Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
“Mired in a Quagmire: Popular Interpretations of the Vietnam War,” Orbis, Vol. 57, No. 4, Autumn 2013.
“Out of Balance: Evaluating American Strategy in Vietnam, 1968–72,” War & Society, Vol. 32, No. 3, October 2013.
“The Myth of an American Attrition Strategy in the Vietnam War,” in and Antonio S. Thompson and Christos G. Frentzos eds., The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History, 1865 to the Present. New York: Routledge, 2013.
“‘A Better War?’ – The View from the Nixon White House,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, June 2013.
“Eating Soup with a Spoon: The U.S. Army as a ‘Learning Organization’ in the Vietnam War,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 77, No. 1, January 2013.