so hard to justify their new policy indicates that they were significantly concerned with the response of ethnic minorities to CCP rule, even though they only comprised 6% of the population of China.

Consequently, the leaders of the CCP turned to policies that would help them create and maintain a secure, unitary, and multiethnic state, while at the same time appeasing ethnic aspirations. As a result, the leaders of the CCP implemented a system of autonomous ethnic areas at the founding of the PRC. The 1953 Election Law guaranteed a minimum of 150 minority delegates in the first National People’s Congress and at least one delegate per ethnic minority, a representation that far exceeded their relative population.<sup>25</sup> The CCP leaders subsequently were obligated to define what those ethnic minorities were, a process that led to the official classification of fifty-six *minzu*. After defining the *minzu*, the leaders of the CCP devised a means of incorporating them into a singular China in order to retain for the PRC the resources of the land occupied by each *minzu*.<sup>26</sup> As Mao noted succinctly, “When we say China has vast land, rich resources, and a huge population what that actually means is that the Han nationality has a huge

---

<sup>21</sup> *Minzu zhengce wenxuan* (Selected documents on nationality policies), Urumchi: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1985, quoted in Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction*, 175.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 175-176.

<sup>23</sup> New China News Agency cable, quoted in *Ibid.*, 176.

<sup>24</sup> *Dangdai Zhongguo minzu gongzuo dashiji* (Chronological records of contemporary China’s nationality work), Minzu Chubanshe, 1989, quoted in *Ibid.*, 177.

<sup>25</sup> Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation*, 18-19.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

population and ethnic minorities have vast land and rich resources.”<sup>27</sup> Areas of ethnic minority concentration comprised 64.3% of all of China, containing (according to official PRC publications) 26.9% of the cultivated land, 52.5% of the water resources, and significant amounts of oil and coal. In addition, these areas were located on borders essential for China’s national security.<sup>28</sup> Hence, the CCP leaders confronted the challenge of all previous governments of China: reconciling the issues of legitimacy and maintaining power over the land, its people, and their resources. The CCP leaders worked to appease ethnic concerns as part of their larger policy of consolidating and creating a unified China.

The CCP’s ethnic policy evolved from 1921 to 1954 in order to meet the needs of the party. The leaders of the CCP first used the policy as a response to the KMT, then as a means of survival in the face of KMT and Japanese threats, and finally as a tool of the government in power to keep legitimacy and resources. The reasoning behind the decisions of the leaders of the CCP to develop this particular ethnic policy over time provide a background for their establishment of ethnic autonomous areas and provisions for the rights of ethnic minorities. This system would nevertheless fail to respect ethnic autonomy and promote full ethnic equality, as outlined in its stated goals and provisions. An understanding of how the leaders of the CCP finally decided to resolve the issue of ethnic minorities as it transitioned into the legitimate power of China is necessary to explain this failure.

---

<sup>27</sup> Mao Zedong, “Criticize Han Chauvinism,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 5 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1997).

<sup>28</sup> Zhao, *A Nation-State By Construction*, 178.

# COLUMBIA'S WASHINGTON: HOW SIMON BOLIVAR DEFEATED THE SPANISH EMPIRE

BY  
BRAD C. NEATON

*Brad C. Neaton is a sophomore and an American History major at the United States Military Academy. He wrote this paper in partial fulfillment of course requirements for a survey of Latin American history. He was drawn to study Simon Bolivar as one of history's most daring, yet also largely unknown, revolutionaries.*

The success of the Colombian Revolution in the early nineteenth century was the result of a combination of intellectual leadership, popular uprisings against Spanish rule, national military organization, and the influence of the American Revolution. Yet the significance of these factors were dwarfed by a single man whose leadership and dedication to the people of South America, combined with his heroic energy and insatiable will, provided a compelling unity within Gran Colombia that laid the foundation for its independence. Often referred to as the “George Washington of South America,” Simon Bolivar was the integral catalyst of the Colombian revolution, helping to bring about both the unification of Gran Colombia and its eventual liberation from Spanish forces.<sup>1</sup> Historians today continue to debate how Bolivar managed to stimulate the emergence of such an extraordinary and unified movement for a democratic nation state in an overwhelmingly discordant country. However, a critical examination of the Colombian Revolution reveals that Bolivar’s rousing Cartagena Manifesto and his timely success in taking advantage of incipient nationalism brewing in the Spanish colonies were the two most important factors contributing to the independence of Gran Colombia.

Simon Bolivar’s famous Manifesto of Cartagena of December 15, 1812, which succeeded in galvanizing the latent people of Gran Colombia by inspiring them to take up the reigns of the independence movement, was an irrefutably important document crucial to his success. The manuscript, the first by which he expounded upon his vision of sovereignty, demonstrated Bolivar’s faith in what he believed was a destined victory of independence. In this invigoratingly authoritarian analysis, Bolivar appealed to Gran Colombians to join in continental collaboration to initiate a movement for the liberation of South America. As he so eloquently stated in

---

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Rourke, *Man of Glory: Simon Bolivar*, William Morrow, ed. (Rahway, N.J.: William Morrow and Company, 2011), 279.

his moving manifesto: “New Grenada’s [freedom] depends upon her assumption of the task of liberating the cradle of Latin American independence, its martyrs and those meritorious people of Caracas whose outcries can only be directed to their beloved compatriots, the New Granadans. . . . Let us fly quickly to avenge the dead, to give life to the dying, freedom to the oppressed and liberty to all!”<sup>2</sup> Openly beseeching an audience of republicans, Bolivar used his Cartagena Manifesto to meticulously dismantle the mythical invincibility of Spanish colonial rule, underscoring the empire’s veiled focus on colonial exploitation in pursuit of greater wealth. Spain had developed an indifference to the rapidly depleting resources of the colonies. To Bolivar, such an apathetic form of rule was a recipe for stagnation and abuse. While other European nations advanced with new agricultural, industrial, or commercial developments, Spain merely marked time, inhibiting the growth of Gran Colombia under its oppressive regime.<sup>3</sup>

Passionately calling upon Gran Colombians to take up the fight against a mother country that was becoming progressively more abusive, he claimed that the “good name” of Gran Colombia depended on his people’s willingness to march to Venezuela, thus initiating a new era free from Spanish subjugation.<sup>4</sup> Bolivar’s searing denunciations of Spain’s empirical maltreatment struck a resounding chord with the people of Gran Colombia, convincing them that the time was ripe for a movement towards independence and inspiring them to action. The document’s importance cannot be overstated, as its widespread appeal resulted in a virtually unanimous endorsement by a historically divided populace. The manifesto was, essentially, an excellent tool for unification. The proposal thus effectively led to the establishment of a cohesive purpose among Gran Colombians, compelling them to break free from the shackles of Spain and ultimately played a significant role in bringing about the eventual independence of Gran Colombia.

An equally important factor contributing to Bolivar’s success in establishing Gran Colombian independence was his shrewd use of a rapidly growing, incipient local nationalism within the colonies. As an organized political movement designed to further the cause of Gran Colombian independence, nationalism was at the heart of Bolivar’s plan for revolution.<sup>5</sup> The growing alienation between Spain and its colonized therefore proved to

---

<sup>2</sup> Robert Harvey, *Liberators: Latin America’s Struggle for Independence* (Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 2000), 241.

<sup>3</sup> Rourke, 253.

<sup>4</sup> Victor Belaunde, *Bolivar and the Political Thought of the Spanish American Revolution* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1938), 171-172.

<sup>5</sup> Harvey, 224.

be an invaluable asset to Bolivar as he endeavored to invoke popular support for a revolt against Spain. Growing resentment by all segments of society towards the increasingly restrictive and oppressive policies of the Spanish culminated to help Bolivar unite what had previously been a vehemently divided people.<sup>6</sup> Through a series of intense speeches, proclamations, and documents, he masterfully highlighted both the futile and insidious nature of a "Spanish America." What was becoming an increasingly evident atmosphere of disgust and nationalistic fervor was thereby fueled. Arguing that Spain's unjust and oppressive practices had severed its ties with Gran Colombia, Bolivar called upon the exploited to defend their natural rights, effectively drawing attention to the ambiguous nature of Gran Colombia's national identity which, under Spanish rule, revolved around political passivity. Most despotic rulers, he argued, had at least an organized system of oppression in which the subordinate people were able to participate at various levels of administration. Yet, under Spanish absolutism, Gran Colombians were denied the ability to exercise any functions of government or internal administration.<sup>7</sup> Increasingly obvious examples of inequality and discrimination found in Gran Colombia served to strengthen the appeal of Bolivar's insistence that Spain was depriving Americans of economic opportunity and public office. The masses, already incensed by the impact of low prices, high taxation, and the prohibition of trade with countries other than Spain, were undoubtedly drawn to these searing denunciations.<sup>8</sup> As an ambiance of loathing and infuriation began to brew, a popular belief that it was time to finally take action against the Spanish Crown manifested itself in Gran Colombia under the leadership of Bolivar.<sup>9</sup> His well-timed success in taking advantage of the powerful nationalism stimulated by Spain's inept control of the colonies infused his efforts to provoke a revolt with a renewed zeal, creating an ingenuity that undoubtedly played a key role in his eventual triumph of Gran Colombia independence.

There will undoubtedly be those who disagree with these arguments pertaining to how Bolivar's rousing Cartagena Manifesto, in combination with his opportune success in taking advantage of the incipient nationalism in the Spanish colonies, effectively led to the independence of Gran Colombia. It is often suggested that, although the Manifesto of Cartagena was conclusively important in stimulating a base of popular support for revolt, it did not play a significant role in guaranteeing the eventual establishment of independence, as the overwhelmingly weak and indecisive

---

<sup>6</sup> Gail R. Pool, "Culture, Language, and Revolution in Grenada," *Anthropologica* Vol. 36, (1994): 73-107.

<sup>7</sup> Pam M. Holt, *The Dauntless Liberator* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 110-11.

<sup>8</sup> Rourke, 265.

<sup>9</sup> Belaunde, 189.

Gran Colombian leadership at the time essentially assured the acceptance of Bolivar's proposal. In addition, it is commonly believed among many historians that Bolivar did not actually capitalize upon the unbridled nationalism that weakened Spain's control, as he was never able to amass an army of supporters numbering more than ten thousand. They assert that, although Bolivar further incited the unchecked nationalism within Gran Colombia, he ultimately did a poor job of harnessing patriotic "fervor" into a weapon to be used in the fight for independence.<sup>10</sup> These arguments are valid, as it is understandably important to acknowledge the factors that may have undermined the effectiveness of Bolivar's campaign. Yet these contentions are wrong: of all the revolutionists in Latin America, Bolivar was the leader with the most powerful sense of purpose who was able to impose his good will upon others. His assumption that a publicized analysis of the Spanish Empire's exploitive intentions, along with an efficient mobilization of a burgeoning nationalism, were needed to initiate a movement to free Gran Colombia from the chains of Spanish rule explain the reasoning behind Bolivar's actions. As history shows, he reasoned wisely.

What the battle for Gran Colombian independence required, against one of the largest and most ruthless military machines the world has ever known, was a man of strength, aggression, and no caution at all. He was a crazed, ruthless *criollo* without fear or inhibitions.<sup>11</sup> The liberation of Gran Colombia was not a task for a faint-hearted individual, but for a man with a clear sense of purpose capable of directing the masses. Bolivar fit this role perfectly, and his legendary character has slowly developed into a symbol of freedom from tyranny, a warning against foreign danger, and an irresistible force of freedom. Historians today continue to dispute how Bolivar succeeded in inspiring a unified movement that succeeded in freeing Gran Colombia from Spanish rule. However, an in-depth analysis of Bolivar's stirring Manifesto of Cartagena, as well as a critical evaluation of his opportune ingenuity in taking advantage of the fervent nationalism spreading within the colonies, underscores how these were the two most important factors contributing to Bolivar's success. Arguably the greatest general in the history of Latin America and one of the most influential leaders the world has ever seen, Simon Bolivar's accomplishments in the face of such daunting odds are enduring, and his legacy remains timeless.

---

<sup>10</sup> Harvey, 298.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

# FROM CHIVALRY TO CAVALRY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH CAVALRY DURING THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

BY  
THOMAS J. MILLIGAN

*Thomas J. Milligan is a junior and a Military History major at the United States Military Academy. He wrote this paper in partial fulfillment of course requirements for a study of early modern warfare. Thomas is an avid rider and member of the West Point Equestrian Team, which piqued his interest in the evolution of cavalry as a military arm.*

The early modern era saw distinct changes to the composition of armies, tactics, and the art of warfare itself. The return to the “classics” so advocated by the Renaissance period gave rise to the implementation of mass infantry formations, composed of pike and shot, subsequently changing the role of the medieval knight on the battlefield. Prior to these innovations, the French state had for centuries relied on the heavily armored men-at-arms to dominate the battlefields of Europe. The technological and tactical advancements, however, forced the French, along with many other states, to remodel their armies to rise to the challenges of early modern combat. States, whose terrain discouraged the use of cavalry, turned to infantry to combat the mounted knight. On the other hand, states with suitable ground for horses continued to develop their cavalry to adapt to the Renaissance and later, Ancien Regime, warfare. The technological advancements during the Renaissance period effectively reduced the prowess of the medieval knight. By proving his armor obsolete, the infantry units of the era drastically reduced the safety of the French noble on the battlefield, which in turn, reduced the desire of the more wealthy and powerful nobles to fulfill their traditional roles as mounted warriors. The tactical revisions that ensued altered the social composition of the French cavalry units, ultimately leading to the birth of large scale implementation of light cavalry, the virtual elimination of traditional French heavy cavalry, and the creation of the professional officer class.

In order to fully comprehend the distinct changes that occurred to French cavalry tactics and composition, the Medieval style of cavalry fighting must first be outlined. The heavy cavalry was comprised of men of noble birth who from an early age, trained to wield the lance and sword in combat. They rode the largest of horses and were heavily armored. They fought in shallow formations, each knight selecting an individual target

among the opposing cavalry formation, and “Horsemen usually fought in thin linear formations just one or two ranks deep.”<sup>1</sup> Fighting mounted was a noble right, the gentleman’s way of war. Their primary role on the battlefield was to execute shock action tactics, to disrupt or break enemy formations that were generally incapable of withstanding their charge. In 1445, King Charles VII established the *Gendarmerie*, the first permanent French companies of heavy cavalry, comprised of knights known as *Gendarmes*.<sup>2</sup> Membership into these units was limited to the nobility, which in turn reinforced the noble disdain for dismounted fighting. Despite the previously catastrophic outcomes of both the battles of Poitiers (1357) and Agincourt (1452), in which the mounted tactics essentially killed his great-great-grandfather and great-grand father, Pierre Tenaille, better known as Bayard, provided an accurate description of the attitude of the French nobility towards dismounted combat. When ordered to dismount and lead *landsknechts* on foot at the siege of Padua, he replied: “the king has no soldiers in his ordinance companies who are not gentlemen. To mix them with the foot-soldiers, who are of a lower social status, would be treating them unworthily.”<sup>3</sup>

Despite being highly trained, well equipped, and unquestionably brave, French heavy cavalry was often outdone by other forms of cavalry during the late medieval period. Initially the French nobility refused the possibility that other forms of mounted combat could surpass the role of men-at-arms on the battlefield. The technological advancements of the sixteenth century, however, forced the need for new strategy and, therefore, encouraged the evolution of cavalry tactics. The French nobles, sensing the end of their dominance on the battlefield, certainly did not accept these changes readily and continued to resist their eventual replacement.

The mass implementation of gunpowder weapons, and the reemergence of the ancient pike square, provided heavy cavalry with significant challenge in the sixteenth century. The *arquebus* and the musket were both fully capable of penetrating the armor of the French *Gendarmes*. The Italian Wars, more specifically the battle of Pavia (1525), demonstrated the effectiveness of the new infantry formations and technology against French men-at-arms. At the battle of Pavia, Francis I, along with many of his knights were taken prisoner, while the rest were slaughtered by imperial infantry.<sup>4</sup> The Italian wars produced casualties among both sides of which

---

<sup>1</sup> Clifford Rogers, “Tactics and The Face of Battle” in *European Warfare: 1350-1750*, Frank Tallet and D.J.B. Trim, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 225.

<sup>2</sup> Treva Tucker, “Eminence over Efficacy: Social Status and Cavalry service in Sixteenth Century France,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 32, no.4 (2001): 1061.

<sup>3</sup> Stephan Turnbull, *The Art of Renaissance Warfare: From the Fall of Constantinople to the Thirty Years War* (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), 176.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Arnold, *The Renaissance at War* (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2005), 174.

the likes had never been seen. Casualty estimates at the battle of Ravenna (1512) are typically 12,000, including the majority of the Spanish colonels.<sup>5</sup> Ultimately, the new weaponry and tactics shifted the balance of power in favor of the infantry, which aimed to mimic the *Trace Italienne* by creating mobile fortresses in the basic form of the Spanish *Tercio*. These formations were capable of providing both a defensive and offensive asset to the Renaissance commander, as they could repulse cavalry attacks with the pike and simultaneously harass by use of the *arquebus* or musket. The invention of new weapons and the evolution of tactics eventually put an end to the ability of the French men-at-arms to conduct massive, frontal charges without suffering horrendous casualties. Therefore, the *Gendarmes* began to slowly develop tactics to counter the infantry, while simultaneously, new forms of cavalry emerged and were proven effective. The eventual willingness of the nobles to adapt provided France with the opportunity to expand its retinue of cavalry types and gave rise to the prominence of the light cavalry more commonly seen in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the reign of heavy cavalry on the battlefield had ended, and “Chivalry had become cavalry.”<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Bert Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 173.

<sup>6</sup> Allan Gilbert, “Fr. Lodovico Melzo’s Rules for Cavalry,” *Studies in the Renaissance* 1, (1954):107.

The inability of the men-at-arms to break Renaissance infantry formations demonstrated the need for a cavalry specific response to the new era of tactics. The invention of the wheellock pistol ushered in a new style of cavalry fighting aimed at disrupting and penetrating enemy formations without sacrificing hundreds of *Gendarmes*. The wheellock pistol had a significantly shorter range than the *arquebus*, but it was drastically more



Figure 1: This 17<sup>th</sup> century work displays the advantages of the wheellock over the traditional lance, as interpreted by Johann Jacob Von Wallhausen. The bottom image portrays the medieval style of cavarly combat.

practical to the cavalryman because of its small size. The wheellock pistol revolutionized the cavalry tactics in the sixteenth century because it provided three distinct advantages over the lance. The pistol could easily penetrate armor, provided greater range than the lance, and allowed the cavalry unit to enfilade the enemy formation.<sup>7</sup> The Germans were the first to experiment with the pistol-wielding cavalry on a large scale through their use of the *Reiter*. These mounted pistoliers often carried more than two pistols and were well practiced in the art of the *caracole*. The *caracole* allowed ranks of cavalymen to charge to the enemy

formation and fire their volley while staying out of the range of the deadly pike. The process would be repeated by the proceeding ranks of horses until the formation of pike collapsed. This tactic, however, required a high level of discipline and was initially rejected by many French nobles, including

Francois de la Noue, who claimed that “the withdrawing part of the maneuver looked suspiciously like a retreat, and could easily become one if the targets in the enemy front line took advantage of any apparent disorder.”<sup>8</sup>

Overall, the *caracole* was not devastating against infantry formations, but it did pose serious threat to men-at-arms formed *en haie* or *en host*. Francois de la Noue began to admire the German *Reiter*'s example and accredited their success to their ability to severely maim the first squadron of men-at-arms by shooting them in the face or thigh.<sup>9</sup> The *Reiters*, after discharging their pistols, would break into the formation and use their swords to cut down the knights still trying to strike home with their clumsy lances. By the end of the sixteenth century, the French *Gendarmes* began to carry the wheellock pistol in addition to their traditional weapons. Although

<sup>7</sup> Rogers, 226.

<sup>8</sup> Turnbull, 177.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 179.

there was still a certain degree of disgust towards the use of a gunpowder weapon by the nobility, they simply could not survive on the early modern battlefield without the unquestionable advantages the wheellock provided.

The reign of Henri IV of France saw some of the most dramatic changes to both the use of cavalry and the composition of the French army itself. Henri IV explored the use of light cavalry and experimented with various formations to maximize the impact of the cavalry charge. When the Duke of Parma encountered Henri IV near Aumale in 1592, he exclaimed, “I expected to see a general; this is only an officer of light cavalry.”<sup>10</sup> The duke’s statement is a testament to the changes Henri IV, the “cavalry specialist,” made to the French cavalry corps, and the resounding attitudes towards light cavalry that still existed among many nobles. Henri IV relied heavily upon the lower nobility to field his specialized cavalry force because he was not able to pay them regularly, and the lower nobility tended to concern themselves with glory instead of riches.<sup>11</sup> Once again, the introduction of new technologies and strategies altered the composition of the French cavalry corps, encouraging the social status of the individuals serving within it to continually decrease. Henri, under the guidance of La Noue, was successfully able to combine *Reiter* tactics with the shock tactics of the mounted knight and replaced the medieval *en haie* formations with more practical, deeper formations of cavalry.<sup>12</sup>

Through his innovations, Henri IV was able to re-organize the French cavalry by creating distinctions between *chevaux-legers* (light cavalry), *arquebusiers a cheval* (early dragoons), and *Gendarmes*, and more importantly, was able to implement the new tactics in concert with the new compositions to create a devastating effect. The *chevaux-legers* were often composed of lesser nobility, who were financially broken by the Italian Wars and could not afford the armor, weapons, and horses required for the heavier cavalry types.<sup>13</sup> These lighter cavalry units allowed the less wealthy nobles to continue to fulfill their desire to be mounted on the battlefield.<sup>14</sup> The light cavalry, however, offered Henri IV the ability to conduct reconnaissance, shock attacks, and to run down routing enemy.

The Battle of Coutras in 1587 not only displayed the effectiveness of Henri IV’s cavalry, but also essentially demonstrated the contributions of the wheellock pistol to the death of chivalry in sixteenth century France. Henri IV used his ranged units to disrupt the enemy *Gendarmes*. Once they were

---

<sup>10</sup> Ronald S. Love, “‘All the King’s Horsemen’: The Equestrian Army of Henri IV, 1585-1598,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 3 (1991): 512.

<sup>11</sup> Love, “‘All the King’s Horsemen’” 513.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, 517.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, 520.

<sup>14</sup> Tucker, 1061.

disordered, he charged the *Reiters* home in their wedge formation and shattered the enemy formation under the Duke of Joyeuse. The Huguenots proceeded to shoot the men-at-arms at close range, sparing almost no one, including the Duke of Joyeuse himself, who tried to surrender before being shot in the head.<sup>15</sup> Under Henri IV, the lance was completely abandoned and the traditional medieval man-at-arms was forgotten. The pistol and sword replaced the lance, allowing for greater mobility and flexibility on the battlefield. Despite the advantages, the pistol provided to the cavalryman, Henri IV preferred to use the sword, or “cold steel” shock tactics, to attack the less modern Catholic cavalry. The French wars of religion would essentially become the proving ground for the revolutionized cavalry tactics and composition. The innovations of Henri IV, initially encouraged by Francois de la Noue, and their application during the French wars of religion, forever changed the role of cavalry on the battlefield and created increased distance between the nobles and their dying dreams of the glorious heavy cavalry charge.

The evolution of the French army during this period required a new officer class and a significantly higher degree of professionalism. The virtual elimination of the heavy, noble cavalry opened the door for many French nobles to attain professional military commands, thus removing the “self-segregation” of the nobility within the ranks of heavy cavalry.<sup>16</sup> The complexities of warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries required the officer to understand the use of combined arms and the intricacies of commanding a more disciplined force. During the dominance of the medieval men-at-arms, the noble class was often able to mask tactical incompetence with the prestige of title. The late sixteenth and seventeenth century armies, however, demanded strong officers capable of much more than swordsmanship and the wielding of a lance.

The transition from “chivalry to cavalry” marked the beginning of the transition to professional officers. During this period, for the first time, “Not all military commands went to nobles, aristocrats, and gentlemen.”<sup>17</sup> The introduction of deadly gunpowder weapons, in addition to the massive costs associated with purchasing proper equipment to guard against said weapons, spurred a “reluctance” from the aristocrats to serve as men-at-arms in the French army.<sup>18</sup> This encouraged many nobles to join light cavalry regiments, or to become officers. Furthermore, it increased the numbers of cavaliers of non-noble birth within the re-organized French cavalry units. Nobles, who

---

<sup>15</sup> Turnbull, 186.

<sup>16</sup> Arnold, *The Renaissance at War*, 116.

<sup>17</sup> J.R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London: Hambledon Press, 1983), 227.

<sup>18</sup> J.R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998), 96.

previously looked down upon serving as an officer of the infantry, recognized the renewed dominance of the foot soldier on the battlefield and began to commission into the infantry officer corps: “In the end the formidable self-discipline of the officer aristocrat was as essential to the working success of the new infantry tactics as the sergeant’s hectoring barks and heavy stick.”<sup>19</sup> Despite the influx of nobles to officer positions, the cavalry units, particularly in the sixteenth century, (including the light cavalry units) remained heavily populated by nobles. During this time, the French nobles certainly chose “Eminence over efficacy.”<sup>20</sup> Officership, however, did not provide the protection originally sought by the nobility wishing to commission. An officer, particularly under the rule of Henri IV, was expected to stand in front of his company, “insensible to possible injury.”<sup>21</sup> Henri IV of France provided the example to his fellow French officers because he led from the very front of his army, which invited insult from the Duke of Parma in 1592. Ultimately, the introduction of a variety of cavalry innovations encouraged the noble role in the officer corps, but initially it did not radically change the percentage of nobles in French cavalry units. Over time, however, the composition of the cavalry units would continue to favor the non-noble cavalier as the noble class steadily diffused into both the officer and civilian sectors of society.

The French cavalry corps is rooted in the unprecedented power the mounted knight provided for the medieval commander. Its transformation began with the death of thousands of nobles at the point of an English arrow, a Spanish pike, or the crack of a primitive firearm carried by a soldier of significantly “lesser” birth than the man who he brutally unhorsed. The challenges presented to French cavalry during the early modern era would eventually leave France with a highly skilled, diverse, and daunting cavalry force in the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The descended nobility of the medieval and Renaissance periods would continue to serve in French armies, not as mounted men-at-arms rearing to charge, but as educated and capable officers, as agents of France instead of representatives from individual regions. In the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries nobles became increasingly less capable of protecting themselves from gunpowder weapons on the battlefield, ushering in a new era of “formality and ceremony” in which officers were to be well treated by the enemy.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, the combination of revised tactics and ever advancing technology encouraged the lesser nobility to form the ranks of the light

---

<sup>19</sup> Arnold, *The Renaissance at War*, 118.

<sup>20</sup> Tucker, 1083.

<sup>21</sup> Arnold, *The Renaissance at War*, 117.

<sup>22</sup> Jack Kelly, *Gunpowder: A History of the Explosive That Changed the World* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004), 147.

cavalry, which was becoming significantly more practical than its heavy counterparts. The thinning of heavy cavalry units simultaneously allowed the rise of the French officer corps, and the development of the light cavalry units as a combination of both lesser nobles and cavaliers without noble blood. The battlefield advancements during the early modern era initially saw the near destruction of the noble class in France; however, these developments stimulated the birth of the French light cavalry corps and the death of the French men-at-arms.

# CONTROLLED CHAOS: WHY THE REVOLUTION IN ZANZIBAR WAS NOT GENOCIDE

BY  
CARL B. RIOS

*Carl B. Rios is a junior and an International History major at the United States Military Academy. This paper was the culminating project of a seminar on modern Africa. After taking a research trip to Tanzania and Zanzibar in the summer of 2011, Carl decided to study the mass killings which shaped the region.*

The tropical islands off the coast of Tanzania known as Zanzibar invite curiosity and tourism to a scenic paradise. It is difficult to imagine that there were fields of bodies speckling the island less than fifty years ago. Death and violence came with the call to revolution in what was arguably the fastest revolution in the twentieth century, which in nine hours removed the Arab governed state left in power after decolonization in Zanzibar on 12 January 1964.<sup>1</sup> That night, a clandestine group of about a thousand Zanzibaris lead by John Okello, a mysterious, intelligent, and charismatic Ugandan, attacked and killed or drove away law enforcement in the police and the prison headquarters.<sup>2</sup> They targeted all of the cabinet ministers, including Prime Minister Mohammed Shamte, Minister of Education Ali Muhsin, and Minister of Finance Juma Aley. Among the general population, the revolutionaries targeted Arabs and in some cases, Chinese middleclass Asians. Okello wrote in his book, *Revolution in Zanzibar*, that he was only interested in removing the government for the sake of misrepresented groups on the island and that it was coincidental that the group in power was Arab.<sup>3</sup> However, he fails to mention the longstanding ethnic and social differences between the Arab and black African groups that set the stage for a revolution based on revenge. These ethnic tensions culminated into a mass killing spree that spread across the island in which about 5,000 people are estimated to have died.<sup>4</sup> Although the term genocide instantly comes to mind, it is important to take into consideration legal definitions of the word genocide in deciding whether or not a mass

---

<sup>1</sup> John Okello, *Revolution in Zanzibar* (Nairobi, Kenya: East African Publishing House, 1967), 162.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 28, 141.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 160-161.

<sup>4</sup> Don Peterson, *Revolution in Zanzibar: An American's Cold War Tale* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002), 107.

killing was genocide or not. To say that what happened in Zanzibar in 1964 was genocide is not accurate.<sup>5</sup> Othello's lack of political control and support, coupled with no intent to annihilate the Arab culture supports the classification of the revolution in Zanzibar as a mass killing meant to bring embarrassment and shame on the Arab population rather than a genocide with the purpose of extermination.

Zanzibar, when referenced as a state, is composed of two islands, Unguja and Pemba. They are about fifty kilometers off the coast of mainland Tanzania, while Zanzibar can also refer to just the island Unguja. The two islands have two major ethnic groups, the Arabs and the black Africans. Unguja and Pemba's population in the early nineteen sixties had a total of about 320,000 people, of which 50,000 were Arabs.<sup>6</sup> Although they were a minority compared to the Africans on the islands, the Arabs exerted political, social, and economic dominance over the majority ethnic group. The roots of Arab control stem from the system of slavery that existed on the island for over a millennium. The ancestors of the Arabs in 1964 were the slave merchants and owners of the ancestors of many of the black Africans living in Zanzibar. Tensions existed between the two ethnic groups before 1890 as Zanzibar was made a protectorate under the British, who showed political preference towards the Arabs. When the British withdrew and granted Zanzibar independence, they left the Arab minority in charge of the island.<sup>7</sup> Before the revolution, the Arabs passed unjust laws such as one that allowed the government to censor anything that challenged it in order to discourage uprisings from radical political groups. To the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP), which was mainly composed of black Africans, building peace with the Arab government grew increasingly hopeless. Little did the Arabs know that it would only take the strike of a match from one person to set Zanzibar one fire – a match which was lit by John Okello.

Okello was the individual who fanned the flames of African resentment of Arabs in Zanzibar. He was an unknown figure when he emerged on the political stage during the revolution. He grew up in Uganda, and before coming to Zanzibar, lived on Pemba, where he was introduced to the tension between Arabs and Africans. After receiving little and insufficient support from fellow black Africans on Pemba for any type of uprising, Okello journeyed to Zanzibar, where he began to gather followers for his revolution. Using religious fervor, charisma, his ability to speak Kiswahili, and a "puritan" level of discipline to inspire his followers, he managed to gather a force of about one thousand men to start a rebellion

---

<sup>5</sup> Peterson, 64-65.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-11.

against the Arabs.<sup>8</sup> Okello's army was composed of young Zanzibaris from the ASP Youth Wing. Okello had the most influence on the unemployed and a high number of black African policemen who had been fired by the Arab government to create an Arab police force a few months before the revolution due to a growing lack of trust in black Africans.<sup>9</sup> His followers abided by his "10 commandments," a set of rules which dictated how to act and behave to a minute level, including an injunction to not eat cold food and to not kill or cause any harm to the marginal white population on the island.<sup>10</sup> It was with this band of politically disenfranchised groups that Okello began his revolution on the night of 12 January 1964, in what is now Stone Town on Zanzibar.

Most killings occurred on the first two days of the revolution. On the first day, the revolutionaries under Okello focused on destroying any organized resistance from the Arabs, whereas they shifted focus on the second day to clearing and burning rural settlements owned by the Arabs. After the initial nine hours of fighting, black Africans across the island joined in the slaughter. Okello's control of the radio tower made the news of the revolution easily accessible. The film *Africa Addio* captures scenes of the killing sites in Zanzibar and bodies lying across fields.<sup>11</sup> The film was filmed by an Italian crew in a time when the capability of African nations to govern themselves without European control was coming into question. The film portrays Africa as primitive and bestial. The killings in Zanzibar are actually a minute part of the film which covers big game hunting, elephants being taunted by helicopters, the war in Angola, and exotic African traditions.<sup>12</sup> An article written by Sandra Lockwood claims this to be "concrete proof of the genocide," but the film at most can allude to genocide; it cannot stand alone in proving genocide.<sup>13</sup>

According to the legal definition of genocide as described by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948, in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as: (a) killing members of a group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group; (c) deliberately

---

<sup>8</sup> Okello, 6-7.

<sup>9</sup> Petterson, 42.

<sup>10</sup> Okello, 124-125.

<sup>11</sup> Gualtierro Jacopetti and Franco Prospero, *Africa Addio* (Italy: Angelo Rizzoli, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Jacopetti.

<sup>13</sup> Sandra Lockwood, "Nightmare in Paradise: the 1964 Zanzibar Revolution and Genocide," in *Hushed Voices: Unacknowledged Atrocities of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, Heribert Adam, ed. (Great Britain: Berkshire Academic Press Limited, 2011), 23.

inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Many of these things did happen in the Zanzibar revolution. The revolutionaries targeted an ethnic group, killing about 10% of its population, while perpetuating violent crimes such as rape and torture that promoted the partial destruction of the group and inflicted mental harm to members of the group.<sup>14</sup> The main point of contention with the definition lies with the intent of the leaders of the murderers. John Okello did not intend to have his band of revolutionaries commit genocide. He, in fact, had very little control over the island population of black Africans, who were motivated by years of political suppression.

The presence or lack of group control is an important factor in the determination of whether a genocide has occurred. Genocide has been historically used as a policy of the state. There are individuals who carefully plan and orchestrate genocide to accomplish many of the desired effects of genocide. There is evidence to suggest that John Okello did not have full control of his group in the revolution, and he most definitely did not have full control of the island when he launched the revolution. Lockwood describes how the atrocious actions committed on Arabs in Zanzibar cause her to believe it was genocide.<sup>15</sup> Graphic reports that reached the United States of people hacked to death with machetes, dead men having “their genitals stuffed into their mouths,” and the raping of Arab and Asian women are grave and abhorrent, but they do not necessarily prove that it was a genocide.<sup>16</sup> Instead, Okello quickly lost control of the course of the revolution, and the killings grew chaotic and unrestrained.

While Okello’s biographical book does not admit to his loss of control, other sources confirm the descent into chaos of the revolution. Okello had put out a list of rules of engagement which his men were to follow, one of them being to not harm Europeans or Asians because they were not the source of political injustice in Zanzibar.<sup>17</sup> This rule was made to prevent any foreign intervention from the United States and Great Britain. Okello’s forces were most organized at the start of the revolution. Don Petterson’s first encounter with revolutionaries was surprisingly the most pleasant one, as they peacefully allowed him and his family to drive by

---

<sup>14</sup> Petterson, 107.

<sup>15</sup> Lockwood, 24-25.

<sup>16</sup> Petterson, 64-65, 68.

<sup>17</sup> Okello, 127.

unharméd.<sup>18</sup> Their later encounters with the revolutionaries were, however, much more confrontational. Initially, Okello may have had better control of his revolutionary army, but discipline in the army quickly deteriorated, especially among those who were not his original followers and were not specifically trained by him, as exemplified by their blatant disregard for his rules and commandments.

The overwhelming violence in Zanzibar was not entirely planned by Okello and it may have become too dangerous for him to have even tried to stop it. The local reaction to the initial violence was reflexive. Okello lost control of the revolution because something else was driving people to carry out the killings on the Arabs. The ethnic and social tensions that had existed for hundreds of years between slaves and slave owners motivated the Africans to commit gruesome crimes on the Arab populace, and not even Okello could have halted it if he had wanted to.<sup>19</sup> Genocide has normally been directed by the leaders of groups, and Okello did not have full control over the Zanzibaris who committed killings. Killing became a collective action with more in common with an emotion than an organized thought.

Though Okello served as the catalyst to the mass killings in Zanzibar, after a certain point, he was not capable of stopping the violence because of the sheer momentum of the revolution. All he could do was maintain the semblance of control, which he did very well until the ASP leaders came back to the island. There is not enough evidence to support that Okello attempted to destroy the entire Arab population in Zanzibar. Even if this had been the case, Okello's rule was cut short by the ASP leaders, who were concerned with legitimizing themselves in the eyes of the international community. He was exiled from Zanzibar by the ASP and has since been given a marginal role in the history of the revolution, a grievance the "unwelcomed hero" made known at the start of his book.<sup>20</sup> From the perspective of the ASP leaders, Okello was too unstable, unpredictable, and terrifying to keep in the new regime.

Intent is the second component in the analysis to determine whether the Zanzibar revolution was genocide. The Genocide Convention explains that there must be an intent by the aggressors to destroy a group as a whole or in part. The revolution consisted of a spontaneous mob with no organized effort to destroy Arabs or their culture. It was a release of pent up anger and hatred towards the Arab groups that caught them off guard because of a mix of low regard and traditional contempt for the black African population.<sup>21</sup> It

---

<sup>18</sup> Petterson, 58.

<sup>19</sup> Abdul Sheriff, "Race and Class in the Politics of Zanzibar," *Africa Spectrum* 36, No. 3 (2001): 313.

<sup>20</sup> Okello, 24.

<sup>21</sup> Petterson, 41.

is important to keep in mind that Asians were also victimized because of their monopolies of middle class jobs on the island (though there is less information on the extent of persecution they received). The revolution was not an African “tribal” conflict between black Africans and Arabs, but a longstanding one between outsiders (Arabs) who were inhibiting the development of insiders (Africans) on the island. A reason for Westerners not being targeted could be because they were very marginal groups in Zanzibar, who had diplomatic type jobs unrelated to the important clove plantations and farming. There appears to be no systematic intent by Okello or the ASP to eradicate the Arab population the island; rather, the humiliation of the population appears to be the objective by the end of the revolution.

There are events that happened later in the Zanzibar revolution that show how humiliation was a key component to the mass killing. Petterson mentions how Okello went to Pemba on January 23 after the revolution.<sup>22</sup> He wanted to make sure that the Arabs there did not threaten the Africans. While in Pemba, Okello and his men continued their perpetuation of violence against Arabs and Asians; they conducted public executions, looted homes, raped women, and shaved men’s heads and beards as a form of humiliation.<sup>23</sup> This brings a completely different aspect to the revolution than just being a slaughter, for if the intent really was to kill the Arabs, it would have been done so in Pemba on a similar scale to Unguja. Okello was not just trying to strike fear and kill Arabs; he was trying to humiliate and shame them. It is difficult to cause that type of psychological damage if the entire enemy population is dead. There is clear evidence of this attempt to inflict psychological damage with the mutilation of male genitals and the raping of women, both of which are symbolic and literal ways of taking away Arab manhood. Further, the intent of the ASP as a political group shifted the focus of the revolution from one on Arab retribution to building of the state. Okello’s work and weak connection to the ASP were factors that excluded him from the rebuilding process.

Abeid Amani Karume, the leader of the ASP, did not know until after the start of the revolution when the newly self christened Field Marshall Okello named him president of the People’s Republic of Zanzibar.<sup>24</sup> Okello’s actions shocked Karume and the other party leaders, but they gladly took advantage of the opportunity. Okello mentions in his book that he had no intentions of taking control of the island for himself.<sup>25</sup> The mystery behind Okello as a phantom figure with really very little known

---

<sup>22</sup> Petterson, 121-122.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 121-122.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>25</sup> Okello, 161.

about him aside from people who have met him and what is written in his autobiography has brought many to believe his revolution was a conspiracy and that he was not acting on his own accord. The fluidity and quietness of his removal from Zanzibar's government so soon after it was established may be used as evidence to support this. Michael F. Lofchie, a political scientist whose focus lies in political economic reform in Africa, wanted to provide an answer to this question. Lofchie concludes that "Okello was simply the first victim of a complex power struggle within the Revolutionary Council."<sup>26</sup> While Okello was out of the island making visits to the East African Nations, Karume was converting loyalties from Okello to him, which was simple to do considering he had been a celebrated figure by the mainlanders before Okello had arrived on the island. When Okello arrived back to Zanzibar, he found that his men were dispersed and was immediately led back onto an airplane at gunpoint and flown to Dar es Salaam.<sup>27</sup> He was effectively removed from his own revolution and was last reported being seen in Uganda.

Genocide is a complex and meticulously planned crime with the intent of destroying in whole or in part a targeted group. The lack of a strong organization to the revolutionary army and the lack of evidence to support a clear intent to destroy the Arab population provide evidence against the mass killing that occurred in Zanzibar being labeled as genocide. There are many aspects of what happened in the revolution that are similar to genocide, and it very well could have turned into one. Many people went unpunished for the slayings committed during the revolution, and it is with weak hope that one can assume that forgiveness for those crimes has been rendered by the victims and their present day generation.

---

<sup>26</sup> Michael F. Lofchie, "Was Okello's Revolution a Conspiracy?" *Transition* No. 33 (1967): 42.

<sup>27</sup> Lofchie, 42.



# SANCTIONED DISCRIMINATION: CHURCH COMPLICITY IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

BY  
TARA C. LACSON

*Tara C. Lacson is a junior studying International History at the United States Military Academy. She wrote this paper for a course on World Religions in order to study the connection between religion and violence. Tara chose to write about the 1994 Rwandan Genocide after meeting survivor Eugenie Mukeshimana during the American Service Academies Program with the Auschwitz Jewish Center in the summer of 2011.*

Since their introduction into Rwanda in the 1900s, Christian Churches, in particular the Roman Catholic Church influenced Rwandan history by impacting its religious, cultural, and economic progress. Often Churches worked hand in hand with colonial governments to bolster each other's legitimacy. The colonial and missionary periods exacerbated the longstanding ethnic tensions that divided Rwanda between the Tutsis and the Hutus by introducing racist European theories of origin. Missionaries and church officials perpetuated these theories as they attempted to gain converts to maintain and increase their influence through alignment with government policies, thus resulting in the churches' acceptance of ethnic discrimination, which facilitated some church members' support, or at least inaction against, the 1994 government-sanctioned genocide.<sup>1</sup>

Before one can fully understand the ethnic discrimination between the Tutsi and Hutu that facilitated the 1994 Rwandan genocide, it is essential to understand the basic ethnic differences that led to cultural, societal, governmental, and educational divides. Since the fifteenth century, the population of Rwanda consisted of three ethnic groups – about 84% Hutu, 15% Tutsi, and 1% Twa.<sup>2</sup> The main differences between the Hutu and Tutsi were their occupations, social statuses, and physical features; as time wore on, marriage and politics were included as well. The Hutu were generally short, square-built farmers who claimed ownership of the land, whereas the Tutsi were tall, slender, warrior and cattle-owning people.<sup>3</sup> Despite their

---

<sup>1</sup> Timothy Longman, "Church Politics and the Genocide in Rwanda," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 31, (2001): 163.

<sup>2</sup> Christopher C. Taylor, *Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994* (New York: Berg, 1999), 39.

<sup>3</sup> Julius O. Adekunle, *Culture and Customs of Rwanda* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2007), 4-5.

smaller population, the Tutsi's superior military experience enabled them to suppress the Hutu and gain political control. However, by the twentieth century, most of the physical differences had dissipated due to intermarriage, and identification based on physical characteristics was far less accurate than it had been in earlier centuries.<sup>4</sup>

In the nineteenth century, racist theories of origin consumed most of Europe and spread to their colonies – including Rwanda. Such theories were supported by pseudo-scientific studies and theories, such as social Darwinism, which fueled the European superiority complex, enabling them to justify their imperialistic subjugation of other biologically or culturally “inferior” people.<sup>5</sup> The most destructive of these racist theories for Rwanda was the Hamitic Hypothesis, which asserted that the Tutsis originated outside of Africa and were descendents of the Christian Biblical Patriarch Noah, from the line of his son Ham.<sup>6</sup> This theory supported European colonization, since the claim that Tutsis originated outside of Africa justified their political success, allegedly refined and European-like features, and the resulting German and Belgian reliance on the Tutsi elite. Furthermore, the Biblical reference added a religious legitimacy to the Hamitic Hypothesis and colonialism in general.

European colonization and occupation of Rwanda began in 1880s, and by 1899, Rwanda was incorporated into German East Africa.<sup>7</sup> Around this time, the first missionaries from the Society of Missionaries of Africa, a Catholic mission commonly referred to as the White Fathers, arrived. Due to the military influence of the budding German regime, the order was able to persuade the new king to provide land grants for missions.<sup>8</sup> The colonial administration provided government and order, while the Church provided religious, educational, medical, and agricultural aid – benefits that effectively integrated the Church into Rwandan society. Both the Church and colonial administration sought to curry favor with the local leaders and elite in order to solidify their power, and each realized that the most effective way to achieve this was by working with the other. Some dubbed their close cooperation the “Holy Trinity,” composed of the colonizers’ gun and capital and the missionaries’ Bible.<sup>9</sup> United under the same goal, mutual

---

<sup>4</sup> Helen M. Hintgens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 2 (1999): 247.

<sup>5</sup> Christian P. Scherrer, *Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 21.

<sup>6</sup> Aimable Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide* (New York: University Press of America, 2003), 48.

<sup>7</sup> *Genocide in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches?* Carol Rittner, John K. Roth, and Wendy Whitworth, eds. (St. Paul, Minn.: Paragon House, 2004), 5.

<sup>8</sup> Lee Ann Fugii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 63.

<sup>9</sup> Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham*, 50.

support for the government and Church became intrinsic aspects of Rwandan society.

The Church ministered to whomever it believed would garner more converts. Initially, this meant that parishioners were primarily Hutu since the Church's educational and medical facilities appealed to the poor Hutus. However, by the 1920s, the Church realized that by converting the Rwandan king and elite, it would be able to convert the people, so the Church then switched its focus to the Tutsis, who received education and administrative positions.<sup>10</sup> After the baptism of King Mutara III (Charles Rudahigwa) in 1943, Christianity spread widely and its influence was evident in the decrease of paganism, polygamy, and adultery, and the illegalization of abortion.<sup>11</sup> In addition to the governmental focus on the Tutsis, their new alliance with the Church, as well as the Church's use of underpaid Hutu laborers to construct missions, led to resentment among the Hutus and intensified the ethnic divide with the Tutsis. Then in the 1940s, the Church's focus again shifted back to the Hutus due to an influx of Flemish priests who related to the class struggles of the Hutu.<sup>12</sup> This shift coincided with the elite Tutsis' push for independence and their resulting alienation of colonial establishments, to include its ally, the Church. In addition to the Flemish priests, Tutsi alienation further encouraged the Church to educate and support the Hutus, creating an educated Hutu counter-elite in the seminaries which eventually filtered down to empower Hutus within the Rwandan clergy.

Throughout these shifts, the Church remained generally aligned with the government, though the following individuals exemplify specific instances of bilateral involvement. In the 1920s, the new Belgian colonial government conceded to Bishop Classe's support for "Tutsization" of the administration, and continued to favor Tutsis for positions.<sup>13</sup> The Belgians agreed with Bishop Classe due to the perceived "superiority" of the Tutsis, as espoused by the Hamitic Hypothesis. The colonial government took advantage of the pre-existing ethnic divides, utilizing the policy of "divide and conquer" to strengthen its control and even went so far as to print the ethnicity of citizens on their identification cards.<sup>14</sup> Then in the 1950s, Gregorie Kayibanda, a product of the Church's educated Hutu counter-elite and editor of a Catholic newspaper, rose to the position of prime minister, then president. Furthermore, prior to and during his presidency, Kayibanda

---

<sup>10</sup> *We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, Samuel Totten and Rafiki Ubaldo, eds. (Rutgers, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 4.

<sup>11</sup> *Genocide in Rwanda*, 6.

<sup>12</sup> Taylor, *Sacrifice as Terror*, 43.

<sup>13</sup> Josias Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide* (New York: Humanity Books, 2003), 79.

<sup>14</sup> Nigel Eltringham, *Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda* (New York: Pluto Press, 2004), 18.

was mentored by Hutu extremist Monsignor Andre Perraudin.<sup>15</sup> Another infamous example of clergy participation in the government is Archbishop Vincent Nsengiyumva's membership in the central committee of the single party prior to 1990, and his firing of the editor of *Kinyamateka* at the insistence of the government, displaying Church alignment with the Habyrimana regime.<sup>16</sup>

Nonetheless, some deny the Church's influence in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, arguing that perpetrators of the genocide came from all walks of life and a variety of religions, and accordingly, Church membership did not correlate to involvement – it was a personal decision based on political leanings, personal beliefs, ethnic tensions, and social pressures. However, considering the Church's ethnic shifts and the actions of its individual leaders, it is clear that politics and ethnic tensions were inextricably interwoven into the Church since colonial times, from the education of its hierarchy to its chosen audience. This connection undeniably influenced the message that the Church was sending to its parishioners. Since the Church had influenced government policy and political leaders, as well as the education, culture, and traditions of Rwanda, it stands to reason that it would be able to exert some authority over the actions, or inaction, of its parishioners.

The 1994 Rwandan genocide was an ethnically based, government planned, Hutu extermination of the Tutsi, which theoretically contradicted Christian values of equality and brotherhood. However, instead of stressing these values, since colonial times, the Church used the racial divide between the Hutus and the Tutsis to maintain and increase its power by shifting its support to whichever group provided the greatest advantage. This standard of behavior continued into the twentieth century, a divisive example that not only intensified ethnic differences, but also set a religious (in addition to the already established government) precedent that made racism acceptable. If the Church could discriminate against its parishioners on the basis of race, than surely it would not be against God's will to discriminate against each other.

Since colonial times, the Church was largely responsible for the establishment of the education system in Rwanda, providing elementary, secondary, and seminary schools, which caused governmental reliance on the Catholic education system, as most administrators were beneficiaries of it.<sup>17</sup> These educational institutions, which into the twentieth century were among Rwanda's best, enabled the Church to choose its students, whose

---

<sup>15</sup> Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*, 79.

<sup>16</sup> *Kinyamateka* was a journal owned by the Catholic Church. Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham*, 90. *Kinyamateka* was a journal owned by the Catholic Church.

<sup>17</sup> Taylor, *Sacrifice as Terror*, 41.

selection, and the resulting educated elite, shifted in accordance with the Church's goal of maintaining power and increasing converts.<sup>18</sup> Through these shifts and the denial of equal educational opportunities, the Church continued to promote the ethnic divide that intensified through the teaching of the Hamitic Hypothesis. Furthermore, Church teaching emphasizes the importance of unquestioning obedience to God and authority, such as the Church and the government to which it was closely aligned. In addition to educational institutions, the Church fostered strong community ties by providing medical, agricultural, and economic aid. This principle of obedience, in addition to the close-knit Church community composed primarily of Hutus (the majority in the population), made its Rwandan parishioners more readily susceptible to group-think mentality and the government organization, training, and implementation of genocide.

Since the Church's continued collaboration with the government dated back to the colonial era, the Church's education system had produced most of the prominent government figures, making it on some level responsible for shaping the political organization that endorsed the genocide. Though the constitutional separation of church and state had been established, in actuality, it was nonexistent as each continued to influence the other. As the government's power increased, the Church recognized the potential benefits of supporting government policies, as shown by the aforementioned examples of clerical involvement. As the Tutsi elite turned away from colonialism and its ally the Church, the clergy felt their power threatened, and, with the government, they turned toward the Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), whose views were espoused in Catholic publications.<sup>19</sup> From this pro-Hutu sentiment, generalizations have been made of the Rwandan Catholic Church's "unconditional support" of the government, supported by Bishop Perraudin's contradiction of Radio Vatican condemnations of genocide as "distortions of the truth."<sup>20</sup>

Debates range on whether or not Church officials explicitly preached racist ideology from the pulpits, but between the 1950s and the 1994 genocide, there was a clear shift in attitudes towards the Church. The parishes where people once sought refuge, as it was Rwandan custom to seek sanctuary in God's houses, became slaughter grounds in 1994, when people who went to Churches for asylum were massacred by the thousands as in Nyamata and countless other churches.<sup>21</sup> While some Church leaders gave their lives to protect the innocent, many others joined or turned over

---

<sup>18</sup> *We Cannot Forget*, 4.

<sup>19</sup> Adekunle, *Culture and Customs of Rwanda*, 18.

<sup>20</sup> Semujanga, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*, 188.

<sup>21</sup> Jean Hatzfeld, *Life Laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak*, Linda Coverdale, trans. (New York: Others Press, 2006), 13.

members of their own parishes, and even fellow clergymen and women to the murderous militia forces. In addition to Catholics, Seventh Day Adventist Church members, such as Reverend Athanase Seromba and Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, were both convicted of participating in the genocide by the International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda.<sup>22</sup> These instances of clergy support, or at least inaction against the genocide, made it acceptable to the perpetrators, as one stated that, “deep down we knew that Christ was not on our side in this situation, but since He was not saying anything through the priests’ mouths, that suited us.”<sup>23</sup>

The 1994 genocide swept through Rwanda culminating in an estimated death toll between 500,000 and 1 million full Tutsis, part Tutsis, and moderate and unsupportive Hutus.<sup>24</sup> Most victims of the genocide were killed via machete or other crude tools, which arguably made the killings much more personal. The Catholic Church was the second largest employer in Rwanda through its social, educational, and medical institutions, and with a population that is 90% Christian, Church influence through support, opposition, or inaction was inevitable.<sup>25</sup> Christians’ quest for converts and collaboration with the colonial governments at the onset of their evangelization resulted in lasting links with the government and the perpetuation of divisive ethnic policies and practices, without which the environment that facilitated the 1994 Rwandan genocide could never have existed. An interview with Eugenie Mukeshimana, a Tutsi survivor of the genocide, illustrates how deeply the ethnic divides, government obedience, and group-think had penetrated society. She described how her previously friendly Hutu neighbour refused to shelter her even though she was pregnant, telling her, “You are Tutsi.”<sup>26</sup>

Understanding that underlying motives and age-old government ties caused members of pacifist religions to carry out the extensive violence seen in the 1994 Rwandan genocide reveals the personal, social, and political links between religion and violence in Rwanda. The historical connection between the government and the widespread influence of a variety of Christian ministers and missionaries elucidates the circumstances of 1994 that led Rwandan priests, pastors, and parishioners to actively kill or allow the killing of their fellow priests, pastors, parishioners, neighbors, and former friends.

---

<sup>22</sup> Phillip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Picador, 1999), 39.

<sup>23</sup> Jean Hatzfeld, *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak*, Linda Coverdale, trans. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 145.

<sup>24</sup> *We Cannot Forget*, 1.

<sup>25</sup> Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide*. (New York: Verso, 2004), 189.

<sup>26</sup> Eugenie Mukeshimana, interview by author, June 6, 2011.

# WINNING OVER THE TRIBES IN MANDATE TRANS-JORDAN: SECURITY, ECONOMICS, IDENTITY, AND CHANCE

BY  
KARL K. SCHOCH

*Second Lieutenant Karl K. Schoch graduated from the United States Military Academy in 2011 with a bachelor's in International History, and he began a cavalry assignment in Schweinfurt, Germany, this spring. As a senior, he traveled to Jordan to research for this paper and earned the Major John Alexander Hottell III Memorial Award for historical writing. He also served as the first editor-in-chief of Report in 2011.*

Jordan was a place undergoing many profound changes during the 1920s. The most obvious change was the emergence of the Hashemites, an Arab clan with a long tradition of political importance due to their control of Islam's two holiest cities, Mecca and Medinah, and their British colonial sponsors, as the rulers of a region that had been previously ungoverned.<sup>1</sup> A more important change, perhaps, occurring during this time period was the collision between the two different types of Arab civilization that Ibn Khaldun described in his *Muqaddimah*, or Introduction, which was written in 1377. Ibn Khaldun observed that a dichotomy existed within the Arab world between two different types of civilizations, desert civilization and sedentary civilization. Desert civilizations, which existed in sparsely populated areas, were generally pastoral or nomadic and were organized by tribe and family connections. Sedentary civilizations, on the other hand, were based in more heavily settled areas and were class rather than kinship based.<sup>2</sup> This was in many ways an urban vs. rural division, with sedentary civilization being more urban while desert civilization was more rural.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> During World War I, the British sought to weaken the Ottoman Empire by sponsoring a revolt among the empire's Arab population, a series of events made famous by the movie *Lawrence of Arabia*. The Hashemites were Britain's partners in this revolt, and expected to gain territory in exchange for their campaign against the Ottomans. The Hashemites did not gain the territory that they believed had been promised to them, but did end up controlling Jordan, although the Britain still exercised considerable authority in the newly created nation due to its international status as a mandate. As a British Mandate, Britain was obligated to help Jordan transition from being a colonial territory to being an independent nation.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 56. While this book is about Afghanistan, the section cited provides a useful summary of Ibn Khaldun's ideas about desert and urban civilizations and is applicable to the situation in Jordan during the 1920s.

<sup>3</sup> For ease of understanding, from this point forward, rural will refer to desert civilization and urban will refer to sedentary civilization. References are made to tribal or Bedouin in this paper, and these are terms that all indicate membership in rural civilization.

Prior to the arrival of the Hashemites, rural civilization dominated Jordan. In the absence of any other form of authority, especially during WWI, Trans-Jordan had come under the influence of native tribes whose power was so unchallenged that rural civilization dominated life in the country from the individual to state level.<sup>4</sup> The Hashemites, with their Arab nationalist ideology and reliance on foreign bureaucrats from more urban Syria to run their administration, were seen as attempting to create a more urban culture in Jordan, a transformation that Jordan's native rural population would have deemed threatening.<sup>5</sup> This threat to political autonomy, as well as cultural dominance, helps to explain the numerous tribal uprisings that threatened the very existence of the Hashemite regime in Jordan during its early years.

The Hashemites faced difficulties fighting the perception that they were an alien force because, although they had long been an important political force in the Middle East due to their control over the Muslim holy city of Mecca, they had little grounds for claiming authority in Jordan. Abdullah, in fact, initially came to Jordan with the intention of preserving his brother Feysal's regime in Syria.<sup>6</sup> The Hashemites' difficulty resulting from their lack of an historical claim to power in Jordan was compounded by the fact that the territory was divided into semi-autonomous districts that had answered to the now defunct Ottoman Empire.<sup>7</sup> This has led to the conception, advanced by many scholars, of Trans-Jordan as "an artificial colonial creation . . . created to satisfy the personal ambition of an Arab prince [Abdullah] who was left after World War I (WWI) without a territory to rule."<sup>8</sup> Needless to say, the rural population did not take kindly to the foreign force that they sensed was attempting to limit their political power and marginalize their way of life.

The late 1950s were another period during which the Hashemites faced a very serious threat to their rule in Jordan, as left leaning Palestinians, who advocated the removal of King Hussein, attempted a coup to remove him from power. To combat this threat, Hussein relied heavily on the Bedouin units within the Jordanian military which were extremely loyal to the Hashemite monarchy. Yet the Bedouins had initially vehemently

---

<sup>4</sup> Yoav Alon, *The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 13.

<sup>5</sup> Mary C. Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 62.

<sup>6</sup> King Abdullah, *The Memoirs of King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan*, R. J. C. Broadhurst, trans. (New York: The Philosophical Library Inc., 1950), 194. King Feysal had established an independent kingdom in Syria following the Great Arab Revolt, but was driven out of Syria by the French, who wanted to keep Syria within their colonial sphere of influence.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>8</sup> Yoav Alon, *The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 3.

opposed the Hashemite regime when it first took power. In seeking to understand how this happened, it is most useful to examine the development of Jordan between the 1920s and its independence from Britain in 1946, where the foundations of the Hashemite regime were laid.

The British assumed responsibility for Jordan in 1921, and were faced with building a state in a territory that had little experience with centralized government. In their nation-building efforts, the British worked with Abdullah's government to institute a number of programs that were based on experiences from other parts of their empire.<sup>9</sup> The strengthening of the Hashemite military and security apparatus and the development of Jordan's agricultural capabilities were an integral part of winning over the country's rural population. The success of these programs in gaining the support of the state's rural elements stems from the fact that they allowed the Hashemites to address the economic, social, and political needs of this group while allowing them to maintain essential elements of their identity. While important, it was not the programs and policies themselves that developed this loyalty but, instead, the circumstances in which they were enacted.

Before discussing the historiography that pertains specifically to the topic of this paper, it is important to first note an important general trend in the historical scholarship on Jordan. Authors have generally focused on the actions of elites and high level political officials when analyzing Jordan's actions during the Mandate period and beyond. Uriel Dann's *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism* is probably the most influential example of this type of palace-level analysis of Jordanian politics. This focus stems from the idea that the Hashemites are the Middle East's "underdog" monarchy and that the Kings of Jordan were able to survive in very dangerous environments due to their remarkable political acumen. It is not until relatively recently that historians have begun to focus on the Jordanian street and its influence on the staying power of the Hashemite monarchy. There have been a number of works published on this subject, with Tariq Tell and Eugene Rogan publishing an influential collection of essays titled *Village, Steppe, and State* that examines the political, social, and economic factors that influenced the lives of ordinary Jordanians during the Mandate Period. Although only published in 2007, another important work that examines how lower level, specifically tribal, politics have influenced Jordan's development is Yoav Alon's *The Making of Jordan*. Mary C. Wilson's *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, published in 1987, is an example of a bridge between works like *King*

---

<sup>9</sup> Michael R. Fischbach, "British Land Policy in Transjordan," in *Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan*, Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell, eds. (New York: British Academic Press, 1994), 105.

*Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism* and *The Making of Jordan*. It is important to keep in mind this general trend when discussing the three topics that most directly pertain to the subject matter covered in this paper: the British Mandate regime in Jordan, Jordan's tribal population, and the Jordanian military.

Much of the historical scholarship on Jordan during the 1930s and 40s focuses on the geopolitical implications of Jordan's period as a British Mandate, but this paper is more concerned with the domestic environment of this era. The publications by Rogan, Tell, Wilson, and Alon cover this topic extensively and are perhaps the best sources that deal with how Jordanian society developed during the British Mandate era. This period saw a subtle transformation take place in Jordanian society. Although Jordan was far from an urban and industrial state during the 1950s, its economic situation had changed in a variety of ways that pushed the rural population closer to the Hashemite regime. Land reform policies that settled Jordan's rural population and transitioned it from a nomadic to a more settled way of life had a profound impact on this group's relationship with the state by making it more dependent upon the central government. This understanding of the British Mandate period is useful in that it provides a greater understanding of the structure of the Jordanian state when it began to be threatened by radical Arab opposition forces in the 1950s.

The scholarship on Jordan's rural population has shown that it has been the Hashemites' most important ally throughout its history, stretching back to the tribal powered Great Arab Revolt. While *Village, Steppe, and State* and *The Making of Jordan* discuss how this segment of Jordan's population became integrated into the state, we see in a number of political histories of Jordan how this loyalty manifested itself. Uriel Dann's vivid account of how the Arab Legion's Bedouin soldiers helped to prevent a coup attempt against the Hashemites shows how vitally important the military, which was drawn primarily from its rural population, was to the regime.<sup>10</sup> In addition to the support that the Hashemites enjoyed from the general rural population through the military, they also ensured the continued support of rural elites, who benefitted from their involvement in the Royal Court, an institution that became more powerful during the 1950s as the Hashemites attempted to weaken the political power of the regime's opposition.

Jordan's military is generally seen as the country's most important institution outside of the monarchy, and as such has received a great deal of scholarly attention. Since the military has been intimately involved in

---

<sup>10</sup> The Arab Legion was Jordan's primary military force while the country was under British control. Led by British officers, the Arab Legion answered to colonial officials, rather than the Hashemite government.

domestic politics in Trans-Jordan throughout the state's history, the influences that this institution has had on the state's political make up has been discussed at length in works like P.J. Vatikiotis's *Politics and the Military in Jordan*. This book discusses how essential the Arab Legion was in legitimizing and consolidating the Hashemite regime between 1921 and 1957. Lawrence Tal's *Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967* provides readers with insight into the way in which the Jordanian military was used by the Hashemites to ensure the survival of their regime in an extremely tumultuous time, and the effect that this had on the nation's political environment. The social impact of the military in Jordan has also received attention in Alon's *The Making of Jordan*, as it played an important role in forming the social composition of the new regime by providing the rural population with a means of being integrated into and advancing in the Hashemite regime.

### **Tribes in Revolt**

During the early days of the Hashemite regime in Trans-Jordan, the state's tribal population rebelled against the central government, and one of the most notable rural rebellions was led by the Adwani tribe in 1923.<sup>11</sup> Sultan El-Ali El-Adwan was able to bring a large coalition to his side by depicting Abdullah as a leader who did not respect the concerns and authority of rural powers.<sup>12</sup> The rebellion was so threatening to Abdullah's regime that the Chief British Resident in Amman, H. St. John Philby, commented that had the Sultan of the Adwani tribe "moved direct on Amman he would have had only the Arab Legion to contend with and, local sympathy being somewhat with him, he might well have been successful."<sup>13</sup>

Abdullah had difficulty combating the rebellion in large part due to the fact that Britain was unwilling to allow him initially to raise a large military force. This situation "forced Abdullah to rely on the military power of the tribes," which was risky, since it would demonstrate the power that rural tribes had over the newly created Hashemite regime.<sup>14</sup> Philby counseled Abdullah that he was of the "opinion that the employment of tribal forces to crush a tribal rising will have disastrous and far reaching

---

<sup>11</sup> Harry St. John Bridger Philby to Sir Herbert Louis Samuel, September 15, 1923, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, J. Priestland, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Editions, 1996), 54-55.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>13</sup> Monthly report on Transjordan by H. Philby, September 1923, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, J. Priestland, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Editions, 1996), 48.

<sup>14</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 41. Although the Arab Legion had been in existence for two years at the time of the Adwani rebellion, it was not directly under Abdullah's control at this point. The commander of the Arab Legion was a British officer even after Jordan became independent, and was mainly intended as an instrument of British policy.

consequences, even if it succeeds in its immediate object.”<sup>15</sup> While Abdullah made some progress in confronting this rebellion through tribal politics, both Abdullah and Philby felt that the best way to defeat the Adwani uprising would be to use British forces, including the Royal Air Force.<sup>16</sup> This strategy proved to be extremely successful, as the British forces were able to inflict such a decisive defeat on the Adwani that Philby was able to report, “[t]he hostile concentration has been completely dispersed and the situation may be regarded as normal.”<sup>17</sup> The battle also importantly resulted in the death of a number of rural sheikhs who were instrumental in the rebellion, as well as demonstrating to tribal leaders that the British were willing to bring their superior military power to bear against forces that sought to rebel against the Hashemite regime.<sup>18</sup>

While the battle was important in preserving the Hashemite regime’s hold on Jordan, it did not mean that the Jordanian regime had effectively dealt with the problems of securing the loyalty of Jordan’s rural population. This loyalty was not something that Abdullah took lightly, and he spent a great deal of time attempting to develop close relationships with Jordan’s rural population, more time in fact than the British initially thought prudent, despite their desire to see Abdullah gain greater rural support, as more allies within this segment of the population would have allowed the Hashemites to avoid more damaging domestic uprisings that showed the regime’s inability to gain broad based political support.<sup>19</sup> The Hashemite’s ability to decimate a powerful tribal revolt only secured the rural population’s submission during the 1920s, and does little to explain why this group was so deeply invested in the survival of the regime by the late 1950s. A letter drafted by tribal leaders to Philby expresses this sentiment, where they commented, “[i]f the Amir wishes to take revenge on us and sends the aeroplanes to tribes to threaten and frighten them threats will not bring us in to him but only pride and love.”<sup>20</sup>

In order for Abdullah to show the rural population that he possessed pride in and love for this group, he would have to address the fundamental issues that caused them to rise up against his regime. Politically, the new regime’s use of Syrian immigrants to run the state’s bureaucracy caused the rural population to perceive that Abdullah’s government was going to

---

<sup>15</sup> Philby to Samuel with enclosure letter from Sultan ibn Adwan, September 15, 1923, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, 55.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Harry St. John Bridger Philby to Sir Herbert Louis Samuel, September 17, 1923, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, 61.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 48.

<sup>20</sup> Harry St. John Bridger Philby to Sir Herbert Louis Samuel with enclosure letter from Sultan ibn Adwan to Mr. H. Philby, September 15, 1923, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, 58.

marginalize them. This perceived marginalization made having to pay taxes to the Hashemite government a point of extreme frustration. The Hashemite regime's insistence on ending raiding as a means of preventing hostilities with the Saudis and establishing law and order also constituted an economic threat to the rural population, as raiding was an essential component of their economy. Raiding and mobility were also integral elements of the Bedouin identity, so the end of this practice constituted a very serious cultural threat.<sup>21</sup> These factors contributed to the rural population's frustration with Hashemite rule, and lay the ground work for understanding why the programs undertaken later on in the mandate period were so successful in winning over this group.

In its attempts to create a functional state in Jordan, one of the imperatives for the newly created Hashemite regime was to develop a functional administrative apparatus. This was an especially difficult challenge, since the Hashemites inherited a country with no real history of centralized government, and thus there were few experienced administrators upon whom Abdullah could call upon to staff his bureaucracy. The fact "that men of capacity [were] not forthcoming locally . . . [forced the government] to rely for filling the higher posts on Syrians and others who have had experience in Damascus and elsewhere."<sup>22</sup> These Syrians, nationalists whose political views and activities had not been welcome in their home country after the French had wrested control of Syria from Abdullah's brother Feysal, found refuge in Jordan and gained such a degree of political influence that Abdullah's first cabinet was composed "entirely of nationalists who had previously served [his brother] Feysal in Syria."<sup>23</sup> In addition to positions in Abdullah's cabinet, these Syrians secured positions across all levels of the Jordanian government, including powerful positions in the Arab Legion.<sup>24</sup>

As discussed earlier, these foreigners provided Abdullah with skilled personnel who could staff his bureaucracy. In addition to concerns about human capital, employing the Syrians helped Abdullah secure the support of the well organized and influential Istiqlals party, an important early Arab nationalist party, which had historically been supportive of the Hashemites.<sup>25</sup> This support was essential given the isolated position of the Hashemite regime, which was facing significant tribal opposition at the time

---

<sup>21</sup> Bedouin poetry was an important expression of their identity, and important poems like 1001 Nights featured many stories about the "rahla" or journey.

<sup>22</sup> Sir Herbert Louis Samuel to Secretary of State for the Colonies, October 5, 1923, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, 72.

<sup>23</sup> Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, 62.

<sup>24</sup> Harry St. John Bridger Philby to Sir Herbert Louis Samuel, December 13, 1923, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, 85.

<sup>25</sup> Harry St. John Bridger Philby, 85.

and was desperate for political allies, even though the British worried about employing Syrian Arab Nationalists who might oppose Western control of the government and persuade Abdullah to break from the British advisors.

While Abdullah had little choice but to use foreign officials to staff his bureaucracy, this decision further exacerbated his difficulties with Jordan's rural advisors. Already suspicious of a centralized government that could threaten their political power, rural leaders' concerns about Syrian influence in Jordan also had a cultural dimension.<sup>26</sup> The urbanized, intellectual Syrian officials that Abdullah employed were almost as foreign to Jordan's rural population as the British. Although over half of Trans-Jordan's population could be described as settled in 1922, there was not a clear demarcation between the nomadic and settled peoples, as "[m]any nomads engaged in part-time agricultural activities . . . [and] peasants were also seasonal pastoralists."<sup>27</sup> This meant that there was little in the way of an organic intellectual and urban population, similar to what existed in other Arab countries, in Jordan during this time period. The lack of any real intellectual class in Jordan is evidenced further by the fact that the population was largely illiterate and a meaningful school system was not established in the country until 1935.<sup>28</sup> The influx of this previously non-existent population group into Jordan could be perceived as providing a signal that Jordanian society was moving towards adopting a more urban identity. The dual pressures of political and cultural marginalization gave the rural powers of Jordan a reason to be fearful of the Hashemite regime and provided an important impetus behind their resistance.

In addition to the political and cultural pressures that the new Hashemite regime placed on the tribal population of Jordan, their presence also enforced a new economic reality on the tribes. The Hashemites were in desperate need of material resources to provide for the governance of their newly established territory, specifically for the purposes of establishing a military to ensure its security from both internal and external threats. Although the British provided support to the Hashemite government, including officers to command the Arab Legion, this support was not sufficient to create an independent and viable Jordanian military that could exert its influence in strategically vital areas.<sup>29</sup> This reality forced Abdullah to attempt to use the limited military forces he possessed to compel the tribal

---

<sup>26</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 46.

<sup>27</sup> Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan*, 56.

<sup>28</sup> A. Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An-Economic Survey* (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency for Palestine Economic Research Institute, 1943), 27.

<sup>29</sup> John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957), 26. Sir Herbert Louis Samuel to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 13, 1925, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, 513.

population to pay taxes to the Hashemite regime, and this proved to be an extremely difficult undertaking.<sup>30</sup>

The tribal population resisted these taxation measures for a number of reasons, and perhaps foremost among them was their frustration that the tax revenue the government was collecting was being used to pay the salaries of Syrian bureaucrats.<sup>31</sup> This response is completely understandable given the fears tribal leaders had that these Syrian officials presented a direct challenge to their political and cultural control over Jordan. The more nomadic population also felt threatened by the government's taxation regime because they had previously been able to extract protection money from the settled areas.<sup>32</sup> The government's attempt to extend military and administrative control would limit the ability of rural groups to have access to this important source of revenue. To limit their economic losses, tribal sheikhs prevented people from joining the state's reserve force, whose existence would provide settled populations with a greater deal of protection from the tribes and thus further limit their ability to extract resources from the local population.<sup>33</sup>

While the Hashemite regime alone might not have been able to exert enough influence to force the rural population to pay taxes, the British certainly did. With British help, the government was able not only to force the Bedouin population to pay taxes but also to "put the final seal on the *khuwa* (protection money) they had formerly extracted from the cultivators."<sup>34</sup> The British, however, were not only interested in forcing the rural population to pay taxes and limiting their ability to extract protection money from the local population but also to put an end to raiding.<sup>35</sup> The British felt that this practice posed a significant threat to Abdullah's fragile regime. Raiding was an important component of the tribal economy in Jordan, and the British attempts to stamp it out constituted a significant threat to Jordan's rural population's ability to maintain its economic standing. The combined efforts of Hashemite and British forces to extract funds from Jordan's rural population while also limiting their sources of revenue further provided ample reason for the tribes to fear that this new regime posed a real and direct threat to their existence and way of life and helps to explain tribal uprisings against the Hashemites.

---

<sup>30</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 31.

<sup>31</sup> Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, 64.

<sup>32</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 17.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>34</sup> Riccardo Bocco and Tariq M. M. Tell, "Pax Britannica in the Steppe: British Policy and the Transjordanian Bedouin, 1923-1939," in *Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan*, Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell, eds. (New York: British Academic Press, 1994), 109.

<sup>35</sup> John Bagot Glubb, *War in the Desert: An R.A.F. Frontier Campaign* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1960), 26.

The creation of a state in Jordan did not occur in isolation, and this process of state formation was occurring throughout the Middle East in the years following World War One. This had a profound impact on the Middle East, as traditional tribal structures of governance and loyalty came into conflict with the new realities of a nation-state system. We have already seen the effect that this had on Jordan domestically, but it also had a profound impact on the fledgling state's relations with other states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis had long been a powerful force in the Arabian Peninsula, and historically they had ruled a territory that "extended from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, and from the Great Desert to Damascus," and in the 1920s, "Ibn Saud has repeatedly expressed an ambition to restore the conquest of his ancestors."<sup>36</sup> The ambitious Saudis presented a very real threat to the Hashemites, and this fact was demonstrated quite vividly when Saudi Arabia took over the Hijaz in 1925.<sup>37</sup> In addition to posing a threat to larger Hashemite interests in the Middle East, the Saudis also had shown that they could threaten Abdullah's holdings in Jordan when they invaded the country in 1924. While this invasion was driven off by a combination of Jordanian forces and British armored cars and aircraft, this was not an occurrence that Abdullah could take lightly.<sup>38</sup>

In addition to the outright aggression of invasion, the Saudis also undermined Abdullah's position in Jordan in other, more subtle, ways. Ibn Saud had threatened fellow Hashemite Feysal's sovereignty in Iraq by gaining influence over the tribes, and this was in fact where his greatest strength lay. The British High Commissioner for Iraq expressed this sentiment, when he said that in Iraq, "[w]hat is feared is not so much an actual attack on Ruwallah and subsequently on the Amarat Anisah [two Iraqi tribes] as their being completely won over to Ibn Saud by a mixture of cajolery and threats which would give no overt cause for war."<sup>39</sup> Ibn Saud had achieved similar success in Jordan, where tribes loyal to the Saudis based in Jauf managed to carry off a successful raid against Kaf, both of which were cities that Abdullah wanted to control.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> Telegram from High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies, January 16, 1925 with minutes by J. Carson and J. Lassory, January 21, 1925, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, 499.

<sup>37</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 75. The Hashemites had traditionally ruled the Hijaz, and Abdullah's father Hussein ruled this area during the 1920's until he was driven out by Saudi forces.

<sup>38</sup> King Abdullah, *The Memoirs of King Abdullah*, 215.

<sup>39</sup> Telegram from High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies, January 26, 1925, with minutes by Mr. J. Carson, January 30, 1925, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, ed. J. Priestland (Cambridge: Cambridge Archive Editions, 1996), 503.

<sup>40</sup> Telegram from Sir Herbert Louis Samuel to Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 13, 1925, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965, Volume 2*, 511. Memorandum by Sir J. Shuckburgh, February 13, 1925, in *Ibid.*, 507.

These border disputes were in large part the result of the conflict between nation-state and tribal systems of governance. Tribal grazing patterns and spheres of influence bore little resemblance to the new borders imposed by the nation state system. Tribes might spend one part of the year in land which was notionally controlled by Jordan, and then spend the rest of the year in land controlled by the Saudis, and they had developed these grazing patterns over generations. With the advent of modern states and more strictly enforced border controls, however, this nomadic lifestyle presented economic and military problems for these fledgling states. This reality presented a number of challenges to the new regimes, but perhaps the most important was which state should be able to tax which tribes. In one example of a dispute over whether the Ateibeh tribe should pay taxes to the Hashemites or the Saudis, "Ibn Saud had to agree not only not to levy taxes on those parts of the Ateibah tribe within his own territory, but to allow them to pay taxes to King Hussein, although not residing within the geographical limits of his kingdom."<sup>41</sup> While this is an example of the taxation issue being resolved peacefully, taxation was an issue of extreme importance. In light of Saudi Arabia's military ascendancy over Jordan during this time period, it was possible that the Saudis could choose to utilize their military power to secure greater economic resources.<sup>42</sup> This military threat was especially worrisome because the British, upon whom Abdullah relied heavily, had expressed their commitment to maintaining "their declared neutrality in the conflict between the Hedjaz and Nejd," thereby making it uncertain whether they would always come to the Hashemites' aid in the event that Abdullah appeared to be suffering the same fate that had befallen his father in the Hejaz.<sup>43</sup>

These international factors made it imperative that Abdullah exercise some degree of control over the tribes that lay within his boundaries, and, with the help of British financing, Abdullah began to extend his authority deeper into the frontiers of Jordan.<sup>44</sup> This extension of authority posed another threat to the rural population. Economically, a greater Hashemite presence in the deserts of Jordan would mean the rural population would be forced to submit to a heavier taxation burden. Also, attempts to confine nomads to the borders of Jordan would make it more difficult for the tribes to maintain their herding practices, which depended on mobility to find the best grazing land in a region where grass and water were in scarce supply.

---

<sup>41</sup> Telegram from High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies, January 16, 1925, with minutes by J. Carson and J. Lassory, January 21, 1925, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965*, Volume 2, 502.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 499.

<sup>43</sup> Memorandum by Sir J. Shuckburgh, February 13, 1925, in *Ibid.*, 509.

<sup>44</sup> Telegram from Sir Herbert Louis Samuel to Secretary of State for the Colonies, March 7, 1925, in *Ibid.*, 521.

In addition to these economic concerns, however, this new regime also threatened to destroy an essential element of the Bedouin identity, mobility.

These economic, political, and social threats that the Hashemite regime posed to the tribal structure makes the tribal uprisings which occurred in Jordan during the 1920s understandable. Used to autonomy and confident in their ability to survive and thrive on their own, tribal powers had every reason to resist this change to the status quo. This resistance might have occurred indefinitely had a series of circumstances not created an environment in which the tribes of Jordan were forced into a position where they needed Hashemite assistance to survive.

### **The Breakdown of Jordan's Tribes**

The rural system that King Abdullah encountered during the early days of his rule in 1920s Jordan was strong and had possessed that strength for a long period of time. The economy that existed in the region, while not providing for a lavish existence, allowed for the population to live fairly comfortably. In addition to their economic system, the rural population also wielded substantial political power, and had developed an effective system of governance that settled property and other disputes. This system allowed the tribes to exist in a state of relative independence and provided them with a coherent and unchallenged identity as powerful and independent force.

By the middle 1930s, however, the rural system in Jordan had lost its vitality. This transformation was the result of a number of different factors, and the advent of British and Hashemite influence in the region played a significant role in altering the economic, political, and military environment in which the tribes existed. This external influence, however, was not the only factor that brought about this change, as the growth in Saudi influence and the rural population's severe economic hardship which occurred during the 1930s were not caused by British or Hashemite policies alone. The economic, military, and political landscape in the region were changing during this time period, and it was these changes, as much as the presence of external forces, that caused the weakening of the rural system and ultimately provided the Hashemites with the opportunity to gain the loyalty of the rural population.

During the 1920s, it became apparent that Saudi Arabia enjoyed a comfortable superiority over their neighbors in Jordan, evidenced by the fact that British officials felt that the main reason for the lack of more aggressive action from the Saudis lay in their fear that any overt displays of hostility

would invoke the ire of the British.<sup>45</sup> The British were acutely aware of this fact, and used the Royal Air Force to enforce a prohibited zone into which Ibn Saud's forces were barred from entering.<sup>46</sup> While incursions by Saudi tribes into Jordan were motivated by Ibn Saud's political ambitions in Jordan, these groups were not entirely motivated by a desire to bring more territory under Ibn Saud's control and used their strength as a means to enrich themselves. These raids, which were in their nature not an extremely effective means of gaining territory, occasionally resulted in one tribe taking another tribe's women and animals as plunder.

The British had not initially intended to use either their own troops or those of the Arab Legion to police the desert, and initially "restricted themselves to the defence of the settled areas, only occasionally venturing into the desert."<sup>47</sup> During the early years of the mandate regime in Jordan, Britain's "concern with the stability of Arabia led her to sacrifice the interest of Trans-Jordan in order to conciliate Ibn Saud," and undoubtedly played an important role in the decision to limit Britain's military activities.<sup>48</sup> As the British came to see the tribal conflict as a threat to their interests in Jordan and the region at large, the Arab Legion began to spread its influence outward.<sup>49</sup> This resulted in the Arab Legion not only making contact with Jordan's rural population but also with the Saudis. British forces were extremely effective in combating Saudi attacks into Jordan, as warriors riding camels were no match for armored cars and aircraft.

While British forces provided much needed security for the tribal population, it also highlighted their inability to achieve these same ends on their own. John Bagot Glubb, an important British officer in Jordan who served in the country for the better part of three decades, provides evidence that members of the rural population came to this realization in an exchange he had with a group of Bedouin women. These women thanked him for the protection he provided them against Saudi raids that had menaced their tribe.<sup>50</sup> This recognition of Britain's superior military strength is evident when one considers that Glubb was able to develop such a degree of status that he became an arbiter of tribal disputes in rural regions of the country.<sup>51</sup> This recognition of the need for support showed that the rural population of

---

<sup>45</sup> Telegram from High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies, January 16, 1925, with minutes by J. Carson and J. Lassory, January 21, 1925, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965*, Volume 2, 500.

<sup>46</sup> Memorandum by Sir J. Shuckburgh, February 13, 1925, in *Ibid.*, 507.

<sup>47</sup> Bocco and Tell, "Pax Britannica in the Steppe," 108.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 108-09.

<sup>49</sup> Bocco and Tell, 108.

<sup>50</sup> Glubb, *War in the Desert*, 154.

<sup>51</sup> Bocco and Tell, "Pax Britannica in the Steppe," 119.

Jordan's perceptions of themselves as a powerful and self-sufficient military force had been dealt a severe blow in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

In addition to military difficulties that threatened the vitality of Jordan's rural system, their economic position during this time period was also extremely tenuous, so much so in fact that Glubb observed that segments of the rural population were facing starvation, and he doubted that some tribes could survive for long on their own.<sup>52</sup> This problem was not limited to the poorer segments of the population, however, as even sheikhs were eating "barley bread, a food reserved for slaves (*'abid*) in good years."<sup>53</sup> Statistics support this anecdotal evidence, as the livestock holdings of "the Transjordan Bedouin fell by 70 percent between 1932, already a famine year, and 1936," and the infant mortality rate in Jordan jumped from 203 to 242 deaths per 1000 births between 1933 and 1934.<sup>54</sup>

This desperate situation was caused by a number of diverse and independent factors that combined to create a highly destructive economic perfect storm that wrought havoc on Jordan's rural population. Raiding was motivated largely by economic considerations, and the Saudi raids into Jordan were no different, despite having a political undertone. The inability of Jordanian tribes to defend themselves against the more powerful Saudis meant that they were powerless to prevent the destruction of their economic resources. One British official "estimated the net losses of the Jordanian Bedouin [from Saudi raids] at 3662 camels, 5270 sheep, 50 killed and £P 1020 in lost possessions."<sup>55</sup> The military impotence of this group also meant that they did not have the ability to recoup their losses through raids against other tribes in the face of increasingly successful British attempts to pacify the desert.<sup>56</sup> While this policy blunted the force of Saudi attacks against the rural population, it also had the effect of putting an end to a practice that, somewhat curiously, tended to level the distribution of wealth between different tribes.<sup>57</sup> In addition to the negative impact that the renewed raiding practices had on the Jordan's rural tribes, the difficulty of their situation was also compounded by the fact that the region was gripped by a terrible drought during the early 1930s.

The combination of drought, military losses at the hands of the Saudis, and the restrictions placed on traditional tribal economic practices, created a circumstance where the traditional economic structure that supported Trans-Jordan's Bedouin population collapsed. This harsh reality

---

<sup>52</sup> Glubb, *War in the Desert*, 26. Bocco and Tell, "Pax Britannica in the Steppe," 120.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, and Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 22.

<sup>55</sup> Rogan and Tell, *Village, Steppe, and State*, 120.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

meant that the tribal portions of the Jordanian population were in desperate need of some form of economic assistance, and the Hashemites and British were subsequently able to provide that much needed help.

During the 1920s, the increasing power of the Hashemite central government led to an increasing portion of Jordan's population living a settled lifestyle. The increasing number of sedentary individuals in Jordan led to an increase in the area under the urban population's economic and geographical control.<sup>58</sup> This trend was a very real threat to Jordan's nomadic population. The Hashemites, although not able to pacify the Jordanian nomads on their own, had the benefit of being supported by the British. British assistance had helped to allow the Hashemites to keep the Saudis at bay, the same Saudi forces which had been decimating Jordan's rural population during the same time period. This British support of the Hashemites meant that the rural population had little chance of success in its struggle against the central government and, therefore, little hope of stopping the settled portion of Jordan's population from encroaching on their land.

In addition to decreasing the land to which Jordan's rural population could lay claim, a stronger central government in the state also meant that the division between the rural and settled populations became more pronounced, a trend which existed for centuries before the British assumed control of the administration of the country.<sup>59</sup> This historical trend repeated itself during the 1920s, as the British, the Hashemite regimes most powerful ally, sought to stamp out tribal raiding in Jordan.<sup>60</sup> Although not all of the contact between settled and nomadic groups in Jordan was violent, Britain's perception of nomads as a threat to peace and stability in the region made even well-intentioned approaches by the Bedouin into settled areas dangerous to the Bedouin, as their mere presence in a settled area could provoke an attack by the Arab Legion.<sup>61</sup>

The combination of an increased amount of land coming under the control of Jordan's settled population and the fact that nomadic tribes were increasingly forced to give these areas a wide berth for fear of inviting destruction at the hands of a superior military force limited the land available to the rural population in Jordan. Previously, the nomads would have merely avoided these areas and moved to a new location that was outside of the reach of the central government. With the advent of the nation state system in this region and more stringently enforced borders, this became less of an option. Even had central government not been a major

---

<sup>58</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 16.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-16.

<sup>60</sup> Glubb, *War in the Desert*, 26.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

issue, this type of migration would not have been possible because of the military power of the Saudi tribes.

During the late 1920s, Jordan's rural population was caught between a hammer and an anvil. The combined pressures of the Hashemites and the Saudis forced this group into a smaller and smaller area with little hope of reversing this process, which could have rendered the nomadic tribesmen of Jordan irrelevant. This was not merely a political threat, however, but a cultural threat as well, since their entire way of life was endangered by a powerful central government which saw traditional nomadic practices like raiding as threatening to its authority and sovereignty. In this desperate situation that the rural population faced, the programs that the Hashemite government undertook in the 1930s provided a means for the nomadic tribes not only to survive, but also to be an important political and cultural force in Jordan.

### **The Hashemites to the Rescue**

While the Hashemite regime and its policies played an important role in marginalizing the tribal portions of Jordan's population throughout the 1920s, the relationship between these two groups changed drastically during the 1930s. In a period where the nomadic groups in Jordan were truly suffering, the Hashemites, along with the British, pursued a number of policies that helped bring the Bedouin back from the brink. These programs not only addressed the acute economic and security needs of this group, but did so in a way which allowed the Bedouin to become integrated into Jordan without having to sacrifice their identity as a politically significant group of rural warriors.

Perhaps the most important way in which the Hashemite regime aided Jordan's nomadic population during this time period was to give them a means for providing for themselves economically after the nomadic economy had effectively been destroyed. Since "the Bedouins of Trans-Jordan were almost entirely illiterate" and schools, which only catered to a very small portion of the overall Bedouin population, were not established in the desert until 1935, these newly settled peoples were not capable of working in any industry except agriculture.<sup>62</sup> This caused both British and Jordanian authorities to focus their energies on building up this sector of the Jordanian economy, an initiative which proved to be extremely successful.<sup>63</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 27.

<sup>63</sup> Michael R. Fischbach, "British Land Policy in Transjordan," in *Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan*, Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell, eds. (New York: British Academic Press, 1994), 107. Michael Fischbach finishes his essay on British Land policy in Trans-Jordan by concluding that the land settlement act was generally popular among farmers in Trans-Jordan, and that

While the loss of grazing territory could have been hugely traumatic to Jordan's rural population, the British Mandate regime instituted a number of programs that helped to ease their transition towards a settled, agricultural economy. The first program that the British undertook to achieve this aim was to expand land-ownership. This was an extremely important program, and not only for its economic implications, and as such had to be executed carefully. Establishing individual land-ownership in a tribal society was difficult since property was generally controlled by a sheikh rather than individual members of the tribe. The British believed that this communal system of land ownership was problematic, as it did not provide any "incentive for a shareholder to make any permanent improvement on his holding."<sup>64</sup> Despite these reservations about the economic efficiency of communal land-holding, the Jordanian government passed a Land Settlement Law in 1933 that divided land into two different categories: Masha'a, community owned land, and Mafruz, individually owned land. This system, while not ideal from an economic perspective, helped to lessen the social and cultural impact that settlement had on the previously nomadic population, as well as ensuring that local sheikhs did not feel as if they were being completely marginalized.

In addition to the provision for communal land ownership, the officials in charge of overseeing the partition generally only recorded the results of partition agreements that the villagers made among themselves, so as not to appear as if they were imposing their will on groups of people used to autonomy.<sup>65</sup> Although a potentially explosive and divisive program, land settlement was generally accepted without violence or rebellion due to the rural population's desperate economic situation. Only one tribal group threatened to use force to avoid land settlement in 1938, which is tremendously surprising given the previous frequency of tribal uprisings against the government of Trans-Jordan during the 1920s.<sup>66</sup>

The land settlement program not only expanded land ownership without too greatly upsetting Jordan's existing social and political order, it also proved economically successful. Over 1.6 million dunums, or 400,000 acres, of land came under official ownership between 1933 and 1938, a full one fifth or all cultivatable land in Jordan.<sup>67</sup> Although the majority of the

---

"[t]he positive political implications of the land programme were of far more use in helping the Hashemite regime accrue valuable political credit and, ultimately, guarantee its survival during turbulent times than the personal dynamism of Jordan's monarchs or other traditionally-cited explanations of the regime's longevity."

<sup>64</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 39.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> Dunums are a traditional Ottoman unit of land area, where 1 dunum is approximately equal to .25 acres. Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 39.

land that came under ownership was under communal authority, new Jordanian landowners attempted to make improvements to their field by taking actions like clearing stones from the fields and utilizing fertilizer.<sup>68</sup>

Beyond attempting to expand land ownership, in the hopes that this would lead to better utilization of Jordan's arable land, the government also attempted to develop irrigation infrastructure for the same purposes. Analysis of the agricultural conditions in Jordan during this time period concluded that "irrigation opportunities provide a sphere of development which can quickly and most profitably contribute to increased production."<sup>69</sup> Jordan was not necessarily an ideal place for agriculture, due to the desert-like conditions that afflicted most of the country, and improved irrigation was necessary to expand cultivation with Jordan's scarce water resources. The cost that irrigation projects presented were not prohibitive either, as there were already irrigation systems in place that just needed to be improved technologically and administratively to provide a large increase in the area of cultivatable land that the population could utilize.<sup>70</sup> The ultimate aim and attractiveness of these irrigation projects during this time period was their ability to allow the fledgling nation to "support a greater population in considerably better condition than at present."<sup>71</sup>

While these programs hardly turned Jordan into an economic powerhouse, crop yield statistics show that they did provide a boost to the state's economy. Between 1927 and 1939 barley production increased seven-fold and wheat production four-fold.<sup>72</sup> In addition to crop yields, the attractiveness of these land offers is also evident by the fact that two foreign tribes, the Tuwayrish from Syria and the Ghazawiyya from Palestine, actually took up residence in Trans-Jordan in 1939 and 1944 respectively.<sup>73</sup>

Although these agricultural policies were successful in providing Jordan's rural population with an ability to support themselves, they were successful in securing this groups loyalty to the king because the transition from a nomadic to a more settled agricultural lifestyle was relatively subtle. While the agriculture program was meant to bring the rural population into a more sedentary lifestyle, it was not intended to bring an end to all kinds of nomadism in Jordan. Even with arable land, "[n]omads camped near their cultivated land during the sowing season and left it for their winter grazing areas only to return for the harvest in the following spring."<sup>74</sup> Livestock breeding was undoubtedly helped by efforts taken during this time period to

---

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 35.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 32-35.

<sup>71</sup> Konikoff, 35.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>73</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 130-31.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 131.

improve irrigation in Jordan. This limited allowance for nomadism meant that the rural population was still able to maintain a sense of mobility, which was an important component of their identity.

In addition to allowing the Jordan's rural population to continue to engage in nomadism, their agricultural pursuits also allowed them to maintain their identity. The settled and nomadic segments of Jordan's population had for a long period of time existed in a state of mutual antagonism, with "the settled man regarding the nomad as his natural enemy and the nomad viewing the settled man as his legitimate prey."<sup>75</sup> In addition to this economic antagonism, the Bedouin largely viewed settled and urban people as soft.<sup>76</sup> Had rural Jordanians moved into more urban areas, they would have been forced to integrate into a social setting in which they would have lost not only their physical separation from this group, but more importantly their psychological distance. This would have been made more problematic by the fact that the rural population would not have been able to be in positions of power in urban environments, since the very few member of Trans-Jordan's Bedouin population was literate, and exclusive schools were not established in the desert until 1935.<sup>77</sup> Working in subservient positions to people they considered in many ways inferior would have been extremely problematic for the Bedouin, a group that R.J.C. Broadhurst describes as having a sense of "great self-reliance and pride [which] will allow [them] to feel deference for no superior."<sup>78</sup>

The fact that rural Jordanians accepted their new agricultural lifestyle is evidence by their fairly ready acceptance of manual labor, an essential part of being a farmer and something that the Bedouin had previously seen as beneath them. Glubb reported that "'many' of the Huwaytat were personally engaged in tilling their land," and that a member of the Sirhan tribe referred to himself as *fallah* in a petition, a term for agriculturalists which the tribesmen had used previously as a pejorative.<sup>79</sup> This willingness to engage in manual labor, combined with the fact that only one tribe even threatened to rebel to avoid land settlement, gives the impression that the Jordanian tribes did not view their new settled existence as too dramatic a departure

---

<sup>75</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 16.

<sup>76</sup> Ahmad Janadbeh, interview with author, 3 February 2010. Mr. Janadbeh was my colloquial Arabic teacher during my semester abroad in Jordan. He was from the more rural parts of Jordan, and he was the only one of his ten brothers who was not a member of Jordan's military. On our first day of class, he explained to us that he was "badu," and thus different from the "tantat" who lived in Amman. The word, "tantat" is the plural form of "tant," which we learned on our first day of class was a derogatory term for homosexuals.

<sup>77</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 27.

<sup>78</sup> Abdullah, *Memoirs of King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan*, 15.

<sup>79</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 131.

from their previous lifestyle.<sup>80</sup> More importantly, it also gives an indication that the Bedouin tribes had become willing to accept Hashemite rule.

The unrest which plagued Jordan during the early years of the mandate regime, while certainly problematic in the eyes of British colonial administrators, was probably quite normal in the context of Jordan's history of tribal infighting. Nomads relied heavily on raiding for economic purposes, but raiding was more than a means to an end. Glubb described Bedouin society as one which was always at war, observing that "their endless hostilities were rarely, if ever, interrupted by peace," and notes that the "majority of Bedouin poems . . . treated of war rather than of love."<sup>81</sup> This societal character had an influence on the individual, and war was a means for a person "to achieve personal glory," and for a Bedouin "[r]aiding is his chief delight."<sup>82</sup> The transition to more settled communities "naturally imposed a measure of discipline which would have been felt as irksome by the wild nomad of the great desert spaces," a discipline which would have made the militant, raiding lifestyle the Bedouin had previously taken pride in impossible.<sup>83</sup>

This movement towards a more settled existence coincided with the rural population's loss of military power to the Saudis and the British. The newly agrarian Bedouin appreciated the security that the Hashemites and their British supporters provided them, since this more static lifestyle made the Bedouin more vulnerable to the sorts of raids that the Saudi tribes had carried out more or less with impunity before the British increased their presence in the deserts of Jordan. Whereas the rural population previously had been mobile and armed, thus presenting a difficult and dangerous target for any tribal raiding party, their new agricultural lifestyle was extremely susceptible to any attacks that could disrupt the already tenuous position of farmers in desert-like conditions. This security, however helpful, though might have further exacerbated rural Jordanian's feeling that they were no longer a powerful military force.

In this context, the employment of Bedouin in the Arab Legion could be seen as a means for them to regain both their individual and collective identity as a martial force to be reckoned with. By providing the rural population with employment in the military forces of Jordan, the Hashemites and the British in many ways eased the transition to a different lifestyle by providing them with an opportunity to express the militaristic side of their identity and thus ensure that they did not have to suffer further amalgamation into the settled culture that they had previously rebelled

---

<sup>80</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 38.

<sup>81</sup> Glubb, *War in the Desert*, 30 and 37.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 31, and Abdullah, *Memoirs of King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan*, 15.

<sup>83</sup> Glubb, *War in the Desert*, 31.

against. The newly constructed warrior identity of the Bedouin was undoubtedly given a tremendous boost by the performance of the Arab Legion during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, where Glubb Pasha commented that “the Arab Legion proved itself the master of the battlefield,” as they provided the Arab coalition with one of their few victories in an otherwise disastrous campaign.<sup>84</sup>

In addition to providing the rural population with a means to retain their sense of themselves as warriors on both the personal and collective level, employment in Jordan’s fledgling armed forces also provided the country’s nomadic population with economic opportunities. The British saw Jordan as an important asset largely for its military value, and this is evident when looking at how Jordan allocated its budget when it was under British control as a mandate. While the British made substantial efforts to increase agricultural production in Trans-Jordan during this time period, the amount of money spent on agriculture and other public works projects is dwarfed by the country’s military budget. The military component of the state’s budget was also more stable than other areas, especially given Germany’s alliance with Iraq in World War Two. The military was deemed so important in 1941-42, in fact, that government expenditure, which was made possible largely by British funds, on the military and police forces outstripped spending in all other areas of government, with spending on public works projects the victim of a precipitous decline that cut its funding by almost seventy-five percent.<sup>85</sup> While this budget was certainly not spent solely on personnel, the military did increase substantially in size during the mandate years. The increase in the size of the Arab Legion is a particularly excellent example of this phenomenon. In the early days of the state, the Arab Legion only had a strength of “1,200 men all told.”<sup>86</sup> When the British Mandate regime was terminated in 1946, the Arab Legion boasted between eight and ten thousand men.<sup>87</sup> By 1956, the Arab Legion had grown even more, to approximately 25,000 personnel.<sup>88</sup>

The military policies of Abdullah’s government were extremely important in ensuring that the Hashemites had the support of the rural populations. By the end of the 1920s, this segment of Jordan’s population was in a state of extreme privation. Their military power had been degraded to the point where it was almost non-existent, which was threatening not only to their economic, but also cultural survival. The Jordanian military

---

<sup>84</sup> Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs*, 132.

<sup>85</sup> Konikoff, *An Economic Survey of Trans-Jordan*, 119.

<sup>86</sup> Monthly report on Transjordan by H. Philby, September 1923, in *Records of Jordan 1919-1965*, Volume 2, 52.

<sup>87</sup> P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), 7.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

helped to solve these problems in a number of important ways. First, the security provided by the central government allowed the rural population to practice agriculture without fear that their harvest would be destroyed in an afternoon through a raid against which they were incapable of defending. The military also provided each group with an extremely stable alternative source of income that could take the pressure off of Jordan's agricultural sector. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, employment in the state's fledgling military provided rural Jordanians with an opportunity to regain their military identity, and the well documented successes of the Arab Legion made the Bedouin once again feel as if they were part of a strong military force. In many ways, Jordan's military forces can be seen as a "school of the nation," breaking down barriers between tribes and giving them a stake in the Trans-Jordanian state.<sup>89</sup>

While Jordan's military provided the Bedouin with the means to regain their warrior identity, it also provided them with a means of obtaining a greater degree of political power. The rural population had largely been left out of the Hashemite's bureaucracy in the early days of the regime. Imported Syrian officials with previous experience were better equipped to handle administrative functions than the largely illiterate tribesmen who had little experience living with a centralized government, much less running it. This was a point of contention between the Hashemites and the nomadic population early in the existence of Jordan, as the "Jordan for the Jordanians" movement among native elements showed.<sup>90</sup> The Adwani rebellion was in many ways the most important manifestation of this tension. While the defeat that the Adwan suffered at the hand of the Hashemite government and their British supporters was devastating to the rural population's ability to defy the central government, in many ways, it presented this group with an important opportunity to gain more political influence in Jordan. The British perceived Arab Nationalists connected with the Istiqlal party to be behind this rebellion, despite the fact that the actual armed threat came from tribal forces. The British used the revolt's demonstration of Jordan's reliance on colonial support as an opportunity to force Abdullah to remove officials with Arab Nationalist leanings from his government.<sup>91</sup> Since the rural population of Jordan had little affiliation with these groups, the expulsion of Arab Nationalist leaders from Abdullah's

---

<sup>89</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 1. This idea of the military forging Trans-Jordan is a commonly held idea among scholars, and Alon is merely one of the many scholars that have expressed this idea when discussing both historical and modern Jordan. Lawrence Tal's *Politics, The Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967* and P.J. Vatikiotis' *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921-1957* are both excellent examples of works that explore the symbiotic relationship between the Hashemites and their military forces in different time periods.

<sup>90</sup> Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan*, 65.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 78-79.

administration in 1923 presented them with an opportunity to gain positions of greater authority.<sup>92</sup> The military proved to be an important avenue through which the Bedouin population rose to obtain these prominent bureaucratic positions.

The Arab Legion increased dramatically not only in size between 1921 and 1956, but also in responsibility. During this time period, members of the Arab Legion were working in parts of the Jordanian government that are not generally considered within the purview of the military, such as “the economic, financial, educational and social fields of state and national endeavor, especially in the Palestinian territories that became incorporated into Jordan after the 1948 war.”<sup>93</sup> This growth of the military, both in terms of personnel and responsibility, meant that the military was a source not only of economic subsistence but also a way of gaining access to other avenues of political and economic power. These opportunities went in large part to the portions of the Bedouin population that were not members of traditionally powerful families due to the fact that Glubb Pasha made a concerted effort to recruit officers who were outside of both the urban and rural circles of power and the army’s noncommissioned officers were from similarly humble circumstances.<sup>94</sup> Providing formerly powerless people with greater authority and responsibility in the Hashemite Regime was important in developing among the tribal population a sense that they had “a clear stake in the survival of the Jordanian state.”<sup>95</sup> Beyond merely developing a dependence upon the state, however, these positions gave this segment of the population a sense of ownership of Jordan, in that they could play an important role in deciding where the state was heading rather than merely being along for the ride.

## A Caveat

*To those who still feel a guilty suspicion that British action in Asia was, in former times, oppressive or unscrupulous, this account may give a different view point. For here, it seems to me, British intervention was purely beneficial. It saved a poor, simple and hardy community from the terror of constant massacre, and established a peace which has never since been broken. The result could only have been achieved by the defeat of the militant Ikhwan, and such a defeat could not have been achieved without British help.*<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>93</sup> Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan*, 7.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 1.

<sup>96</sup> Glubb, *War in the Desert*, Preface.

Glubb's preface to *War in The Desert* contains this passage, which presents Britain's Mandate Regime in Jordan in an almost humanitarian light. This paper has demonstrated how the Jordanian Bedouin population in many ways benefitted in the long run politically, economically, and militarily from the British sponsored Hashemite regime in the country. While many of the British soldiers and diplomats undoubtedly viewed their work in Jordan in a benevolent light, they were not in this country on a humanitarian mission. Britain's interests in Jordan were geopolitical in nature, and the fact "[t]hat Transjordan existed at all as a separate state [from Palestine] was in response to Britain's strategic and political needs."<sup>97</sup> Examining the policies that empowered the Bedouin demonstrates this fact.

While the agricultural development policies that were undertaken in Jordan provided the Bedouin with much needed resources at a time when they were in a precarious economic position, these policies helped Britain to achieve its self-serving political goals. The British and Abdullah were both very concerned about the threat that foreign Arabs with nationalist leanings posed to the fledgling Hashemite regime in Jordan. Since the distinction between those in Jordan with Arab Nationalist sympathies and those without was largely determined by whether they lived in settled or more rural settings, transitioning the Bedouin to a more settled, yet still rural, agricultural lifestyle was an ideal way to ensure that the "taint" of Arab Nationalism did not spread to the "pure" segments of Jordan's population.

The most important ways in which the taint of Arab Nationalism spread was through education, and ensuring that the Bedouin remained in rural areas was an extremely effective way of limiting their access to education. Before the mandate period, education in Jordan only existed on an extremely limited scale. What educational infrastructure that did exist in Jordan was centered in larger towns, leaving the rural population without any significant access to education, which likely contributed greatly to the fact that Jordan's rural population contained few Arab Nationalists.<sup>98</sup> Those schools that did exist in rural areas of Jordan were only four year elementary programs, compared with seven years programs in the more settled areas.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, the only schools that provided secondary education were located in the urban areas of Es Salt, Kerak, Irbid, and Amman, and the only secondary schools that provided a full four year program with a matriculation exam was located in Amman.<sup>100</sup> Had the rural population migrated to cities, it is likely that a greater portion of its population, or at least the sons of wealthy sheikhs, would have gained an education and been

---

<sup>97</sup> Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, 2.

<sup>98</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 27.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

exposed to ideas that could threaten a pro-British Hashemite regime. This threat to the Hashemite regime, and thus British interests in Jordan, was made more problematic by the fact that many of the schools were taught by foreigners, since it was difficult to find qualified teachers in Jordan.<sup>101</sup> This problem of the demographics of teachers was not such a problem in the elementary schools that the Bedouin were attending in the rural parts of the country, since the level of qualification required was lower and thus made it slightly easier to find teacher's within Jordan's population. In addition to the differences between the demographics of teachers in elementary versus secondary schools, there was also a higher proportion of foreign teachers at private schools, schools which relied on concentrations of wealthier individuals and thus precluded their penetration into the more rural parts of Jordan.<sup>102</sup>

In addition to the benefit of keeping the Bedouin isolated from problematic Arab Nationalists, most of whom had learned their ideology before migrating to Jordan, that transitioning them to an agrarian lifestyle, this also provided Abdullah's government with an important revenue stream. Running a state is an expensive enterprise, and from the beginning of their administration in Jordan, the British were concerned with developing a system of land ownership that would eventually lead to an efficient and effective system of taxation.<sup>103</sup> A final land tax law for Jordan was passed in 1933 after much difficulty, and following the passage of this law the central government saw its revenues increase substantially, from an average of £232,250 between the fiscal years of 1924/25 and 1933/34 to £358,160 in 1937/38.<sup>104</sup> During this same time period, the funding that Abdullah's government received in the form of a Grant-in-Aid from the British Treasury decreased from £67,823 to £19,000.<sup>105</sup> While Jordan was an important British holding, the British, quite reasonably, wanted to keep their expenditures on the governance of the country at as low a level as possible, and establishing an economic base which the country's central government could tax was an important component of this plan.

The British also saw their mandate in Jordan as having important strategic purposes, since "[t]he territory lay between the Red Sea and the

---

<sup>101</sup> Konikoff, 29.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Michael R. Fischbach, "British Land Policy in Transjordan," in *Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan*, eds. by Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell (New York: British Academic Press, 1994), 82-85.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 91. The British did not have complete control over the legislative process in Trans-Jordan, and thus had to convince the local government to pass laws. The land tax law of 1933 was a difficult piece of legislation to push through, since it threatened to increase the tax burden on several influential Trans-Jordanian landowners. Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 139.

<sup>105</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 139.

oilfields in Iraq . . . [and] also sat astride the overland routes to the Persian Gulf.”<sup>106</sup> Having an effective military in Jordan that could protect these important transportation routes, as well as provide strategic depth in the defense of the Suez Canal, was vital if Jordan were to fulfill the strategic purposes that the British desired.<sup>107</sup> That the British were extremely concerned with developing a military in Jordan is evidenced by the fact that the Arab Legion was founded barely a month after Abdullah first arrived in Amman in 1921, and remained under the control of British officers until Glubb, its commander, was expelled from Jordan in 1956 by King Hussein.<sup>108</sup>

While the Jordanian military proved helpful in providing the Bedouin of Jordan with employment and a means to express their warrior identity in a more productive way, at least through the eyes of Britain and the Hashemites, it would be naïve to believe that this was the primary motivation behind its creation. A strong military force furthered Britain’s interests in Jordan, and the fact that it helped the Bedouin was a positive externality of its creation rather than the prime motivator. Seeing the relationship between the Bedouins and all of the programs and policies that the Hashemite regime pursued during this time period in the light of positive externalities is the most useful way of understanding them.

## Conclusion

In his introduction to the *Making of Jordan*, Yoav Alon quite correctly states that “Jordan was one of Britain’s most successful colonial projects in the Middle East and elsewhere.”<sup>109</sup> Jordan gained its independence from Britain peacefully, and the modern state is an important Arab ally of the West that has been able to remain relatively calm during the recent wave of revolutions that have swept across the Middle East.

Much of the foundation for this stability was laid during the mandate period, and Britain and the Hashemite government undoubtedly did a lot of things right in ensuring that this happened, especially in gaining the support of the fledgling state’s initially restive rural population by pursuing programs that, intentionally or not, allowed this group to maintain important parts of their identity during their integration into the state. Abdullah devoted a great deal of time and effort to legitimizing his regime with the

---

<sup>106</sup> Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan*, 38.

<sup>107</sup> The British during this time period considered the Suez Canal as an indispensable part of its colonial holdings, since it allowed for Britain to have easy access to India. This is a commonly held view, and Elizabeth Monroe’s *Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971* is a noteworthy example of this viewpoint.

<sup>108</sup> Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan*, xi.

<sup>109</sup> Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, 3.

rural population, and the land ownership program's allowance for a slow transition to fully private land holdings was important. The British also were important in this process, in that their rule in Jordan was of a fairly "laissez-faire nature," and that important officials, like Sir John Bagot Glubb, served in the country for a long period of time and became very familiar with its people, politics, and culture.<sup>110</sup>

Despite pursuing these well thought out and executed policies, a number of factors that were almost completely out of control of either the British or the Hashemites were vitally important in gaining the support of the country's rural population. The Saudi tribes' military superiority over the Jordanian nomads had little to do with British or Hashemite influence, and the drought that played an important role in bringing the Bedouin to the verge of starvation was similarly out of their control. In addition to these factors, Jordan was not urbanized in any meaningful way during the mandate period, as the average population density of people living in the country's habitable area in 1940 was only "18 persons per sq. klm."<sup>111</sup> This lack of urbanization meant that the conditions were not suitable for any form of Arab Nationalism to develop in Jordan, an ideology which would have made the country's population far less willing than it already was to accept British influence.<sup>112</sup> However well thought out and executed the policies and programs of the Hashemites and their British sponsors might have been, it is not fair to say that they would have worked nearly as well if Jordan during the mandate period had been more urbanized or if the Bedouin had been economically prosperous and militarily powerful.

The political, social, and economic situation in Jordan, which the British and Abdullah inherited in 1921, was in many ways well suited for the nation building process that they undertook. The rural population's inability to maintain their political, military, and economic independence was essential in this process, and, over the course of two decades, Abdullah and his British advisors were able to position themselves in such a way that they became the rural population's allies rather than adversaries. While it might be tempting to use the case of Jordan as a model for future state building endeavors, the number of external factors which made nation building in Jordan successful make this problematic. More than a template, the case of Jordan demonstrates that peoples, cultures and states are influenced by a constellation of different factors, factors which are hard for individuals and even states to control and predict.

---

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>111</sup> Konikoff, *Trans-Jordan: An Economic Survey*, 15.

<sup>112</sup> The idea that urbanization and industrialization are important prerequisites for the rise of nationalism is a commonly held belief among scholars. The foremost example of this interpretation is Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*.



TO HELL WITH INTEGRITY:  
WHY MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL'S LACK OF SELF-  
REGULATION FORCED CONGRESS TO BECOME  
INVOLVED IN ITS DRUG TESTING POLICY

BY  
DANIEL G. PRIAL

*Daniel G. Prial is a senior studying American History at the United States Military Academy. He has been passionate about playing and studying baseball all his life, and he wrote "To Hell with Integrity" as his senior thesis.*

*It's our game, that's the chief fact in connection with it: America's game. Baseball belongs as much to our institutions, fits into them as significantly, as our constitutions and laws: [it] is just as important in the sum total of our historic life.<sup>1</sup>*

*-Walt Whitman*

The game of baseball has always had a special yet intangible connection to the American public. It produces a feeling of nostalgia connecting the greats of today to those who have been setting records for over a century before. Baseball is the game that kept soldiers, sailors, and marines sane on the front lines in World War II. It is the game that fosters a unique bond when a father takes his kid to the ballpark for the first time. It is the game that lifted a city with one swing of the bat ten days after the tragic events of September 11<sup>th</sup>. It is, truly, the national pastime.

For all the benefit baseball has provided America, it has still faced its fair share of scandals. Most notably, Shoeless Joe Jackson and other members of his Black Sox team were paid to fix the 1919 World Series.<sup>2</sup> Yet not every scandal was a result of the desire for money; the unbridled drive to win has also caused ballplayers to forego their integrity and respect for the game. Gaylord Perry, while still managing to become enshrined in Cooperstown in the Baseball Hall of Fame, was known for throwing an illegal spitball. In 1986, National League (NL) Cy Young Award winner

---

<sup>1</sup> Walt Whitman, quoted in Benjamin G. Rader, *Baseball: A History of America's Game* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), xx.

<sup>2</sup> Rader, *Baseball*, 109.

and Astros ace, Mike Scott, scuffed up the ball before hurling it those sixty feet and six inches.<sup>3</sup>

However, none of these cheating scandals ever came to define an era. This all changed with the introduction of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) to the game of baseball.<sup>4</sup> Prior to the Steroid Era, there was a prevailing belief that it was quickness, flexibility, and hand-eye coordination that made a great player, not muscle mass.<sup>5</sup> However, through experimental PED use by pioneer players such as Jose Canseco, it was found that these drugs could add muscle without eliminating the coveted quickness, flexibility, and hand-eye coordination. Furthermore, it also turned batted balls that, without the drug, would be ordinary fly-ball outs, into home runs. When the assumption about the drawbacks of increased muscle mass proved false, players flocked to the gyms, the local drug stores, and to trusted steroid dealers.<sup>6</sup>

PED use, disguised in the form of exciting baseball through increased power numbers, brought many fans back to the game after the bitter strike in 1994. From 1995 to 2003, players started posting stats and breaking records at a rate never seen before.<sup>7</sup> It was only then, in 2003, that baseball first implemented a drug testing policy. When this policy proved inadequate, Congress took an unprecedented step in 2005 and subpoenaed suspected players and league leaders and threatened government action if a more stringent policy was not implemented.<sup>8</sup> While the current drug testing

---

<sup>3</sup> Mike Downey, "Catching Them Cheat Might Be Bigger Feat, but It Is Time to Try," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 31, 1989. For more details on cheating within the game of baseball, see Dan Gutman, *It Aint Cheating If You Don't Get Caught: Scuffing, Spitting, Corking, Gunking, Razzing, and Other Fundamentals of Our National Pastime* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), or Derek Zumsteg, *The Cheater's Guide to Baseball* (New York: Houghton Books, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> The term "Steroid Era" for the use of this paper will begin with the start of the 1995 season (after the strike of 1994) and continue on to the present day. Jose Canseco takes credit for introducing players to steroid use in the late 1980s. However, steroids did not have a drastic impact on the game until the latter half of the 1990s. Additionally, many experts within the game of baseball, along with medical experts on steroid use, believe that PEDs will be around forever for a variety of reasons. Because of this, I briefly considered using the term "Steroid Revolution" beginning at the same start date. However, it is too early to tell if this will be an era or a revolution. Furthermore, anytime the word "revolution" is used in historical terms there are significant complexities that accompanies the term, none of which would get its due in the scope of this work.

<sup>5</sup> Fay Vincent, interview by author, February 23, 2012. Vincent was the commissioner of Major League Baseball from 1989-1992.

<sup>6</sup> Tom Verducci, "Totally Juiced," *Sports Illustrated*, June 3, 2002, <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1025902/1/index.htm> (accessed April 8, 2012). In the article, an anonymous player compared the ease with which PEDs could be acquired to the ease of trying to find pot at a college fraternity party.

<sup>7</sup> Rader, *Baseball*, 272.

<sup>8</sup> What makes this action so unprecedented is that the three other major professional sports all had dealt with the PED issue much sooner and much more effectively. At a subsequent hearing in front of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in September 2005 with all four major sports commissioners and union heads present, Senator George Allen of Virginia confirmed this saying, "I want to

system has come a long way, it is still far from perfect, and players are still using PEDs.<sup>9</sup>

This work will explore reasons that baseball required Congressional intervention to make a serious effort at confronting PED use in the game. Baseball consists of many components, and each failed to police the game with regards to PED use. Ownership was making too much money off the increase in power, thus would not take measures that could hurt itself financially. The players belong to a fraternity too strong among themselves to turn one another in, fostering a climate where PED use was acceptable. The press did not have the time, resources, or will to fulfill its role as a watchdog for the public. The fans knew PED use existed, cared about what it was doing to the game, yet still flocked to the ballpark making the game as lucrative as ever. However, the most important obstacle to policing PED use in baseball was the venomous relationship between Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Major League Baseball Players' Association (MLBPA).

Historians and scholars have only recently begun to explore the topic of PED use in baseball and what that phenomena can tell us about American society and culture.<sup>10</sup> For example, in their book, *The Steroids Game: An Expert's Inside Look at Anabolic Steroid Use in Sports*, Dr. Charles Yesalis and Virginia Cowart argue that the fundamental problem associated with PED use in sports is that, while on one hand the American public has a desire for purity within the game, "Public sentiment for stopping the use of steroids and PEDs at the elite level is not particularly high . . . many Americans are entertained by watching bigger-than-life athletes perform

---

commend the NBA and the NHL for your recent strong action against and putting in a program to combat drugs. . . . The model, if you look at past performance, is the National Football League."

<sup>9</sup> Dr. Charles Yesalis, interview by author, March 5, 2012. This was proven true with 2011 National League Most Valuable Player (MVP) Ryan Braun's positive test in October 2011 immediately after a playoff game. While Braun's appeal was recently upheld by arbitrator Shyam Das on a technicality, it is still widely accepted among the baseball community that Braun was using an illegal substance. Dr. Yesalis was an epidemiologist at Penn State with a doctorate from Johns Hopkins. Howard Bryant claims Dr. Yesalis to be one of the three most respected steroids experts in the country, along with Dr. Gary Wadler of New York University and Don Catlin of the University of California at Los Angeles. Dr. Yesalis has produced multiple books pertaining to PED use in sports.

<sup>10</sup> As mentioned, the timing of the Steroid Era is central to the lack of a historiography. The majority of published works are primary sources published by insiders. These will be addressed in future footnotes. For a general work on the history of performance enhancing drugs in sports, see Daniel Rosen, *Dope: A History of Performance Enhancement in Sports from the Nineteenth Century to Today* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2008). Rosen does an excellent job tracking not only the major doping incidents around the globe since 1865, but also when each of the major drugs became prominent within sports. Rosen argues that fans mistakenly see the issue of cheating through drugs as a more modern problem within the world of professional athletics. In contrast, Rosen states that the idea of using PEDs in an effort to get a leg up on the competition is nothing new to the world of sports. The only thing that has changed is the way that athletes go about this. He claims, "Illegal or unethical performance enhancement techniques in sports are likely to be around for some time to come. What may change, however, are the means, methods, and techniques in which some athletes will manipulate their bodies in their never-ending quest for perfection."

superhuman feats.”<sup>11</sup> Yesalis and Cowart assert that it will take a mass movement of the public, the players, and the sports’ governing bodies to commit to eradicating steroids before the problem will go away. They also highlight the politics that surround drug testing as far as who has the right to administer the tests, handle the samples, and know the test results.<sup>12</sup> An even more drastic problem is the accuracy of these tests. The testing policy for the Olympics has come under scrutiny because there are so many banned substances that “an athlete could get a positive test by taking a certain type of cold medicine.”<sup>13</sup> This leads to an increased number of false positive tests. On the opposite side, false negatives are just as much, if not more, a problem for drug testing. It is a constant game of chess between the rogue chemists and the scientists. Because of this, former MLB Commissioner Fay Vincent claimed simply, “I don’t think drug testing works.”<sup>14</sup> Yesalis and Cowart came to a similar conclusion, establishing their belief that drug testing alone is not enough to clean up professional sports.

While *The Steroids Game* provides important insight on the problems with drug testing and fan apathy, Howard Bryant’s *Juicing the Game: Drugs, Power, and the Fight for the Soul of Major League Baseball* connects the dysfunctional management-labor relationship with the rise of PED use in the MLB. Bryant asserts that because any sort of drug prevention program must be collectively bargained by the MLB and MLBPA, the caustic relationship between the two eliminated any hope of working together, thus allowing PED use to run rampant throughout the league.

---

<sup>11</sup> Virginia S. Cowart and Charles E. Yesalis, *The Steroids Game: An Expert’s Inside Look at Anabolic Steroid Use in Sports* (Champaign, N.Y.: Human Kinetics, 1998), 69. This work was written in 1998 as anabolic steroid use in all sports, at all levels, started becoming a real problem. The three purposes of the book identified by the authors are: informing the readers about anabolic steroids, describing some of the problems encountered with the drugs, and covering prevention methods such as drug testing, laws, and alternatives. This book is particularly helpful in providing a basis for what exactly these PEDs are and how they work. The human body is a wonderfully complex system, and drugs at the level of anabolic steroids, human growth hormone (HGH), and erythropoietin (EPO) are fully understood only by medical experts, and often misunderstood by the general public. Anabolic steroids are designed specifically to increase muscle mass – to push the body past its natural limits. HGH is a drug that helps the body recover from injury at an incredibly rapid rate. EPO increases the amount of red blood cells in the body. This allows oxygen to be carried to various parts of the body at a much higher rate. Because of this, EPO is used more so for sports requiring extensive cardiovascular exercise such as long distance running or cycling.

<sup>12</sup> This problem is most evident in the recent ruling by MLB arbitrator Shyam Das upholding Ryan Braun’s appeal of his fifty game ban. Braun was suspended after an October 1, 2011 drug test showed elevated levels of testosterone in his body. However, Braun was ultimately vindicated, on the technicality that the collector did not ship the triple-sealed specimen that day, but rather kept it in his house for the weekend before shipping it Monday.

<sup>13</sup> Cowart and Yesalis, *The Steroids Game*, 173.

<sup>14</sup> Fay Vincent, interview.

In making this connection, Bryant fails to give adequate attention to the issue of collusion.<sup>15</sup> Collusion was an attempt by the owners to defeat the union under the table. In the late 1980s, the owners wanted a salary cap, but the union would not negotiate it. The owners, led by current commissioner Bud Selig, got together and agreed among themselves to set their own salary cap and not pay players over a certain amount. This went on undetected for roughly three years, costing the players an estimated \$300 million dollars. When the union got word of this, they immediately sued the ownership for bad business practice. More importantly, however, was the broken trust between the two organizations that still exists today. Former Commissioner Fay Vincent, having witnessed collusion first hand, claims, “You cannot overemphasize the affect of collusion on everything. . . . In my view, collusion was the single most important development in baseball in the past 30 or 40 years.”<sup>16</sup> So while Bryant importantly highlights the issue of labor relations in the broad context of the Steroid Era, he glosses over the most central event to why the relationship exists the way it does.

It is based off of this historiographical void that I plan to make this work’s contribution to this field of study. After half a decade of numbers grossly disproportionate to the previous 134 years of professional baseball, MLB finally produced a drug testing policy in 2003 – albeit a woefully ineffective one.<sup>17</sup> This, veteran investigative reporter Mark Fainaru-Wada notes, is a trend that the game has shown throughout the era: “Baseball has always been reactive instead of proactive on this issue.”<sup>18</sup> There were a variety of factors during this era that forced baseball’s hand to include tell-all books and articles made public, federal investigations, and threats from Congress. Unimpressed with the continued weak drug testing policies collectively bargained by the MLB and MLBPA, the House Committee on Government Reform in 2005 threatened to become involved in Major League Baseball’s drug testing policy because the game had proven that it could not police itself. The reasons for this include ownership turning a blind eye for financial gains, the tightness of the fraternity of players, the

---

<sup>15</sup> Howard Bryant, *Juicing the Game: Drugs, Power, and the Fight for the Soul of Major League Baseball* (New York: Penguin Group, 2005), 42.

<sup>16</sup> Fay Vincent, interview.

<sup>17</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball’s Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use*, 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 2005, H. Doc. 109-8, 281. The first drug testing policy in 2003 was a survey program to determine how many players were using PEDs, and no penalties would be levied. If more than 5% of the league tested positive, MLB would look into a more stringent drug testing policy; if less than 5% tested positive, the issue would be dropped. It left many PEDs off the list of those being tested for, tested players only once, and did not include off season testing. Calling it a drug testing policy at all is a liberal use of the phrase.

<sup>18</sup> Mark Fainaru-Wada, interview by author, February 9, 2012. Fainaru-Wada is an investigative reporter who, along with fellow investigative reporter Lance Williams, blew the story off the BALCO story exposing many high-profile baseball players as PED users. He now works for ESPN as an investigative reporter covering stories related to this topic.

inability of the press to expose the issue, and fans' refusal to express their disgust with PED use by avoiding the ballpark. Most important and probably least understood of all reasons, however, is the ill-will and lack of trusting relationship between management and the players' union.

## Ownership

*Anyone in baseball who claimed not to know what was going on was either a liar or a moron.*

*-Dr. Charles Yesalis*

The CEO of a large corporation, the commander of a military unit, the local manager of a Wendy's restaurant, and the owner of a major league baseball team all share a common bond. Whether justified or not, they are the ones ultimately responsible for what goes on in their organization, good or bad. Because of this, it is impossible to absolve the owners of any blame in the emergence – and then explosion – of PED use in the MLB. To make matters worse, this did not go on behind their backs. Rather, they knew what was happening and chose to do nothing about it because, according to Dr. Yesalis, “they were making out like bandits.”<sup>19</sup> In fact, when asked about current MLB chief Bud Selig, former Commissioner Fay Vincent said, “I don't think the integrity of the game has ever been his highest concern.”<sup>20</sup> With so much money at stake, it is clear that ownership would not take part in policing themselves when that meant limiting profits.<sup>21</sup>

There is much merit to Dr. Yesalis' claim. From 1995 to 2007, attendance at an average MLB game went from 25,000 to 33,300.<sup>22</sup> Increasing at a fairly constant rate, this 33% surge is symbolic of the overall growing popularity during the Steroid Era. Nike developed a slogan that mirrored the trends of the game at the time: chicks dig the long ball.<sup>23</sup> According to baseball historian Benjamin Rader, “By 2006, millions of new dollars were flooding into the bank account of each major league franchise. The money came from record crowds, lucrative media contracts, and soaring revenues from the Internet and licensing.”<sup>24</sup> In fact, in 2005, MLB's official website – mlb.com – individually generated \$10.5 million in revenue for

---

<sup>19</sup> Yesalis, interview by author.

<sup>20</sup> Fay Vincent, interview by author.

<sup>21</sup> It is important to define the term “ownership” for the purposes of this paper. Ownership refers to the actual owners of the franchises, the teams' front office (i.e. general manager), and the commissioner's office. It is the job of the commissioner to represent the owners in labor talks and promote the game.

<sup>22</sup> *Ballparks of Baseball*, “MLB Ballpark Attendance,”

<http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/attendance.htm> (accessed April 3, 2012).

<sup>23</sup> Rader, *Baseball*, 263.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 261.

each major league team.<sup>25</sup> Former Commissioner Fay Vincent acknowledged that one of the primary functions of that office is to secure financial stability of the game. He described current Commissioner Bud Selig as “lucky” for holding the office during the time of this explosion in technology.<sup>26</sup> Whether luck, skill, or both, with numbers that staggering, it is tough to wonder why Selig has kept his post for nearly two decades.

More evidence that shows ownership had no true intent to rid the game of steroids can be seen by the league’s handling of androstenedione, a legal drug until 2004 with steroid-like affects.<sup>27</sup> In 1998, a bottle of “andro,” as it is called for short, was found in the locker of Cardinals slugger Mark McGwire.<sup>28</sup> At the time, andro had already been banned by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), National Football League (NFL), and International Olympic Committee (IOC); yet baseball not only had no testing system for it, it was also completely legal within the game. The feel good story of the McGwire-Sosa home run race had captivated the nation, and no one, especially the commissioner, wanted the focus to shift away from that, let alone to the topic of PEDs.<sup>29</sup> Accordingly, Commissioner Selig embarked on a public relations ploy, funding Harvard scientists to conduct a study into the effects of andro. However, “the trainers and physicians [already] knew that andro was a steroid.”<sup>30</sup> Additionally, the test results were conveniently withheld until 2004 (the same year that the FDA banned its sale).<sup>31</sup> The handling of andro shows that ownership knew what was going on, but took no action to rid the game of PED use. Until Congress intervened in 2005, it is clear that management had no intentions of policing themselves or the game as a whole.

Another example of the ownership turning a blind eye to – if not condoning – PED use in baseball can be seen through the lexicon of people within the game at the time. Baseball has always had a language of its own with phrases like “hit-and-run,” “pinch hitter,” and “bullpen.” With PED use becoming prevalent in the game, teams had to indicate this type of information when scouting a player, or marketing a player on the trading block. Needless to say, “Player X’s recent use of anabolic steroids has increased his batting average, runs batted in, and home runs to nearly 25% of his career average, even though he is 37,” is not something that can be written on an official document, especially because that indicates criminal

---

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 265.

<sup>26</sup> Fay Vincent, interview by author.

<sup>27</sup> Andro is now commonly referred to as a steroid precursor.

<sup>28</sup> Rader, *Baseball*, 270.

<sup>29</sup> Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 113.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>31</sup> Rosen, 106.

activity.<sup>32</sup> To get around this, according to one baseball insider, “teams might indicate PED use . . . through other language. For example, a report on a player might be ‘This player altered his diet and gained 25 pounds’ or something to that nature. That was their way of saying, ‘Hey, this guy is juicing.’”<sup>33</sup> This again shows that the highest priority of the teams’ front office was to get the right players on their team, thus winning more games, drawing more fans out to the ballpark, and accordingly making more money. Integrity mattered but obviously not as much as profits.

Additional evidence implicating ownership can be seen in the testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform in March 2005. First, Commissioner Selig concluded his prepared opening statement with the following, “Baseball will not rest and will continue to be vigilant on the issue of performance enhancing substances as we move toward my stated goal of zero-tolerance.”<sup>34</sup> However, during the question and answer portion, Congressman Patrick McHenry of North Carolina asked Selig a question that seemed to be a fastball right down the middle: would he accept a zero-tolerance, one-and-done policy if presented to him? Selig answered, “I can’t answer yes or no. I want a zero tolerance policy. I want tougher things. Whether once and done is fair is something I would have to think about. . . . I think that what we have done so far will discourage it [PED use]. I am really optimistic about this program.”<sup>35</sup> In his statement he claimed to want zero-tolerance, yet when asked under oath, with the threat of perjury looming, Selig would not confirm whether or not he *really* wanted it. It is quite a stretch to believe that as commissioner, with PED use rising in the game for the past decade, he had not yet thought about whether a zero-tolerance policy would be fair.

Additionally, in early 2005, Congress asked to see the new drug testing policy that, when announced by Commissioner Selig that January, he claimed to be a “historic” day and said the plan would rid baseball completely of PEDs.<sup>36</sup> However, the MLB would not give it to them. A few days later, a written letter was sent requesting the drug policy. However, the MLB still refused. Finally, it took a congressional subpoena for the

---

<sup>32</sup> While some PEDs were legal at times in the Steroid Era, possession, sale, or distribution of anabolic steroids had been against federal law since 1991.

<sup>33</sup> Sweeny Murti, interview by author, February 10, 2012. Sweeny is a beat reporter covering the New York Yankees for WFAN AM 660, the most prominent sports radio station for the tri-state area. He has held this position since the beginning of the 2001 season.

<sup>34</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball’s Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use*, 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 2005, H. Doc. 109-8, 286-287.

<sup>35</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring Faith in America’s Pastime*, 371.

<sup>36</sup> Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, *Game of Shadows: Barry Bonds, BALCO, and the Steroid Scandal that Rocked Professional Sports* (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 263.

members of the committee to see the new drug policy.<sup>37</sup> When asked why it took so much effort to produce the policy, baseball claimed that the policy had not been finished. However, Selig announced it in January, two months prior. Baseball's refusal to be policed by others was a strong indication that it could not police itself.

The final bit of evidence to show that ownership could not police itself additionally explains why they were so reluctant to produce their new drug policy to Congress: it was filled with loopholes. While appearing to establish a tough stance on PED use, the detailed language of this policy shows that this was actually far from the truth. It is more likely to have been a smokescreen to make outsiders believe that the problem was being addressed while in practice allowing PED use to continue. This evidence suggests not only that ownership was turning a blind eye, but that they may have even been trying to cover up PED use. The loopholes are as follows:

1. When tested, players must produce a certain amount of specimen; if that amount is not attained, the sample is thrown out. The subject may then leave for an hour unattended, after which they must come back and try again. In the Olympic testing, widely considered the gold standard for drug testing, the subject must be monitored at all times from when they are told they are being tested, until the sufficient specimen has been provided.<sup>38</sup> According to Dr. Charles Yesalis, there are "any number of ways" a player could use that one hour to beat the drug test.<sup>39</sup>
2. This policy was marketed by baseball as a test where the penalties for positive results are ten days for the first offense, thirty days for the second offense, sixty days for the third offense, one year for the fourth offense, and a life ban for the fifth offense (all suspensions without pay). Upon reading the fine print, however, for each respective offense the penalty also asserts: *or* up to a \$10,000 fine for the first offense, \$25,000, \$50,000, and \$100,000 respectively. Additionally, there was no clause stating that the player who tests positive *must* be named publicly. Therefore, a player's first positive test could result in

---

<sup>37</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring Faith in America's Pastime*, 336.

<sup>38</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring Faith in America's Pastime*, 305.

<sup>39</sup> Dr. Charles Yesalis, interview by author, March 5, 2012. One example cited by Dr. Yesalis was the use of a contraption hidden on the body either in a sleeve or in the pants to hold another person's clean urine. In 2005, Minnesota Vikings running back Onterio Smith was found to have one of these at an airport security screening known as "The Original Whizzinator." For more examples of how to beat drug tests on the spot, see Kirk Radomski's *Bases Loaded: The Inside Story of the Steroid Era in Baseball by the Central Figure in the Mitchell Report*, (New York: Hudson Street Press, 2009). On pages 30-34 Radomski explains how he not only took, but also got away with, a drug test for Dwight Gooden multiple times when Gooden would have tested positive for cocaine.

- a ten day suspension (loss of \$160,000 for an average salary due to the suspension) and public notification as a PED user. Or, the player could be fined \$10,000, not miss a game, and never face the worst part of the punishment, public scrutiny.<sup>40</sup>
3. The list of banned drugs is exclusive. Drug testing is an everlasting battle between the rogue chemist and the scientist, and as one baseball insider believes, “Chemists are always going to be ahead of the tests.”<sup>41</sup> The Olympic drug testing policy combats this by including in their drug testing policy the language to account for drugs not yet known. Any substance “of similar chemical composition that has a similar biological effect on the person taking the chemical, that [substance] is also banned as well.”<sup>42</sup> Because baseball does not have this, by the time the league has a test for particular designer steroids and bans them, the players will be on to the newest designer steroids just similar enough to have the same effects, but just different enough to not technically be banned.
  4. The new Anti-Oversight Clause: “Major League Baseball policy provides that this new policy ‘will be suspended immediately’ if there is an independent government investigation into drug use in baseball.”<sup>43</sup> It is very difficult to believe that the game will be policing itself when, if the government steps in, baseball can essentially push a self-destruct button on this drug policy. This clause is very telling as far as baseball’s intentions with this new drug testing policy.

The evidence is overwhelming that ownership went beyond turning a blind eye to PED use in the game to actually playing an active role in covering it up. Steroids and PEDs brought far too much money to the game for the owners to have it any other way. Dr. Yesalis’ view of sports may be jaded, but baseball in this era seemed to prove him right: “One thing that you have to dispel from your mind is that baseball is a sport. It’s not. It’s a business. It’s a huge business.”<sup>44</sup> Kirk Radomski, a member of the New York Mets clubhouse for nearly two decades, starting in 1985, confirms this view: “There was absolutely no doubt in my mind that just about everybody in the game, from the [clubhouse workers] to the team owners, knew that players were using anabolic steroids, human growth hormones, and other

---

<sup>40</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America’s Pastime*, 299.

<sup>41</sup> Marc Malusis, interview by author, February 4, 2012. Malusis is a well-known sports talk radio show host for WFAN AM 660 in New York.

<sup>42</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America’s Pastime*, 186.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 298.

<sup>44</sup> Dr. Charles Yesalis, interview with author.

substances.”<sup>45</sup> These circumstances thus created a scenario where it was the “foxes guarding the hen house.”<sup>46</sup> How many people expect the foxes to police themselves?

## The Press

*This idea that the media turned an eye because they were there every day and didn't see anything? Well, it's not like these guys pull their pants down and stab each other in the ass right in front of us.*

*-Sweeny Murti*

One of the most fundamental functions of the media in the United States is to be a watchdog for the American people. Dating all the way back to yellow journalism in the late 1800s, the press has exposed scams, lies, scandals, and wrongdoing of all kinds. This idea was further embedded into American society with the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in *The New York Times v. United States* which allowed the paper to publish the leaked Pentagon Papers.<sup>47</sup> To anyone who has ever turned the TV channel to ESPN, or read the newspaper from the back to the front, to say that the media covers the MLB might be something of an understatement. With few exceptions, the beat writers and reporters that spent more time with their team than they did their own families over the summer were not the right people to expose the story of PED use in the MLB. It is not that they passed on their civic duty to be a watchdog. Rather, the media allowed baseball to go unpoliced because they simply lacked the access, time, and will to do it.

Sweeny Murti joined the New York Yankees in 2001 as the beat reporter for WFAN, the most prominent sports talk radio station in New York and the surrounding area. He arrived two seasons removed from the historic home run race between Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa, yet still very much in the peak of the Steroid Era. He learned very quickly what all the other reporters were thinking: everyone suspected certain players used or were using steroids, but none had the time to pursue the suspicion. Plus, it was not worth the risk of writing or reporting about just suspicions. First of all, reporters really only spend a total of one hour per day in the clubhouse. Additionally, there are still areas of the clubhouse where reporters are not allowed.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> Kirk Radomski, *Bases Loaded*, 4.

<sup>46</sup> Dr. Charles Yesalis, interview with author.

<sup>47</sup> John M. Scheb, II and Otis H. Stephens, Jr, *American Constitutional Law: Sources of Power and Restraint*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed, (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2008), 187.

<sup>48</sup> Sweeny Murti, interview by author.

This is critically important as to why the media never got to reporting on steroids – they never saw anything. In his testimony before Congress in 2005, pitcher Curt Schilling made the comparison of player suspicions to “the discussion . . . you get on high school lunch breaks. You talk. You wonder. You speculate.”<sup>49</sup> If the players were speculating, it is logical to assume that the reporters were doing the same among themselves. Even Jose Canseco, the most forthcoming of all steroid users, would go into a bathroom stall when injecting himself or a teammate.<sup>50</sup> There had been plenty of newspaper articles written in the 1990s about suspected use, but none had any impact because there was no basis for the claims other than the author’s hunch. Furthermore, “the idea that a beat reporter could do extensive investigative reporting in the middle of the season is not realistic.”<sup>51</sup> Their work is extremely busy, and there is always a more pressing story to tell: a closer just blew a save, the clean-up hitter is slumping again, or the catcher has not caught a base stealer in over a week. In the process of doing their job, there was simply not the time to find the evidence and sources necessary to report a credible story regarding PED use.<sup>52</sup>

While time is one issue, maintaining relationships is an additional factor that inhibited the media from performing their watchdog duty. A beat writer’s livelihood is based on the relationships he or she has with the players on the team. It is walking enough of a fine line when he has to write negative comments about these players’ performance on the field, but throwing a player under the bus by accusing him of PED use will all but lose the reporter his or her job. This exact situation happened to Steve Wilstein, an Associated Press (AP) writer covering the St. Louis Cardinals in 1998, save for one glaring difference: he was right. He saw a bottle of andro in Mark McGwire’s locker, wrote about it, and *still* was banned from the locker room by manager Tony LaRussa and ostracized by his peers in the journalism industry.<sup>53</sup> If this can happen to a writer who had a basis for his claims, one can only wonder what would happen to a reporter who wrote a similar piece without evidence.

The first successful work of critical journalism on PED use in baseball was conducted when Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams of the *San Francisco Chronicle* broke the story about the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) which distributed undetectable designer drugs to many

---

<sup>49</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America’s Pastime*, 270.

<sup>50</sup> Jose Canseco, *Juiced: Wild Times, Rampant ‘Roids, Smash Hits, and how Baseball Got Big* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), 8.

<sup>51</sup> Mark Fainaru-Wada, interview by author.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> Rader, *Baseball*, 272.

high profile athletes. They were able to break this story because they were investigative reporters, not beat writers. This meant that they both had the time, and “[were] able to do their job and not care about what kind of access and relationship problems it created.”<sup>54</sup> Simply put, the media had the closest access to players who were using steroids. However, they still lacked access that could provide hard evidence to write a story. Additionally, they did not have sufficient time to search for such evidence, or the motivation to do so for fear of losing relationships with players; it was on these relationships which rested their primary responsibilities of reporting on baseball. Because of these reasons, the media could not perform its civic duty of exposing PED use in the game, thus another reason baseball went un-policed, forcing Congress to act.

---

<sup>54</sup> Sweeny Murti, interview with author.

## The Fans

*If you walked up to a father walking his kid into a ballgame in PacBell Park and said 'Will you let your kid use steroids to perform in baseball?' the father of course is going to say no. But . . . you can be sure that when Bonds came to the plate and hit a ball 450 feet into the water, that guy and his kid were going crazy despite knowing what they know.*

*-Mark Fainaru-Wada*

The MLB fan has as storied a history as the game itself. In no other sport are fans as close to the game, or even so much a part of the game. Individuals in the crowd such as Steve Bartman and Jeffrey Maier have infamously reached into the field of play to alter not just a game, but a playoff series as well as the fortune of teams for a decade.<sup>55</sup> In Chicago and Baltimore respectively, their names provoke emotions paralleled only by the name Benedict Arnold in late 1780. Beyond the individual fan, it is the mass of the patrons who love, follow, study, and argue about the game. It is the fans who pay increasingly astronomical prices to support the teams they cherish at the ballpark. Many people wonder how firefighters, policemen, and teachers can make such low wages compared to the figures made by professional ballplayers. Yet the answer could not be simpler: ultimately, it is the fans who pay their salaries and the fans cannot stay away from the game. During the Steroid Era, fans knew that PED use was rampant by players in the game, cared about the effects of players using the drugs, and yet continued to turn out to ballparks in record-setting numbers. It is because the fans did not rebel against PED use by voting with their feet that they failed to police the game using their agency of attendance.

It is difficult to prove what millions of people knew or did not know. However, the evidence with regard to PED use in baseball is so strong that for even a casual fan to *not* know about the existence of drugs in the game, one must have lived in a cave to truthfully profess ignorance. The following timeline displays critical events that exposed PED use in baseball very publicly for fans to see:

---

<sup>55</sup> Tom Jones, "Baseball's Most Famous Fan-Interference Plays: Jeffrey Maier and Steve Bartman," *Tampa Bay Times*, May 4, 2009, <http://www.tampabay.com/sports/baseball/rays/article998054.ece> (accessed April 8, 2012). In 2003, Steve Bartman interfered with a play that led to the Cubs losing what would have been a pennant-clinching game. They went on to lose the next two games, thus losing the series and squandering their chance to play in the World Series. Since that incident, the Cubs have been one of the worst teams in baseball, save for the 2007-2008 season, when they won the NL Central. In 1996, Jeffrey Maier interfered with a play that cost the Orioles a playoff game against the Yankees in Yankee Stadium. The Orioles also went on to lose that series, and have been to the playoffs only one time in the fifteen years since that occurrence.

| Date          | Event   |
|---------------|---|
| August 1998   | AP reporter Steve Wilstein produces article claiming that Cardinals slugger Mark McGwire had a bottle of androstenedione in his locker. The publicity of this event caused Cardinals manager Tony LaRussa to ban Wilstein from the locker room, and Commissioner Bud Selig to fund a Harvard study looking into the effects of andro. <sup>56</sup>   |
| June 2002     | <i>Sports Illustrated's</i> Tom Verducci writes a seven page article looking into the pervasiveness of PEDs in baseball. Included in this article is a confession by 1996 NL MVP Ken Caminiti that he used steroids during his MVP season. Furthermore Caminiti estimates that 50% of major league ballplayers use PEDs. <sup>57</sup>  |
| December 2003 | Big name players including Barry Bonds and Jason Giambi testify before a grand jury regarding their involvement in the BALCO scandal. It was later discovered through leaked testimony that both Giambi and Bonds had admitted to steroid use. Bonds, however, claimed that he did not know the substances were steroids when taking them. <sup>58</sup>  |
| January 2004  | President George W. Bush declares during his State of the Union Address that drugs in sports must be cleaned up to return integrity and fairness to the athletic fields. <sup>59</sup>  |
| February 2005 | Jose Canseco publishes tell-all book <i>Juiced!</i> in which he discusses his view on steroids, takes credit for introducing them to the game, and claims that everyone should take PEDs. In the book he estimates that 80% of MLB ballplayers use PEDs. The book creates a whirlwind of publicity. Because of its stunning accusations, many people in baseball trying to protect the game portray Canseco to be an unreliable, disgruntled former player looking to make money. Time has proven Canseco to be very credible on the issues in his book related to PED use. |

These are just the most noteworthy of public events that informed the fan base as to the prevalence of PEDs in baseball, and they were very

<sup>56</sup> Rader, *Baseball*, 272.

<sup>57</sup> Verducci, "Totally Juiced." I have chosen to disregard any player's estimations of the percent of players using PEDs as evidence. First, it is hard to believe that memory is good enough to give an accurate estimate. Second, this is completely subjective, and there is no way to compare different estimates. What does that particular person consider a PED? Lastly, former Yankees pitcher David Wells once gave an estimate of around 50% of MLB players using PEDs. He was later "convinced" to change his estimate a few days later to around 20%. There is no way to control all the variables when evaluating this evidence, so for these reasons I will only report the numbers claimed by these players, not use the numbers themselves as evidence.

<sup>58</sup> Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, "What Bonds Told BALCO Grand Jury," *San Francisco Chronicle*, December 3, 2004. <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/12/03/BALCO.TMP&ao=all> (accessed April 8, 2012).

<sup>59</sup> Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 310.

effective in alerting the masses to the depth and breadth of the problem. For example, Linda Ruth Tosetti, the granddaughter of Babe Ruth, is a frequent patron at Yankee Stadium to watch baseball. As Barry Bonds closed in on her grandfather's career mark of 714 home runs, the San Francisco Giants organization repeatedly reached out, asking for her attendance at the Giants games to be on hand for the record-breaking home run. Yet she claimed, "My family and I believed that he used steroids, so we wouldn't go."<sup>60</sup> However, she still attended many other baseball games that year. This attitude is crucial in understanding how attendance numbers continued to rise regardless of fan knowledge about PED use: everyone knew it was going on but always assumed it was the players on the other teams.

Yet for all this evidence, the strongest of all is also the most difficult to quantify. Baseball, more so than any sport, is a numbers game. Fans of the game obsess over even the most detailed of statistics. It is quite common to find patrons at an MLB game putting down their peanuts and beer after every pitch to keep the scorecard of the game. Because of this obsession with statistics and how they compare to the past, it is simply not possible that the new power numbers being put up could be accepted as clean. Furthermore, the home run record was one of the most, if not *the* most, cherished records in the game. Roger Maris hit sixty-one home runs in 1961. It was not until 1998 that anyone reached sixty again; yet in three of the next four years, Cubs slugger Sammy Sosa hit a minimum of sixty-three home runs without leading the league in any of those years.<sup>61</sup> In 2001, Barry Bonds hit seventy-three home runs yet in no other year had he ever reached fifty.<sup>62</sup> Dr. Yesalis felt that anyone around the game during the Steroid Era who claimed not to know what was going on was a "moron."<sup>63</sup> With such knowledgeable and statistic-oriented fans, there is simply no way the fans were blind to PED use in baseball.

Further evidence to show that baseball fans knew about PED use in the game also proves the assumption that they cared about it as well. In 2004, a Harris poll of American adults showed that 84% of the respondents believed that players who were found to be using PEDs should be punished.<sup>64</sup> One year later, a *USA Today*/CNN/Gallup poll showed that 82%

---

<sup>60</sup> Linda Ruth Tosetti, lecture to MA488 class, West Point, NY, February 10, 2012.

<sup>61</sup> *Baseball Reference*, "Sammy Sosa Statistics and History,"

<http://www.baseballreference.com/players/s/sosasa01.shtml> (accessed April 9, 2012). 1998: Mark McGwire hit 70 and Sosa hit 66. 1999: McGwire hit 65 and Sosa hit 63. 2001: Barry Bonds hit 73 and Sosa hit 64.

<sup>62</sup> *Baseball Reference*, "Barry Bonds Statistics and History,"

<http://www.baseballreference.com/players/b/bondsba01.shtml> (accessed April 9, 2012).


<sup>63</sup> Dr. Yesalis, interview with author.

<sup>64</sup> Rader, *Baseball*, 279.

of fans felt that any records set by players using PEDs should either be eliminated from the books or noted with an asterisk.<sup>65</sup>

Additional evidence that MLB fans cared about PED use in the game can be seen in the treatment of San Francisco Giants slugger Barry Bonds by opposing fans. The boos and jeers targeted at Bonds while playing road games reached decibel levels generally reserved by a NASA rocket launch. Fans got creative with signs such as: “RUTH DID IT ON HOT DOGS AND BEER. AARON DID IT WITH CLASS. HOW DID YOU DO IT?” and “BONDS, FIRST INTO THE HALL OF SHAME.” Others were less subtle: “BARRY IS A CHEATER” and “ASTERISK.”<sup>66</sup> In one instance, a fan at Petco Park in San Diego even threw a needleless syringe at the outfielder as he was running into the dugout between innings.<sup>67</sup> Dr. Yesalis claims that only “we old-timers” greater than fifty years of age care about PED use in the game.<sup>68</sup> Barry Bonds would likely disagree. The evidence shows that fans *did* care about rampant PED use in the game – apparently just not enough to stop showing up to the ballpark.

The agency of MLB fans is that they pay the salaries of the players. They were the reason that ownership had a financial incentive to turn a blind eye. This chart shows the attendance figures of an average MLB game from 1990 to 2011:



69

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> “Fan at Petco Tosses Syringe Near Bonds,” *NBCSports*, April 5, 2006, <http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/12141859/> (accessed April 22, 2012).

<sup>68</sup> Dr. Yesalis, interview with author.

<sup>69</sup> *Ballparks of Baseball*.

This graph is very telling about baseball fans during the Steroid Era. They knew what was going on, but as the graph shows, continued to flock to the ballpark at record rates. From the return after the strike in 1995 until the beginning of the economic depression in 2008, there is only one year with a significant dip in attendance. Even that could potentially be attributed to fans staying away from mass gatherings after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Never has the quote from legendary Detroit Tigers manager Sparky Anderson been more true than regarding fan attendance of games during the Steroid Era, “We’ve tried and tried to ruin this game, and we just can’t do it.”<sup>70</sup> Accounts of PED use in baseball were rampant in the national media throughout the Steroid Era. Furthermore, the typical baseball fan is statistically-savvy, and the power numbers from this era could not be ignored or denied. Thus, not only did fans know about PED use in the game, but the treatment of suspected user Barry Bonds by opposing fans showed that it bothered them as well. Yet attendance figures at games show that fans did not rebel against PED use in the game; if anything it appears that they did the opposite. Because the fans would not police the game by avoiding the ballpark based on principle, Congress was forced to take action.

## The Players

*I’m not here to talk about the past.  
-Mark McGwire*

While ownership set the conditions for PED use to exist and flourish, the media was too handcuffed to do anything about it, and the fans condoned it with their attendance at games, ultimately it was the players themselves who made the decision to use PEDs. While the players’ decision to take these drugs may not have been ethical, they were in many ways logical. As Rico Brogna, a journeyman first baseman whose career spanned from 1992-2001 put it, “the pressure to perform, it’s real. You’re competing not just for your position [on the team] but also with guys around the league.”<sup>71</sup> While baseball is a game many players love, it is a job for all of them. Regardless of what industry one works in, job security is essential, and anything that might help attain that is worth considering, if not trying. Furthermore, this is a job with so much on the line, “especially when you see the money at stake, [players] are always going to try.”<sup>72</sup> Regardless of why many players chose

---

<sup>70</sup> Sparky Anderson, as quoted in Rader, *Baseball*, 280.

<sup>71</sup> Rico Brogna, interview by author, March 1, 2012.

<sup>72</sup> Sweeny Murti, interview by author.

to use PEDs, the strength of the baseball player fraternity is the ultimate reason that the players themselves failed to police the game.

The fraternity of the baseball clubhouse is something that few people get to experience, and even fewer can understand. While one can make assumptions about what this fraternity is like, Kirk Radomski experienced it. After being ostracized from baseball, he no longer had a reason to keep to himself, and his description from the perspective of a clubhouse worker speaks volumes about the culture: “While working there, I learned the only rules that mattered to clubbies: do whatever the players, managers, and coaches ask you to do. And keep your mouth shut about everything you do, you see, and you hear. What happens in the clubhouse is private. The first time you talk about it might well be your last time.”<sup>73</sup> This culture points to the trend that once you become part of the club, what you do stays within the club members even if it is wrong. Another example of the baseball fraternity can be seen in the reaction of Jason Giambi’s fellow Yankees after it was leaked that he had taken an undetectable designer steroid, THG. Giambi had cheated the game, the players who came before him, and the fans. Most of all, he cheated his fellow players. All players claim that they want a level playing field.<sup>74</sup> By using the drugs, he had put himself on a playing field that was not level. The Yankees players’ reaction? According to Sweeny Murti, “They rallied around him.”<sup>75</sup> How can it be expected that the players will police themselves, when even a member who has been caught cheating them is still rallied around because he is part of that fraternity?

This culture of protecting each other even when it means undermining the integrity of the game is not exclusive to the use of performance enhancing drugs. Jason Grimsley was a pitcher who had not just become a client of Kirk Radomski but a friend as well. In 1994, he was a member of the Cleveland Indians and a teammate of Albert Belle – a slugger known around the league for occasionally using a corked bat. After one at-bat, the home plate umpire, suspecting just that, confiscated Belle’s bat and had it locked in a storage room to be x-rayed the next day. According to Radomski, “To save his teammate from being suspended, Jason crawled

---

<sup>73</sup> Radomski, 10. Kirk Radomski was running probably the most widespread steroid and other PED distribution ring in the MLB. On December 15, 2005, Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Jeff Novitzky and his team searched Radomski’s home, and his life as a felon began. Radomski was offered a plea deal that did not include jail time if he cooperated with federal agents in their attempts to catch the ball players with whom Radomski had dealt. In doing so, the once well-connected Radomski was ostracized by the baseball community for working with the federal agents and naming players. For example, the famous raid on pitcher Jason Grimsley’s house was a result of a sting step up using Radomski. Once good friends, Grimsley has never spoken to Radomski since.

<sup>74</sup> Rico Brogna, interview by author.

<sup>75</sup> Sweeny Murti, interview by author.

through the air-conditioning duct, dropped into the room, and replaced the corked bat with a regular one. Thanks to Jason, Belle's bat came up clean."<sup>76</sup>

This is extremely telling for two reasons. First, this is nothing short of a black and white issue. Cork is illegal in baseball, and anyone who is caught with it in their bat is universally considered cheating, no questions asked.<sup>77</sup> Because of this, there is no defense for Grimsley's actions other than he was looking after his teammate. He knew Belle cheated, but helping him not get suspended was not only more important, it was worth crawling through air conditioning ducts for. What makes this even stronger is the fact that Grimsley is a pitcher. If another batter had hit a home run off of him with a corked bat, he would want justice. However, this was one of his guys, so compromising the best interest of those at his own position was worth ensuring his teammate was not suspended. When teammates actively helped each other cheat, it certainly cannot be expected that they would police themselves with regards to performance enhancing drugs.

Another example of the baseball fraternity can be seen from the players' testimony before Congress in 2005. A portion of Mark McGwire's both written and verbal opening statements are as follows, "What I will not do, however, is participate in naming names and implicating my friends and teammates . . . I have always been a team player. I have never been a person who has spread rumors or said things about my teammates that could hurt them."<sup>78</sup> When asked later about their obligation to their team if they knew a fellow player was using steroids, the panel of players put on one of the most spectacular displays of question dodging that Congress has likely ever seen:

CONGRESSMAN SHAYS: I would like to know the obligation that each of you think you have for your team to make sure you don't have drugs being used by teammates. Let's start with you, Mr. Schilling.

CURT SCHILLING: Well, my obligation first is to the Lord and to my family, my family name, above any of my teammates that I have ever had.

---

<sup>76</sup> Radomski, 155.

<sup>77</sup> There has been only one corked bat incident in the past decade. Ironically it was Chicago Cubs slugger and strongly suspected PED user Sammy Sosa, who, after an at-bat that also ended in a broken bat, had cork found in the bat. While many considered him a cheater to begin with, because of his suspected PED use, this only cemented his status as a cheater. His defense was that he accidentally had taken a bat used for batting practice to the plate. When the rest of his bats from the game were confiscated and x-rayed, none were found to have cork in them. However, as seen in the Grimsley evidence, it is difficult to believe that the bats actually scanned were the exact other bats that were his for the game. For a more in-depth discussion on corked bats and an example of a planned effort to not get caught with a corked bat, see Radomski, *Bases Loaded*, 12-13.

<sup>78</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America's Pastime*, 223.

CONGRESSMAN SHAYS: Ok. What do you think the Lord would want you to do?

SCHILLING: To be as truthful and honest as you could be and had to be.

CONGRESSMAN SHAYS: Do you feel that means you should confront, even privately, your colleagues that are using them, drugs?

SCHILLING: I think that varies with different people.

RAFAEL PALMEIRO: I am not sure how I would handle that. I have never had that problem. You know, if it became a problem, I guess I would confront the player.

MARK MCGWIRE: I agree. I have never had that problem. And being retired and out of the game, I couldn't even think about that.

CONGRESSMAN SHAYS: Never had the problem of seeing your colleagues use drugs?

MCGWIRE: Pardon me?

CONGRESSMAN SHAYS: Never had a problem of seeing your colleagues use drugs, steroids; is that what you mean? I don't know what you mean by you never had that problem.

MCGWIRE: I am not going to get into the past.

CONGRESSMAN SHAYS: Ok, I'm not really asking about the past. Mr. Sosa, what obligation do you think that you have to your team if you are aware that someone is using drugs on your team?

SAMMY SOSA: I am a private person, I don't really go, you know, ask people whether they –

CONGRESSMAN SHAYS: I will just conclude by saying I think I know your answer, sir. It seems to me that one of the messages you may be telling young people is that a team player – it's an interesting concept of a team player, it seems to me [*sic*].<sup>79</sup>

---

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 266.

The tightness of the baseball fraternity can be seen in the words of the players, essentially telling Congress that, no, they would not do anything if they knew a teammate was cheating. However, this tightness goes beyond having each others' backs to the point of apathy. Says one current player of the PED users, "Personally, I could care less. They're the ones doing it and getting in trouble, that's their decision."<sup>80</sup> Rico Brogna echoed this sentiment that in the late 1990s, "everyone was doing something." In fact, it had been other players who introduced andro to him.<sup>81</sup> This is critical in understanding why the players themselves could not police the game of baseball. The fraternity is not just, "I got my guys' backs." It is more like, "I know this goes on in the game, and I just don't care. Even if I don't know them, I don't care and I won't do anything about it." Furthermore, Jose Canseco notes that he would have players he did not know come up to him and ask for help with steroids because they knew his reputation.<sup>82</sup> This was a culture where a player could go up to another player, one with whom he is not familiar at all, and freely discuss the topic of procuring illegal drugs and know that not only will he not get questioned, but that he will get what he needs. This speaks volumes to both the breadth and the depth of the fraternity of baseball players, and why that is the reason the players failed to police themselves.

## The Union

*You cannot defeat this union.*  
-Fay Vincent, former MLB Commissioner

The fraternity of baseball players was so strong that it extended beyond just the baseball field. The MLBPA might be the most powerful union in the world, regardless of nation, regardless of industry. Founder Marvin Miller had remarkable success building up this union from scratch. Accustomed to a baseball world pre-union where they had free range, the owners became more and more disgruntled with the pesky MLBPA. In 1985, ownership demanded a salary cap to the point where the players went on strike over it. Two days later, the owners broke, dropping their demands. Dismayed from yet another embarrassing loss to the union, the owners

---

<sup>80</sup> Nick Markakis, interview by author, February 8, 2012. Markakis is currently the starting right fielder for the Baltimore Orioles.

<sup>81</sup> Rico Brogna, interview by author. There is an important note with this quote. When Rico says that everyone was doing "something," that does not mean that everyone was taking illegal drugs. He emphasizes that andro (which was legal at the time) was common, and that creatine (which is still legal) was in nearly every player's locker.

<sup>82</sup> Jose Canseco, *Vindicated: Big Names, Big Liars, and the Battle to Save Baseball* (New York: Simon Spotlight Entertainment, 2008), 2.

responded with collusion, an arbitrary salary cap under which they agreed not to pay players over a particular amount.<sup>83</sup> It was “the most egregious breaking of trust in baseball history . . . any chance of civility on the part of the players was destroyed.”<sup>84</sup> The union leader at the time was Donald Fehr, who remained the head during the Steroid Era. The owner who rallied the others to the call of collusion was then the owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, Alan “Bud” Selig, also the commissioner of baseball through the Steroid Era. The most important reason that baseball could not police itself during the Steroid Era was because of this union. The toxic relationship between the union and management, as a result of collusion, prevented any progress being made to clean up the sport.

Dr. Elliot Pellman was the medical advisor to Commissioner Selig in 2005. Prior to his work with MLB, Dr. Pellman spent nearly a decade with the NFL. He noted that the fundamental difference between the two organizations was the nature of the relationship between management and the union. The NFL and its union made up “truly a partnership between management and the Players’ Association . . . in terms of priorities.” Meanwhile, he used the phrase “wide, wide schism” when describing the relationship between baseball and its union. Dr. Pellman implied that the NFL did not have nearly as much of an issue with PEDs because the ownership-labor situation allowed the league to deal with PEDs swiftly when they first became a problem.<sup>85</sup> In MLB, this was not the case.

Commissioner Selig unilaterally implemented a drug testing program in 2001 for the minor leagues. He was able to do this because minor league baseball players do not fall under the jurisdiction of the MLBPA. While he wanted to apply it to the majors as well, the union used its leverage with other Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) issues to force Selig to drop the issue at the time.<sup>86</sup> The union fought to keep testing out of the majors for two main reasons (apart from the ever present reason to just stick it to the ownership). First, union leaders maintained that steroids simply were not much of an issue. In fact, they cited that cigarettes were far more harmful than were steroids.<sup>87</sup> Yet the biggest issue that the union clung to was that testing was a matter of privacy. If baseball had probable cause that a player was using PEDs, he could be tested. Otherwise, it was a violation of the player’s civil liberties and 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment right to privacy.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore,

---

<sup>83</sup> Rader, *Baseball*, 216.

<sup>84</sup> Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 42.

<sup>85</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America’s Pastime*, 189-190.

<sup>86</sup> Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, *S. 1114, The Clean Sports Act of 2005, and S. 1334, The Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act*, 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 2005, H. Doc. 109-525, 54.

<sup>87</sup> Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 264.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 259.

random drug testing established a presumed guilt among the players. The MLBPA would not budge from these stances until pressured from Congress.

Because of this, Commissioner Selig sounded like a broken record in front of Congress. Every question posed to him as to why baseball did not act sooner or more effectively, his response was similar to, “That is the negotiated policy. That is the best we could do in collective bargaining. This is collective bargaining . . . the penalties would be much tougher if I had it my way.”<sup>89</sup> Earlier in the hearing, Congressman Henry Waxman of California posed the question to union leader Don Fehr that the commissioner wants a tougher drug policy, and many players have said they want a tougher drug policy, so would he support it? After dodging the question as the players had done so well before him, he added a quote that is very telling about the stance of the union at the time: “our job with violations of substance abuse is not to destroy careers.”<sup>90</sup> It is no wonder that former Commissioner Fay Vincent was adamant that “the MLBPA has no interest in the integrity of the game.”<sup>91</sup>

Rico Brogna points out that the union’s attempt to inhibit action by the owners is not unique to the steroid issue. Regardless of topic, the players would not budge an inch anywhere, because the effects of collusion were still being felt. There was a “feeling among players that we’re not going to give in . . . we’ve worked so hard for 30-40 years, with all the strikes, all the labor issues, anything the players have accomplished through negotiations, we’re going to keep.”<sup>92</sup> This sentiment showed itself when Fehr was asked if he would go back to the players following the hearing and ask for a stronger drug testing policy:

DONALD FEHR: As I indicated before, I will report fully the sentiments here today, both the testimony at the hearing and the comments that have come from the Members; and I want to consult with my membership.

CONGRESSMAN GUTKNECHT: That’s an interesting answer. The question is, will you go back to your members and ask for a new vote?

FEHR: I will go back to my members, and I will consult with them. That is the most I can do.<sup>93</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America’s Pastime*, 337.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 335.

<sup>91</sup> Fay Vincent, interview by author.

<sup>92</sup> Rico Brogna, interview by author.

<sup>93</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America’s Pastime*, 363.

To translate, Fehr is both avoiding perjury while saying, “no, I will not ask the union to concede anything to management.” Essentially as Rico Brogna puts it, “the players have come so far with this labor contract stuff that we can’t just give it back.”<sup>94</sup> There was truly no hope of baseball policing itself when there was such bitterness between the union and management.

The most egregious example of the union blocking attempts by the Commissioner to begin cleaning up the game can be seen through the handling of the drug ephedra. The timeline for ephedra is as follows:

| <b>Date</b>       | <b>Event</b>  |
|-------------------|---|
| 1997              | NCAA bans ephedra   |
| May 2001          | NFL bans ephedra, players who test positive will be suspended for four games.   |
| February 17, 2003 | Orioles pitcher Steve Bechler dies during spring training, ephedra is thought to be the cause.  |
| February 22, 2003 | Commissioner Bud Selig asks that ephedra be banned from baseball.   |
| February 27, 2003 | MLB announces that ephedra is banned in <i>minor league</i> baseball (where the MLBPA has no jurisdiction).   |
| March 14, 2003    | Toxicology reports confirm ephedra was a contributing factor to the death of Bechler.   |
| March 29, 2003    | MLBPA head Don Fehr is quoted in <i>The Los Angeles Times</i> , “We have a real hard time saying that if you can walk into a store and buy something . . . do I have the right to tell a 35-year-old guy he can’t? If a substance is so dangerous it ought not to be used by anyone, then it ought to be prohibited.” |
| February 11, 2004 | FDA issues final ruling banning substances containing ephedra.  |
| January 2005      | After reopening the Collective Bargaining Agreement, MLB includes ephedra among banned substance for new drug testing policy.   |

95

This timeline shows that the MLBPA blocked league attempts to ban the use of ephedra until it was found to be a banned substance by the government, even after one of their own players died from it. This shows that sticking it to the ownership was more important to the union than the safety of its constituents. Furthermore, Fehr’s argument that the substance was not

<sup>94</sup> Rico Brogna, interview by author.

<sup>95</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America’s Pastime*, 341-342.

federally banned, so it should not be banned by baseball, is insulting in its weakness. As broadcaster Bob Costas properly pointed out, “Cork is not illegal, neither is saliva. But when used a certain way in the context of baseball, it absolutely is illegal.”<sup>96</sup> The refusal of the MLBPA to consider banning a substance while it was still federally legal – even though all other professional sports had – is very indicative of why baseball neglected to police itself, thus forcing Congress to intervene.<sup>97</sup>

The management-labor relationship is astoundingly deplorable and all thanks to collusion. Even after the congressional hearing in 2005, the standoff continued. Commissioner Selig authorized an intense investigation by former Senator George Mitchell into PED use in baseball. Included in the final report was this:

The Players Association was largely uncooperative. It rejected my requests for relevant documents . . . I sent a memorandum to every active player in MLB encouraging each player to contact me or my staff if he had any relevant information. The Players Association sent out a companion memorandum that effectively discouraged players from cooperating. Not one player contacted me in response to my memorandum.<sup>98</sup>

If there was any doubt as to the power of the MLBPA, this would put it to rest. According to Mark Fainaru-Wada, “The fact that baseball would launch an investigation into this era and that not a single player would cooperate with them . . . speaks volumes about everything you need to know”<sup>99</sup> regarding the management-labor relationship and the power of the union.

Perhaps the most damning evidence can be seen in comments given by then-MLBPA head Fehr in another Congressional hearing just six months after the March 2005 hearing. This hearing, held in front of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, was attended by the commissioners and union chiefs of all four major sports – MLB, NFL, NHL, and NBA – with the purpose to determine whether the government should

---

<sup>96</sup> Bob Costas, quoted in *Juicing the Game*, 142.

<sup>97</sup> The MLBPA handled the steroid DHEA in very much the same fashion. At the time, it was considered an anabolic steroid by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). Because of this, Rob Manfred explains that MLB actually lobbied to Congress to get it put on the list of banned substances under the Steroid Control Act. Only when this happened would the commissioner have the leverage to ban the drug from baseball. See House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America's Pastime*, 366.

<sup>98</sup> House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, *The Mitchell Report: The Illegal Use of Steroids in Major League Baseball*, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 2008, H. Doc. 110-206, 37.

<sup>99</sup> Mark Fainaru-Wada, interview by author.

pass legislation to take over drug testing for all major sports.<sup>100</sup> At one point, Fehr responded to the charge that he was the only one standing in the way of fixing PED use and restoring integrity to baseball by saying, “My obligation as a representative of the players, both generally and under the National Labor Relations Act, is to negotiate on their behalf what they believe to be an appropriate and fair agreement under all circumstances.”<sup>101</sup> After briefly questioning Commissioner Selig, Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota turned back to Fehr:

SENATOR DORGAN: Mr. Upshaw (union leader for NFL players) made the point that I’d written down somewhere that the football players believe taking drugs is cheating and they want cheaters out of football. I would assume that baseball players would feel exactly the same way and if they don’t, I’m surprised. If they do feel the same way, it’s strange that we haven’t gotten to the point where this is solved, so that you don’t have to come to the Congress about it, or that we don’t have to call you in.

FEHR: Would you like me to respond?

SENATOR DORGAN: Yes I’d be happy to.

FEHR: Thank you, Senator . . . the players of course feel that way, they always have.<sup>102</sup>

It is difficult to overstate the gravity of the combination of these quotes. When analyzing both statements from Fehr, it is clear that he condemned himself, leaving no wonder that he tried to avoid giving a comment. He adamantly declared that his role was to represent the players for *what they believe*. He then went on to say that not only did all players believe PED users to be cheaters and that they wanted cheaters out of the game, he says that they *always did*. Yet still Fehr continued to be the primary obstacle to an effective drug testing policy, which would have gotten cheaters out of the game. Unless he is lying, the only possible explanation for Fehr to neglect

---

<sup>100</sup> While all major sports were represented, this hearing was clearly focused towards baseball’s slow reaction to fixing the PED problem in their sport. The three other sports were publicly commended for their stance on PED use, seemingly to shame the MLB for its continued feet-dragging on the issue. In fact, at one instance in the hearing it was pointed out that, if the government applied their proposed testing policy across all sports (the one designed to significantly strengthen the MLB policy), it would actually weaken the current testing policy of the NFL.

<sup>101</sup> Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. 1114, *The Clean Sports Act of 2005*, and S. 1334, *The Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act*, 54.

<sup>102</sup> Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, S. 1114, *The Clean Sports Act of 2005*, and S. 1334, *The Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act*, 54-55.

his self-declared obligation to represent the players is that he would do anything to oppose efforts of Commissioner Selig due to their long-standing vile relationship.

The collusion scandal in the late 1980s was the driving factor behind the cancerous relationship between the MLB and MLBPA. According to former MLB Commissioner Fay Vincent, “It drove a stake into any hope that there could be a relationship of trust between the owners and the union.”<sup>103</sup> PED use in baseball had proven to be a monumental infection within the game that Americans hold so dearly. Of all the avenues that baseball could have policed itself, none could have been more effective than an agreement between the players and the owners. However, because collusion resulted in a bitter lack of trust and borderline hatred between the two, baseball could not overcome the bad blood between management and the union.

## Conclusion

*You have told us baseball doesn't have a major problem, but Kevin Towers has made it clear there is a major problem... I think that whoever makes the decision for baseball [should] look at the situation we are in and see if it is time for new leadership, because I don't think baseball is doing what it should have been doing for all these years on the steroid problem.*

*-Congressman Henry A. Waxman*

Baseball holds a special place in American society. Even if football has taken over as the most popular sport in this country, baseball will always be the “national pastime.” Even since its beginning around the time of the Civil War, baseball has always been a microcosm of America, mirroring its every move. As leisure time became available in the “roaring twenties,” baseball played games specifically designed so that laborers who worked six days a week had access to a game. During the Second World War, baseball supported the war effort along with the rest of the nation by sending its own players to fight and by hosting all-star games with all proceeds going to fund the war. The game was slightly ahead of society as far as integrating blacks, with Jackie Robinson breaking the color barrier a few decades before the Civil Rights movement. As improvements in planes, trains, and cars made coast-to-coast movement possible, baseball did too as the Giants and Dodgers took root in California in the late 1950s.<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> Fay Vincent, interview by author.

<sup>104</sup> *Cooperstown Symposium on Baseball and the American Culture*, 2002, William M. Simons, ed. (Jefferson: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2002), 174.

Maybe the most important parallel between baseball and American society is that baseball reflects the “American Dream” that, if you work hard, you can provide for your family. Baseball has always been a potential outlet for lower class Americans to provide a better life for their kids and future generations. Nowhere is this more evident than the legendary Babe Ruth who rose to stardom after humble beginnings in Baltimore being raised by parents who were German immigrants.<sup>105</sup> Even today, some players grow up in poverty-stricken Latin American countries and, with one major league contract, can make a life for themselves and their families.

This is the real crime in the Steroid Era. It cuts at the most cherished aspect of the American national pastime, and everyone is to blame. Because of PEDs in baseball, no longer are the most talented and hardest working players the role models, but rather those who have the best chemists.<sup>106</sup> Furthermore, these substances erode the treasured connection to the past, specifically those who did it with hard work. Dr. Charles Yesalis looked up to Mickey Mantle as a hero in his childhood. It is his feeling that players who use PEDs cheat Mantle, and that enrages him the most.<sup>107</sup> In late 2007, the real home run king, Hank Aaron, was asked about his feelings towards Barry Bonds closing in on his all-time home run record of 755; his answer spoke volumes: “I’m making a comment by not making a comment.”<sup>108</sup>

There are so many aspects to the Steroid Era that it was difficult not to digress often. Fortunately, this leads to many other potential future studies. For example, this work was only able to gloss over the effectiveness of drug testing. This question of effectiveness could be an entire work on its own, with some people believing that drug testing is worthless, some believing that its use is in being a deterrent, and some believing that a drug test is an IQ test. Another future study could look further into the parallel of baseball’s increased steroid use with the increased use of steroids in American society. Others could look into when baseball “lost its innocence” with the American public. When did baseball players become professional athletes; was it when the union was created? Was it when free agency became legal? What effect did this “perform for money” change have on the game? Could that be the main catalyst in PED use? Lastly, collusion needs to be explored much further. If a former commissioner of the league

---

<sup>105</sup> Linda Ruth Tosetti, lecture.

<sup>106</sup> I am not advocating that players today do not work hard, and I am also not advocating that players who work hard but do not take PEDs cannot make it into the major leagues. I am simply trying to emphasize the schism PEDs have cause in the parallel of baseball and American society with regards to the “Protestant work ethic.”

<sup>107</sup> Dr. Charles Yesalis, interview by author.

<sup>108</sup> Hank Aaron, quoted in Tim Dahlberg, “Life on Road Not Fun and Games for Bonds,” *NBCSports*, August 1, 2007, <http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/20062973/> (accessed April 8, 2012).

believes that it is the most important event in the past half-century of the game, it should certainly be better understood by baseball fans.

On March 17, 2005, the House Committee on Government Reform convened to review the MLB's efforts to eliminate PEDs from the game. Some people felt that Congress had better things to do than discuss baseball, but Congressional leaders justified the inquisition for two reasons. First, steroid use was having a terrible impact on the nation's youth with regards to drug abuse.<sup>109</sup> Second, the MLB is a multibillion dollar industry with teams spread all over the country, and Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states explicitly that Congress has the right to regulate interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the fact remains: baseball let PED use get to the point where Congress *had to* intervene because the game refused to police itself. Since the owners were making money off of it, they would not police themselves. The press did not have the time, and it was not worth the risk of exposing the cheaters. The fans knew what was going on, yet they condoned it by continuing to flock to the ballparks. The fraternity of ballplayers was too strong; they would not police themselves either. And most importantly, because of collusion, the relationship between the MLB and MLBPA was so toxic that they would rather fight each other than fight for the integrity of the game.

---

<sup>109</sup> House Committee on Government Reform, *Restoring the Faith in America's Pastime*, 9. At this hearing, two sets of parents testified regarding the loss of their sons due to steroid use. Additionally, statistical evidence was brought to show that up to 500,000 high school athletes may be using PEDs.



**West Point**<sup>®</sup>  

---

The United States Military Academy