

Yes, I Have No Bananas: The Guatemalan Insurgency

Agenda

- Assumptions
- Background
- Theory
- Strategy
- Operational Template
- Battlefield Operating Systems
- The System
- Conclusion

Assumptions

- General Understanding of:
 - History, Politics (1944-1954)
 - the Operational Template
 - Battlefield Operation Systems
 - Leites' and Wolf's System

Bottom Line Up Front

- The Guatemalan/American insurgency of 1954 was a short term success but a long term failure because the insurgents were unable to demobilize the Guatemalan society.

Background

- Big three US corporations
 - Monopoly
 - Economic destruction
 - Political Power
- Land issues
 - Distribution
 - Unused Land
- Ubico to Arevalo to Arbenz to Armas

Theory

- **Structuralist (State-Centered)**
- States shape civil society: Land reform is Guatemala's driving issue (state constructionist perspective)
- How revolutions form: unpopular economic arrangement sponsored by the state
- State is unable to maintain its security
- Shortcomings of structuralist theory: networks, privately owned companies unexplained

Strategy

- High Profile
 - At the Presidential level
 - CIA
 - Ambassadors
- Inside Out
 - Straight to the problem
 - First Contact was open combat

Doctrinal Model

- Dynamics of Insurgencies
 - Environment/Geography
 - Ideology
- Organizational Pattern
 - Foco

Phases

- Organization
 - Trained in Honduras and Nicaragua on how to kill and fight
 - Equipped with arms and aviation support
- Demobilization
 - aftermath of Armas' rise to power
 - Insurgent force actually a politicized military
 - Problem of land reform unsolved

Battlefield Operating System

- Intelligence
 - Over 50 pre-determined targets
 - Ambassadors
- Mobility/Survivability
 - Ike's arms control
 - Murder How-Tos
- Command and Control
 - William Willauer

The System

Exogeny is a key component: CIA, United Fruit Company, U.S. government, sanctuary provided by Somoza

Inputs: money and weapons from United Fruit Company, training from CIA

Conversion mechanism: CIA training in Honduras

Outputs: Arbenz ousted in weeks


Authority: Armas legitimacy short lived

Tie to the Doctrinal Model:

External Support

1. Moral support
2. Support in international forums
3. Resources
4. Safe haven

Model



Conclusion

- Arbenz ousted, Armas installed
- United Fruit Company gets its land back
- Absolute rule of upper classes checked by unrest in the country.
- Some land reforms undone
- Civil war would continue

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