

# Conditional Effectiveness of Military and Civilian Human Security Effects

Dr. Sam Bell  
Kansas State University

Dr. Amanda Murdie  
Kansas State University

Patricia Blocksome  
Kansas State University

Kevin Brown  
Kansas State University

NOTE: This work/research was funded by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. The contents of this publication are solely the responsibility of the Grantee.

## 1 Statement of the Questions

In the aftermath of humanitarian disasters and conflict, both military- and civilian-led interventions appear to have mixed success. For example, military-led reconstruction efforts in South Korea have been long heralded for improving basic governance, human rights, and development outcomes within the state; however, military-led efforts in Haiti after its 1994 civil war have been widely critiqued for bringing limited improvements within the state (Orford 2003; Fortna 2004; Ell 2008). Similarly, civilian-led efforts, such as those led by international non-governmental organizations (hereafter INGOs), at improving human security outcomes in Bangladesh in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 have

been deemed successful; similar efforts in Bosnia, however, have been largely unsuccessful at both gaining local trust and improving ultimate human security outcomes (Phillips 2005; Murdie and Davis 2012; Jeffrey 2007).

What explains this variation? When and where are military-led reconstruction efforts likely to make an impact on the ground? When are civilian-led efforts likely to be successful? How do these sets of actors combine to influence human security in post-conflict and post-disaster situations? Although there exists a rich cross-disciplinary literature concerning both civilian and military intervention efforts, no extant research examines both the conditional effectiveness of these efforts and, more importantly, the various ways civilian and military efforts combine on the ground to conditionally improve human security outcomes.

Using a global sample of states experiencing either conflict or natural disasters from 1980 to 2010, this project focuses first on identifying the conditions necessary for both civilian- and military-led interventions to be successful in three critical aspects of human security: (a) keeping the peace between potential belligerents, (b) improving basic governance and human rights, and (c) improving development within a state (Paris 2001). Various conditioning factors are examined, including preexisting political conditions within the targeted state, monetary aid provided for the efforts, and diplomatic relations between the intervening country and the targeted state. Special attention is also paid to the first stage of the equation: identifying the conditions when intervention by civilian and military forces is likely (Fortna 2008).

Although this research identifies a rich set of scenarios where military-led reconstruction efforts are preferable to civilian-led interventions, the stated goal of many, if not all, humanitarian interventions is the successful turnover to local civilians. The second stage of this research effort examines the spell of time until this transition takes place. What factors speed up this transfer to civilian control? Conversely, what factors impede this transfer of control? This question has received very little attention in the cross-disciplinary literature and our efforts here represent a first cut at identifying the factors which speed up the transi-

tion process. In an ideal world, all transfers of control would be long lasting; however, this is typically not the case and our research here employs statistical tools to allow us to capture the “frailty” of these transitions (Hougaard 2000).

Below, we briefly review the basic approach to these research efforts. At this stage, we remain agnostic as to our particular research hypotheses and only mention the extant literature in passing. Future iterations will, of course, spend far more attention on the theoretical underpinnings of these potential relationships.

## **2 What determines the conditional effectiveness of civilian- and military-led interventions?**

This stage of the research will largely mirror the research framework that Murdie and Davis (2010) and Murdie and Davis (2012) used when studying military-led and civilian-led interventions on human security outcomes. This study differs in three key ways, however. First, the sample under consideration here concerns only cases “ripe” for intervention. As such, the focus will be on states that have experienced at least one armed conflict in the past ten years or have experienced at least one natural disaster in the same time period (UCDP/PRIO 2008). This focus will, in part, allow us to address issues of self-selection by various intervener types in a theoretically-informed way.

Second, to our knowledge, all extant literature on interventions has focused on only one potential type of intervener (military or civilian), the study here will examine interventions by (a) militaries of individual countries (b) military efforts that result from alliance or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), (c) civilian interventions by IGOs, and (d) civilian interventions by INGOs, and (e) civilian interventions that come as investments in enterprise from foreign firms (FDI). The study will utilize data from Mullenbach and Dixon (2010) on all types of military interventions, data from Murdie and Davis (2012) on INGO interventions, and data from the WDI (2008) on monetary transfers. These data sources will be

used to create our key independent variables, which will then be interacted with the various underlying structural conditions, like target state regime type, which could condition when and where certain types of interveners will be successful. Data on regime type, for example, will come from Marshall and Jaggers (2007)'s Polity IV project.

Third, we propose to examine a variety of outcome variables that are consistent with existing ideas of human security. To capture peace, we will use data from UCDP/PRIO (2008). To capture basic good governance and human rights, we will use data from Cingranelli and Richards (2007, 2008). To capture economic development, we will focus on GDP per Capita from the WDI (2008). The dependent variables will all be examined both as raw levels and as yearly change in these levels, following a growing norm in the literature.

### **3 What determines when civilian-transfer occurs?**

The dependent variable for this stage of the project will be the length of time from military intervention to civilian control; therefore, our sample here will be of all states that have experienced at least one military intervention. Because our research question concerns the length of time until civilian-transfer, we will use event-history or survival analysis statistical methods that uniquely allow us to capture the length of time until this transfer takes place. We will utilize “frailty” methods here to account for the idea that transfer may not be long lasting (Hougaard 2000). Our data on this variable will be constructed using the Mullenbach and Dixon (2010) and UCDP/PRIO (2008) dataset, similar to earlier work by Fortna (2008).

The key independent variables used here will be a variety of theoretically-informed structural conditions and policy-manipulable conditions that could influence transfer, such as money spent, battlefield deaths, change in target state region type, and the presence of INGO efforts. This data will come both from the WDI (2008) and from UCDP/PRIO (2008).

## 4 Conclusion

Activists and policymakers have long argued that military and civilian efforts for improvements in human security are necessary following conflict and natural disasters. Unfortunately, much of the existing scholarly research has not examined the conditions necessary for these efforts to be successful. Further, this literature has not examined the ways in which various types of these efforts interact to improve human security. The proposed research here, the first step in a longer research agenda, will begin by globally investigating the conditional nature of intervention effectiveness and the process of transition to local control that follows these efforts. This research will provide both policy and academic insights designed to improve human security on the ground.

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