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Editor’s Note

Welcome to the first edition of the Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities! The JoSH is a multidisciplinary effort run by cadets and faculty at the United States Military Academy at West Point, who collectively seek to improve the body of scholarly knowledge in the fields of social sciences and humanities and to promote civil-military cooperation and understanding. As such, we sought scholarly works from students, academics, working professionals, political leaders, and others who have interesting insights into topics related to social sciences or the humanities. We also engaged with thought leaders in a variety of fields whose words and actions impact defense, development, business, politics, or major social issues. Our intent is to present a broad cross section of thought and to stimulate useful dialogue.

In preparing for publication, we made a conscious decision to reflect the diversity of our contributing authors by not adhering to a single theme or one specific formatting standard through the articles portion of the Journal. Our writers come from a variety of backgrounds and professional experiences; for this reason, except for purposes of clarity or continuity, we tried to remain as true to the original submissions as possible.

Creating an academic journal from scratch is a long and arduous process, and publishing the first edition of the Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities was certainly no exception. I am deeply grateful to our dedicated and highly capable staff of West Point faculty and cadets, and especially to our contributors, who demonstrated a great deal of patience over the last year and a half as we got the JoSH off the ground. Additionally, this work would not have been possible without the sponsorship of West Point’s Department of Social Sciences and the generous financial contributions of the Center for the Study of Civil Military Relations.

And thank you, readers of this first edition of the JoSH, for taking the time to read our Journal. I hope our first effort meets your expectations.

Charles D. Faint

Charles D. Faint
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army
Editor, Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities
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Unraveling Arctic Law: The Aarhus University Inaugural Lecture
by Dr. Ed Canuel

Today, we will unravel Arctic Law and analyze this legal field’s foundations. At the highest level, Arctic law involves the law of, in or directly affecting the Arctic. But how do we identify the foundations of this emerging legal field? Perhaps a simple childhood game provides a clue.

Last summer I was at the Copenhagen central railway station, awaiting a train to Aarhus. Three boys were in a fix. Despite my terrible understanding of Danish, I could discern that they missed their scheduled train back home—unfortunately their quest to find the ultimate city bakery took longer than anticipated. The boys would now arrive home late—and their mom would not be happy. I then saw the boys extend their arms and start speaking “sten, papir, seks”—the game we know back home in the U.S. as rock, paper, scissors. This decision-making (or decision-forcing) game involves a relationship between the three objects, each trumping the other. As I saw a very grumpy boy make a call home to tell his mother that he would be late, it came to me: Arctic law is, in a sense, like a complementary game of sten, papir, seks.

Today’s lecture will define Arctic law within this framework. We’ll start off with rock or hard law, move to paper or soft law, followed by the scissor’s blades, representing domestic law and transboundary private law. At the end, I’ll suggest how the Aarhus University’s International and Transnational Tendencies in Law (INTRAlaw) Center, encouraging academic, governmental and private sector cooperation, can provide and encourage deep insights into the unraveled Arctic law.

A. Hard Law as Rock: Durability, Influence in the Arctic, Evolution and Domestic Processes

Hard law is our rock, recognized as legally binding obligations that define the conduct that they require or proscribe. Hard law, or compulsory law, has often focused on treaties. This takes us back to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which, among other things, ensures that the equality and sovereignty of all states are protected. Arguable benefits from hard law include the reduction of transaction costs from future repeat interactions (such as negotiating and enforcement mechanisms, ex ante and ex post), as opposed to the costs of restricting a state’s behavior and sovereignty.

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There are no treaties exclusively contending with the Arctic. We do see, however, treaties and conventions which contend with Arctic-related issues. The primary example is the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. The Convention guarantees a signatory state’s vessels navigational rights and freedoms throughout the world’s oceans. UNCLOS codifies member rights over all ocean resources, including on and under the ocean floor, in a member state’s 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone. The Convention covers various interconnected Arctic issues including fisheries management, pollution prevention, resource conservation and international shipping regulations.

That brings us to customary law, which can be interpreted as the evolution of norms developed by hard law. This evolution creates a certain custom, eventually recognized as being required to be followed as a legal obligation. For example, the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS yet the treaty is recognized by the United States as having the force of customary law.

So we see that states are bound by what they consent to, either through implied customary law or explicit treaty-based hard law. Hard law and certainly customary law have always brought up enforceability issues. Countries generally comply with international treaty and customary law obligations. That said, compliance issues may sometime emerge, particularly where international norms seemingly conflict with what are perceived as crucial national interests.

Now, there also has been a trend to characterize certain international agreements as hard law—including those without binding dispute settlement mechanisms or mandated fora where states may register complaints of non-compliance. The rock seems to be slightly rolling.

Enter the Arctic Council. Arctic states universally hailed two Council agreements as legally binding instruments. The Agreements do not have binding dispute mechanisms or specify a forum to hash out complaints of non-compliance. Yet, the Agreements have been characterized as hard law. The first agreement is the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. This Agreement specifies obligations. Arctic state agencies conducting searches have designated geographical areas of responsibility. Arctic states must provide assistance to individuals regardless of nationality or circumstance. The Arctic states are to share information on capabilities and data, in addition to requiring actual search and rescue operations. The Agreement uses the word “shall” about 50 times in the text to set out obligations.

The Arctic Council’s 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic also carves out numerous state obligations. Article 20 notes that “the character of the Agreement’s Appendices do not constitute an integral part of this Agreement and are not legally binding.” By such exclusion we see that the signatory states otherwise intend that the Agreement is indeed legally binding. As far as enforcement, this Agreement states that “a party that fails to live up to their obligations can be held liable under international law.”

The roll-out to a treaty or something comparable is not an easy process—and each Arctic state must comply with its own domestic legislative requirements, aside from the intense negotiations required between and among states. In the United States, the term “treaty” has a different domestic legal interpretation than that under international law. Treaties require advice and consent by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. Alternatively, executive agreements may be signed by
the President without Congressional consent. Many international engagements requiring appropriations or criminal prosecutions constitutionally mandate U.S. Congressional action. The President often chooses to undertake the treaty process over executive agreements to gain legislative support on issues eventually requiring Congress to pass implementing legislation or to appropriate funds. Otherwise, it’s pretty embarrassing when the executive branch signs an agreement which can’t be enforced. From the birth of the United States through the mid-twentieth century, less than two-fifths of international agreements committed by the U.S. were made through the treaty-making process. The annexation of Texas and the settlement of post-World War I debts were, for example, made without treaty. Under international law, treaties and executive agreements are recognized as having the same force.

Future hard law research in the Arctic may include the seeming trend of legally-binding Arctic Council agreements becoming more common, the possible “softening” of hard law and studying how individual Arctic states are choosing domestic legislative mechanisms to create international Arctic public law.

B. Soft Law as Paper: *Flexibility, Purpose and Arctic Role*

Let’s move from rock to paper. If we truly were playing the game, paper would beat rock. The audience includes creative and imaginative students and professors, so we’ll let that slide. Paper is flexible, malleable and should be interpreted to support and complement our rock, or hard law.

Soft law has been defined as the institutionalization of international norms. The norms are understood to be non-legally binding: goals rather than duties, guidelines rather than obligations. So we see words and phrases in soft law instruments like “should” rather than “shall,” in essence, words which do not create an exact burden or obligation between states.

Yet there are cohesive effects emanating from soft law, with states “bound” in a political or moral context. Its impact grew under circumstance. Soft law developed through 20th century institutions, a means by which many newly independent states could shape principles of international relations. This was once the exclusive jurisdiction of long-existing “great powers,” shaping international relations through resolutions or recommendations. Additionally, legal disciplines such as environmental and information technology law, which developed as bold new scientific advances emerged, required flexible legal instruments to keep pace with a changing world. The process of adopting soft law, resulting in (or from) the emergence of international norms, occurs over time through repetition of similar rules--creating a common understanding. Soft law is innovative, adapting to changing circumstances at a speed much faster than the perceived glacial rigidity of hard law development. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration, establishing the Arctic Council, is a prime example of soft law. The Declaration calls for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.

This document set the stage for Arctic interaction ever since. The consensus-based Arctic Council is soft law in action, with Arctic member states and permanent participants representing Arctic indigenous peoples and observers. The various Council working groups and reports, including 2009’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, focus on the twin goals of the Council—
sustainable development and environmental protection. These themes permeate subsequent soft law declarations, agreements, institutions and organizations. Non-binding rules that are soft law include the International Maritime Organization’s Polar Code, providing voluntary shipping guidelines and regulations for ships crossing polar waters.

Some theorists have suggested that one of the greatest benefits of soft law is that non-state actors are afforded an ability to participate in the decision-making process traditionally reserved only for states. Think of the permanent participants in the Arctic Council, as the Council ensures a seat at the table for Arctic indigenous peoples. Soft law allows parties to come together and tackle contentious issues. As such, soft law may be a “way point,” easier to achieve than hard law, all while facilitating compromise and mutually beneficial cooperation.

And what of future research concerning soft law. Will today’s soft law be incorporated into tomorrow’s “hard law?” Is soft law hardening? Factors to consider whether soft law may so “evolve” include the source and origin of the soft law text, how it was adopted and how states react to it—and that takes us to domestic law.

C. Domestic Law: The First Blade of the Arctic Law Scissors

Domestic law is one of the scissors’ blades. I will focus on current trends in U.S. Arctic law, evidencing that this field incorporates many different legal disciplines, with complex issues covering divergent stakeholders—all while illustrating the important roles that policy, culture and economics play in the Arctic decision-making and legal processes. When we review U.S. domestic case law concerning the Arctic, note that proprietary rights and jurisdictional issues are often at play in complex contexts.

As a backdrop, when we reference Arctic law in the United States we must focus on Alaska, the state which makes the U.S. an Arctic country. Alaska is one-fifth the size of the entire U.S., with over 60% of the state’s lands under federal government control. Approximately 53,000 people out of Alaska’s total population of 740,000 live in its Arctic region. Hydrocarbon extraction, fishing, mining, tourism and logging are Alaska’s major industries. Oil production currently accounts for the vast majority of the state’s unrestricted general fund revenues.

Let’s start off with a specialization, tribal law, which also covers multiple disciplines including environmental, energy and regulatory law. Native tribes in the U.S. are afforded certain sovereign powers, including the authority to establish their own form of government and tribal justice systems. In effect, Native American jurisdictions are deemed domestic nations dependent on the U.S. Justice Marshall in the 1831 Supreme Court case Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 2 outlined this relationship, holding that the tribes are dependent on the U.S. in a relationship akin to “that of a ward to his guardian.”

Alaska is a special case when studying tribal law, particularly involving proprietary rights. The Alaska Native Claims Act of 1971 (43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. or “ANSCA”) eliminated aboriginal title and claims on land and water. Think of the timeframe—the massive Trans-Alaskan pipeline was being contemplated, and certainty of real property ownership was needed. Under ANSCA, Alaskan natives received over forty million acres of land and nearly one billion dollars—money which was fully distributed by 1982. ANSCA created twelve for-profit regional
corporations and 200 village native for-profit corporations, with a thirteenth regional corporation subsequently created for Alaska Natives who no longer resided in Alaska. Note that land areas where village corporations controlled the surface estate, the subsurface estate would be controlled by the regional corporations.

Let’s look at an example of domestic law in action. It has all the qualities of a Hollywood blockbuster. A simmering feud between a “maverick” rancher and a corporation—a tale of 30 years of court fight after fight, contending with core legal precepts of who owns what and how much control the federal government may exert. This case makes War and Peace look like a light comedy.

The feud I refer to is Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman. Following ANSCA’s enactment, the village corporation of Lesnoi was permitted to select over 115,000 acres of land to manage but a regional corporation would remain in control of the subsurface. Lesnoi joined the Koniaq regional corporation. Stratman was a cattle rancher and tourist operator, self-styled as “stubborn” and characterized as an “ornery” gentleman. His 45,000 acres of grazing leases granted by the federal government were transferred to the state of Alaska and then transferred to the Leisnoi village corporation. Stratman filed suit in 1976 to prevent certain ANCSA land transfers, a case which was first dismissed then reinstated.

To make matters even more complex, under another federal law, the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 410hh-3233, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1784 et seq. or “ANILCA”), Koniaq was to receive specified lands awarded to Leisnoi. ANILCA affected over 100 million acres of federal lands in Alaska. Koniaq the regional corporation and Stratman came into agreement in 1982, whereby Stratman set aside his court action in return for certain land transfers. But as Lesnoi eventually separated from Koniaq, the settlement was unenforceable against Lesnoi. With the drama of a bad marriage, Stratman would sometimes win, Leisnoi would sometimes win. Year after year after year…

Stratman argued that Lesnoi was essentially fictitious, think of “Brigadoon,” a village which disappeared from existence prior to ANSCA. Meanwhile, Leisnoi sought “quiet title” actions—effectively seeking judicial recognition that it owned the land and not Stratman—and requested court fees. The 9th Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, Case No. 97-35775, recognized Stratman’s claims in 1998, stating that “Our conclusion might lead to perceived unfairness in a few rare situations, such as this one, but perfection is not to be expected from a statutory scheme.” Fast forward to 2002, as the Secretary of Interior and subsequent courts—and there were many—held that Congress designated Leisnoi an eligible village without requiring that it satisfy the requirements for eligibility set out in ANCSA. Courts found that whether Congress conveyed land to Leisnoi under the allegedly mistaken assumption that Leisnoi was an eligible village was irrelevant. In 2008, the federal court held in 545 F.3d 1161 that “While it is essential . . . [that] government agencies…comply with the law . . . [w]ether Congress was acting under a misapprehension of fact or law is irrelevant once legislation has been enacted.” As long as the pertinent legislation is valid, that court found that it is not the duty of the courts to revise such legislation. In effect, “Absent a constitutional impediment to the exercise of its authority, the intent of Congress to designate Leisnoi as an eligible village corporation and convey land to it as such must be given effect.” In 2009, Stratman tried filing with the U.S. Supreme Court, and
certiorari was denied. In 2010, Leisnoi’s quiet title action was affirmed by the Alaska Supreme Court which settled claims of outstanding legal fees. And so every tale has an end, at least for now.

In the complex relationship involving tribal law, we see certain affirmative federal obligations towards Native Alaskans. Federal land agencies are mandated to ensure the protection of indigenous religious and cultural values, and federal actions are subject to “trust” responsibilities. For example, an agency must meet certain standards in approving a mining operation affecting tribal lands, overriding any “purely economic consideration” of a mining applicant. Numerous executive orders have stressed these trust responsibilities. For example, President Clinton’s Executive Order 13007 of 2006 required all federal agencies to accommodate access and use of sacred sites by native religious practitioners while avoiding adversely affecting such sites’ physical integrity unless “clearly inconsistent with essential Agency functions.” Executive Orders have required that the all federal agencies must consult tribal governments, to the greatest extent practicable and legally-permitted, prior to taking actions that affect federally-recognized tribal governments. Yet, intersecting social and legal issues, a disparity remains in the U.S. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau in 2014 noted 28.4 percent of Alaska Natives and American Indians lived in poverty in 2010, close to double the national averages of 15.9 percent. Most recently, President Obama established a White House Council on Native American Affairs, chaired by the Department of Interior, to “promote the development of prosperous and resilient tribal communities, including by “[fostering] sustainable economic development, particularly energy.”

So how does this trust responsibility play out in practice? In general terms, federal agencies must consider the interest of tribes in planning and decision making processes. The agencies must establish regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration with Indian tribal governments. Under administrative law, as evidenced with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)’s regulations, “Consultation” is defined as “a process of meaningful communication and coordination between EPA and tribal officials prior to EPA taking actions or implementing decisions that may affect tribes.” It is a “continuing dialogue” between EPA and tribal governments, and program and regional procedures and plans. Moreover, on issues relating to tribal self-government, trust resources, or treaty and other rights, Executive Order 13084 mandates each agency’s office to explore the use of consensus decision making mechanisms for developing regulations, including negotiated rule-making. The EPA, for example, instituted an administrative framework where offices must interact with tribes on a government-to-government basis consistent with the inherent sovereignty of each tribe.

Energy issues play an integral, cross-cutting role in domestic Arctic law, including energy security. Industry experts note the U.S. Department of Defense uses more than 750 thousand tons of minerals annually. There had been growing talk among think tanks of stockpiling a “national strategic reserve” of rare earth elements. Contending with mineral mining issues in the United States requires negotiating a complex legal framework consisting with of over three dozen federal environmental laws, and a multitude of state regulations. Multiple federal laws also demand the involvement of numerous agencies.
Mining issues also evidence instances where native regional and village corporations are in conflict. Take, for instance, the Alaskan Red Dog mine located on lands of the NANA regional corporation. The Red Dog mine, the world’s largest zinc producer and holder of the world’s largest zinc reserves, accounts for 10 percent of global zinc production. The mine lies within the Northwest Arctic Borough, approximately the size of Indiana. Think remote: no roads connect the eleven communities in the Borough. More than 85 percent of the region’s approximately 7,300 residents and NANA’s 12,000 shareholders are from the Iñupiat tribe. Under the terms of ANSCA, NANA must share approximately half of its profits from natural resources with the other eleven land-based regional native corporations. This could result in a distribution of several hundred million dollars annually. While many Borough residents benefit from the mine and associated economic activities (about 60 percent of the 569 jobs at the mine in 2008, with a total $51 million payroll were completed by NANA shareholders), nearly all Borough residents depend on subsistence activities in their daily lives. Over the years, there have been environmental suits against the mine by native villagers, evidencing this intersection of law, economics and policy. Five native residents near Red Dog were recently awarded $8 million over planned wastewater discharges into Red Dog Creek. The alternative would involve building a pipeline above or below ground from the mine, some 52 miles to the Chukchi Sea—costing an estimated $261 million.

Administrative, environmental, energy and property law converge again in the context of a mining project, the proposed Pebble Project. We also see the voter initiative process in action, which is effectively direct legislation, where voters themselves enact legislation. The mine is projected to hold more than $300 billion in precious metal deposits including copper and gold. Should Pebble become fully operational, the mine would boost overall U.S. copper production by 20 percent.

But there is a long legal road to be travelled before this project becomes a reality. The submittal of development applications will require an Environmental Impact Statement in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1969). The Act sets up procedural requirements for all federal government agencies to prepare environmental assessments and environmental impact statements, creating multiple opportunities for formal public comment and agency review. In the case of Pebble, the minerals are located at the headwaters of rivers flowing into one of the world’s most productive salmon fisheries. Through 2013, there have been numerous public ballot initiatives in Alaska with lawsuits challenging the initiatives, in addition to collateral litigation and election finance enforcement proceedings. In 2007, a vote proposal that regulated the release of toxic chemicals passed legal challenges and was placed on a ballot, but was defeated. In 2011, a “Save our Salmon” initiative took place, the relevant Borough Code was amended to hold that development permits would not be issued where topsoil of more than 640 acres of land would be disturbed and would have “significant adverse impact” on existing waters. The SOS initiative passed, 280 votes to 246 votes—with 34 votes, a multi-billion dollar project was halted in 2011. The road recently twisted again, as the Alaska Superior Court invalidated the SOS initiative. The Court held that Alaska’s Constitution allowed the State and its Department of Natural Resources, not local government, the power to decide whether the Pebble Project posed unacceptable risks. And the story continues.
Now we move to the other blade of the Arctic Law scissors, contending with private law. While the U.S. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law provides a technical definition we are, in effect, discussing the obligations and rights of private parties. The concepts and considerations that inform private international law also guide the development of some areas of public international law, notably the principles limiting the jurisdiction of states to prescribe, adjudicate and enforce law. As we see the increasing worldwide reach of business in the Arctic, most particularly involving natural resource extraction, the relevance of the international private Arctic law pillar increases. A series of contracts between a drilling company from Houston with a subcontractor in Stavanger are not uncommon. In terms of agreements, we see the ever-increasing use of standardized boilerplate contracts to facilitate transboundary commerce—that is the export of contractual provisions—or legal transplants—from one jurisdiction to another.

First, let’s look to systemic and perhaps cultural differences between the legal traditions of Arctic states. These will influence private party outcomes and contractual interpretations. The civil and common law traditions diverge in several areas, including the role of judges, the influence of precedent and perceptions of legal certainty. The civil law tradition places a law-giving role in the hands of the legislator, who crafts a code which motivates the judiciary’s acts. Civil law judges must identify the proper existing rule and apply it to the facts of the subject case. The common law family is organic law, with judges reliant upon precedents and the persuasive effect of the works of other common law jurisdictions. Common law is thus case law, with judicial decisions modifying new rules or adapting existing rules.

Any Arctic transboundary commercial endeavor will involve a contract which may exist over divergent legal families. The civil law systems allow a judicial role interpreting the parties’ bargain. Such proactive judicial stance has been collectively identified as the “good faith” interpretation, where courts may fill perceived gaps in the contracting parties’ bargaining relationship. Under the civil law tradition, individuals are bound by certain conduct, even if such conduct is not specifically included within a contract. Speaking broadly, civil law courts may reform a contract should new circumstances emerge, rewriting the agreement in what is interpreted as the parties’ interests and intentions; if that fails, the entire contract will be voided.

Under the common law approach, good faith may only be found sporadically in certain areas, such as contract termination. The common law tradition focuses more on remedies, and less on the rights and duties that are at its core. Common law courts historically avoid judicial intervention into the contracting parties’ relationship. The rationale is that the contracting parties, except in limited instances where public policy would otherwise be contravened, should have contractual freedom to dictate their own agreements.

So with that background, we should be sensitive that contract provisions, forged under one legal tradition’s requirements and exported to another jurisdiction, may lead to unexpected consequences. Extrinsic contract circumstances, such as conduct during, before, or after contract execution, are usually not considered by the common law judge. That is the parol evidence rule,
generally disallowing parties producing evidence which may vary, add or contradict a contract’s wording. That rule does not exist in most civil law systems, with judges allowed to consider such conduct. Another thorny area relates to liquidated damages clauses, which act as specified amounts intended as fair compensation for the non-breaching contractual party to be paid in lieu of contractual performance. Consider the difference between that provision with a penalty clause, or an attempt to secure performance with a purpose of deterring contractual breach through threat of punishment. Penalty contractual clauses, otherwise unenforceable under the U.S. system, are allowed under the Scandinavian civil law systems—with a Scandinavian judge empowered to either void or reform a penalty. Additionally, efficient breach is allowed under the common law tradition. In other words, if it is more efficient for a party to breach a contract and pay expectancy damages in order to enter a superior contract, courts will not intervene by requiring that the breaching party pay more than was due under its contract. That is not necessarily the case under the civil law context.

So, we distinguish legal traditions across Arctic states, demonstrate that certain contractual provisions may have unintended meanings when transplanted, and then what? If we’re reviewing potential issues for Arctic transboundary commercial contracts, we need to ask whether comparative commercial law issues derived from black letter law (or so-called “settled” textbook law found in statutes and cases) and the application of such law, known as “law in action,” result in differences throughout all phases of a commercial contract, from creation to enforcement. And this information is important, guiding practitioners, academics, dealmakers and jurists alike seeking to structure optimal transactions and reach some sort of commercial certainty across the Arctic states.

I have proposed a methodology, called objective pluralism, to study this. This approach recognizes that complex legal systems contend with complex legal problems—and should be viewed from multiple vantage points. Objective pluralism considers three factors. The first is economic, dealing with efficiency—namely, acting with a minimum of effort, waste and expense. This economic factor also contends with transaction costs, or those costs that drain the efficiencies flowing from contractual provisions and are associated with all aspects of such clauses, from negotiation to implementation. The next factor is social, a modeling which determines how individuals react to divergent legal rules and regimes, with the expectation that the results of such reactions lead to predicting individual responses, with certainty. The final factor pertains to relational contracting law perspectives, involving various contracts which may “relate” in different senses and degrees. The totality of this review creates a balanced perspective offering unique insights. Objective pluralism avoids the temptation to, perhaps by unconscious default, interject the “same” meanings to specific transplanted contract terms.

One scholarly way to explore the application of black letter comparative law through law in action involves a survey. A well-structured survey with a proper sampling may yield important insights. Comparative law surveys must also use a variety of sampling techniques, respecting and considering cultural differences, linguistic preferences and sociological factors. Handled properly, objective pluralism allows a fulsome commercial comparative law review, providing the comparativist with a deeper understanding of select legal systems. This methodology, weighing economic, social and cultural considerations, provides a toolkit from which to review a
legal problem. Objective pluralism can weigh the black letter law of multiple Arctic state jurisdictions against the framework as to how law is applied, in practice. The survey, the optimum method of conducting an objective pluralism review, reveals subtleties and perceptions which defy preconceived viewpoints or assumptions.

E. Questioning the Future: INTRAlaw and Unraveling Arctic Law’s Complexities

So, where do we go from here? We have seen Arctic law described as a complex intersection of international hard and soft law, of multidisciplinary domestic law and transboundary private law. The Aarhus University INTRAlaw Research Center is a means to offer a deeper understanding of the various Arctic law foundations. The Center may capture and elaborate upon many of the complexities stemming from Arctic law, provide an invaluable resource for scholars, demystify business issues for practitioners, encourage a dialogue among indigenous peoples and offer students a home to gain expertise in a growing legal field.

And there are many questions which can be tackled. For example, can we discover deeper meanings or trends in Arctic hard and soft law? Do we see commonalities in how, for example, indigenous Arctic law is being developed in the US as compared to other Arctic states, across legal traditions? Are there ways to more effectively undertake multi-jurisdictional transactions across legal systems, all the while being cognizant of different perspectives from different stakeholders? What are the legal, policy, economic and social concerns affecting decision-makers, citizens of the north and investors when contemplating an Arctic cross-border commercial deal? How can commercial certainty—to the extent that such certainty may ever exist—facilitate policymaker goals of sustainable Arctic business development? To that effect, can we achieve common legal understandings as to what sustainable development means in the Arctic?

By gathering researchers, private sector representatives, interested domestic parties (including indigenous peoples, government actors, NGO representatives, and experts in various legal disciplines across Arctic states, we can develop future experts who will expand their knowledge through an institution embodying the very spirit of active learning. Let’s foster future learning in order to tackle the many challenges confronting the Arctic, from climate change impacts to the pushes and pulls associated with rapid development. INTRAlaw can develop and foster expertise. As it is said, “From a small seed a mighty tree may grow.” And yes, together through INRAlaw, we can grow a mighty tree—even in the Arctic—spurring a new generation of experts dedicated to contending with the complex issues ahead.
“Cadetspeak:” Understanding Dialect at West Point
by Daniel Glockler

Introduction
The field of anthropological linguistics demonstrates that language and culture have a complex relationship across all societies. Just as family structures and subsistence strategies, for example, change over time and in response to shifting environmental factors, so do the morphology, phonology, and syntax of a language gradually change. When differences in these three language components are “not great enough to produce unintelligibility,” a language is said to have a unique dialect.1 An alternate definition of dialect, and one that is quite helpful in this study, is offered by G. L. Brook: “a dialect may be defined as a subdivision of a language that is used by a group of speakers who have some non-linguistic characteristic in common… the link... may be social or occupational.”2

In studying the population of cadets at The United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, a three-pronged question naturally arises: to what extent do West Point cadets use a unique dialect of English, what are the cultural influences at West Point that form such a dialect, and to what extent does cadet language fit with key hypotheses in the field of anthropological linguistics? I intend to demonstrate that West Point cadets do speak a unique dialect of English, that this dialect is formed and informed in part by the unique values and purpose of West Point, and that West Point’s linguistic realities uniquely complement current scholarship in the field of dialectology within anthropological linguistics.

Testing this hypothesis involves collecting and analyzing data on cadet lexicon, defined in this study as the vocabulary used by cadets. Because lexicon accounts for the morphology and phonology aspects of linguistic change, I assert that cadets exhibit a unique dialect if the data demonstrates that cadets use a unique lexicon. Data is both qualitative and quantitative, the former coming from interviews and the latter from surveys distributed to cadets. Specific survey questions are addressed below, while interviews focus largely on cadets’ subjective experience with personal linguistic change since their arrival at the academy. I asked each respondent to describe words and phrases used and encountered here, and whether the respondent uses and encounters that same lexicon while on pass, on leave, or at other Army installations.

My study relies on a few key assumptions, one of which is the conception of first year cadets, called Plebes, as immigrants in cadet society. By considering Plebes the immigrants of cadet society, I will be able to compare my findings to scholarship on lexical change in immigrant populations. Another key assumption, discussed later in this paper, is the existence of a class system at West Point. Such an assumption is necessary in order to examine the effect of military social structure on dialect acquisition. Within the Corps of Cadets (students), the class system is as follows: Plebes (freshmen), Yearlings (sophomores), Cows (juniors), and Firsties (seniors).

Additionally, this study crucially emphasizes West Point’s cultural isolation in order to compare findings on the cadet dialect with research on linguistic factors unique to historically isolated

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populations. I additionally consider “cadet” and “Soldier” to be culturally positive and attractive identities in order to address the relationship of language usage and self-identification among cadets. Finally, my study employs an explicit functionalist lens, similar to Bronislaw Malinowski’s school of functionalism: “that all cultural traits serve the needs of individuals in a society; that is, they satisfy some basic or derived need of the members of the group.” In essence, I assume that cadet language, as a factor of culture, satisfies some need common to cadets. Determining that need becomes essential to this study. Approaching linguistics from a functionalist lens has precedent in anthropology; John Baugh notes that “street speech” survives in American black communities because its speakers “know that it is the appropriate style of speaking for their personal needs.”

The implications of my research exceed the scope of dialectology by addressing the fundamental relationship of language and culture. Anthropological research widely demonstrates that a society’s lexicon “reflects the everyday distinctions that are important in the society.” Regional and cultural differences in lexicon are thus the basis of significant research in the field of anthropological linguistics: R. K. Agnihotri and A. L. Khanna use lexical distinctions as the basis for differentiating Indian English from British English. It will be shown that the unique prevalence of military values, among other factors, create the conditions for a unique cadet lexicon, while the cultural isolation experienced by the corps of cadets adds an element of social identification to the usage of the cadet dialect.

Analytical Framework
This examination of language at West Point is contextualized by a rich array of scholarship on anthropological linguistics. In his study on dialect acquisition in immigrants, J. K. Chambers identifies several principles that determine the dialect acquisition process. Chambers studied six young, English-speaking Canadians who moved to southern England in the mid-1980s. One of the principles that he deduced from his study is that “lexical replacements occur rapidly in the first stage of dialect acquisition and then slow down.” If Chambers’ principle holds true at West Point, we would expect to see Plebes acquiring the West Point dialect at a greater rate than that of upper class cadets. In other words, Chambers’ work predicts that Plebes will exhibit a significantly higher ratio of West Point dialect acquisition to time spent at the academy relative to that ratio for upper class cadets. In theory, this ratio should be inversely related to time spent at the academy.

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3 Ember and Ember. Cultural Anthropology., 47.
5 Ember and Ember. Cultural Anthropology, 87.
Testing Chambers’ principle thus requires the identification of a lexicon at West Point. Having lived among cadets for nearly four years, I identify such a lexicon based on personal experience. Within West Point’s dialect, bathrooms are called “latrines,” cars and trucks are “POVs,” non-uniform attire is “civies,” personal growth is something called “development,” a demanding week of school is a “Thayer week,” someone with limited social and athletic involvement is a “slug,” a high performer is a “stud,” vacation is called “leave,” a supervisor with high expectations is called “brutal,” exercise is “PT,” and the list goes on. By surveying and interviewing cadets in all four classes of cadets, I quantify their usage of these terms in order to develop average ratios of lexicon acquisition to time spent at the academy for each class. Surveys also ask cadets to identify any prior military experience, any family history of military service, and any personal or family connection to West Point in order to control for possible confounding variables.

Israel Sanz-Sánchez develops his research in the dialect known as “New Mexican Spanish” into a framework for understanding koinéization, the formation of a dialect from the “mixing, leveling, and simplification of disparate dialects.”8 West Point’s unique situation as both an Army officer training institute and an undergraduate college, especially given the combination of prior enlisted cadets and prior civilian high school and college students, may provide the requisite characteristics for koinéization. If so, we would expect West Point’s dialect to reflect the interaction and combination of Army vocabulary, academic language, and the influences of geography-specific language brought to West Point by cadets from around the United States. Along these lines, I demonstrate the extent to which West Point’s dialect is influenced by vocabulary and mannerisms that are associated with the culture of the American South. The usage of “y’all,” for example, might illuminate the degree to which southern linguistic influence is mixed and leveled into West Point’s dialect.

Sanz-Sánchez further explores the role played by social status in dialect acquisition, distinguishing linguistic change “from above,” that is, a socially dominant group’s exertion of “prestige pressure,” from linguistic change “from below” as when a repressed group initiates dialect acquisition.9 West Point presents an excellent case study to test the role of social status in dialect acquisition, as cadets recognize a rigidly hierarchical social structure in the context of an institutionally prescribed and socially internalized class system. Carol and Melvin Ember define a class system as one in which “there is unequal access to prestige” and groups enjoy “substantially greater or lesser access to economic resources and power.”10 Cadets are familiar with inequality in prestige, as symbols such as the class ring, Firstie saber, red sash, and rank insignia provide daily reminders of one’s social status. Access to resources and power is further defined by social status, as pay grade varies according to class year and privileges such as access to weekends off, alcohol consumption, and the wearing of “civies” varies according to cadet rank.

If dialect acquisition at West Point results in part from prestige pressure as described by Sanz-Sánchez, we should expect to see dialect acquisition in Plebes in line with the example set by

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9 Ibid., 64.
10 Ember and Ember. *Cultural Anthropology*, 139.
upper class cadets, and especially key leaders in a chain of command. To test this I ask interview respondents whether they have found classmates or superiors more influential on their speech patterns. To the extent that first semester Plebes imitate the linguistic tendencies of their superiors, we may infer that prestige pressure plays a role in dialect acquisition. Other anthropological research shows that homogeneity in speech is correlated to high class populations, while lower classes exhibit greater variation based on geography.\textsuperscript{11} To this end, it could be expected that upper class cadets will return more homogenous quantitative data, while Plebes will exhibit relatively high quantitative variation.

Dialectologist Hans Boas has studied the dialect known as “Texas-German” originally spoken in 19\textsuperscript{th} century southern-central Texas. His study defines \textit{Sprachinsel}, or language islands, as culturally and economically isolated societies in which “settlers’ language and culture... serve as the basis for group identification.”\textsuperscript{12} In my study, I consider West Point, geographically isolated by its gates and culturally isolated by cadets’ limited opportunities to leave post, as a \textit{Sprachinsel} in which dialect influences group identification. My surveys test whether cadets perceive a linguistic basis for identification with other cadets, USMA, other Soldiers, the Army, or none of the above. Boas also notes that the \textit{Sprachinsel} of Germans settling in Texas gradually came into greater contact with larger and more culturally dominant groups. As contact increased, so did synchronism in their dialect to the point that it ceased to exist as a unique dialect at all.\textsuperscript{13} Firsties who have a clean disciplinary record are able to spend as many weekends away from West Point as they wish, so I will compare their quantitative lexical data with that of the lower three classes in order to examine whether their increased contact with populations outside of the \textit{Sprachinsel} results in reversal of their dialect acquisition or possible synchronism.

Findings

My research returns qualitative and quantitative data pointing to the presence of a unique cadet dialect. When 86 cadets across West Point’s four classes were asked to report the frequency with which they use specific cadet lexicon, a large majority of cadets reported that they use such language at least as frequently as Standard English alternatives. Only two respondents stated that they never use cadet lexicon. By controlling for cadets’ prior exposure to military culture, we see that usage of the cadet dialect generally arises from the unique culture of West Point rather than from other sources. Slightly fewer than 80 percent of cadets reported perceiving overall speech change since arriving at West Point, thus we may be confident that cadet dialect arises at West Point and is not simply imported from elsewhere. Additionally, close to 84 percent of cadet survey respondents reported using cadet vocabulary less frequently away from West Point. Thus we see that not only are West Point’s cultural factors influential in changing speech, but that cadets preferentially use their acquired dialect situationally, that is, in response to needs associated with physically being at West Point. Determining the nature of those needs became a central point in my interviews, as will be discussed below.

Having demonstrated, in accordance with the assumptions of this study, that unique linguistic realities at West Point constitute a cadet dialect, my research expands to uncover the cultural factors at West Point that give rise to such speech. Using Boas’ \textit{Sprachinsel} framework and a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 88-89.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Hans Boas. “Dialect Contact and New-Dialect Formation.” \textit{American Speech}, Vol. 83, (Dec., 2008), 77.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 77.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
functionalist lens, I asked cadets whether their language usage helps them identify with other cadets, USMA, other Soldiers, the Army, or none of the above. Remarkably, only nine percent of respondents chose “none of the above.” “Other cadets” and “USMA” received approximately seventy percent in the affirmative, while “other Soldiers” and “the Army” received approximately fifty percent each. Data here provides rich insight: we immediately note that more than nine out of ten cadets link language used with some identity integral to life at West Point. This fact becomes essential in understanding West Point as an institution in the business of identity transformation. The two first items of “knowledge” that incoming cadets must memorize in basic training are the USMA mission statement and the mission of Cadet Basic Training. Both mention an identity as the end state of training at West Point: that of a “leader of character.”

Examining survey responses by class revealed even greater findings. Firsties are the least likely to use Cadetspeak, as predicted by Boas’ Sprachinsel research. This result confirms the notion that West Point is a “language island” in which social and linguistic isolation set the conditions for the maintenance of a unique dialect, and that individual’s usage of that dialect is inversely proportional to contact with other societies. Interview data adds another dimension to these findings: out of fifteen respondents asked, only two stated that their speech has not changed since coming to West Point. Both were Firsties, who in fact have spent the longest time at West Point and have thus, logically, had the greatest number of experiences to potentially affect their speech patterns. Equally interesting is the finding that Plebes use Cadetspeak lexicon at a rate approximately equal to the average rate of usage among the upper three classes. Thus we see Chambers’ lexical replacement principle at work, as Plebes, our model’s immigrants, have acquired as much cadet lexicon in approximately five months at West Point as others have in much longer durations. The logical explanation is that lexical replacement at West Point does indeed occur fastest in the earliest stage.

Our understanding of culture at West Point is further enriched by interview data which prominently demonstrates the importance of professional development and Army career preparation to cadets. When asked what role language and language change play in USMA’s mission, a majority of cadets mentioned either professionalism, preparation for a career as an officer, credibility, or effectiveness as factors that are related to cadet dialect acquisition. A minority stated that there is little connection or that cadet language is a reaction to other cultural factors such as an identity need or personal factors such as the goal-oriented nature of most cadets.

Findings also indicate the active presence of koinéization at West Point. Survey respondents demonstrated that usage of the contraction ‘y’all,’ culturally and geographically associated with the American South, increases by class year, despite the fact that each class features a similar percentage of cadets of southern origin. Yet multiple interview respondents of southern origin reported a loss of southern accent and a repression of southern mannerisms. I also found that depending on whom I asked, West Point is either full of “Yankees” or disproportionately full of southern speech. Koinéization accounts for this phenomenon, as the mixing and leveling of discrete cultures results in a unique cadet dialect, one in which “Yankees” borrow “y’all,” or

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15 See Interview Responses from Cadet 13 and Cadet 15, Appendix B.
16 See Interview Responses from Cadet 8 and Cadet 15, Appendix B.
even “all y’all,” according to one respondent, while cadets of southern origin neutralize their native accent.

As both an Army officer training institute and an undergraduate college, West Point also features mixing and leveling between language associated with the Army, especially in specific slang and the abundance of acronyms, and language associated with academia. Most cadets reported increased use of Army slang, while multiple cadets stated that their vocabularies and abilities to hold intelligent conversation have increased. Finally, several cadets reported swearing more since coming to West Point, sometimes attributing the change to their experience during Cadet Basic Training, while a Plebe stated that she swears less because “you’re not supposed to do that here.”

Thus we observe outcomes in dialect change along the lines predicted by koinéization— not just in terms of regional dialect but also in Army-specific terminology, academic language, and institutionally sanctioned speech.

Interview responses on the relative effect of peer influence and superior influence on speech change indicated that peer influence is the clear victor. Cadets observed that they communicate with peers more than superiors, that superiors are not as easily related to, and that classmates develop greater social bonds and hence linguistic imitation. Yet multiple cadets did emphasize the importance of superior influence, describing the tendency to consciously imitate officers on post.

**Conclusion**

John Baugh’s research on “black street speech” corroborates with the centrality of identity to cadet language. Baugh notes that “when people share linguistic… norms, we think of them as comprising a homogeneous group.”

We may thus understand unique and shared language as a homogenizing force at West Point, where the mission demands that individuals from diverse personal backgrounds emerge with a new, singular, shared identity. It should not be surprising, then, that koinéization at West Point contributes to this homogenizing, for the West Point graduate is intended to be a scholar, an athlete, a Soldier, and most of all, a leader. Cadet culture is an amalgamation of disparate cultures, yet the final product is indeed a specific identity.

What is most fascinating, and encouraging, about this study is the light it sheds on West Point’s success in achieving its mission. With the majority of cadets identifying everyday language as a source of self-identification with other cadets and USMA, and interview respondents connecting language with concepts such as professional development and effective leadership, we see that cadets are internalizing the values espoused by this academy. Baugh notes that “people tend to adopt styles of speaking” that not only fulfill needs in a functional sense, but “that are suited to their… personal aspirations.”

When we hear cadets using Army language on their own time, especially outside of professional contexts, we can be confident that their aspirations are Army-oriented.

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17 See Interview Response from Cadet 4, Appendix B.
19 Ibid., 6.
Ali A. Marzui’s work on political sociology and applied linguistics are a further source for optimism regarding the state of language at West Point. In his chapter “Language in Military History,” Marzui identifies “two broad categories of language usage from the point of view of military performance… inspirational usage [and] organizational.”\(^{20}\) In the military inspirational usage, “language is utilized to capture certain ideals and manipulate the emotions in the direction of psychological stamina.”\(^{21}\) One of the most ubiquitous and provocative cadet terms is the pejorative “slug,” used broadly in the trichotomy of cadet athletics as “corps squad, club squad, slug” or specifically to demean an individual that is perceived as lazy, asocial, and usually lacking in psychical fitness. The related term “slug nap” effectively assigns guilt to non-athletes for using their free time for napping, also known as “racking out,” instead of furthering their professional development. Thus Cadetspeak manipulates the ideals embraced in cadet culture, especially physical fitness as a domain of professional development and overall health. In Marzui’s findings, “sophistication and depth” are the mark of military cultures that employ language for both inspirational and organizational functions, while military cultures that exhibit only organizationally functional language are seen as inferior.\(^{22}\) To this end, my research points to the conclusion that Cadetspeak indicates success in the institutional prowess of West Point, and, more broadly, the cultural strength of the U.S. Army. When a cadet accuses another of being a “total slug,” as I have heard many times, he or she is actually making a powerful statement of internalized values. The prevalence of related terms should be a point of pride to West Point leadership.

Research on cadet dialect and its cultural underpinnings at West Point thus fits quite well within the broader framework of anthropological linguistics. More specifically, such research tells the story of culture, in its many manifestations, at a unique and important military institution. Linguistic research is rich with the assertion that distinctions with culturally relative importance give rise to unique language in all human societies. Cadet culture is no exception, as the unique cadet dialect demonstrates functional needs for identification, enhanced by an environment predicated on personal transformation, as well as professional development in the arena of military leadership. That cadets seem to embrace their unique dialect is a testament not just to their enthusiasm, but to the success that West Point appears to be having in the art of creating leaders of character.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 129.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 146.
In Service to our Female Veterans: The Disparities in Veterans’ Affairs Healthcare
by Jessica Frankeberger

Militaries have traditionally been a male-dominated realm with women only playing minor roles or working as military nurses. Today, women make up roughly 15% of the United States active duty military forces and, as of 2013, women are officially allowed to serve in combat roles (NCVAS, 2011). With over two million women veterans and increases expected, the Veterans’ Affairs (VA) Healthcare Services needs to equip their centers to address women’s health and military issues. Female health services, such as gynecological care or mammography services, are often nonexistent in VA medical centers and women veterans often express negative views of VA healthcare, citing that the VA is not sensitive to women’s issues. Women serve in the military in the same ways as men with similar, if not worse, health outcomes, but their current healthcare is not fully or equally serving them back. As the number of women serving in the United States military increases and women continue to play a major role in military operations, the VA Healthcare Services for women veterans remains limited and is not fully-equipped to serve gender-specific needs.

Women have been a significant part of American military operations since the Revolutionary War, but only more recently have they been officially allowed to serve in as military forces. In 1948, women were allowed to enlist in the reserves and a minority served in as forces in both the Korean and Vietnam wars. It was not until the end of the Vietnam War and start of the All-Volunteer Force that women were officially allowed to serve in all branches and positions of the military with the exception of combat roles (NCVAS, 2011). While many women have since served informally in combat roles, the ban was not officially repealed until 2013. Today, more than one-sixth of the military consists of active duty servicewomen, and there are more than two million living women veterans. These numbers are expected to greatly increase as the VA predicts that by 2035 women will make up 15% of all veterans, compared with 8% today (NCVAS, 2011). Despite these demographic shifts, VA healthcare services have not kept up with military changes and currently do not fully address women veterans’ health concerns.

While women make up a minority of all veterans, the health of women veterans is similar, if not worse, than male veterans and significantly worse than non-military women. In a study of over 28,000 women veterans, Frayne et al. (2006) compared the overall health status and concerns of women veterans with male veterans and non-veteran women. Results indicated that female and male veterans did not differ in physical health. While women had higher rates of mental health concerns, the difference was not statistically significant. On the other hand, women veterans showed worse health outcomes than non-military women in every variable tested. Similarly, research illustrates that male veterans have substantially worse health outcomes than non-veteran men (Hoerster et al, 2012). In turn, women veterans face increased challenges compared to the general female population. Women veterans are slightly more educated than civilian women, yet they have similar rates of employment and income (NCVAS, 2011). However, women veterans under age 25 face significantly increased risks of unemployment, poverty, and uninsurance, severely limiting their ability to get adequate healthcare and psychiatric treatment (NCVAS, 2011). These results stress the need for competent healthcare for all veterans, but also emphasize women veterans’ need for the same amount of care and treatment as male veterans. This equal healthcare is not currently available in VA medical centers.
While all VA centers have medical and mental health care available to women veterans, the gender-specific care needed to fully address women’s health concerns is greatly limited. Previous research indicates that women veterans have better health outcomes and feel more accepted in VA centers when female-specific services are available (Yano et al., 2006). As a result, in 1994, VA medical centers became eligible to receive funding to provide women’s health clinics separate from primary and other specialized care. While this produced an increase in women’s health clinics in VA centers nationwide, Yano et al. (2006) estimate that as of 2006 only 55% of VA medical centers have separate women’s health clinics and only 10% of those are considered to be comprehensive women’s health clinics. By default, the accessibility of care at the women’s clinics is considerably limited.

For example, less than a quarter of VA women’s health clinics have obstetrical and prenatal care available. About 75% of clinics do not have screening and diagnostic mammography capabilities and 40% are not capable of treating breast cancer non-surgically (Yano et al., 2006). In addition, while roughly half of women over 50 are likely to experience an osteoporosis-related break, only about 40% of VA women’s health clinics have the ability to measure bone density (Medline Plus-NIH, 2014; Yano et al., 2006). VA medical centers also often do not take into account how women utilize medical services. Women veterans, especially those with both mental and physical conditions, are significantly more likely to prefer and to use outpatient services than men (Frayne et al., 2007). Yet, outpatient services are limited particularly in areas of women’s health and mental health clinics (Yano et al., 2006; Frayne et al., 2007). These shortcomings greatly hinder the VA’s ability to provide comprehensive and effective healthcare to women veterans and expand further to limit VA mental health care.

Women have been shown to be roughly twice as susceptible to some common mental health conditions (WHO, 2015), yet VA mental health services do not necessarily take into account gender differences in their mental health care structure. Women cope with trauma, disease, and experiences differently than men and, in turn, have different mental health needs and symptoms. Women veterans are more likely to be diagnosed with a mental disorder, especially depression, anxiety disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), than civilian women and male veterans (Goldzweig et al., 2006; Frayne et al., 2006). While the majority of women’s anxiety disorders and PTSD cases are combat related, sexual assault has continually been cited (Goldzweig et al., 2006). However, VA mental health centers often do not differentiate between treatment for men and women and therefore cannot take into account these many social differences in genders.

Women veterans are also less likely to report having a social support system than male veterans, which can drastically change mental health status and which type of treatment would be the most effective (Frayne et al., 2006). While it should be noted that individual doctors and psychologists may tailor their treatment to their patient’s gender, treatment with women veterans is often more effective with separate women’s mental health services. However, only 10.6% of VA women’s clinics have specific women’s mental health clinics and less than half have outpatient mental health services (Yano et al., 2006). These services are vital in the treatment of PTSD, depression, and other mental disorders and their deficiencies may play a part in the continued mental health issues of women veterans.
Military sexual assault and harassment has increasingly been reported among military women and veterans (DoD, 2013) and can greatly impact mental health risk. Women who experienced sexual assault in the military are more likely to develop PTSD than other women veterans, including other women veterans who experienced previous sexual assault unrelated to military service (Suris et al, 2004). In addition, lesbian and bisexual women veterans are at the greatest risk of experiencing military sexual assault and related PTSD (Mattocks et al, 2013). As sexual assault in the military is associated with increased rates of mental illness, knowledge of such history could benefit the physician or psychologist in his or her care. Yet roughly one-fourth of both men and women are not screened for sexual assault upon visiting VA medical centers (Kimerling et al, 2007).

As many women do not openly admit to such experiences if not prompted, sexual assault screenings are vital to the healthcare provider’s care and this discrepancy may have considerable consequences on women’s mental health. Additionally, sexual assault in the military may be associated with different mental disorder symptoms than other traumas, requiring different treatment. Mental health professionals specifically trained in treating sexual assault trauma would best be able to address these differences. However, while almost all VA mental health staff members in VA centers as well as the VA women’s health centers are trained to treat combat-related PTSD in women veterans, roughly 30% are not specifically trained to treat sexual assault-related PTSD (Yano et al, 2006). With sexual assault commonly being reported by service members and veterans, all VA mental health staff, especially those in women’s health clinics, should be well versed in sexual assault-related mental disorders. These limitations in the treatment of military sexual assault may greatly limit VA utilization rates.

Women veterans have consistently lower utilization rates of VA healthcare services. Women veterans have continually been found to use VA medical centers less often and for a shorter amount of time than male veterans (NCVAS, 2011; Goldzweig et al, 2006; Washington et al, 2011; Vogt et al, 2006). Moreover, women veterans who experienced military sexual assault were significantly less likely to access VA health services, possibly due to the VA’s association with their assailants (Suris et al, 2004). While there are many reasons for low utilization rates by women, logistics to accessing care is often a main concern. Washington et al. (2011) found that delayed care was the most common reason women gave for not utilizing VA medical services. However, it should be noted that a number of factors, including non-VA related issues, such as being able to take time off work, contributed to this delay. Nevertheless, the VA system’s limited health insurance, difficult eligibility logistics, and perceived insensitivity of staff also discouraged women from obtaining VA care. Another study showed that while women veterans do not perceive a significant difference in the quality of VA healthcare from other providers’ care, VA problems regarding inefficiency and accessibility of care influence women’s decisions to obtain healthcare elsewhere when possible (Vogt et al, 2006). As a result, women veterans have high attrition rates (Hamilton et al, 2013). Inaccessibility of healthcare services and eligibility difficulty were the most common reasons women veterans gave for discontinuing VA healthcare use (Hamilton et al, 2013). Addressing these challenges in the VA system would greatly benefit all veterans and have the potential to positively impact the negative perceptions of the VA healthcare system by women veterans.

Women veterans are not blind to the disparities in the VA healthcare and as a result often develop negative perceptions of the VA healthcare system. Women veterans who stopped using
VA healthcare were more likely to believe that VA healthcare providers were insensitive to the needs of women patients (Hamilton et al, 2013; Washington et al, 2011). While this complaint is common among female patients, only 12.1% of VA medical centers have formal women’s health training and care programs for VA staff (Yano et al, 2006). Additionally, women who experienced military sexual assault perceived VA services to be encumbered by the male dominance of the institution. Compared to other women veterans, female victims of military sexual assault are also more likely to report problems and negative perceptions of the VA staff and overall VA health system (Kelly et al, 2008). Nevertheless, research shows that the implementation of women’s health clinics and more gender-specific care can increase women veterans’ positive views and likelihood of utilizing VA medical centers (Goldzweig et al, 2006). With continued implementations of women’s health clinics and women’s health services, the VA healthcare system could improve the opinions of women veterans and be able to more thoroughly provide medical and mental healthcare.

Women veterans experience unique health concerns, but gender-specific healthcare at VA medical centers is greatly limited. This inequality is evident throughout the VA healthcare system, but little has been done to close this gap. Specialized women’s health clinics and mental health services, including specialized services for those who experienced military sexual assault, should be implemented in all VA medical centers, as these are vital in addressing women veterans’ health issues. Message tailoring to women veterans and staff training may also show positive results in combating VA perceptions of insensitivity to women’s needs. Improving VA medical centers would benefit all veterans and provide women veterans complete, accessible, and competent healthcare, allowing the American people to start to repay these veterans for their service to the country.

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Designing a Framework:
Compensation as a Consequence of Environmental Damage Caused by Military Activities
by Sandra Cassotta

1. INTRODUCTION

How does one compensate environmental damage as a consequence of military activities? There are no international treaties or conventions dealing entirely with this compensation. Environmental legal scholars who have tried to address the consequences of war on the environment have in reality come to face the presumption that human beings usually prevent war or prevent ongoing conflicts. One way to address compensation resulting from militarily-precipitated environmental damage is to re-construct and design a legal framework by integrating and combining different sources of law existing at different multi-regulatory levels. This article briefly sketches out the sources of international law applicable to this compensatory issue. Specifically, “alternative methodologies” to restore costs and contemplate final plans of restoration which are suggested by U.S. statutory schemes, such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), should be considered and are referred in this article as the “American model.” This article suggests that the American model is an interesting source of inspiration to be used to compensate damage. The American model should be integrated with the role and activity of the United Nations Compensation Commission (hereinafter the UNCC) and other rules of international law in combination with state’s practices. When examining state’s practice, this article includes reviewing the UNCC’s efforts to address damage to the environment caused by war, particularly related to marine environment. This Article will include a focus upon when the UNCC decides upon a state’s claims alleging such damages, with emphasis on the UNCC’s work on evaluation and quantification of such damages.

2. THE AMERICAN MODEL

Not all countries protect natural resources in the same way. Historical legal comparative analysis demonstrates that there are different choices adopted by legislators in common and civil law countries. The American model, for example, explains how to protect the environmental damage and method of compensations in sensu stricto, and not in connection with individual traditional injuries such as the damage to health or property like other Civil Law models. One method based on such American model which could be used to compensate environmental damage caused by military activities is the “Habitat Equivalency Methodology” (HEM). Different from the “Contingent Evaluation Method” (CEM), which consists of interviewing subjects that are asked to give a hypothetical value which could be attributed to


2 In 1980, the U.S. Congress enacted an important body of legislation, the so-called “CERCLA” which introduce an innovative specific regime for damage to natural resources by implementing compensation schemes based on “alternative methodologies” to restore environmental damage. Also, the Oil Pollution Prevention, Response, Liability Act (OPA) of 1990 is an important statute which was set up after the 1989 Exxon Valdez accident: a damaged tanker released oil, causing a major ecological disaster. After an agreement involving Alaska, the U.S and Exxon, Exxon was ordered to pay 900 million dollars damage for compensation to affected natural resources.


the preservation of a specific natural resource, the HEM is not based on a calculation of the economic value of the natural resources.

HEM determines what restorative actions “would” provide compensation to the public “equivalent” which is equivalent to the interim lost resource value.\(^5\) This method has already been used by some international conventions as a consequence of environmental damage\(^6\) which protect the environment by liability rules. Even though such conventions exclude the existence of a “principle of restoration of environmental damage as a consequence of damage caused by a military activity” causing a damage arising from unlawful invasions, these conventions are actually de facto still using the “HEM.” This methodology of calculation has not only been used by such conventions but also by the UNCC and its experts as a recovery technique by the United Nations (UN) when asked to determine the restoration costs for the damage to natural resources created by Kuwait’s invasion by Iraq in 1990, which caused damage to soil, threatened species and marine birds.

Therefore, the use of this method could represent an important source of inspiration for international states (including member states of the European Union (EU)) or international organizations, and could be applied to cases of past historical environmental damage, especially in relation to soil pollution caused by such military activities.

3. THE UNCC AND OTHER SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The establishment of the UNCC by Security Council Resolution 678\(^7\) in 1991 contributed to international law relating to liability and compensation for military-related environmental damage. The UNCC was established to administer claims arising out of Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91.\(^8\) The activity of the UNCC dealing specifically with compensation (with related environmental damages concerning Kuwait) was concluded in June 2005. The result: the UNCC found that a state may seek compensation as a consequence of damages to natural resources. The UNCC’s work has and will have a strong impact on future damages due to trans-boundary pollution where soil pollution is relevant.

When a state seeks compensation as a consequence of environmental damage caused by military activities, several factors must be understood, including:

- the broad definition of environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources;
- how the evaluation and quantification of environmental damage to natural resources is made, and
- who can make a claim for such damage.

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\(^6\) Such as for example the maritime Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) of 1969; and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund Convention (FC) of 1971.


\(^8\) See more details at http://www.uncc.ch.
The UNCC’s Governing Council⁹ established with a decision in 1991¹⁰ that requests of environmental compensation that were previously assessed as being “compensable” in accordance with the UN resolution 678, could include direct environmental damage and depletion of natural resources. Such includes losses or expenses resulting from:

a) “Abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses directly relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in coastal and international waters”;

b) “Reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or future measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and restore the environment”;

c) “Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for the purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the environment”;

d) “Reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings for the purposes of investigation and combating increased health risks as a result of the environmental damage”;

e) “And Depletion of damage to natural resources”.¹¹

The list is non-exhaustive.¹² In addition, compensation claims can include not only the clean-up costs and costs of preventative measures, but also the costs of monitoring and the costs of the evaluation and quantification of environmental damage (assuming evidence of such damage is demonstrated). Such environmental damages are not restricted in terms of “significance” or “reasonable criteria.”¹³

The acceptance of costs emanating from the above referenced subsection “d” is very important because monitoring and evaluation of environmental damage represents the first step to permitting compensation as a consequence of environmental damage. Only recently has customary international law estimated that such costs could have been compensated on the basis of the practice. In that sense, an important document to consider in case of compensation and quantification measures is the “Fifth F4 Report” of June 2005 issued by the Panel of Commissioners¹⁴ (hereafter “Panel”) charged with examining compensatory claims.

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⁹ “Governing Council” or “Council” as defined in the document of the Decision n. 7 of the Council of administration UN doc. S/AC26/1992/10/Rev, point 4) means “the Governing Council of the Commission”. The Governing Council is the organ of the Commission that sets its policy within the framework of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. As such, it establishes the criteria for compensability of claims, the rules and procedures for processing claims, the guidelines for administration and financing of the compensation fund and the procedures for payment of compensation. It reports regularly to the Security Council on the work of the Commission. See more at: http://http://www.uncc.ch/hover.html, last visited 04.02.2014.

¹⁰ Decision n.7 of the Council of administration UN doc. S/AC26/1991/7/Rev.1

¹¹ Par. 35 of the decision n. 7 the Council of administration UN doc. S/AC26/1991/7/Rev.

¹² See Report and recommendation made by the Panel of commissioners concerning the second installment of “F4” claims, S/AC.26/2002/26, paragraph 22.


¹⁴ The Panel of Commissioners (“the Panel”) was composed by three Commissioners, Messrs. Thomas A. Mensah (Chairman), José R. Allen and Peter H. Sand to review claims for direct environmental damage and depletion of natural resources resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning the Fifth Installment of “F4” Claims, SIAC 26/2005/10, 30 June 2005, United Nations, Security Council, point 1, page 8. The Panel elucidated that it was possible to restore losses irrespective from their commercial value. Specifically, “The Panel does not consider that there is anything in the language or context of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) or Governing Council decision 7 that mandates or suggests an interpretation that would restrict the term “environmental damage” to damage to natural resources which have commercial value”. Report and Recommendations made by the Panel of Commissioners concerning the Fifth Installment of “F4” Claims, SIAC 26/2005/10, 30 June 2005, United Nations Security Council, Paragraph 55.
and adopting recommendations as to the quantum of restoration for environmental damages classified as “depletion of or damage to natural resources” (point “e” of the list above).

The Panel specified that it is possible to compensate for environmental damage caused to natural resources especially in case of interim losses independently from commercial value which could be a novelty for international law but not for the United States. While the use of methodologies to calculate and evaluate interim losses to natural resources is not contemplated by any treaty and in some cases it is even prohibited, this is certainly not the case of the U.S. In that sense, the use of such kind of methodologies would be taking international law into a new domain. In addition, since the Panel is not anchored to domestic law but only to Security Council resolution 678, to the decisions of the Governing Council of the UNCC and to “any other relevant rules of international law”, its very existence is innovative.

In addition, other kinds of rules of international law can be combined with the UNCC activity above described and the state’s practice which will be treated in the next section. These rules of international law are to be found also in Article 38 (1) Statue of the International Court of Justice and where sources of law do not adequately address the specific circumstances of a given claim, other rules are to apply by analogy or serve as a source of inspiration for the decision of a particular case. Such rules include: (i) customary rules concerning different, but related fields of international law, and (ii) acts of relevant international organizations and conferences, including rules referred to as “soft law.”

4. STATE’S PRACTICE

The position of the UNCC Governing Council is in contrast to the current international regulatory solutions, at least with respect to this Article’s Iraq case stud. That said, the fact that certain environmental damages as a consequence of military activities are excluded from the existing International Civil Liability Conventions it is not a sufficient element to advocate that such type of environmental damages are prohibited by international law. A central problem is whether a lack in customary international law of “the prohibition to compensate environmental damage as a consequence of a military activity” is a sufficient or a strong enough argumentation to deny the existence of the “principle of restoration of environmental damage as a consequence of damage caused by a military activity” despite that this principle is explicitly excluded by the institutions providing the functioning of the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution (CLC) of 1969 and the Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund Convention (FC) of 1971. Further, in certain state practice, environmental damage caused by hazardous oil spills or caused by other substances may not be compensated.

The Panel has also an innovative approach to temporary environmental damages (interim losses) caused to natural resources for which damaged states presented compensatory claims. The Panel evaluates interim

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16 Art 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is generally recognised as a definitive statement of the sources of international law and requires the Court to apply, among other things, (a) international conventions “expressly recognized by the contesting states”, and (b) “international customs evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. Art 38.1 (b) of the ICJ refers to “international custom” as a source of international law, specifically emphasizing the two requirements of state practice plus acceptance of the practice as obligatory or opinion juris sive necessitatis (or opinion juris “tout-court”).
18 Para, 58 of the Fifth F4 Report.
19 See footnote n. 6
losses according to the HEA, which serves as a basis to determine the type and the nature of the project of compensation.  

According to the Iraqi case, the use of methods to calculate the evaluation of environmental damage in the case of interim losses caused to natural resources by military activities, is not contemplated by any treaty and even forbidden in some cases. In reality it would arguably not be permitted to use such evaluation techniques since this “would be taking international law into a new domain”. Hence, the Panel is quite prudent to estimate that the HEA is reliable but recognizes that the use of this methodology is restricted at both the domestic level and at the international level--and that there are some difficulties in applying it. But such difficulties do not mean that the method of HEA is in contrast to the principles of international law. The compensation claims founded on the HEA method should be accepted if the Panel “has satisfied itself that the extent of damage and quantification of compensation claimed are appropriate and reasonable in the circumstances of each claim”. The Panel expressed also how compensation as a consequence of military activities should occur. Initially the Panel’s position was based on the objective of bringing natural resources to its baseline conditions or the status quo ante the invasion (the situation before the damaging situation occurred). Yet, the Panel realized that it is not always appropriate and reasonable to act in this manner as this could have more negative effects than positive for the environment. In addition, it is not always possible to establish the “baseline conditions” existing to the invasion. This means that the Panel is contemplating measures of compensation alternative to those of the status quo ante, given that this kind of compensation is impossible. Some examples include compensation claims of Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. All these examples stem from the 1991 Iraqi invasion. In particular, several compensation claims were accepted in Jordan, including the loss of rangeland and soil productivity in the case of Iran’s crop decreases. Another type of damage was caused by the afflux of refugees, the damage to soil, waters, animal extinctions or in captivity in Iraq. The Panel partially accepted partially Jordan’s compensation claims and suggested to establishing management cooperative programmes in order to compensate Jordan for losses along the financing programme for breeding in threatened animal species in captivity. With regard to the compensation claims from Kuwait, the Panel assessed as “compensable” all the environmental damages caused to the coasts due the oil spill and since the damage caused to the coasts and to the habitat are intrinsically linked and could be extremely difficult to compensate, the Panel advices the use of alternative compensation measures. The Panel held the same alternative compensatory measure also in the case of the Saudi Arabia to achieve projects aimed at compensating the loss of ecological services and also related to the phenomenon of high tides. Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will be able to reconstruct protected areas and offer ecological services similar to those deriving from the loss of natural resources. The Panel’s decisions are enforced through an individual state’s responsibility, while civil action in a national court in time of armed conflicts has not
received much attention. In the case at hand, civil liability arising from military activities due to Iraq’s unlawful invasion is not really clear and well defined.

5. CONCLUSION

From a multilevel contextual legal analysis of different regulatory solutions at different levels of sources of law coupled with states’ practice, there is a need to take into greater account what are, or will be, the environmental consequences during the decision-making of military strategic plans and decisions. Not all the solutions suggested by the different levels of sources of law are exhaustive and each level including state practice presents gaps. Thus, it is only by combining and integrating different solutions that it is possible to design an effective legal construct to compensate for such kind of environmental damages. The role of institutions, such as the UNCC, may be crucial and promising with regards to the monitoring and assessment especially, in the phase of pre-claim. Nevertheless, assessment and monitoring are not really applicable in case of armed conflicts, neither State responsibility. Therefore the solution is really in taking into account the possibility to use or build *ad hoc* weapons to prevent environmental damage.
The European Union: A Quest for Security Policy
by Filip Tuček

In 2012, the European Union was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for having “contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.”¹ For over six decades, the EU’s “common assets” – people, territory, interests, policies, facilities, freedoms² –and shared values of democracy, human dignity, and freedom have been reinforced by a common perception of external threats posed by “others.” The post-Westphalian nature of international relations have driven the Atlantic Europe, Core Europe, New Europe, and Non-Aligned Europe³ to develop increasingly convergent strategic cultures based on mutually shared identities facilitated by common economic and security interests.

Members of the community have increasingly identified positively with one another, and security has become perceived as the responsibility of all, as opposed to competitive or individualistic security systems of the Old Continent’s past. In the contemporary, interdependent world, a power to influence global events has been “in many hands on many places.”⁴ The transformation of the global distribution of power brings important implications for security and defense policy. These implications are derived from the mutual interdependence of individual actors in crisis-solving, decision-making, trade, and accessibility of energy resources, forming an overriding “paradigm of the post-bipolar world …where everything depends on everything.”⁵ Cooperation in an ever-wider set of issues, including security, has become the motto of the day.

FROM ECONOMIC COOPERATION TO ACTIVE PEACE PROMOTION

The EU originally started off with economic interests as its primary focus, yet soon became motivated by a quest for peace and was tacitly designed to help sustain it. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, marked the first step in modern European integration. Despite its original purpose of maintaining peace throughout the period of the Cold War, “the EU remained largely untouched by [cooperation in] the security and defense policy”.⁶ The only credible Western platform for defense collaboration was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Once Germany and Italy joined NATO, all founding members of the EU were then also members of NATO and therefore could easily work together on security and defense issues through a different, (and thanks to presence of the United States) more influential platform than the EU. Thus NATO seemed at the time to provide sufficient security guarantees. The unwillingness of the Western Europeans to coordinate their defense and security policies outside of NATO is well reflected in the

³ Graeme P. Herd, Europe and Russia, From Strategic Dissonance to Strategic Divorce?, in Thierry Tardy (ed.), European Security in a Global Context, Internal and External Dynamics (Routledge, Oxon, 2009), p. 95
⁵ Pere Vilanova, Post-bipolar World: the Interdependence Paradigm, interview by Oleguer Sarsadenas, CIDOB, 2012
⁶ Ibid., p. 5
European attitude towards the Western European Union (WEU), which was kept relatively dormant, and was at least partially reactivated only in 1984 by the Rome Declaration.

The only accomplished foreign policy initiative, the European Political Cooperation (EPC), served solely as a discussion platform, and security defense was completely omitted. The EU was therefore for almost fifty years perceived as a purely “civilian actor.” It was increasingly ambitious in the spheres of economics and trade and deeply rooted in international law, but the EU was devoid of any sort of military policy.

The first major step in the direction of greater cooperation in security and defense came after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1992 at a summit in Maastricht, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was introduced as a second pillar of the newly formed European Union. Despite vague definitions, the Treaty acknowledged not only the positive (but passive) role of the EU in fostering security internally, but also its ambitions in strengthening it further through increase in active cooperation in security policy between Member States and through active influence on external environment. And yet, the Balkan Wars fully exposed the lack of preparedness of the European Union to act with coordination in security policy matters. The prolonged, bloody conflict in EU’s proximate neighborhood was, in the eyes of many Europeans, perceived as a collective failure to act as a security actor capable of holding other actors responsible, and of incurring obligations on them.

Amidst the prolonged Kosovo crisis, seeing the urgency for strengthening cooperation in the sphere of security and defense, European leaders responded. The European Council’s meeting in Cologne in June 1999 launched the European Security and Defense Policy, renamed by the Lisbon Treaty to Common Foreign and Security Policy, as an integrated part of the CSFP. Since 1999, the EU has created a number of institutions and mechanisms to enable itself to act in accordance with the goals declared in 1998 in the Saint-Malo declaration to equip the EU with “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces.”

To overcome deeper organizational challenges, the EU has established a strong institutional background to CSDP. In 2000, the European Council in Feira formally approved the establishment of key decision-making structures: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, and associated EU Military Staff. This has been a “remarkable [achievement] in a system where institutional change often proceeds at a glacial pace,” and it demonstrates how serious the EU member states were about the future (military aspect) of security and defense cooperation. To provide support to the member states’ capabilities in development, research, and acquisition of armament capabilities and to promote

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7 Ibid., p. 5
11 Desmond Dinan. Ever Closer Union, An Introduction to European Integration (Palgrave Mcmillan, The United States of America, 2010), p. 555
the unity of their military requirements, the EU established a European Defense Agency in 2004, in parallel with the release of HHG 2010 and the establishment of the BGs concept. Further, the Lisbon Treaty introduced an institute of permanent structured cooperation that enables states that “fulfill the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities”\(^\text{14}\) to cooperate under the EU framework.\(^\text{15}\)

To be able to cover a relatively large scope of tasks assigned by the Petersbourg Tasks and by the ESS, Helsinki Headline Goals 2010 acknowledged that the EU “must retain ability to conduct concurrent operations simultaneously.”\(^\text{16}\) To achieve this goal, individual national capacities must be increasingly interoperable, deployable in distant theatres, which can be, according to the document, best achieved by increased pooling and sharing.\(^\text{17}\) The Capability Development Mechanism should ensure that the capabilities are enhanced in coordination with NATO in order to fully exploit the potential of the Berlin Plus. Furthermore, the Member States have agreed to form EU Battle groups (BGs),\(^\text{18}\) 1500-man-strong units capable of rapid response within 10 days after decision. Despite being operational since 2007, they have not yet been deployed. Nevertheless, the BGs concept has so far “substantially supported the transformation of the [national] armed forces and intensified national defense reform process.”\(^\text{19}\)

VALUES, STRATEGIC CULTURE AND POWER

The European Union is based not only on values and ideas, but also on common interests. Although construction of a united Europe with an original all-encompassing European Identity\(^\text{20}\) has not yet materialized, respect for human dignity, freedom, promotion of democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights – as stated in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)\(^\text{21}\) – represent a common standard that shapes policies of the EU and of its members.

However, the role of ideas in the formation of the EU’s strategic culture cannot be overestimated, as this may lead to false conclusions. These ideas are not static and have fluctuating value patterns. Because the European Union is tasked to protect and develop the aforementioned values within its borders and abroad, further development of consensus on (and adherence to) values that underpin its existence are essential for it to develop further.\(^\text{22}\) Translated into EU practice, the actions of the EU member states within the framework of the Union values have been increasingly converging (either directly driven by the values or tacitly respecting them), leading inevitably to deeper interaction and creation of a certain

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\(^{15}\) Qualified majority voting is required, and in decisions regarding missions, unanimity.


\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 2

\(^{18}\) Denmark and Malta remained outside of the concept.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 7


strategic culture. Even through a strictly realist view, omitting values as the driving force behind the ever-growing closeness of the EU Member States, the shared interests of these countries have led to the gradual formation of a common strategic culture.

Importantly, the “common strategic cultures only produce cooperation when they tend towards the post-Westphalian variant, (…) where the states are likely to view multilateralism as the strategy of choice. (…) Westphalian security cultures, on the other hand, (…) target the maximization of power, rely on military power, (…) and do not provide the basis for routinized cooperation.”

An actor with an identity and a certain strategic culture must be able to transform its potential to act into real action; only an actor with the power to act is truly relevant if peace needs to be maintained, promoted, or enforced. According to the dictionary, power “is the ability to achieve one’s purposes or goals (…) to do things and to control others.” Further, in international politics, power may be understood as the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do. More importantly, the use of power is connected with the possession of a means to influence, which may vary from political to military to cultural or economic contexts.

While historically power in international relations was measured mostly by the strength of an actor’s army (hard power), the end of the Cold War, globalization, and the general transformation of the global system towards one with influence to shape global events “in many hands on many places” have brought about a new, more diverse understanding of power. Scholars have been increasingly focused on challenging the conventional, materialist, and military-oriented view of security. The traditionally perceived (hard) power inevitably derived from largely inherited circumstances – geography, population, and raw materials. During the 20th century, and fully emerging after the end of World War II, preserving autonomy of the state and freedom of decision-making was increasingly dependent not only on armed force, diplomacy, and intelligence but also on economic leverage and cultural superiority. Eventually the concept of power gradually became ever more complex, including education, technology, economic growth, and cultural products (soft power).

peaceful coexistence and gives them a considerable leverage when pressuring for peace outside of its territory.

Since the power of an actor in international relations can no longer be assessed solely by how many tanks, aircraft, or military personnel it has, a rather more complex set of factors must be examined and put into wider context. Behavior of actors is influenced by a level of interaction and interdependence never before seen. To ensure that it remains peaceful, mutual understanding through exchanging goods and carefully sharing values and ideas has become vital.

According to landmark essay *Power and Interdependence* by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, force, while necessary in extreme cases, has been generally losing its importance and is often not an appropriate way of achieving actor’s goals, peace being the most important among them. In such a world, the ability to maintain and to promote peace depends significantly on the existence of non-military instruments, although backed by complementary military capacities for a greater credibility. These instruments correspond to the nature of current threats to peace and are to a large extent dictated by them.

**SECURITY THREATS THAT THE EU FACES**

It is in the globalized international environment, filled with an unprecedented number of relevant, mutually interdependent actors, where previously non-existent or marginal security threats gain importance. As these security challenges can be local, regional, or global, so the responses are inevitably a result of a complex interaction between states and also non-state actors, with a global, regional, or sub-regional scope. The complexity of the current dangers is well described by former Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan:

“Ask a New York investment banker who walks past Ground Zero every day on her way to work what today's biggest threat is. Then ask an illiterate 12-year-old orphan in Malawi who lost his parents to AIDS. You will get two very different answers. Invite an Indonesian fisherman mourning the loss of his entire family and the destruction of his village from the recent, devastating tsunami to tell you what he fears most. Then ask a villager in Darfur, stalked by murderous militias and fearful of bombing raids. Their answers, too, are likely to diverge.”

States no longer constitute the sole object of security, as the concept has been progressively expanded to include new phenomena and new types of non-state actors. The network of interdependencies, caused by economic openness and pursuit of welfare maximization together with increased pressure on

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35 Ibid., p. 11
a democratic and equal approach, has weakened the state’s “gate-keeper” role. The resulting effect is that “more than ever threat to one is a threat to all.” Complex security challenges require concerted responses to which the EU, sharing a common strategic culture, is well suited.

The growing complexity and variable nature of threats to peace requires categorization. The following is a two-layer categorization by Barry Buzan. In his three-sector division he distinguishes among three potential targets: individual, state, international system. Then he divides threats into five sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. This division has become a basic framework for a broad understanding of security and has also been a starting point for contemporary security strategies. The table below outlines the connections between the three targets and the five-sectoral theory.

Of course the directions in a table are not absolute and in practice many different factors affect the quality (or existence) of peace. Moreover the threats are often combined or triggered by one another. Nevertheless the table provides a lucid overview of the sectorial theory that represents a basis for further categorization included in the National Security Strategy of the United States (2010), the European Security Strategy (2003), NATO Strategic Concept (2010), and the United Nation’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). These documents serve to list the most eminent current security threats; Inter-state conflict, failed states and lack of governance, terrorism, proliferation of conventional, biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, transnational organized crime, threats to energy supply and critical infrastructure, cyber threats, environmental threats, economic threats and prosperity threats.

The European Union, as well as other actors, has to address these dangers on its territory and outside of it. Furthermore, a closer look at these threats highlights why conventional military is often futile against them. Rather promoting understanding through assistance, aid and cooperation is usually a way to alleviate these threats to security of the target.

**MILITARY MEANS AND BEYOND**

The ability to be a security actor capable of active and impactful action must be measured not only by the disposability and capability of an entity’s military force but also by the existence of sources and mechanisms capable of meeting asymmetric security challenges. In accordance with the Clausewitzian dictum, the means changed as political objectives to be pursued with them had transformed. Peace-building, conflict prevention, controlling migration, promoting good governance, tracking down terrorist groups, overseeing the movement of arms and preventing the spread of WMDs, reducing

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36 Ibid., p. 28
37 Barry Buzan. *People States and Fear* (Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., Great Britain, 1983)
38 For the sake of the clarity of the text, it is important to have a non-state actor as an entity between individual and state.
poverty, securing transit and communications routes, protecting electronic data, tackling environmental challenges, fighting infectious diseases, or promoting global economic sustainability are areas that go well beyond conventional means at an army’s disposal. International consensus and coordinated multi-dimensional efforts (not necessarily including all actors) rather than an overwhelming individual power can bring about positive outcomes.

This is why a non-state entity with no conventional military force, but inevitably limited military cooperation, can aspire to be a security actor in this intractable security environment. The non-military capacities often have a persuasive form (economic, political, diplomatic) and play a key role in assurance (post-conflict interventions) and prevention (pre-conflict interventions), and partially also in protection (internal security). On the other hand, coercive military (and policing) capacities serve primarily for compellence (military intervention). The EU has largely moved beyond compellence policy into a sphere of laws, rules, and international cooperation, as threats to security in the current environment require.

The scope of EU external activities within CSDP is largely predetermined by two key documents, the European Security Strategy outlining threats, as mentioned previously, and the (extended) Petersburg Tasks, incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997 (effective in 1999). The Tasks included humanitarian and rescue missions as well as combat forces for crisis management. The set of operations has been extended by the Lisbon Treaty to include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may also contribute to the fight against terrorism, including providing support to other third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

Practically, all of the aforementioned activities primarily aim to promote security by increasing regional cooperation, by promoting human rights, democracy, and good governance, by preventing violent conflict, by battling organized crime and enhancing internal security, and by investing in cyber-security. The common denominator of these efforts is multilateralism, on which the eventual success of the preferred non-military actions is “increasingly dependent.”

EU SECURITY POLICY IN PRACTICE: APPROACH AND OBSTACLES

External activities of the EU in the realm of security are thus characterized by (1) a preference for non-military means; (2) ends achieved by cooperation; (3) use of persuasion rather than coercion; and (4) democratic civilian control over security (and foreign) policymaking.

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Together with the export of normative standards – the rule of law, respect for human rights, mutual understanding based on shared values (or interests) – the EU employs normative and civilian soft power instruments to create a robust security policy for a free, safe, and open Europe, however contradictory this may be. In practical policy, the normative multilateral approach is limited by a pragmatic selective (typically bilateral) partnership, acknowledged even within the ESS, and by the preference for security over altruistic interests. The European Neighborhood policy (ENP) may be the finest example.

Within the chiefly bilateral ENP, the EU [officially] offers its neighbors a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). However, the relationship between the will to export good governance on the one side and the desire to sustain stability in its neighborhood on the other has produces mixed results. The implied principles of conditionality, based on a cost-benefit calculation of the partner country, and of externalization that presumes that tight internal integration will diminish the influence of detrimental external forces that have largely shaped the ENP.

The inclusive (preventive) security approach included in the ENP promotes social, economic, and pro-democracy development. Although simultaneously applied, a Schengenized exclusive (protective) policy aiming at border protection is contradictory, as it prefers stability over uncertainty behind external borders. The internal security has been partially strengthened by exclusiveness. In effect, the declared goal to create a “zone of shared stability and prosperity” poses a stability-democratization dilemma. As the ENP is not meant to be a road to accession, inevitably its main purpose is to secure rather than blur borders and to export stability rather than import instability. Hereby it uses a mix of financial, civilian, and normative security measures in combined bilateral and multilateral approaches in order to strengthen the EU’s collective and internal security. Understanding within is not always compatible with security from the outside.

Despite the aforementioned obstacles, the ENP has already produced a number of positive results and is far from being the only similar project. Through the Instrument for Pre-accession, the European Community Humanitarian Office, and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, through the Instrument of Stability, or through Partnership for Change, the EU aims to break a vicious cycle of weak governance and related phenomena endangering peace, by massive financial and technical

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51 The bilateral ENP is accompanied by multilateral initiatives within the Eastern Partnership Program and the Union for the Mediterranean.
55 Ibid., p. 179
support. Adding the European Development Fund, the Development Cooperation Instrument, and the European Neighborhood Policy Instrument, the European Union is by far the world’s largest source of Official Development Aid (ODA), accounting for around 60% of the world total in 2010.

The EU also deploys direct, non-military means to address security challenges far from its borders. Various preventive or post-conflict civilian missions, including police, lawyers, judges, civil administrators, customs officials, relief agents, and other specialists, often prove more effective in promoting stability than military power. By adopting Civilian Headline Goal 2010 in 2007, the EU made sure that “sufficient numbers of well-qualified personnel are available (…), planning and conduct capabilities, equipment, procedures, training and concepts are developed and strengthened according to need, (…), …[and that] the EU is able to (…) respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks.” So far, the EU has thus conducted a number of civilian and military operations. The EULEX in Kosovo launched in 2008 has been the largest one at the time of this writing, with 2,124 officials deployed.

ACHIEVEMENTS TO BUILD UPON

For more than five decades, the European Union has maintained peace between countries that used to be mortal enemies for centuries. With a common identity, a shared strategic culture and a will to translate them into real power, the European Union has promoted peace not only internally, but also conducts security policy activities behind its borders.

The European security’s new role as a prominent international actor takes place in an environment completely different from the pre-CSDP one where traditional security actors dominated. The emergence of new regional and global actors has led to an increasingly multipolar world. In this environment, multilateral cooperation with intergovernmental organizations and relevant state actors has become a vital aspect of crisis management. Accordingly, the security threats that have emerged in this transformed environment require an approach that goes beyond unilateral military response.

Terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, transnational organized crime, critical-infrastructure protection, failed states and extreme poverty, environmental degradation, or cyber-threats require a complex, concerted, often non-military and long-term effort. This development has thus produced an environment that measures securitization in terms of welfare, law, and order. In direct contrast to traditional actorness based on military capability and self-sufficiency in security issues, the present security threats often require normative, non-military measures for which the EU is equipped.

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60 The complete list of all EU operations may be found on the following link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/eu-operations?lang=en
62 John McCormick. The European Superpower (Palgrave Mcmillan, New York, 2007), p. 17
Through a number of programs, usually based on the principle of conditionality, the EU aims to share its experience with building more or less just and free societies. It is doing so not only for altruistic reasons, but also because having a stable and democratic neighborhood increases security of the EU itself. The opportunity to share the hard gained experience with building sustainable peace at home through increasing understanding, security and institutional accountability should not be missed. In order to develop a truly sustainable, coherent global security presence, the EU must overcome existing conceptual, organizational, and capability issues.63

The EU has managed to agree on security priorities and to gradually build common mechanisms to tackle them. However, in practice the actions, above all in the military sphere, have been often hampered by political differences and economic difficulties. The uncertainty and ambiguities about what the EU security and defense role really should be still prevails among member states. In effect, despite the considerable material and institutional capacities, the EU is still searching for a more forceful and decisive security role. Though a lot remains to be done both at home and abroad, the Nobel Peace Prize from 2012 may serve as an important acknowledgement of achieved successes, and as motivation to reach new ones in the future.

*The text is adapted from the author’s book “The European Union as Security Actor of a New Type.”*

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63 Ibid., p. 15
Trade, Globalization, and U.S. Foreign Policy

by Liesl Himmelberger

Why are some nations rich and others poor? Why do some grow richer while others stagnate? And how does the economic realm influence the ability of states to pursue their broader political and strategic interests? These are the questions of international political economics; they are also questions of great significance to U.S. policymakers. The United States has traditionally championed economic globalization – that is, reducing barriers to international trade and opening economies to foreign investment. And yet as the global economy has lurched into recession and scholars have sounded the alarm of “American decline,” many have started to question whether economic globalization still serves the interests of an increasingly, thinly-stretched super-power and the rest of the world. Should U.S. policymakers continue to promote economic liberalization? And how do the demands of economic development and the rise of new economic powers like India and China influence America’s standing in the world?

Free Trade and Economic Inequality: The Rich-Poor Gap versus the Catch-Up Thesis

Ours is an era of rapid “globalization.” Recent decades have seen barriers to international trade collapse and levels of foreign investment increase. And yet even as global GDP rises, some nations and individuals share a disproportionate amount of the gains. One must ask, then, whether “globalization” is on the whole a desirable or lamentable development, and what U.S. policymakers can (or should) do to encourage or discourage it.

Some say that globalization makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. The idea that the per capita GDP of the world’s rich countries grows faster than that of poor countries is frequently referred to as the “Rich-Poor Gap Model.” Anti-globalization advocates argue that this gap illustrates the negative effects of international trade on the developing world. The 1999 UN Human Development Report provides some support for this thesis. According to this report, the gap between the per capita income level of the top and bottom twenty percent of the world’s population increased exponentially over the previous three decades. Demonstrating that this gap exists, however, is considerably easier than explaining why it exists. Poor countries might remain poor due to political instability or corruption, geographical factors such as access to seaports, poor infrastructure, education, or enforcement of rule of law (discouraging foreign investment).
investment), or some as yet unexplained concatenation of causes. Exploring these causes is an important component of formulating prudent trade policy.

Advocates of globalization, however, point out that the rate at which rich countries get richer does not remain constant over time. Eventually, the per capita GDP of wealthy nations seems to level out. This idea – called the “Catch-Up Thesis” – further suggests that the key divide among the world’s nations is not so much rich versus poor as industrialized versus non-industrialized. Once poor countries industrialize, their per capita GDP begins to improve and they start to catch up to their richer peers. There is considerable historical evidence for this thesis. In Europe, per capita income has effectively converged around $40,000 for Germany, France, and Britain as of 2012. This is despite the fact that Britain peaked as an economic leader in the late 1800s and Germany peaked much later, in the 1920s. Additionally, the Soviet Union experienced significant per capita income growth in the twentieth century by industrializing, yet did not develop sufficient infrastructure (especially in its oil industry) to maintain advanced industrial development; thus, the Soviets peaked and quickly declined. If the Catch-Up Thesis is correct, the question that policymakers face is how and under what conditions to help poor nations industrialize, and thus commence the growth and eventual convergence of their economies with those of richer countries.

These models – the “Rich-Poor Gap” and the “Catch-Up Thesis” – need not be considered mutually exclusive. Perhaps they simply describe the growth of states’ economies at two different points along their development. Industrialized countries may grow richer when compared to poorer, non-industrialized countries, but might not be getting significantly richer, tending instead to converge with one another. Each model also has its own virtues and vices. While the Rich-Poor Gap describes the disparity between per capita income levels that occur when a state industrializes, it does not consider maturation and decline of richer, advanced industrialized states. The Catch-Up Thesis deemphasizes the initial growth of an industrializing power as it increases in relative power away from other poor countries, highlighting how advanced industrial countries mature, peak, and start to decline. It does seem to be the case, though, that states experience diminishing per capita growth rates until rates level out, allowing poorer countries the relative opportunity to ‘catch-up.’ Eventually, industrialized countries like Britain, Germany, and France converge around a per capita income growth rate of 2 to 3%. At present, the United States is approaching the same per capita income growth rate, and thus seems to provide further evidence for this thesis, reflecting a 2.8% per capita GDP growth in the third quarter of 2013. When researchers examine purely per capita income data, there appears

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5 For instance, Soviet oil production peaked and dropped in the 1980s due to a lack of investment in and infrastructure for secondary drilling techniques to access deeper and less viscous oil. The US oil industry had relied on these techniques since the 1970s. Matthew R. Simmons, *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), p. 305.
meager evidence for this convergence. Although, using statistical techniques to control for steady state factors, like population growth rates and human capital accumulation (talent through education), the data reveals convergence of developed countries’ growth at a rate of about 2% per year.8

**Free Trade and Power**

Until World War II, the size of a nation’s population was perhaps the most significant determinant of that nation’s power. Today, however, a nation’s capacity to generate wealth – including its ability to deploy technology and facilitate innovation – seems to play a larger role in determining its power to pursue national interests. The most relevant measures of power are relative rather than absolute – that is, the decisive question is not how much power a nation has, but how much power it has relative to its rivals.9 Since the growth of international trade has had a decisive impact on nations’ wealth relative to their peers and thus their relative power, one cannot formulate international economic policy without taking into account international power relations.

The determinants of growth in power and economic development are related. Advances in technology can accelerate or decelerate a country’s economic growth and can help to increase its productivity levels. Even if the technological advances are incremental, the effects can be significant.10 Likewise, globalization can serve to “grease the wheels” of economic growth, thus making the redistribution of power amongst rivals more fluid than it would otherwise be. Globalization also eases the export of technologies from advanced to less advanced countries, thus expediting industrialization.

Even if rates of per capita income growth converge after industrialization, however, nations need not necessarily converge in terms of relative power. China has grown quickly, but it may just as quickly pass through inflection points where its growth slows, peaks, and begins to converge – just like other advanced industrial powers.11 Now that India is industrializing, albeit somewhat slower than China, it is gradually gaining in power relative to its South Asian rivals. There may be economic and potential military competition between China and India as China works to retain and expand its present superiority in relative power.

To gradually sustain increasing levels of growth and prosperity, how can capitalization on technological advances allow China, India, or the United States to retain greater relative wealth and power than their competitors? If globalization threatens to make some advanced nations relatively less powerful – as for instance the rise of India would seem to make China relatively less powerful, or the rise of China would seem to make the United States relatively less powerful – are there interests aside from power that should nevertheless lead these nations to pursue increased globalization?

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The Neo-Mercantilist Critique of Free Trade

In the past decade or two, several nations have opted out of important aspects of international free trade in an attempt to maintain (or increase) national power. One theory of how states can do this, called “Neo-Mercantilism,” holds that economic desires of individuals should be subordinate to the interests of the state. This theory stands in contrast to Marxism, which considers economics to be the driver of politics, and liberalism, which holds that economics and politics should in the ideal case interfere with one another minimally. Neo-mercantilist, otherwise known as state capitalist, states do not trust independent firms to make economic decisions; rather, they guide nominally private firms towards what political leaders consider national interests. It is important to understand the reasons for the increasing appeal of nations to apply state capitalist tools (state-owned enterprises, private ‘national champion’ firms, and sovereign wealth funds), especially to cushion countries from recessionary periods.

As practiced by a number of Asian countries over the course of the twentieth century, such as China, South Korea, and Japan, neo-mercantilism also differs significantly from old-style mercantilism in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries (sometimes referred to as “paleo-mercantilism”). Paleo-mercantilism thrived in Europe, where monarchies focused on building up treasuries of gold and silver specie to fund wars and accrue current account surpluses, rather than turning national resources towards expanding international commerce. In fact, trade was viewed as a form of warfare, utilizing colonies to collect current account surpluses of specie, and supporting national champions through letters of patent: the Dutch and British East India Companies.

State capitalism, by contrast, encourages “selective forward investment,” or state promotion of select export-driven companies favored to compete in international markets. To differing degrees, the United Arab Emirates, China, and even Norway have state-owned enterprises. These policies attempt both to ensure that export-driven companies are extremely competitive in international markets and to limit foreign competition in domestic markets. For instance, three Chinese firms produced low-cost solar panels in the late 2000s. Senior executives of two of these firms worked together on the China New Energy Chamber of Commerce for ‘collaborative’ purposes. Their primary U.S. competitor, a solar panel innovator called Solyndra, declared bankruptcy in 2011. Solyndra sued these firms, claiming that they used predatory pricing to flood markets with below-cost solar panels by “dropping their prices ‘in tandem’ by 75 percent in four years.” Solyndra alleged that the Chinese National Energy

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13 Ibid, p. 54-72.
15 Letters of patent were issued by the respective Crowns to the Dutch and British East India Companies, granting these firms exclusive monopoly rights to the trading routes from their ports with finished goods to colonies for resources and markets. Thus, any trade of goods to these ports outside of these companies was considered illegal and conducted by smugglers, who ultimately broke the monopoly power of these two companies over time thanks to the extensive transportation demands generated by the Industrial Revolution. Bremmer, p. 35-36.
Administration issued commercial directives for the solar industry.\textsuperscript{19} Despite receiving $535 million in federal loan guarantees (given its research and development efforts to develop more efficient solar panels),\textsuperscript{20} Solyndra could not compete with the below-cost practices. Regardless, state-managed policies that target any industries skew signals for market participants, inject additional risk for all players, and may prove costly in the long run.

Neo-mercantilist states also restrict imports, although they do not always do so by means of high tariffs. Rather, these states use non-tariff barriers which they frequently frame as “cultural preferences.” When the slogan “buy Japanese” is backed up with government policies, however, and very few Korean cars are sold in Japan despite the close proximity of the two countries, something more than cultural preferences are likely at play.\textsuperscript{21} States can use tariffs under cultural preservation auspices. With a 778 percent tariff on rice and its products, the Japanese government subsidizes this industry due to its alleged sacred nature and its agricultural heritage,\textsuperscript{22} although this high tariff is more likely for national security purposes. This subsidization of the rice industry has led to “mediocre” crops, due to a lack of competition; recently, Japanese citizens have questioned the purpose of this tariff, given Japan’s terms to potentially join the Trans-Pacific Partnership.\textsuperscript{23} Neo-mercantilist states develop a number of similar policies to achieve the same end: domestic production for both domestic and international consumption. Given the popularity of government tools to affect international competition, it warrants consideration of the time-horizon and winners and losers of such economic policies.

Some state capitalist countries manipulate monetary policy in order to give their firms a leg up on the international competition. China, for instance, has undervalued its currency by keeping its foreign exchange rate artificially low and by buying up foreign currency.\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, native Japanese are allowed to invest their personal savings in only one state bank. This bank naturally has a large surplus of money, which enables it to give very low interest rate loans to large exporting companies. Unless these large companies use their loans to drive exports, they do not get loans in the future. Monopoly profits that result from these practices come at the expense of foreigners who might otherwise sell in Japan and Japanese firms that might otherwise reach decisions different from those favored by the state. There are open questions as to whether these groups could help counter protectionist policies, whether countering neo-mercantilism should be an interest and how the United States would go about it if it chose to do so.

Secrecy often associated with state capitalism allows use of sovereign wealth funds to merge state aims and official reserve accounts with private enterprise. According to the relative backwardness hypothesis, rapidly developing nations benefit from the advances and technologies that preceded them, adopting, or stealing at times, the collective wealth of technology generated

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Martin Wolf, \textit{Fixing Global Finance: Expanded and Updated} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), p. 92-95.
\end{itemize}
by developed countries. With less competition and significantly greater resources than competitors, firms backed by governments effectively leap-frog over technological achievements of predecessors, avoiding the high costs of research and development.

Neo-mercantilist countries promote extremely large firms, like China’s solar panel firms, to compete with international industries; although, as lack of competition leads them to become increasingly inefficient, states increase their investment in their success via subsidies and tax breaks. As a result, smaller and medium sized firms essentially get squeezed out of business, further hindering competition and entrepreneurship. While China has opened its markets to foreign investment, it practices its own unique blend of state capitalism with a Marxist flavor, generating shadow banks that parallel foreign companies and can gain significant profit margins. With about one billion consumers in China, foreign investors have an incentive to agree to whatever terms the government offers. As with any foreign direct investment, multinational corporations stand the chance of getting pushed out of the market by domestic firms, suffering losses if a host nation alters its policies, or outright expropriation.

Neo-mercantilism has enabled rapid growth and development over the past forty to fifty years in countries like Japan, Korea, and China, and now countries like India and Brazil. Results were especially impressive in short-term spurts, such as Japan in the 1960s. As these newly industrializing countries blossom, they experience growth rates of approximately 8 to 10% and benefit from pre-existing technology innovated and paid for by other advanced industrial powers. After this period of rapid growth, however, the per capita income growth rate inevitably slows and tapers off. As these countries become advanced industrialized countries, neo-mercantilist policies arguably prove less and less efficient. The state-led policies at the core of these economies stifle entrepreneurship, the development of new technology, and thus diminish economic growth. Since the governments manipulate firms for political ends, rather than empowering consumers to drive production, firms cannot fully benefit from globalization. Rather than making decisions focused on specialization, they comply with state-led directives.

These considerations suggest that neo-mercantilist policies, while designed to promote national interests, may in the end prove self-defeating. And yet, with the United States responding with similar policies of greater market regulation and intervention, especially in response to recessions, several nations have opted toward evident short-term gains from state capitalist policies, and many did so while industrializing rapidly and moving from national poverty to wealth in a short period of time. All of which forces policymakers to confront a number of questions: is globalization still an economically sound and morally responsible tenet to champion, or are imperatives like nationalism or protectionism important to counterbalance the effects of world trade? During times of economic turmoil, should policymakers look to the short-term benefits of state capitalist methods, although these techniques may likely exacerbate and inhibit future long-term growth? Does neo-mercantilism get something right?

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26 Bremmer, p. 69-75.
28 Pugel, p. 346.
For advanced industrial countries, the only way to avoid or eventually escape limitations of neo-mercantilism is by reforming policies toward free market practices. The longer neo-mercantilist policies exist, the more bureaucratic infrastructures grow along with them, making reforms all the more difficult. A strong middle class might lead the charge for reform, since under neo-mercantilist policies they bear the brunt of government policies designed to aid firms and politicians rather than consumers. Unfortunately, in countries like China, cultural barriers (like inhibitions against protesting) hinder the middle class’ demands for reform. Also, many people in these countries see relative improvements in their economic well-being, which naturally makes them less eager to demand even the reforms they might otherwise prefer.

Of all the Asian states using neo-mercantilist policies, Korea likely has the strongest chance to advance reforms. China’s Communist Party has asserted increasing authority over the economy in the past decade. Japanese institutions, framed around firm-conglomerates called keiretsus, are already deeply ingrained. While Korea has similar ‘family of company’ institutions to Japanese keiretsus, called chaebols, South Korea worked to reduce the influence of these institutions to achieve the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which went into effect on March, 15, 2012. If, as seems likely, time only hinders free market reform by ingraining unproductive practices, should economies that have adopted state-capitalist institutions liberalize as soon as possible? Or has neo-mercantilism proven sufficiently successful in the short-run to justify the continuance of state-protected industry in the long-run and economic decisions oriented towards political ends rather than the good of the consumer?

U.S. Foreign Policy and International Political Economy

Given the competing theories of globalization considered above and debates over the long-term efficacy of state capitalism, it is difficult for U.S. policymakers to know how to chart the nation’s course in the international economy. To conclude, there are two areas where U.S. policymakers face particularly consequential decisions.

First, the simultaneous rise of China and India presents U.S. policymakers with a significant challenge. In both cases, demographics and economics intertwine. While currently experiencing a surge in economic growth, China’s One-Child Family policy of the late 1970s and 80s permanently altered its demography for decades to come, leaving younger generations the burden of caring for an aging, disproportionately male population. If the “Catch-Up Thesis” is correct, China will soon find itself on a similar per capita income growth rate along with other advanced industrial powers. Forbes reported that China’s per capita GDP growth fell to 7.5% in 2013 due to decreased industrial production and fixed asset investment, and is currently projected to further drop in 2014 to 6.9%. By undervaluing its currency, opening its borders to foreign firms, capitalizing on existing technology, and enacting the One-Child Family policy, China expedited its economic productivity via trade, albeit at high cost. Its rapid development

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30 Rosser and Rosser, p. 149-150.
may slow in the next decade due to an aging population, insufficient workers to maintain similar levels of growth, and China’s neo-mercantilist policies.

At the same time, India has not restricted its population growth, has adhered to free market principles, and has opened its borders to trade (albeit one decade after China). India’s per capita income growth rate is slowly and steadily increasing. India is projected to surpass China in population by 2050 and its growth will be more rapid than any other G20 country, though the size of its economy will limit India from overcoming the United States or China in terms of real U.S. dollars. Given low labor costs and democratic roots, India is already taking power share away from China and will continue to do so throughout this century. If China should become increasingly aggressive in future decades in order to control the South China Sea, it would be at a point when India would be a much more powerful regional actor. Although, due to anti-colonial leanings toward self-sufficiency, a poor educational system, corruption, red tape barriers to starting firms, and a robust informal employment system inhibit India, which discourages foreign investment.

The second major decision that U.S. policymakers face is how to maintain the United States’ own relative power given the economic rise of competitors, some of whom (like India) are currently allies. Some economists expect some power to shift from the U.S. to South Asia due to the off-shoring of 30 to 40 million service jobs from the United States to China and India over the next 20 to 30 years, given their joint projected population increases by 300 million people. Other scholars, like Paul Kennedy, anticipate a more dramatic decline. But in either case, U.S. policymakers must find a way forward on a more level economic playing field.

How the United States charts the way forward will have a decisive impact over the distribution of global wealth and power over the decades to come. Weighing the alternative policy responses to trade, globalization, and the international political economy, is therefore a daunting task – one that demands thinking beyond boundaries.

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35 Rosser and Rosser, p.466-467.
36 Bremmer, p. 114-118.
Contra Friedman: A Case for National Conscription
by Saythala Phonexayphova

In 1973, the U.S. government ended the military draft and instituted an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Many people rightly attribute the backlash against the unpopular Vietnam War as the primary reason behind terminating conscription; not many, though, realize the specific role of economists in the anti-draft movement—particularly, the contribution of Milton Friedman. Most remember Friedman primarily for his Nobel Prize winning work in economics; few people would know that he was one of the greatest proponents of the AVF. For about ten months in 1969, he was a member of the Thomas Gates Commission whose tasks were to research, debate, and formulate ways to finally end conscription in the U.S., satisfying the political platform of President Richard Nixon. The commission relied on economists to estimate supply and demand curves for types of personnel, the effects of bonuses on retention, and other economic externalities that would impact the costs of instating an all-volunteer military. Though they studied non-economic issues, which centered on the American experience with the draft and volunteerism during past conflicts, they ultimately underestimated the social costs of using an AVF during prolonged conflicts. While economists might be right about efficiency and other economic benefits of maintaining the AVF, I argue that they fail to capture the normative value of shared national service. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss why economic factors do not provide enough normative reasons for why we should have an AVF.

While Friedman and his supporters may cite the past decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as \textit{prima facie} evidence to the resilience and successes of the AVF, in achieving national interests and protecting individual liberties, the effects of these wars have not been without negative consequences to the nation. This paper argues that an all-volunteer military leads to misrepresentation in the force and demands little participation from “elites,” ultimately leading to the overall decline of American civil society. To revive our national commitment to one another as citizens who have shared obligations and goals of national defense, we need to relook and (perhaps) reinstitute a form of national conscription.

In this paper, I identify two popular cases for reinstituting the draft and use them to discuss some problems they pose for Friedman’s conception of an AVF. First, I present the issue of misrepresentation in the military force and explain how this is a threat to a healthy representative democracy. Further, I question if military members are merely means to accomplish an ill-defined end when their government sends them back \textit{repeatedly} fight wars. These soldiers return home and find that fellow citizens are happy to pat them on the back,

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2 In this paper, I will argue against and rely on Friedman’s time on the Gates Commission, as captured by his biography \textit{Two Lucky People}, and assumptions he makes from \textit{Capitalism and Freedom}.


4 Christopher Lasch, \textit{The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy} (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995) 25-26. For my purpose, I use Christopher Lasch’s definition of elites as those “who control the international flow of money and information, preside over philanthropic foundations and institutions of higher learning, manage the instruments of cultural production and thus set the terms of public debate” (\textit{Ibid.}).
praising them with words like “hero” and “patriot.” Yet, some of these same citizens have little understanding of the soldiers’ experiences or no interest in sharing the soldiers’ burden. This type of social apathy weakens civil society, compartmentalizing people to their own private interests and increasing social and political risks, and will eventually require a form of conscription (as one measure amongst others) to correct this problem.

The Economic Draft

The all-volunteer military of about 2.4 million, less than one percent of the total U.S. population, has been continuously fighting the Global War on Terror since the attacks of 9/11—making it the longest large-scale war in the country’s history. Friedman would most likely argue that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the effectiveness of the AVF. The success of sustaining combat operations in two arenas without resorting to conscription give substantive reasons for why we must keep the current practice. Simply stated, Friedman would suggest that the AVF has enabled the “protection of the individual and the nation from coercion.” That is, the volunteers’ service prevents the government from forcing other civilians to serve by means of a draft. However, there are arguments against Friedman.

In the past ten plus years, there have been popular appeals for reinstating the draft. The first argument states that there is still a type of draft in the United States. Instead of a total draft of all military-aged male citizens, there is an economic draft; people volunteer for the armed forces not just for patriotic motives, but because they have few options in life and are, thus, economically drafted into service. This argument identifies overrepresentation by the poor and minorities in the military as a core problem for the AVF, because it is simply unjust to place the weight of service on those who have few economic options. Moreover, the economic draft argument cites the lowering of recruiting standards by the military, especially the Army, during the past ten years as an indicator of this economic draft. In other words, the armed forces had a hard time enlisting qualified candidates so they dropped standards to enable more disadvantaged people to volunteer.

Some U.S. citizens casually accept this economic draft argument as a matter of fact, that is, holding the view that military service attracts a large proportion of the poor and minorities. In contrast, the Heritage Foundation rejects the economic draft claim, reporting that members of the AVF “are more likely to come from high-income neighborhoods than from low-income neighborhoods.” Soldiers are more educated than their civilian peers. Whites and blacks are overrepresented in the military; the former are troublingly the overwhelming majority in the officer rank. It seems that conventional wisdom is wrong to an extent and that the economic draft argument is false.

7 Ibid.
Robert Gates, on the other hand, puts a different spin on the issue of representation in the military. He points out that there is an experience gap which is widening between the military and another smaller segment of the population. During a speech at Duke University in 2010, Gates, in one of his final acts as the Secretary of Defense, expressed concern for another type of misrepresentation in the AVF: a lack of representation from the our nation’s social, economic, and political elites. Challenging those Duke graduates who sat in the audience, he called for them to go outside their comfort zone and to enter military service in order to better understand people they will one day lead. Gates’s concern is a valid one. In 1963, for example, 23% of Harvard graduates served in the military; half of those commissioned through ROTC programs.\(^8\) Today, elite colleges are far less likely to produce soldiers of any rank, officer or enlisted.\(^9\) While ROTC programs are returning to some of these elite universities, it is unlikely to significantly increase the numbers of those who volunteer for service or change the view that some elites have about the value of military service.

Here, Friedman may question why any member of the elite class has to volunteer in the military, and he may wonder what is to be gained by the elites’ involvement. Isn’t the purpose of an AVF to give people the individual freedom to choose? It is a volunteer force. Of course, the elites do not have to join the AVF, but it would probably be a better and more cohesive society if they think that they should and do, in fact, join. It is a better society, since all Americans share the same risk in defending the nation, reconnecting people. The elites’ involvement would bring greater credibility to military service as a respected means to serve others that all people ought to emulate.

It seems problematic when some of our nation’s future leaders, attending these top-tier universities, cannot identify with those that they will send to fight. Most will never know the challenges of service—the harsh realities of war, the sacrifices of military families, and the tragedies of lost comrades. If most elites exempt themselves from military service, enjoying the benefits of citizenship but bearing little of the nation’s burden, then it is difficult to see how they can make demands that others sacrifice for the greater good of all. While they may volunteer in their communities, take public office, and donate money and time to others, volunteering in the military does not seem to be an option that few of them take seriously. Why is that the case?

Gates’s concerns over elites abandoning military service appears justified if one examines the number of veterans who are part of the political elites—an even smaller segment of the general population. William Galston, an advocate for conscription, states that, “From 1900 through 1975, the percentage of members of Congress who were veterans is always higher than in the comparable age cohort of the general population.”\(^10\) However, since the mid-1990s, the percentage of members of Congress who were veterans was lower than in the comparable age cohort of the population, and this percentage continues to decrease.\(^11\) Currently, only 19% of the 535 members of the U.S. House and Senate have any type of active-duty military service, down from a peak in 1977 when 80% of lawmakers were military veterans.\(^12\) Given the drastic

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10 Ibid., 305.
11 Ibid.
12 Susan Davis, “Number of veterans in Congress continues to decline,” USA Today, November 20, 2011,
decline in military service in Congress, it seems clear that the AVF widened the experience gap between our politicians and the most powerful instrument of political power, the military.

The political elites’ lack of military experience limits their knowledge of other citizens who serve the national defense, and this will cause great friction in the future, as fiscal constraints loom. Ignorance of the nature of military service will diminish their capacity to recognize the hardships and sacrifice of those who volunteer. More troubling, it will breed distrust and arrogance, creating factions between members of the society.\(^{13}\) For the elites, they may simply, as described by Christopher Lasch, “regard the masses [in this case, those in the military] with scorn and apprehension” if their attitudes toward life and service are so disparate from those of service members.\(^{14}\) Perhaps this will be the reality as the influence of military experience dwindles, demand for forward deployed troops goes down, and budget restrictions require overhauling military programs and institutions.

A counterargument to this claim is that the number of veterans in political office is more representative of the general population, since the military is such a small percentage of the whole anyways. Nineteen percent of Congressional members are veterans, and this is much more than 7.1% of veterans who are members of the general population.\(^{15}\) Certainly, this is the case, but the core problem lies in the Department of Veteran Affairs’ projection that by 2040 less than 15 million people will be veterans (compared to the 22 million today).\(^{16}\) As a result, the numbers of political elites with military experience will likely decrease proportionately to the number of veterans in the general population (just like it has been in the past four decades).

Nevertheless, reinstituting the draft could curb this problem by placing the elites in the same position as any other civilians. Two political scientists Michael Horowitz and Matthew Levendusky highlight this reason for why elite participation in the military is critical, saying,

“While the all-volunteer army is not as biased toward the ‘have-nots’ as is commonly assumed, it is true that elites—those at the top of the distribution of economic and political power—are underrepresented in the all-volunteer force. Fair and equitable conscription would bring more elite members of society into the military, people who have a large and disproportionate voice in the governmental system. They will ensure their voices are heard by government leaders, so if their sons and daughters were likely to

\(^{13}\) Further, I posit that the shortage of veterans in government can be detrimental to the development, sustainment, and employment of the AVF. It weakens the society’s social ties by separating people into private groups and interests. While it is outside the purview of this paper to elaborate on this claim, if the civil-military gap persists, it seems fair to think the following:

- It becomes easier to use military members as mere instruments of political power than as ends in themselves who have families, community ties, and professional obligations.
- Evaluating the justice and gravity of declaring war or the right conduct of soldiers in fighting becomes more difficult.
- The military may be left to correct itself in terms of organizational challenges.

\(^{14}\) Lasch, 28. If political elites are unable to relate to the experiences of those who serve, then how can they empathize with the military professional and make decisions that are prudent and wise for members of the military and society at large? I argue they are at least limited.


\(^{16}\) Ibid.
be drafted, their skepticism about the use of force would likely increase considerably, which provides a potential argument in favor of the draft for those wishing to restrain the use of force.”

For Horowitz and Levendusky a conscript military may raise the level of personal and professional scrutiny on the political elites and make it less likely for them to take military actions. Here, they seem to make a cogent argument for eliminating the AVF, leading to the second argument.

The Social Revival Argument

During World War II, 16 million men and women served in the armed forces, including six million volunteers. Of the men born in the 1920s, nearly 80 percent served in the military. Now, unlike past generations, American society’s connection to the military, as reflected in the number of veterans in political office, dramatically declined since the inception of the all-volunteer military in 1973. For instance, one study reports that in 1988, about 40 percent of 18-year-olds had a veteran parent. By 2000, the number dropped to 18 percent and is projected to fall below 10 percent in the future. These numbers and percentages suggest a widening experience gap between civilians and the military that may cause unhealthy social apathy—breeding distrust, misperceptions of values, and an overall decline of civic engagement. Ultimately, this experience gap may lead to a breaking of social bonds in the United States. This is where the second popular case for conscription begins.

Unlike past major wars in U.S. history, the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have not brought the shared adversity and enemy, or the same type of national patriotism and local civic activism. These protracted wars have demanded both the reserve and active components of the military (and their families) to shoulder the brunt of the nation’s hardships. Thus, the second call for conscription, which I refer to as the social revival argument, says that a draft would get more citizens involved with national security issues and reinvigorate civic ties.

While at the Aspen Ideas Festival in 2012, Stanley McChrystal, the former commander of international forces in Afghanistan, made an argument for this second case. He claims that, “[We] ought to have a draft. I think if a nation goes to war, it shouldn’t be solely be represented by a professional force, because it gets to be unrepresented of the population.” McChrystal pointedly calls for change and suggests, “I think if a nation goes to war, every town, [and] every city needs to be at risk. You make that decision and everybody has skin in the game.” For McChrystal and other supporters of this argument (like Tom Ricks and the current Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel who made this case in 2004), they rely on three premises to support their final conclusion:

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19 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Putnam, 268.
24 Ibid.
1. The AVF cannot represent the total population.
2. It is simply unfair to ask so much of so few volunteers.
3. A reinstituted draft would force the U.S. to think twice before sending soldiers into war.\textsuperscript{25} 

While it is outside the purview of this paper to evaluate the merit of all three premises, I take the first two premises to question the very means of volunteerism wherein the country demands so much of a small segment of the whole, calling them to repeatedly sacrifice for the greater good of the non-participating majority. The third premise relies on Horowitz and Levendusky’s study, which indicates that “all else equal, reintroducing a draft decreases public support for war across a variety of different conditions (relative to an all-volunteer military).”\textsuperscript{26} One of the main reasons why a draft lowers people’s support for war is because it forces more Americans to face the possibility of bearing the costs of war.\textsuperscript{27} People are less likely to support a war, if there is a likelihood that they or the people who they love can fight and die in this war. The personal price of sending soldiers to war goes up and few people want to pay.

The social revival argument would point to the protracted wars in the Middle East as an example of a violation of shared values wherein, to quote Rousseau, “the sovereign has never any right to impose greater burdens on one subject than on another.”\textsuperscript{28} The AVF places greater burden on a select, but consenting few, in the military. When the responsibility of military service is relegated to a distinct group of citizens, promoting a pernicious type of social class system, it contributes to what Galston calls an optional citizenship, or the belief that being a good person is all it takes to be a good citizen.\textsuperscript{29} Galston claims that, “This duty-free understanding of citizenship is comfortable and undemanding; it is also profoundly mistaken.”\textsuperscript{30} It is mistaken for Galston, because military service should not be a burden of citizenship but a duty of citizenship.

I think Galston is right to an extent, because optional citizenship appears to yield divisiveness rather than a common social bond to unite separate interests. As this common interest is the foundation of social and political community, it should be the same ground for the endorsement or rejection of the country’s military actions wherein any citizen would be willing to sacrifice his or her own life.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, the failures of societies begin when individuals relax their social bond and disengage from public interests to focus on private interests. Individuals neglect the common interests and seek to only secure their personal gain.

Friedman may look at the social revival argument and counter that the sacrifice of the few is justified, since it enables others to express their political liberty, defined by Friedman as “absence of coercion of a man by his fellow man.”\textsuperscript{32} He explicitly identifies the AVF as an “appropriate free market arrangement… which is to say, hiring men to serve. There is no

\textsuperscript{25} This is Thomas Ricks’s argument.
\textsuperscript{26} Horowitz and Levendusky, 9.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{29} Galston, 305.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid}.
justification for not paying whatever price is necessary to attract required number of men.”

I take this to mean that an all-volunteer military is better than the alternative conscript force, since it protects personal freedom by providing fair wages to those who willingly serve. Members of the military consent to service and fully understand the consequences of their service; the government has not coerced them to join and fight. They accept their roles and they freely perform their duties, and one of these duties is to follow the orders of their political leaders.

Further, whether people elevate or degrade the military professional is a minor point if the greater result is the sustainment of the American way of life. To counter Galston’s optional citizenship claim Friedman would suggest that military members would rather have appreciation, irrespective of whether it is misguided or not, than to revisit the anti-military sentiments of the Vietnam era. While social and political ills are regrettable results of the AVF, those problems are minimal or merely economic externalities compared to the alternative, a draft.

Following this line of reasoning, proponents of Friedman would call a reinstitution of a large conscription force as a form of de facto slavery. A national draft forces people to join the military ranks without giving the person the opportunity to assent. These soldiers are merely tools for the government’s end. This idea is most apparent in a well-known anecdote of Friedman’s time on the Gates Commission. Recounting his exchange with General William Westmoreland, then Chief of Staff of the Army, Friedman wrote how he responded to Westmoreland’s protests of not wanting to command “an army of mercenaries.”

“I stopped him and said, ‘General, would you rather command an army of slaves?’ He drew himself up and said, ‘I don’t like to hear our patriotic draftees referred to as slaves.’ I replied, ‘I don’t like to hear our patriotic volunteers referred to as mercenaries.’ But I went on to say, ‘If they are mercenaries, then I, sir, am a mercenary professor, and you, sir, are mercenary general; we are served by mercenary physicians, we use a mercenary lawyer, and we get our meat from a mercenary butcher.’”

Friedman’s point to Westmoreland was clear: receiving monetary compensation for simply doing one’s job/profession does not deem the person the equivalent of a mercenary. In this regard, I think Friedman’s distinction between a slave and a mercenary is correct. However, his distinction between a volunteer and a draftee is incorrect. Draftees have rights and professional obligations that slaves do not possess. For instance, the military trains draftees to defer to the authority of their superiors, to act for the greater good of the unit, and to obey the professional ethics and codes as legal combatants. Also, draftees cannot just obey any and all orders. They undergo intensive professional military education to discern the difference between lawful and unlawful orders. Draftees maintain their rights of citizenship, and they gain even greater political obligations to the nation since they are now an extension of government policy. The draft can be seen as appointments for the draftees to represent the state as servants, and their official duties are to defend the covenant of state and citizen: the Constitution. Military service, then, is a duty of citizenship as opposed to enslavement. Draftees are far from being slaves, because they are political officials of the state.

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33 Freidman, 36.
35 This idea is derived from a conversation with Dr. Graham Parsons, Assistant Professor at West Point’s
In great contrast, mercenaries have little to no professional code. They simply act in ways so as to get paid for their service, and the mercenary's labor is simply an economic commodity. Their life and labor has a monetary value, and the state measures their contributions and the nature of their service in terms of money, by way of an economic supply and demand curve. The losses of mercenary’s lives may not have significant impacts on society, since their lives are replaceable. The state merely needs to find more consenting mercenaries who are willing to provide the same services if the nation is willing to pay the right prices for them.

It seems evident to me that military service, at least in the United States, is not a commodity. When service members’ actions benefit someone else at some cost to themselves, service members recognize this act as making a sacrifice. If this sacrifice is the service member’s life, then it is the ultimate sacrifice. This ultimate sacrifice of a service member’s life is not an exchange. It is not exchanging something of lesser value for something of greater value. The soldier’s life is as valuable as the defense of the nation. Military service should not be a commodity and should not be for sale.

For the past 12 years, the U.S. government has fairly compensated military members for their service; the American people learned from the mistakes of the Vietnam War and have respected the soldier despite the unpopularity of the wars. I assume Americans would not consider AVF members as mercenaries. However, I question if we, as a nation, are treating service members as mere commodities if we simply praise them for their services but then remain detached from their realities. As a result of the AVF and its relatively small size, to operate in two major theaters of operations, soldiers have repeatedly deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. At the height of the Iraq War, some, to include the current Secretary of State argued that the U.S. government enacted a “back-door draft” by using “stop-loss” policies. The U.S. government prevented service members, whose military contracts had expired, from leaving the service, because the AVF could not meet the force demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not only is this practice wrong, it demonstrates that the AVF is not large enough to meet all its requirements.

However, the past 12 years the nation used another form of commodification. To meet the logistical support shortfalls in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government did not resort to a draft but called on the free market system to provide more troops: we employed lots of contractors. The government contracted combat service support elements, because the AVF neither had enough forces nor did it have the kinds of services to meet the demand. The Congressional Research Service made a report to Congress that as of March 2011,

“[The] DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than uniformed personnel (145,000). Contractors made up 52% of DOD’s workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since December 2009, the number of DOD contractors in Afghanistan has exceeded the number in Iraq.”

Department of English and Philosophy.

36 Congressional Research Service, “Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis,” May 13, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf. It is true that the majority of these contracted forces are not security or combat forces (that is, combat multipliers) but are service support elements—these include bus drivers on major outposts, laundry personnel, cooks, etc. who are third-party nationals. And, even if we were to resort to conscription, the United States would have to resort to a specialized draft to draw people who
In terms of money spent, from Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 to 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD) “obligated approximately $112.1 billion on contracts for the Iraq theater of operations, representing 19% of total DOD obligations for the area”; and conversely, in the same period, DOD obligated approximately $33.9 billion on contracts in Afghanistan.\(^{37}\) While the cost of using contractors is terribly worrisome, the issue lies in the nation’s overreliance on contractors to fight and support prolonged conflicts. Perhaps, it can be said that instead of using “mercenary” forces, the U.S. government used contractors. I question whether the nation realizes that we are masking the true capabilities of the AVF by not bringing to light this dependence on contracted force.\(^{38}\) Also, few Americans understand that some elites, even in politics, have profited as a result of these wars. It seems that we are taking great risk in the future by not discussing these issues in the public sphere. We place our nation at great peril when we ignore these gaps in the AVF.

**Conclusion**

The civil-military gap can be evaluated in two ways. It can be seen as a gap in moral values (i.e., the U.S. military’s values are separate or, possibly, superior to the American society’s values or vice versa) or a gap as a result of differences in experiences. In this paper, I have argued that it is the latter, and the former is a consequence of instituting the all-volunteer military. With the drawdown in Afghanistan and overall decline in demand for forces, the divide between civilians and the military may become less visible in the media. But, I think the lack of elites in the military and veterans in government coupled with a growing social apathy for military service demand national attention. If we ignore the problems that began in 1973, the nation takes great strategic risks when we have to call the entire nation to service. To revive our commitment to one another as citizens who have shared obligations of national defense, we need to relook and (perhaps) reinstitute a form of national conscription.

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37 Ibid.

38 This also brings up the moral question of whether we are taking care of these contractors who suffer harm while fulfilling the needs of the nation.
Works Cited


I. NATO’s Burden Sharing Conundrum

In his last address in Brussels on 10 June 2011, outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates seized his final opportunity to air frustrations concerning burden sharing between the NATO member states:

_In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance...Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership...but don’t want to share the risks and the costs._

Secretary Gates went on to proclaim that without boosting capabilities NATO faces “the very real possibility of collective military irrelevance” and a “dim, if not dismal”\(^1\) future, a sentiment widely shared in the American military establishment. President George W. Bush’s condemnation of the world’s largest military alliance as “not willing to fight”\(^2\) in Afghanistan has become a widespread perception, only slightly alleviated by the NATO intervention in Libya from March to October 2011. Even then, throughout _Operation Odyssey Dawn_, deficits were illuminated, especially European participants’ lack of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets and in-flight refueling (IFR) capability.\(^3\) Above all, the absence of major players like Germany from the operation on the ground brought to light those in the alliance who, in the words of British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond, both “wouldn’t but could” and “couldn’t but would” contribute to NATO missions.\(^4\) As of 2013, only seven of 28 member states, (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Estonia) met or exceeded the alliance’s requirement for each member state to spend at least two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) per year on defense.\(^5\)

The questions raised by NATO’s burden sharing conundrum are of grand strategic significance: What both motivates and prevents European allies from effective participation in NATO operations, and are there any ways the United States might compel them to take up a greater share

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of the burden? Is it now in the United States’ interest to encourage Europe to develop autonomous defense capabilities? The answers to these questions take on fresh urgency in the current climate of defense budget cuts and austerity on both sides of the Atlantic, combined with new Russian territorial aggression in its former sphere of influence that poses a direct threat to some NATO allies.

II. The Root Causes of Burden Sharing Inequities

When NATO was created in 1949, the United States explicitly sought to minimize European military autonomy and created a permanent free-rider problem through the establishment of a binding security guarantee for the continent. In this way, burden sharing inequities were institutionalized in NATO from its inception. The basic bargain, that the transatlantic alliance perpetuates American military dominance in exchange for some free riding and a security guarantee for Europe, remains in place for both parties.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO underwent a seismic shift in its strategic rationale that further exacerbated the burden-sharing conundrum. In a moment, the direct territorial threat to Europe necessitating an American security guarantee dissipated, creating an environment of overabundant security for the European allies and removing the perceived need for an alliance against a common enemy. NATO continued to exist anyway, reflecting the persistence of alliances containing major asymmetries of power. In the newly unipolar world, NATO began to embark on United States-led “out of area” missions radically different from its Cold War imperative of protecting Europe from a Soviet invasion, often with only lukewarm European participation. Even when both the United States and its European allies have been committed to these operations, the Europeans are limited in their contribution by a lack of military assets, a lack of coordination between military assets, and a lack of desire to use the assets they have stemming from a legacy of reliance on American military power and reluctance to incur casualties.

In this context the Europeans fear entrapment in American foreign policy more than abandonment, a reversal of the historic dilemma concerning the credibility of the United States’ security guarantee for Europe. Because the United States was still the predominant power in NATO prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, European recalcitrance must reflect a perceived decrease in external threat after the Cold War and may also be contingent on activist American strategy after 9/11. Data from SIPRI on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP for all the NATO allies support these conclusions. Though the economic criteria of a nation’s defense budget is distinct from the military criteria of operational readiness and combat effectiveness, focusing on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP at least reflects a nation’s prioritization of its defense capabilities, the relevant variable in this discussion.

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6 In service of an uncluttered visual representation, Croatia (a major outlier) has been eliminated from this graph.
For the original members of NATO in Western/Central Europe, plus Germany and Spain, military expenditures as a percentage of GDP have overall decreased steadily over the period of 1991 to 2013. Not a single nation is spending a greater percentage on defense in 2013 than it was at the moment the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The United States exhibits the only strong upward trend in the group starting after 9/11, which promptly drops off again in 2011 corresponding with drawdowns in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite its “special relationship” with the United States, the United Kingdom follows the same downward trajectory as every other nation in Western/Central Europe with respect to military expenditure. For the nations of Eastern Europe that joined NATO in the late 1990s and early 2000s, military expenditures converge over time on the NATO minimum of 2 percent, regardless of whether a given nation was over or under that percentage at the time of accession. Croatia (removed from the graph) is the only major outlier, due to its enormous expenditure during the Balkan wars of the mid 1990s, though after that era it rapidly decreases to 2 percent as well. Turkey and Greece, which do not properly belong in either category, do not exhibit a smooth downward trend but still spent significantly less on defense in 2013 than they did in 1991.

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8 SIPRI only provides military expenditure data between these dates.
Overall, the data from SIPRI indicate that the end of the Cold War coincides with a long and universal decline in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP among NATO allies. Even the United States followed this trend until it adopted a more activist grand strategy in the Middle East following 9/11. As the United States’ military expenditure increased from 2001 to 2010, none of its allies either followed suit or decreased spending in proportion, suggesting that threat perception is a primary determinant of percentage of GDP spent on defense, not the spending of other allies. For this reason, neither decreasing American military spending alone nor cajoling the European allies to spend more on defense in the name of fairness seems likely to inspire a greater commitment of resources.

III. Alliances and Unipolarity in International Relations Theory

The international relations literature provides a theoretical foundation for the effect of unipolarity on intra-alliance behavior. First, Olson and Zeckhauser’s RAND corporation study, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” has demonstrated that because security is a collective good, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the size of NATO nations as measured by gross national product (GNP) and the percentage of resources they devote to the common cause, with large nations contributing a greater share and small nations tending to free ride. This conclusion is supported by the data from SIPRI. Furthermore, when every participating nation acts purely in its own national interest, each will usually fall short of contributing the resources it would be in the alliance’s collective best interest for them to provide. Critically, Olson and Zeckhauser suggest that “American attempts to persuade her allies to bear larger shares of the common burden
are apt to do nothing more than breed division and resentment,” and one way to prevent inequities would be to promote greater unification of the smaller alliance members.9

Second, as identified by Glenn Snyder in *Alliance Politics*, entering an alliance necessarily carries the twin fears of “abandonment” or “entrapment;” the former is when a nation is left in the lurch in a time of need while the latter is when a nation is dragged into an unwanted conflict by another ally. 10 With the advent of unipolarity, the United States and its European allies have mostly switched position on this spectrum, with the Europeans now fearing entrapment in American wars more than abandonment in the event of attack. Similarly, the United States’ fear of entrapment in a war in Europe has been mitigated by the fall of the Soviet Union, as the “Boston for Berlin” credibility question has lost relevance to NATO’s mission. It would be a stretch to assert that the United States now fears abandonment by NATO due to its capacity for unilateral action and choosing “coalitions of the willing;” it has expressed frustration with European reticence to engage in wars the United States perceives to be essential. In short, the United States now needs its European allies to carry out its foreign policy more than European allies require the United States for their day-to-day security.

The Europeans are rational to fear entrapment in American foreign policy in a unipolar world; according to international relations theorist Nuno Monteiro, unipolarity is not peaceful. Indeed, the first two decades of American supremacy, which make up less than 10 percent of the nation’s history, account for more than 25 percent of the United States’ total time at war. During its unipolar period, the United States has deployed forces in six interstate wars: Kuwait 1991, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003, and Libya 2011.11 Of these six deployments, NATO played the central role in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Libya, suggesting that allies from the previous bipolar era can indeed be compelled to engage in the unipole’s wars regardless of their individual national security interest.

Of course, all alliances have characteristics unique to their history and membership aside from their conformity with the theoretical literature. It is an empirically unresolved question whether or not the current features of the NATO alliance in unipolarity are structural or unique to the unipolar era of the United States specifically; there is no comparison available. For this reason, an understanding of the dilemma of burden sharing in NATO must take into account the distinctive history of the alliance itself.

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IV. NATO’s Strategic Rationale: Geopolitics and Ideology

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, has its direct origins in the complex geopolitical realities presented by the position of Allied troops in Europe at the conclusion of World War II. Throughout the war, the Western democracies and Stalin’s totalitarian regime had maintained an uneasy alliance, united in their common determination to annihilate the enormous threat to Europe presented by Hitler’s Third Reich. Sir Winston Churchill had proclaimed: “If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons,” but when the Soviet devil remained on the European doorstep after Hitler’s defeat, the perceived necessity of protecting the continent from the appetite of yet another totalitarian threat presented itself to the war-torn nations of Western Europe.

The solution, the European allies decided, lay in obtaining from the United States a mutual security guarantee. Although they felt uncomfortable with a preponderance of American power and influence in the alliance, their first priority was to secure a counterweight to the Soviet Union such that Europe would not become a battlefield. Thus “the offer of a major American troop presence in Europe, the proposal to set up a strong NATO military system, the suggestion that an American general would be sent over as NATO commander – all of this was, in itself, music to their ears.” From the United States’ perspective the formation of NATO presented an unprecedented opportunity to exert influence over European military policy, assure allies against the Soviet Union, and regulate the rearmament of Germany and other major European states.

A paradox of NATO’s strategic rationale is that, despite the alliance’s obviously geopolitical nature, its founding members do not prefer to speak of it as such. The transatlantic alliance was intended to amount to more than the sum of its military parts, reflecting an ideological commitment to more than participation in a conventional “balance of power” structure. In accordance with this idea, the Atlantic Charter, a precursor to the North Atlantic Treaty drafted by the United States and Britain in August 1941, takes the form of a statement of shared political principles rather than a strategic document. The principles listed embody a common understanding of “Western values,” including condemnation of territorial conquest, national self-determination, free trade, the right to economic prosperity, freedom of the seas, and the eventual abandonment of the use of force as a tool for settling international conflicts.

However, the idea of those “Western values” as a source of transatlantic unity has lost credence in recent years. Journalism like Robert Kagan’s *Of Paradise and Power* (2003) have presented an alternative, proclaiming that “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are

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from Mars and Europeans are from Venus,” referring metaphorically to the Roman gods of war and love. One reviewer summarizes Kagan’s argument as follows:

*Europe...has emerged into a political paradise much like the stable, civilized world order of perpetual peace envisioned by Immanuel Kant. America, in contrast, with its massive defense budget, capacity to launch military operations around the world, and willingness to engage in unilateral actions against “rogue states,” remains inside a violent, anarchic Hobbesian world.*

Such a generalization is simplistic and does not account for the breadth of opinion on military matters within either Europe or the United States, nor that such differences can definitely be attributed to a unipolar world and not to the unique traits of the United States itself. What is certain, however, is that NATO’s military operations in the last ten years have repeatedly fallen short of the lofty goals articulated by its members.

**IV. A Dysfunctional “Partnership”**

*Operation Eagle Assist and beyond: NATO in Afghanistan*

The attacks of 9/11 provoked a rare moment in which most of the international community rushed to the United States’ assistance, pledging full support in bringing those responsible to justice. Nowhere was support more full-throated than in the capitals of Europe. *The Mirror* (UK) proclaimed “War on the World,” *The Daily Mail* (UK) “Apocalypse,” and famously, *Le Monde* (France) that “We Are All Americans.” British Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged that the UK would stand “full square alongside the US,” and even the usually reserved German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder characterized the attacks as “a declaration of war against the civilized world.”

Indeed, on 12 September 2001 NATO invoked Article 5 to condemn the terrorist attacks against the United States in the strongest possible terms. On 4 October, the alliance agreed to a package of eight measures to support the United States in its response. The first, *Operation Eagle Assist*, consisted of seven NATO radar aircraft to help patrol American airspace until May 2002. On 26 October it launched its second operation, *Operation Active Endeavor*, which sent NATO’s standing naval forces to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect terrorist activity. In March 2004 that operation was expanded to include the entire Mediterranean, and still exists today.

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From this promising beginning, trouble emerged immediately. Europe’s most serious concern with the Bush administration’s approach was its unilateralism, made even more alarming by its condemnation of the “axis of evil” (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) and machinations to open a second front in Iraq. In 2002, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer protested: “I utterly reject anti-Americanism. But, for all the differences in size and weight, alliance partnerships between free democracies cannot be reduced to obedience. Alliance partners are not satellites.”\(^{19}\) By embarking on the war in Iraq, the United States demonstrated Glaser’s hypothesis\(^{20}\) that unipolar powers have a tendency to overreact to threats and underestimate their own security, spooking its European allies with a seemingly disproportionate response to the attacks.

Although NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the American *Operation Enduring Freedom* coexisted amicably at first, it rapidly became apparent that the United States needed more help from its allies due to the “gravitational pull” of resources to Iraq. The ISAF mission “to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country and ensure that the country can never again be a safe haven for terrorists” by training and developing the local Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) was expanded, and by August 2009 consisted of approximately 64,500 troops from 42 countries, with all 28 members of NATO providing the bulk of these forces.\(^{21}\)

However, according to General Stanley McChrystal, the twelfth commander of ISAF and all U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the disjuncture between the American mission and the NATO mission was often fundamental on both a strategic and tactical level. First, “NATO really came in with an assumption that this was going to be a peacekeeping mission,” whereas the United States rapidly discovered that a counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) mission more focused on combat operations would be necessary. As a result, General McChrystal suggests: “you really had two different definitions of the mission – the NATO definition and the American definition.”

Although General McChrystal was technically the operational commander of all forces, in practice he did not possess the unfettered ability to set the NATO allies’ strategy. He states that the allies “don’t have to do anything they don’t want to do” due to limitations imposed by each member’s national government. Such limitations included bans on offensive operations, nighttime operations, and taking detainees. Aside from the written limitations, according to McChrystal:

\[A \text{ greater factor was the unwritten guidance, which in most cases was that any commander was not supposed to suffer casualties...In best cases commanders would go on and do things if they thought it was the right thing to do, in other cases it was as far as some countries talking directly to the local Taliban and cutting deals.}\]


\(^{21}\) “NATO and Afghanistan.” *NATO*. Web.
The effort in Afghanistan only began to turn around when American forces were placed alongside those of the European allies, providing both an instructive example and equipment that many allies were lacking. Overall, McChrystal asserts that in this environment, “Everything we did you couldn’t do for purely military reasons, which leaves you as a commander with a lot less flexibility than you need... Everyone is fighting their part of the war, the way they want to fight it, and you can’t win a war unless you can have unity.” The division of the mission into five regions administered by a different ally ensured NATO fought five separate wars, exacerbating an already serious collective action problem. Each ally’s focus on its own geographic area manifested in constant wrangling over the number of kandaks (battalions) to place in each region, with each ally lobbying McChrystal and the President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai for reinforcements so that they could transition out sooner on an individual basis.

The ISAF mission formally ended in December 2014, though NATO will continue to provide training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces via the non-combat mission Resolute Support. In retrospect, the United States can derive two major lessons on the source of burden sharing inequities within NATO from the war in Afghanistan: 1) rejecting initial offers of support from allies damages credibility when asking for assistance later on, and 2) anything that can be done to minimize collective action problems, such as unifying the smaller constituents, is helpful when trying to administer a coalition war.

**Operation Odyssey Dawn: NATO’s 2011 Military Intervention in Libya**

In February 2011, the Arab Spring descended on the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Protests in Benghazi led to clashes with security forces that fired on the crowd, and the bloody rebellion spread across the country and organized around the National Transitional Council. The revolution quickly became a humanitarian crisis, as Gaddafi’s response evolved from delusional to murderous. With no allies left in the Arab world or on the UN Security Council and with his resolve to exhaust every weapon in the regime’s arsenal before giving up power, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 authorizing foreign military intervention in the Libyan civil war.

In many ways, conditions could not have been more favorable for a successful humanitarian intervention. Members of the Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Gulf Cooperation Council all endorsed the UN’s no-fly zone and even provided assistance. China and Russia, usually resistant to intervention under any circumstances, had no vital interests in Libya and decided to abstain rather than veto the resolution. Libya’s relatively small population, arid geography, and location just offshore continental Europe eased logistical challenges, and the reasonably credible and cohesive rebel movement assuaged concerns about the post-Gaddafi transition period.

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22 “NATO and Afghanistan.” NATO. Web.

The diplomatic approach taken by the Obama administration, characterized by some commentators as “leading from behind,” represented an improvement in alliance management from the Bush administration in Afghanistan with its attempt to force European nations to take on a larger share of the burden. However, despite this strategy and unusually favorable conditions, the European allies were not fully up to the task. Although the majority of sorties were flown by non-American aircraft, it became rapidly apparent that European militaries as a whole lacked the refueling and logistical capabilities to sustain an air campaign without American support. Even worse, “serious shortfalls” were identified in ISTAR assets, long identified as a weakness in European military power. Put bluntly in a report by the Istituto Affari Internazionali of Italy: “…This means either that [the member states] will have to bolster their own military strength through closer cooperation and partial integration or that they will no longer have adequate forces to intervene in situations where key European interests are at stake.”

The lesson from Libya is that even under favorable conditions and with effective diplomatic signaling, the Europeans proved themselves incapable of carrying out a straightforward humanitarian intervention directly across the Mediterranean Sea against a regime with no external support.

VI. Reimagining the Transatlantic Relationship

In light of NATO’s lackluster performance in what should have been two good opportunities for alliance action in Afghanistan and Libya, the United States must take two courses of action to restructure NATO’s defense capabilities and redefine the alliance’s prerogative: 1) support the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), including lifting restrictions on the duplication of American assets, and 2) end the conception of NATO as a “global alliance,” with a corresponding end to further preemptive pushes for NATO expansion outside the European region.

The first course of action, promoting development of CSDP, is made in the context of a U.S. military facing severe financial constraints for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. In 2011, U.S. military spending decreased for the first time since 1999 due to the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan and Iraq and the financial crisis. In this environment, some commitments must be treated as zero-sum, with assets committed to one area taken away from another. As a reflection of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,” a January 2012 report from the U.S. Department of Defense indicates that the United States has already planned to bring home two of four heavy brigades forward-stationed in Europe, shut down a corps headquarters, inactivate two Air Force

squadrons, and bring home 10,000 of the approximately 80,000 service personnel currently stationed in Europe by 2016.27

Western and Central Europe also decreased its collective spending by 1.9 percent28 over the same period due to austerity measures implemented to combat the Eurozone crisis. However, European defense budget cuts have occurred in an uncoordinated fashion, such that individual nations have maintained symbolic capabilities that cannot be deployed effectively either by themselves or with others. The same report by the Istituto Affari Internazionali cautions: “The risk is that the EU as a whole may lose certain military capabilities as a result of uncoordinated decision-making.”29 Some mini-lateral (e.g. just the Benelux countries) and bilateral initiatives have been undertaken to combat this issue, to little effect. Neither the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing” program nor NATO’s “Smart Defense” initiative have caused a significant uptick in European defense procurement to date either.

Why is this the case? First, European militaries’ ‘assured access’ to NATO assets under the Berlin Plus pact, even when operating on their own initiative, provides a major disincentive to the development of independent capabilities. Therefore, the best way to redress the emerging gap is not only for the United States to promote the development of CSDP, but also to encourage thoughtful duplication of assets such that European nations can conduct complete military operations without American assistance. From a European perspective, having this capability is a core interest. Major security threats abound on the European periphery, including further Russian territorial aggression in Ukraine and potentially other former Soviet satellites, unstable regimes in North Africa, civil war in the Levant, the constant threat of ethnic violence in the Balkans, and a potential scramble for resources in the Arctic Circle. For the Europeans to rely entirely on a superpower ally with its own interests to be willing to address these potential crises would be irresponsible at best. This arrangement would also be economical for the United States, if the European allies no longer had to rely on the United States to maintain peace in their immediate neighborhood.

As obvious as this approach may seem in light of NATO’s experience in Libya, as recently as the Clinton administration, the American position toward CSDP has been predicated on the “three D’s” — 1) no duplication of NATO assets, 2) no discrimination against non-EU members of NATO, and 3) no actions that would decouple the United States from Europe.30 However,
eliminating the first stipulation need not lead to the disintegration of the second and third. Both sides of the Atlantic must recognize that the choice is no longer between acquiring more equal capabilities on a national basis, which was thought to allow the United States to choose among allies to form “coalitions of the willing,” or through multinational cooperation; the choice is between acquiring more capabilities through European multinational cooperation or not acquiring them at all.\(^{31}\)

The second course of action, to drop the concept of a “global alliance” and end further preemptive pushes for NATO expansion,\(^{32}\) is a major component of decreasing European fear of entrapment. This does not mean halting membership processes already in motion: admitting Balkan states like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro is consistent with the historical and ideological roots of the alliance. However, Georgia’s membership process—initiated in 2008 as a direct response to its conflict with Russia—as well as a prospective future process for Ukraine, carry greater risk. NATO’s Article 5 commitment runs both ways; in admitting a nation like Ukraine, the United States could risk turning the alliance into a “transmission belt” rather than a “firebreak” to war. However, so long as NATO allows these and other nations in the former Soviet Union’s sphere of influence and geographically contiguous with Europe to initiate the membership process themselves (rather than preemptively inviting them to join and thereby provoking potential backlash from Russia), the NATO alliance should welcome these long-suffering nations with open arms.\(^{33}\)

Furthermore, to expand NATO beyond the commonly recognized boundaries of Europe implied in its characterization as the “North Atlantic” Treaty Organization may induce other nations to balance against the United States. Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier have suggested that if the purpose of NATO is no longer territorial defense, it must broaden its mandate to “bringing together countries with similar values and interests to combat global problems.” The other democratic countries which could be included in this “Global NATO” include Australia, Brazil, Japan, India, New Zealand, South Africa, and South Korea.\(^{34}\) Admitting such nations could be highly disruptive to the international system and counterproductive to U.S. interests. For example, how might China respond to the entrance of Japan and South Korea into a mutual defense commitment with the United States? Expansion of the NATO concept to a “global alliance” would decrease the United States’ ability to manage its relations in every region of the world on a case-by-case basis, a flexibility that is especially imperative in a world without the binary distinctions of the Cold War.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.


At the macro level, the value of alliances is their ability to inject predictability into an uncertain world, in which the United States cannot be confident of retaining its unipolar status indefinitely. As characterized by G. John Ikenberry:

The political philosopher John Rawls argued that political institutions should be conceived behind a “veil of ignorance” — that is, the architects should design institutions as if they do not know precisely where they will be within a socioeconomic system...The United States needs to take that approach to its leadership of the international order today.35

A moment’s consideration of the dilemma posed by Rawls reveals that the ability to count on strong alliance partners while maintaining flexibility in addressing every contingency around the world is a core interest of American foreign policy. Regardless of the continual frustration posed by burden sharing inequities in NATO, the destiny of the United States will remain inextricably linked with that of its closest friends across the Atlantic for the foreseeable future.

Why Minorities Rebel

*by Nils Olsen*

On the morning of April 12th, 2012, tanks rolled down the streets of Bissau, seizing control of political institutions and detaining the two leading candidates vying for the vacant presidency of Guinea-Bissau. Citizens seemed only mildly surprised at the events. If there is one thing this poor, underdeveloped country on the West African coast can point to as their “claim to fame,” it is its history of military interference in the government. The former Portuguese colony has seen five military coups in the past eleven years. They happen more frequently than elections, and none of the presidents since independence from Portugal in 1974 have served a full term.¹

The coup in 2012 posed an interesting puzzle because it represented a departure from previous trends. With a tumultuous history following independence in 1974, Guinea-Bissau had not experienced a significant period of representative government. Instead, military elites frequently intervened in politics, empowered not only because of an absence of checks on the army but also because of funds gained through involvement in the international narcotics drug trade.² However, prior to this coup, there had been two contested presidential elections carried out without military intervention, in 2005 and 2009. Yet in 2012, the military intervened and detained the candidates. This begs the question, why did the military stage a coup d’état in 2012?

This article will be laid out in four parts. The first section will review the academic literature surrounding the role of institutions in state strength and legitimacy, and how a lack of both increases the opportunity for the establishment of non-state actors and potential challenges to the existing regime. A thorough understanding of Ted Gurr’s theory on why minorities rebel additionally provides a framework for explaining what factors influenced the behavior of the military elite. Second, these theoretical constructs will be applied to the case of the 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau. Next, an analysis of what ultimately incentivized the coup presents a drift from Gurr’s framework. Finally, a brief consideration of potential policies to fix the current situation in Guinea-Bissau is given.

**Institutions, Instability, and Minority Revolt – An Overview**

*At first glance, the 2012 coup was another chapter in* Guinea-Bissau’s history of frequent military intervention, despite a political stability after 2003. Reviewing the academic literature surrounding general state weakness, military coups, and minority rebellions frames the specific case study within existing theory. Understanding structural flaws and potential threats offer insight into why the coup occurred.

When analyzing state behavior, Francis Fukuyama distinguishes between strength of state power and the scope of its activities. One of the key defining elements of a state is monopoly of violence in a defined territory. This, along with state power and scope are important in maintaining this control of force. In order to maintain stability, the regime must have the power


to enforce laws, maintain order, and execute policies.\(^3\) It must also have the scope to provide this public order across its territory.\(^4\) Thus, prudent strength and scope can help stabilize regimes.

Additionally, states can and often use institutions to achieve regime stability. Indeed, Fukuyama highlights that “well-functioning public institutions” are key elements to functioning states.\(^5\) Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson offer a definition of these institutions. “Inclusive” institutions, defined as “pluralistic systems that protect individual rights,” are deemed essential to long-term human welfare.\(^6\) Without these inclusive institutions, the state is unlikely to be strong, with growth and development stagnating. One of the geographical regions characterized by this lack of development is Africa. Georg Sørensen offers five elements which perpetuate weak African states; one of which is the presence of “ineffective institutions,” which lack both strength and scope, if they are present at all.\(^7\)

If institutions are weak or absent, other entities will fill this void. Erica Marat examines this problem in a case study of the drug trade in former Soviet states. She explains that when there is a lack or deficiency of state institutions, criminal networks are able to “fill in the political gap.”\(^8\) They are able to develop strength faster than legitimate government institutions because of the profitability of illegal trade.\(^9\) Once embedded, it is difficult for the state to oust these organizations, and thus the issue perpetuates.\(^10\) Therefore, not only will criminal networks implant themselves in states with weak institutions, but once these organizations are established, it is very hard for legitimate institutions to replace them. Furthermore, the prevalence of criminal organizations in these institutions undermines government legitimacy, and enables further destabilizing factors, such as military intervention.

As Edward Luttwak highlights, the lack of government legitimacy is an encouraging element to militaries contemplating a coup d’État.\(^11\) In a legitimate regime, such as a western democracy, a coup is not likely to succeed because the population considers the government legitimate, and would move to reinstate it following any overthrow by the military.\(^12\) However, if the regime lacks a strong population base, coups will be more likely to achieve success.

Luttwak additionally classifies the different types of coups; in light of the topic of this paper, attention will be focused on the most relevant, the pronunciamiento. In this version of a coup d’etat, popular in Latin America and Africa, the phenomenon is “organized and led by a particular army leader, but carried out in the name of the entire [military].”\(^13\) In this sense, it is

\(^{4}\) Ibid., 22.
\(^{5}\) Ibid., 17.
\(^{9}\) Ibid., 97.
\(^{10}\) Ibid., 97.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., 26.
\(^{13}\) Ibid., 23.
strictly the officer corps, acting as a minority in the army representing the population as whole, which in turn rebels against the existing regime.

In his evaluation of the conditions which drive minorities to rebel, Ted Gurr lists three main categories of factors which influence minority groups: factors internal to the group, actors external to the state, and causes exterior to the group but internal to the state.\(^\text{14}\) The first category, factors internal to the group, is divided into three sub-categories: cohesiveness, mobilization, and state effects. The more cohesive groups are held together by “dense networks of communication and interaction.”\(^\text{15}\) This communication and interaction are a function of its organization, and its cohesion tends to be greater in groups that are concentrated in a single region or entity. Additionally, groups that maintain their own authority structure are much more likely to remain cohesive and committed to action once rebellion occurs. Mobilization refers to the “extent to which group members are prepared to commit their energies and resources to collective action on behalf of their common interests.”\(^\text{16}\) The more cohesive a group, the more likely they are to mobilize and sustain this action. The last factor interior to the group which influences minority rebellion is history: “to the extent that a group’s disadvantages have been established and maintained by force, its grievances and identity are intensified but its potential for political mobilization is reduced.”\(^\text{17}\)

The second category of influence on minority mobilization is external to the state. The two main factors that penetrate into the state from the international environment are termed diffusion and contagion. Diffusion refers to processes that “spillover” from adjoining countries. These effects are seen predominantly among ethnic groups that span across state boundaries, such as the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and other neighboring states. Contagion differs from diffusion in that the former is indirect while the latter is direct. Contagion occurs when one group’s actions offer “inspiration and strategic and tactical guidance for groups elsewhere.”\(^\text{18}\)

Finally, factors interior to the state affect minority action. Generally, this refers to the strength and structure of the state’s regime. Similar to the past precedence element of intergroup factors, if a state is powerful and able to support or suppress minority groups, this has a direct impact on whether an ethnic faction will mobilize. Additionally, if a state is authoritarian or non-representative, action may be the only means for a minority to achieve their aims. Meanwhile, in a democratic regime, rebellion is less likely because democracies offer an outlet for a government to address a group’s demands within the confines of the political structure.

This literature, taken together, highlights that weak states without effective institutions are vulnerable to non-state actors providing the security, programs, goods or services well-functioning institutions do. As a result, illegitimate factions, such as criminal networks, are likely to embed themselves. Furthermore, effective institutions often are a source of state legitimacy. If

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 127.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., 127.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., 129.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., 134.
their role is filled by other parties, the state’s legitimacy will be lowered, opening the door to coups or revolts. Lastly, Gurr provides a set of factors which influence minority rebellion.

**Case Study: The 2012 Coup in Guinea-Bissau**

An examination of Guinea-Bissau demonstrates that many of the factors outlined above, contributing to state instability, are present. Furthermore, the military elite of the Guinean Army contain many of Gurr’s factors influencing minority groups to rebel. Adding contemporary characteristics to the paradigm offered from the researched literature underscores that the coup of 2012 was not a surprise. Yet, the period of democratic stability from 2003 to 2013 occurred in spite of many signs of its infeasibility.

By any measure, Guinea-Bissau is a weak state in both strength and scope. In a study comparing state weakness in the developing world, Brookings Global ranked Guinea-Bissau in the last quintile of developing countries in state ability to provide security with a value of 5.96, and in the second quintile for political legitimacy with a score of just 3.83. These values, and the report in general, support that Guinea is currently unable to maintain a monopoly of force in its territory, a key component of the definition of a state.

An extension of its overall lack of state strength, Guinea-Bissau lacks legitimate institutions. It is currently 5th worst in a study by the Global Democracy Ranking of 104 countries in the presence of democratic functions. The few institutions that are present can also hardly be seen as lawful. Transparency International ranked them 150th out of 176 countries in its level of corruption in government. Additionally, Guinea earned a negative score in its ability to control its corruption, signifying that this problem is only worsening. In general, institutions are either absent in Guinea-Bissau or performing poorly. As a result, a void is present, open for other organizations to secure a foothold in the country.

Two diverse parties have filled this hole: non-governmental organizations and a cohort of high-ranking military officials involved in the international narcotics drug trade. In 1992, the government recognized NGOs as legitimate and allowed them to operate within the country. To help struggling Guinea-Bissau, the international community has provided assistance to the population. The result was a large flow of external aid to the large percentage of the population living in abysmal poverty. Religious organizations have also provided a variety of public services, especially education. However, both entities operate independently of state funding or oversight. As a result, the large rural population is indifferent to activities in Bissau because the UN and Muslim churches are providing the public services normally offered by strong states.

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22 Ibid.
This perception decreases regime legitimacy because the populace feels no attachment to their government because it does little for them.

The other party which occupies this “political void” is the elite involved in the narcotics drug trade. This group has indeed caused an exacerbation of these institutional and corruption problems in Guinea-Bissau. In its World Drug report of 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime identified Guinea-Bissau in particular as an area where large-scale cocaine trafficking has been a destabilizing factor.24 The country serves as a key trans-shipment hub for cocaine coming from Latin America bound for Europe via Spain and Portugal.25 The control of this trade has been “monopolized by the military” and thus provides the armed forces with an income and source of power.26 Not only has this outside revenue decreased the incentive to remain loyal to government, but also the heads of the military are officially labeled drug traffickers by the U.S. Government.27 Criminal networks have indeed come to occupy a strong presence in Guinea-Bissau, largely using the military to ensure safe passage of goods from South America to Europe and elsewhere.

Turning to Gurr’s framework for why minorities rebel, the military leaders exhibit many of the listed factors which define a “minority.” Although the military has traditionally been dominated by the Balanta, the largest ethnic group at 30% of the population, the military elite can be judged a minority sub-group for two reasons.28 First, they contain their own agenda separate to that of their tribesmen at large; therefore, any potential rebellion will be aimed at achieving their specific goals as opposed to those of the Balanta. Second, when the military has staged coups in the past, they are not accompanied with a wide-spread Balanta movement, but rather remain isolated to the armed forces.

The military, because of its structure, strongly exhibits Gurr’s three factors interior to the group. The general hierarchical structure present in armed forces allows for easy and frequent communication between the ruling generals and their subordinates. Military units are also closely confined geographically, experiencing near constant interaction, further developing group cohesion. The chain of command also offers an excellent platform for mobilization because generals and other high-ranking officers can directly control the movements of their subordinate units. It behooves the lower-level commanders to adhere to these orders because if they refuse, they not only risk death or other reprimands, but they will be excluded from the drug profits flowing down the chain of command.

External factors exert much less influence on the actions of the military minority. Yet the geographical environment of Guinea-Bissau does have some impact on prospects for a coup. The West African coast is characterized by a high density of weak or failed states. As a result, it is unlikely that a neighboring country would intervene on behalf of the Guinean government and oppose a coup. Although there is a UN peace keeping mission in Guinea-Bissau, UNOBGIS, it

25 Ibid., 84.
26 Ibid., 242.
has never offered direct opposition to military intervention in the government. In general, the external environment does not attribute to rebellion, yet it fails to disincentivize military intervention.

While Guinea-Bissau’s constitution proclaims the country a republic, it is essentially an authoritarian regime where a single-party, the Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), has traditionally held nearly every governmental position. The executive branch holds much of the power, and although it is split between a president and prime minister, both have been traditionally been from the same majority party of the legislative. Therefore there is no democratic outlet for minority grievances which Gurr identifies as an influence dissuading minority mobilization. Additionally, the historical precedence of military intervention with little government suppression makes a prospective coup seem likely to succeed.

**Analysis: A Unique Case?**

The current situation in Guinea-Bissau offers strong evidence to why the minority group of military elites would rebel. Therefore, in examining why the coup of 2012 occurred after an unprecedented period of regime stability, it seems that the real puzzle is not why did military intervention occur, but what was the spark that ultimately incentivized the coup?

The answer is rather straightforward: there was a possibility that the status quo would be upset in favor of democratization policies. The coup d’état occurred in April of 2012 after the first round of presidential elections had just been completed. In the preliminary voting, Mohamed Ialá Embaló, a Balata with ties to military elites won only 23.97% of the vote, while reformist Carlos Gomes Júnior won 48.97% and seemed poised to win in the run-off. Had Carlos Gomes won, not only would the Balanta not had their candidate in power, but Gomes was likely to pursue policies of addressing the institutional failures of the state. This would directly inhibit the autonomy that the military enjoyed and such a result was undesirable. There was no military involvement during the terms of Malam Bacai Sanha, whose death forced the 2012 elections, because he made no efforts to bring the military under civilian control.

This is where the 2012 coup drifts from Gurr’s analysis. He recognizes that a driving factor in conflict analysis and group mobilization is “relative deprivation”: how peoples view their current position in the power hierarchy and their discontent with the present situation. Yet the rebellion military elites in Guinea-Bissau were enjoying a very large amount of power prior to the election. Their revolt was more of a preemptive strike against a potential threat ran action based on long-standing grievances. An area of future research into this case study is whether the coup can be better explained through the lens of ruling elites faced with a threat to their power.

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**Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Future Actions**

So how can the current situation in Guinea-Bissaube fixed to prevent future coups and allow for economic and political development? The swift ousting of any reformer attempting to come to power signals that any domestic, top-down reforms is unlikely. Therefore, it seems that substantial change will have to rely on international involvement. Two policy recommendations could quickly and significantly impact the security environment in Guinea-Bissau.

First, the drug trade needs to be curbed in order to decrease the power, influence and autonomy enjoyed by the military and especially its generals. One area for targeting this issue is to integrate crime and drug trafficking prevention into the current United Nations peace operations under UNOGBIS. The United States has also recently increased its efforts to curb this issue, and is even bringing a former general to trial on drug trafficking charges. Additional efforts can be made by Portugal, since the majority of Guinean cocaine shipments enter Portuguese ports.

Second, domestic institutions need to be strengthened. This will not only allow for the government to exercise control over its territory, but government public service programs and rule of law to help increase regime legitimacy. Both of these factors can help to prevent and disincentivize coups. A possible solution is for the NGOs currently operating in Guinea-Bissau to work through or establish partner domestic institutions. This can increase the population’s interest in the government because it is providing services that directly impact their lives.

The security situation in Guinea-Bissau is not easily solved, but attempting to do so would have positive second and third order effects. Targeting the drug flow in Guinea would help cripple the international drug trade at large, and the creation of a strong republic could also facilitate an increase of stability to a region plagued by civil war, military coups, and illegitimate governments. Studying the events of April 2012 can offer insight into solving some of these problems. Hopefully, Guinea-Bissau will one day boast about its democratization success rather than its military coups.

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Determining the Effect of Attractiveness on Cadet Military Grade  
by Jeffrey Rush

Abstract

The military pillar at the United States Military Academy is one of three main aspects from which a cadet’s performance is derived, along with academic and physical pillars. The military grading system lacks a defined guideline for determining cadet grades and is subject to personal opinions influencing grades. This study uses data gathered about cadets’ physical appearances to determine the effect attractiveness has on military grades. I use two variables representing cadets with above-average and below-average attractiveness levels, but they are statistically insignificant. I find that attractiveness does not have a significant effect on a cadet’s military GPA.

Introduction

The United States Military Academy at West Point uses three pillars to create class rankings for cadets. These pillars are academic, physical, and military development. The academic pillar is composed of a cadet’s GPA in their academic classes, the physical pillar creates a GPA based on cadet performance in physical fitness tests and physical education classes, and the military pillar creates a GPA based on a cadet’s general performance throughout the school year. This military development pillar is determined by numerous factors, not all of which are known to cadets. Since the military pillar covers such a broad scope, many cadets believe their superior cadet officers’ personal opinions have a large effect on grade distribution. This creates disconnect between cadets and the institution due to one of the three main pillars being subjective in nature rather than based on merit. I seek to determine if the military grading system is flawed by allowing personal opinions and perceptions of a cadet’s attractiveness to affect their military GPA.

Although the military pillar has a set grading system, it is not a traditional one composed of tests or exams to determine a cadet’s aptitude. This lack of traditional assessments makes it difficult to assess one’s performance and leaves much of a cadet’s grade up to subjective perceptions. Military development grades at the academy give cadets the responsibility to evaluate their peers on performance and capabilities throughout the academic semesters and summer training. It is an important developmental tool for cadets to determine what “right” looks like and learn what is expected in their profession. As they progress through the academy, each cadet is given more responsibility and is eventually assigned to a leadership position among their classmates. These positions provide cadets with the experience of peer leadership and give them an idea of how to assess a proper performance. At the end of each semester and summer training, the cadet leadership meets with their officer and non-commissioned officer mentors and assigns grades to other cadets’ performances. Each grade is determined by a perception of each cadet and whether or not they are seen as productive or responsible. This perception by graders potentially allows cadets’ and officers’ personal opinions of someone to affect the cadet’s final military grade.

Whenever individuals are in charge of grading peers under any circumstances, there is a certain level of bias that affects the results. Whether that bias comes from the individual’s personal experiences with that peer or just their offhand perception, the bias is still significant and changes the standards for grading procedure. In the United States Military Academy’s Corps of Cadets, juniors and seniors are responsible for assigning military grades to their peers and
subordinates that generally reflect that cadet’s performance throughout the semester. The close-knit culture of the academy, however, creates the possibility for the same personal bias to occur to favor a friend over a stranger or an attractive individual over a plain looking one. This becomes controversial when cadets at the academy push themselves to earn the best grades possible, and then find out a peer has control over their performance in one pillar. Preferably, these graders would have a given set of standards to assess cadets militarily, but without guidelines to follow, any number of personal opinions may influence a grader’s decision.

In this paper, I will seek to answer the question: Does a cadet’s attractiveness impact their military GPA either positively or negatively? My thesis for the question is that cadets perceived to be more attractive will earn a higher GPA than their counterparts with a below average physical appearance. To properly address this question and thesis, I will provide background information and a literature review of previous studies that address similar issues to familiarize the reader with the nature of the subject. I will then outline my data collection process and the potential errors in the collection. Next, I will outline my empirical model as an equation and explain the methods of testing the attractiveness variables. The empirical model leads into my discussion of summary statistics, listed in Table 1 of the Appendix, and interesting trends discovered in each of the variables. I then present my regression results, in Table 2 of the Appendix, and discuss the coefficients of the independent variables and the effect they have on the dependent variable as well as their statistical significance. I then conclude with a possible policy recommendation and further research that may be done in the subject.

The regressions denote statistically insignificant correlations between attractiveness and a cadet’s military grade. Though the attractiveness variables I study are insignificant, I discuss the correlation of the other variables that are statistically significant with one’s military GPA. I separate my regression into three models: one focuses on the attractiveness data, the second adds a Body Mass Index variable, and the third adds controls for race, gender, academic GPA, APFT scores\(^1\), and whether a cadet is a Division 1 athlete. The only variables with statistical significance in these regressions are academic GPA and APFT score. This shows that a cadet’s performance in the Academic and Physical pillars also determines their performance in the Military pillar.

**Background**

Researchers have studied the potential advantages and disadvantages of attractiveness in previous studies. In 1993, Daniel Hamermesh and Jeff Biddle conducted an in depth study of how attractiveness affected the level of wage an employee earned. They used data from the 1977 Quality of Employment, 1971 Quality of American Life, and 1981 Canadian Quality of Life surveys. These surveys included interviewer responses about employees interviewed and included the interviewer’s perception of each employee’s level of attractiveness.\(^2\) The Canadian survey was conducted in 1977, 1979, and 1981 and asked different interviewers in each year to rate each respondent in accordance with this system: strikingly handsome or beautiful, above average for age (good looking), average for age, below average for age (quite plain), and

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1 The APFT is the Army Physical Fitness test graded on a scale from 0-375 at the United States Military Academy. The APFT is a graded event that factors into the Physical pillar and factors into a cadet’s physical GPA.

homely.\(^3\) They focused on the Canadian survey as it provides more observations and three separate observations on each respondent’s looks.

The results of this survey classified approximately half of the men and women as average, and many more rated above-average than below-average.\(^4\) Each survey also provided different measures of earnings, which Hamermesh and Biddle summed into hourly wage. They excluded respondents who either worked less than 20 hours per week, earned less than $0.75 per hour, or who were self-employed.\(^5\) Their analysis comparing the level of attractiveness associated with each respondent and their respective hourly wage showed a 5-10% penalty in hourly wage for those below average and homely and a slightly lower percentage premium in hourly wage for those above-average and strikingly handsome. In the analysis, Hamermesh and Biddle held demographic and labor market characteristics constant to avoid other influences on wage. They ultimately found more attractive men and women earned a percentage more per hour than their average counterparts, who earned more than those rated as below-average in beauty. The effects were slightly larger for men than women.\(^6\)

Using Hamermesh and Biddle’s study of beauty’s effect on wage, Markus Mobius and Tanya Rosenblat conducted a study examining why beauty matters when it comes to employment opportunities and earnings. Their study involved workers performing a complex maze-solving task that requires “true skill” and is unaffected by physical attractiveness.\(^7\) They had employers rate each of these workers using the same five point rating system Hamermesh and Biddle used before they attempted the maze. Rather than looking at the effect of beauty on wage directly, Mobius and Rosenblat studied the effect of attractiveness on worker confidence and their ability to complete the maze. Employers were asked to predict productivity estimates based on their perception of the worker’s completion of the maze and resume.

Their initial results showed that physical attractiveness does not raise actual productivity, but it does raise the worker’s and employer’s productivity estimates.\(^8\) This provides new insight to attractiveness in the labor market. Employers like to hire confident individuals who they think will be productive. Mobius and Rosenblat show that attractiveness of workers often creates confidence in any task, whether it applies to attractiveness or not, and thus are more desirable in the labor market. Employers perceive these confident individuals will be productive; however, Mobius and Rosenblat’s results show that is not always the case.

In addition to his study in 1993, Daniel Hamermesh also published a book in 2011 describing the theory behind why beauty has such a significant impact on the labor market. His research focused on the obsession American culture has with beauty and how that translates into expectations at the workplace. He found that men spend an average of thirty-two minutes out of a typical day grooming and cleaning himself while women spend an average of forty-four minutes, regardless of age.\(^9\) This shows despite what stage of life a person is in, they take a


\(^{4}\) Ibid, 1184

\(^{5}\) Ibid

\(^{6}\) Ibid, 1174


\(^{8}\) Ibid, 229

certain amount of pride or dignity in the way they look. He also found statistics describing the amount of money a typical American household spent on clothes in 2008: $718 on women’s and girls’ clothing, $427 on men and boys’ clothing, $655 on infants’ clothing, and $616 on personal care products.¹⁰ This dedication to keeping up with the latest trends and fashions shows how much of a priority looking attractive is to American society.

He also found data in other industrialized countries, particularly Germany that resulted in similar average times spent on grooming and personal care between the two countries. This hints towards the universality of prioritizing beauty and the effects beauty has on human behavior.¹¹ Internalizing this nature of vanity and personal care translates into the labor market when employers are looking to hire individuals. An employer is more likely to hire an individual who is clean shaven and well-kept over a poorly dressed individual, despite the capabilities of either. Hamermesh also collected research from a telephone survey that respondents perceived that discrimination based on looks in the United States exceeded discrimination on ethnicity or background.¹² This idea that beauty is a discriminating factor in society further progresses the theory that strikingly handsome individuals will receive a premium over their plain counterparts in a variety of scenarios.

Data
I collected my data in a similar manner as the surveys did in Hamermesh and Biddle’s study of beauty in the labor market. I gathered four fellow cadets who are in positions of leadership and responsible for assigning military grades and asked them to rate attractiveness of past graduates of USMA on a scale from 1 (the least attractive) to 10 (the most attractive). As mentioned in their study, Hamermesh and Biddle found through research that within a culture at a particular time, there is a general agreement on standards of attractiveness.¹³ This research implies that despite each cadet being varied in their opinions and beliefs, they will all generally perceive attractiveness in the same way. I used cadets in these leadership positions because they are responsible for assigning military grades and their experiences in this role are similar to graduates who held the same position years prior. The pictures used for rating came were face shots from two USMA yearbooks, each from a different year. The raters gave their perception on 449 individuals between the two years. I averaged the four values assigned to each cadet into one variable btygd. I then binned these values into three categories of attractiveness: above-average (7-10), average (5-6), and below-average (1-4). Binning these results allows me to test the effect of being above-average on military grades compared to being below-average and determine if there is a premium or penalty, respectively, for each category. All of the pictures rated were graduates of their respective yearbook as those were the only pictures provided. I then worked with the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) at USMA to collect further data on each cadet rated. OEMA provided each cadet’s height, weight, academic GPA, military GPA, physical GPA, APFT score, and whether or not a cadet was a Division 1 athlete. I used cadet’s height and weight to determine their Body Mass Index¹⁴ and created a new BMI

¹⁰ Ibid, 4
¹¹ Ibid, 3
¹² Ibid
¹⁴ Body Mass Index is calculated by dividing weight by height squared and multiplying by 703. \( \text{weight} \div \text{height}^2 \times 703 \)
variable. I combined my attractiveness data with the OEMA provided data as my final dataset to conduct regressions.

Despite being provided this data for each cadet, there are some potential errors in the reliability of the data. The pictures used to rate cadets were from their senior year in college, while the OEMA-provided data were from the first semester of their freshman years. I asked for freshman year data in particular because as a freshman at USMA, all cadets have the same jobs and responsibility as one another as opposed to their later years when they begin filling different leadership roles. This difference between freshman and senior years has a level of measurement error present. It is possible that a cadet during his freshman year was more or less attractive than what his senior year picture depicts, which provides reason to question the results.

The likelihood of such drastic change in facial features is small, but the difference in height and weight from freshman to senior year is much more likely. A cadet’s BMI from their freshman year may not be equal to their senior year. BMI is important to measure because it provides a general perception of how a cadet’s figure looks, which is a significant factor for attractiveness in today’s society. The regression assumes a cadet’s height and weight do not change over the course of four years. Therefore, there will be error in the measured BMI variable because the height and weight data for each cadet’s senior year was not collected and used.

Though the difference in four years may create some error in the relation of attractiveness and freshman year grades, it is still useful for this study. Data such as academic GPA, APFT score, and whether a cadet was a Division 1 athlete are numerical values earned by cadets during their freshman year and have no relation to if they were attractive. The effects of these variables on a cadet’s military GPA will show little error because all of these values are assigned in the same time frame. The only error comes from the differences in height or weight and other significant physical changes over four years. Even with this slight possibility for change, the error measured in these variables will remain low.

**Empirical Model**

My empirical model depicted below compares the effects of an above-average and below-average attractiveness levels on a cadet’s military GPA. I include other variables to control for differences between cadets in the sample and determine if those differences have any statistically significant effect on military GPA.

**Equation 1. Empirical Model**

\[ cmps1 = \beta_0 + \beta_1 abavg + \beta_2 belavg + \beta_3 BMI + \beta_4 CSquad + \beta_5 nonwhite + \beta_6 APFT + \beta_7 caps1 + \beta_8 female + \epsilon \]

In this model, the dependent variable analyzed is \( cmps1 \), a cadet’s first semester, freshman year military GPA graded on a 4.0 scale. \( Abavg \) is a binary variable depicting whether a cadet’s attractiveness ranged from 7-10, and \( belavg \) represents those cadets whose attractiveness ranged from 1-4. Using both of these variables allows me to examine the different effects being attractive and unattractive have on military grades. I can then compare these results and determine if attractive individuals have an inherent advantage over their unattractive counterparts.
I omitted the variable representing cadets rated as average (5-6) in order to avoid collinearity issues with the model. *BMI* is each cadet’s BMI based off of the calculations executed using their height and weight. This variable provides a different look into perceiving attractiveness rather than a portrait picture of each cadet. *CSquad* is a binary variable denoting whether a cadet was a Division 1 athlete during their first semester. This variable is included because of the perception at USMA that Division 1 athletes earn lower military grades. *Nonwhite* is a binary variable stating whether or not a cadet is white. *APFT* is each cadet’s score on the APFT, *caps1* is a cadet’s academic GPA (on a 4.0 scale) for that semester, and *female* is a binary variable denoting whether a cadet is female. I include the variables *APFT* and *caps1* because both academic and physical GPAs are common indicators of a cadet’s military grades and thus the nature of these values in the regression will show if the results are reliable. If both variables have positive coefficients and are statistically significant, then I can conclude the results are reliable. The variable *ε* represents any unobserved variation in factors that contribute to a cadet’s military grade such as work ethic or performance in military science classes.

The largest specification issue with my model is the data that lies in the unobserved term. My model lists only a few variables that are commonly associated with the military grading process, while there are other possibly important variables to consider. This creates omitted variable bias in my model and potential flaws in the results. Some of these omitted variables may include a cadet’s work ethic, efficiency, ability, or popularity among the upper class that could affect the value of their military grade. The possible effects these variables would have in my regressions create an amount of bias that is taken into consideration when interpreting the results.

Though this omitted variable bias creates uncertainty in the validity of the model, the model takes into account the variables most commonly associated with military grades. Academic GPA and APFT scores are largely thought to affect a cadet’s military grade. The binary variables *CSquad* and *female* also take into account certain perceptions at USMA that could affect military grades. A Division 1 athlete is often perceived as disconnected from his classmates and will typically receive a lower military grade as a result. There are positive and negative biases towards females at the academy and this model seeks to identify whether a cadet benefits or suffers just by virtue of being female. As long as the model includes the variables with larger effects on military grades than those unobserved, then the model will still produce reliable and useful results.

**Results**

In Table 1 of the Appendix, I show the summary statistics for above average, average, and below average looking individuals. This table shows interesting trends among these three categories in a few key variables. Looking at the dependent variable, Military GPA, it is of interest to note that all three categories earn approximately the same GPA. Attractive and unattractive cadets earn the same GPA, which is slightly higher than the GPA of average looking cadets. This conflicts my original position that attractive cadets would experience a premium in their military grade while unattractive cadets suffered. Other interesting trends that may provide ideas for further research are that APFT scores, academic GPA, and participation in Division 1 athletics all decline as cadets become less attractive. Further studies may seek to prove correlation between level of attractiveness and success in the workplace using similar methods to the ones
Mobius and Rosenblat used. It could be the increased confidence of the attractive individuals that allow them to perform better in both of these fields. After analyzing my summary statistics, I use Ordinary Least Squares to further investigate the relationship between these variables and military grades.

Using my empirical model above (Equation 1), I conducted regressions of the six independent variables on military GPA and obtained OLS estimates located in Table 2 of the Appendix. The level-level nature of the model means that each coefficient has that numerical value effect on military GPA, which is graded on a 4.0 scale. For example, the coefficient for abvavg is 0.051 in the first model, so if the value proves to be statistically significant, a cadet rated as above-average looking would generally receive a 0.051 point increase in their military GPA.

Interestingly, the two main binary variables, abvavg and belavg, are not statistically significant at any acceptable level. Throughout all three models, abvavg shows statistical insignificance as well as instability due to the sign change that takes place between the second and third models.

*Belavg* is stable through the regressions, but is still statistically insignificant. Though they are insignificant in every model, the positive sign of the coefficient for abvavg makes sense for the first two models. This denotes that if a cadet is rated as above average, they experience a .051 point increase in their military GPA. In model three, the sign no longer makes sense because Hamermesh and Biddle’s study showed attractive individuals experiencing a premium on their wage, not a penalty.15 Throughout the model, the positive sign for the coefficient of belavg does not make sense because, based on the literature, I would expect a negative impact on military GPA for an unattractive cadet. The nature of these coefficients provides reasoning to believe there is no correlation between attractiveness and military GPA, and implies that Hamermesh and Biddle’s theory of beauty premiums in the labor market does not apply to the United States Military Academy’s cadets.

In the second model, I added the variable for BMI to add a new perception to attractiveness that my raters were not able to see during the data collection process. My raters only graded cadets from the shoulders up and were not able to see the physical build of each cadet. The cadet officers who graded this sample in their freshman year were able to see the fitness level of each cadet and thus perceive their attractiveness in ways my raters could not. In the second model, the sign of BMI makes sense because the larger the value of BMI, then typically the larger the person. Largeness as fat or disproportionate weight for height is viewed negatively in today’s society, which would explain the increasingly negative impact on military GPA as BMI rose. However, this variable was also statistically insignificant and its coefficient changed signs in the third model, showing instability as well.

Model three was the only model to show a variable with statistical significance. In this model I added all of the other controls outlined in the empirical model and analyzed their impacts on military GPA. The coefficient for abvavg changed sign which not only shows its statistical insignificance, but also its lack of stability throughout the models. This change in sign did not make sense as all of the literature done on attractiveness in the labor market showed attractive individuals facing a premium in the dependent variable over their average and plain looking peers. BMI also changed signs, again showing instability and insignificance. Typically, as the

value for BMI increases, an individual’s physique becomes more out of shape and the person is considered relatively unattractive. This positive sign for BMI did not make sense because it showed as the value for BMI increases, there was an increasing impact on military GPA. CSquad was an interesting variable to examine because the model upheld the stigma at USMA that Division 1 athletes earn a lower military GPA than their classmates.

In this case, it would cause a .044 point decrease in a cadet’s GPA. This stigma comes from the notion that Division 1 athletes do not commonly associate with their non-Division 1 peers, creating a split in the cadet population. However, this variable was also not statistically significant. The variables female and nonwhite present possible controversies in the grading system because the sign of their coefficients showed a negative impact on military GPA for a cadet being female or a minority. Some cadets believe that being female at a majority male military academy would offer a premium to military GPA while others believe females are alienated due to their low concentration and thus suffer in other’s perceptions of them. These variables are also not statistically significant at any acceptable level, but it is interesting to note the negative trend associated with both of those variables.

The only statistically significant variables in any model were caps1 and APFT in model three. Both variables were significant to the 1% level, depicting strong significance in the model. The size of the APFT coefficient shows that, though it has a statistically significant impact on military GPA, it is not a large return. However, the large nature of APFT scores (from 0 to 375) can create very sizable impacts on military GPA as a cadet’s score increases. The size of the caps1 coefficient, however, shows a significant and sizable impact on military GPA if a cadet performs well academically. This shows a strong correlation between academic performance and the military GPA a cadet earns. These variables are universally used to determine military grades, which add legitimacy to the results. The general trend shown by the CSquad variable also provides reason to accept the results that attractiveness has no significant effect on military GPA. My model was not able to prove correlation, much less causality between the level of attractiveness and the magnitude of military GPA. The statistical insignificance of the attractiveness variables resulted in no correlation between the military GPA a cadet earned and how attractive their classmates perceived them to be.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Most of the variables in my model are binary variables, so I predict that heteroskedasticity will be a problem with the model. I tested this in Stata using the command “hettest” which reported the test statistic and resulted in my rejection of the null hypothesis and accept the alternate that heteroskedasticity exists in the model. To correct for the heteroskedasticity, I used a “robust” option in Stata to estimate the standard errors using Huber-White estimators.

In addition to heteroskedasticity, omitted variable bias was also a problem with my empirical model. There were many variables that contribute to a cadet’s military GPA that were in the unobserved variable in the empirical model. Such factors may be ability of the cadet, work ethic, efficiency, or even popularity of the cadet in their company. These variables or immeasurable character traits of cadets may have significant impact on military GPA and explain the general statistical insignificance of my model. If the variables work ethic or popularity were included in the model, they would most likely have a positive coefficient because the more popular the cadet
or the harder the cadet works would typically result in a higher military GPA. Though this omitted variable bias exists, correlation does exist between the APFT and academic GPA variables and a cadet’s attractiveness. The trends show that an above average looking cadet has a higher academic GPA and higher APFT score than their below average classmates. Though this correlation exists, causation cannot be claimed due to the lack of empirical evidence that shows a higher academic GPA or APFT score makes a cadet more physically attractive.

As discussed in my data collection, measurement error also presents an issue in my findings. The four year difference between performance grades and being rated on attractiveness allows room for physical changes in a cadet’s appearance. For instance, a cadet who was relatively out of shape their freshman year may have improved their physique over four years and was perceived as more attractive during their senior year. In particular, this will show error in the BMI variable because a cadet’s height and weight is likely to change over a four year period. When conducting the regressions, I operated under the assumption that BMI did not change and there were no drastic physical changes among the sample of graduates. There is also measurement error in the data collection because each rater was asked to provide their perception of attractiveness in each cadet, which inherently includes measurement error due to the nature of surveys.

Given the results of this test, cadets can feel reassured that personal opinions and perceptions of attractiveness do not affect their grade in a major pillar of the academy. However, the policy of distributing military grades can still be improved. For instance, my tests showed that academic GPA and physical performance had significant effect on military GPA, despite being separate pillars of grading. USMA creates a ranking system for cadets based on the GPA’s they earn in all three pillars. However, if the military pillar is dependent upon the other two pillars, then a cadet can find themselves held accountable for their academic GPA and physical performance twice. If a cadet does not excel at academics, but is physically fit, they may receive a lower military grade because academics are shown to sizably affect military GPA.

If the institution is going to create a ranking system based on three pillars, they should create guidelines for the military pillar that separates its requirements for good grades from the influence of the academic and physical pillars. Some suggestions for these guidelines would be: a checklist for uniform inspections to show discipline in appearance, military science classes counting for a larger portion of the military GPA, and not being late or absent from their classes or duties. These three suggestions separate military grades from the influence of the other two pillars by influencing cadets to be more disciplined in their daily lives, and therefore exhibiting a more militaristic nature. Further studies in this subject should achieve a larger sample of cadets and also study the trends of APFT score and academic GPA decreasing as cadets are rated as unattractive. This information is important for future policies and changes in the military grading system to take into account to further eliminate any bias or correlations in order to make the military pillar more independent. Research may also be conducted with respect to the impact of attractiveness on promotion throughout a person’s military or civilian career and discuss the correlations or benefits found over a period of time.
Bibliography


Table 1. Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cadet Attractiveness</th>
<th>Above (7-10)</th>
<th>Average (5-6)</th>
<th>Below (1-4)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military GPA</td>
<td>3.009 (0.434)</td>
<td>2.958 (0.417)</td>
<td>3.01 (0.361)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Mass Index</td>
<td>24.98 (2.18)</td>
<td>24.91 (2.75)</td>
<td>25.19 (3.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division 1 Athlete</td>
<td>0.38 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.35 (0.48)</td>
<td>0.22 (0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not White</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.21 (0.41)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APFT Score</td>
<td>293.90 (29.53)</td>
<td>283.26 (29.24)</td>
<td>282.23 (30.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic GPA</td>
<td>2.92 (0.44)</td>
<td>2.83 (0.56)</td>
<td>2.83 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.08 (0.27)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.36)</td>
<td>0.16 (0.37)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Notes: Sample means are reported for each variable with standard deviations in parentheses below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cadet is considered attractive (abvavg)</td>
<td>0.051 (0.062)</td>
<td>0.051 (0.062)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet is considered unattractive (belavg)</td>
<td>0.052 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.053 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.049 (0.034)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Body Mass Index value (BMI)</td>
<td>. (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in Division 1 Athletics (CSquad)</td>
<td>. (0.037)</td>
<td>. (0.037)</td>
<td>-0.044 (0.037)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binary measure of race (nonwhite)</td>
<td>. (0.040)</td>
<td>. (0.040)</td>
<td>-0.057 (0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of cadet APFT score (APFT)</td>
<td>. (0.001)</td>
<td>. (0.001)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet academic GPA (caps1)</td>
<td>. (0.032)</td>
<td>. (0.032)</td>
<td>0.342*** (0.032)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binary measure of gender (female)</td>
<td>. (0.047)</td>
<td>. (0.047)</td>
<td>-0.042 (0.047)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>2.960 (0.029)</td>
<td>3.031 (0.165)</td>
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<td>R²</td>
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<td>0.005</td>
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<td>449</td>
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Notes: Coefficient estimates depicted with standard errors in parentheses below. Asterisks indicate the level of significance in a variable: * = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1%.
Al-Shabab in Somalia: Weakened, but Still Dealing in Evil
by Harald Edinger

As far as radical Islamic terrorism goes, ISIS has been dominating the news. From mass beheadings and burning people alive to destructing immeasurable cultural heritage, their unspeakable acts of barbarism have secured it the widest media coverage among violent extremist groups. Rival jihadist organizations have been struggling to find their place. After all, the game is not just about drawing attention to their cause – spreading their radical interpretation of Sunni Islam across the world and ultimately creating their own religious state – but also about attracting financial support and recruits for their respective groups. While al-Qaeda remains ideologically opposed to ISIS’ vision of imminent apocalypse, Nigerian militant group Boko Haram in March 2015 decided to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. Another African Islamic terrorist organization, the al-Shabab of Somalia, which remains formally affiliated to al-Qaeda, chose a different method to garner media attention: in a video message released in early February 2015, the group is calling on Somalis abroad to attack shopping malls in North America and the United Kingdom. This raises the question: how dangerous is al-Shabab really – to the United States, East Africa, and to the future of Somalia?

Origins of al-Shabab
The al-Shabab, also known as Mujahedeen Youth Movement, has its origins in the traditional Islamic courts that had begun to operate in southern Somalia in the 1990s. Despite the courts’ extreme and brutal application of sharia law, their existence provided some sort of stability to the population of the war-torn country. In the early 2000s, the local courts organized themselves into a union. Their growing influence soon posed a threat to the authority of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was backed by neighboring Ethiopia – a predominantly Christian country Somalia had been fighting in one way or another for four decades.

In 2006 a bloody conflict ensued, which had fighters of the courts union face off with Ethiopian and TFG forces. The governmental coalition took the capital Mogadishu relatively unopposed, but was unable to install a stable social order there, which resulted in a humanitarian disaster: Mogadishu was drained of the majority of its population; Human Rights Watch put the number of displaced persons at 1 million. It was at that time that al-Shabab emerged from the youth movement of the courts. Their resilience and strength in irregular warfare quickly made them the most decisive component of the resistance, and ultimately wore out the Ethiopian forces. Even though a peace agreement was reached in 2008 and an African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) was established, fighting raged on. This was in part due to the fact that a large part of the population believed the peacekeepers were merely propping up the TFG, which was widely regarded as an Ethiopian puppet regime. All this allowed the al-Shabab, which occupied the Islamist nationalist niche, to gain the necessary support of powerful local clan elders, some of

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which regard the militants as a viable alternative to the foreign-backed institutions in Mogadishu.2

Since Kenyan forces invaded southern Somalia in 2011, however, the group has been considerably weakened in terms of military strength and territorial influence. The Kenyans were integrated into the AU mission shortly thereafter, and Ethiopia, too, rejoined the fight against the al-Shabab under the banner of AMISOM. The two neighbors launched a multi-pronged assault on the Islamists in their remaining strongholds in central and southern Somalia. In September 2012, AMISOM drove al-Shabab out of the southern port city Kismayo, ridding the Islamists of a valuable economic center. Finally, in August 2014, AMISOM’s operation ‘Indian Ocean’, a coordinated campaign including troops from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Burundi, succeeded in taking the extremists’ last bastions, including the coastal town of Barawe. The group has also lost more than one leader to U.S. drone strikes, leaving few figures charismatic and capable enough to unite the fractious organization, and making it even harder to consolidate its power. Al-Shabab fighters have now been largely expelled from Mogadishu and the larger cities of the south, but remain in control of some more remote townships. The loss of influence in their homeland has unfortunately prompted al-Shabab to take their fight to a different arena – away from conventional warfare and to carrying out indiscriminate attacks on ‘soft,’ but highly visible targets within, increasingly also outside of Somalia’s borders.

**Westgate and al-Shabab’s shifting focus**

Up until the attack on Westgate shopping mall in 2013, al-Shabab violence was primarily targeted at the Transitional Government, African Union soldiers, peacekeepers, and nongovernmental organizations, mostly within the borders of Somalia. They also claimed responsibility for the twin suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, on July 11, 2010 that killed more than 70 people who had gathered to watch the final match of the soccer world cup.3

Rather than a strengthening of the movement, however, the raid on Westgate mall as well as their recent call to attack shopping malls in the West illustrate desperation on the part of al-Shabab. Not only does it show that the militants have lost a great deal of power and influence over Somalia itself, but the attack reveals that the group has neglected to consider the complexity of the international dimension of their struggle: al-Shabab depends heavily on support from foreign sympathizers and from their compatriots abroad. Hence, until Westgate, al-Shabab had avoided to attack Kenyans at home in order not to fuel hatred against the Somali refugee population there, which now consists of well over a million people.

Rather than being worried about the safety of Somalis in Kenya, this concerns the Shabab because it could easily cause bad blood between al-Shabab and Somali expatriates throughout the world – most of which already hold a very unfavorable view of the group.4 “This is part of a new phase for al-Qaeda [al-Shabab was formally merged with al-Qaeda in February 2012], because al-Shabab lost the big war in Somalia,” said the media adviser to and son of the

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3 National Counterterrorism Center. “Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar: Al-Shabaab.”
4 Chitty, Alex. “The Westgate attack shows how desperate Al Shabaab have become.” *Vice*, September 2013

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president of the Somali province of Puntland. “They have attacked a soft target in order to tell the world, ‘we are here.’” Violence in Kenya continued after Westgate, culminating in a record 173 deaths last year due to al-Shabab attacks, according to Kenyan police forces. In November, for example, al-Shabab militants attacked a bus in northern Kenya, singling out and killing 28 passengers who could not recite the shahada, a Muslim declaration of faith.

Al-Shabab’s attacks outside Somalia’s borders are not undisputed within the organization, however. It is important to note that there is not a single, homogenous group by the name of al-Shabab. A closer look at its internal structures reveals deep ideological and organizational divides. A particularly important rift in the organization has emerged between those Shabab fighters who place higher emphasis on the transnational dimension of the conflict, and those who are more focused on the national struggle. Also, there are differences between the local cells of al-Shabab, in terms of clan-affiliation, degree of ideological radicalization, and general understanding of their struggle and its aims, among other factors.

The kind of influence al-Shabab fractions have over peoples’ lives in the controlled townships also varies, as Mary Harper describes in her book on Somalia: “The areas controlled by al-Shabab are not united under a strong, centralized Islamist administration; the experience of each town and village varies according to which group of militants control it at which particular time.” Generally, though, al-Shabab control over a territory seems to be synonymous with a frightened, unfree civil population. Nonetheless, a limited sense of security and stability for many outweigh the drawbacks of the militant regime.

In order to uphold a favorable attitude of (at least parts of) the population, the militants have to keep Somalis away from outside assistance. Sometimes this has dramatic consequences, as in the case of the 2011 famine, when al-Shabab militias withheld shipments of food and medicine to the starving population of southern Somalia. In other cases, however, al-Shabab fails to keep the Somali population from outside help, as in the example of a field hospital close to Mogadishu, where hundreds of Somalis have sought medical care, despite warnings that anyone found in possession of an AMISOM medical form risked having their tongue cut out.

Outside of East Africa, the group has been exerting its influence mainly through its presence on the Internet, by disseminating propaganda videos and audio tracks, and by using social media channels. Throughout the attack on Westgate mall, Shabab militants provided updates on the shooting, along with messages outlining their causes, through their Twitter channels (which were quickly suspended by the social media site): “The Mujahideen entered #Westgate Mall today at around noon and are still inside the mall fighting the #Kenyan Kuffar inside their own turf.”

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Since the incident, new accounts that can be linked to, or at least sympathize with, al-Shabab have been opened on Twitter. Interestingly, al-Shabab’s extensive and sophisticated use of social media has been very much at odds with the regular bans on using or consuming communication technology they are issuing for regular Somali citizens. When trying to set up a global caliphate, it seems, the ends justify the means.

The al-Shabab threat

The good news is that, according to most experts and homeland security officials, al-Shabab does not seem to have the financial and logistical capabilities to plan and carry out terrorist attacks beyond East Africa. Their recent threat against Western shopping malls can be viewed as an implicit acknowledgment to that fact – a haphazardly attempt to activate a ‘lone wolf’ already living in the U.S., and incite him to commit an act of terrorism in the name of al-Shabab.

That latter threat, unfortunately, is less easy to dismiss: homegrown terrorists and sympathizers are posing an increasingly large threat. However, most of these radicals have tended to take the fight back home, to Somalia, rather than to the Mall of America. Between 2007 and 2010, more than 40 Americans joined al-Shabab, making the United States a primary exporter of Western fighters to the Islamist group. In particular, the militia has attracted several radical volunteers from Minneapolis, which is home to the largest Somali population in the country. The first American to become a suicide bomber blew himself up in Somalia in October 2008. Another recruit, a 22-year-old from Minneapolis, attacked African Union troops on October 29, 2011. In 2013, in an attempt to draw further recruits, the group also released the so-called ‘Minnesota Martyrs’ video, which follows some of the Minnesota suicide bombers in the weeks prior to their attacks.

The question now is whether al-Shabab’s recent threat to attack shopping malls in North America in particular could serve as a call to arms for Somali-American jihadist sympathizers. Some fear that the announcement could “influence the ideology of people thinking about what they could do. It could be a call to action,” said former U.S. attorney Anders Folk, who investigated al-Shabab as part of an FBI-run task force. It is important to point out, though, that such calls to violence had been issued before – the ‘Minnesota Martyrs’ video in 2013 being the best example – and Somali-Americans, except for a select few, have remained very unresponsive to these messages. Most likely, the answer to the question how great a threat al-Shabab poses to the U.S. after their most recent video release is, therefore, just as high as before.

The greatest security threat remains to be posed not to the West, but to East Africa. While AMISOM’s operation ‘Indian Ocean’ may have been very successful in pushing the al-Shabab

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1 RAND Corporation, Jones, Seth G. “The Terrorist Threat from Al Shabaab.” Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 3, 2013
2 RAND Corporation, Jones, Seth G. “The Terrorist Threat from Al Shabaab.” Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 3, 2013
3 ibid.
out of Somalia’s larger towns, a recent IISS report indicates that the group is far from being defeated: al-Shabab still had “the potential both to slow AMISOM’s progress through its use of asymmetrical tactics and to conduct attacks on Somali and foreign targets,” and AMISOM was “about 15,000 troops short of the strength believed required for concurrent operations to clear Somalia of al-Shabab,” the report points out.\(^\text{15}\) Perhaps most importantly, thousands of Somalis, most of them young, remain under the spell of al-Shabab’s ideology. What is ultimately at stake, therefore, is the future of Somalia. If the group continues to draw recruits from Somalia’s massive youth population, thousands more will become radicalized, traumatized, and left with blood on their hands.

**Countering al-Shabab**

The United States – still traumatized by the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident of 1993 – has been mainly relying on proxy forces in the region, namely the Ethiopians and Kenyans. It is believed that since 2007, Washington has provided more than half a billion dollars to train and equip African Union forces battling al-Shabab.\(^\text{16}\) In comparison to waging war on terror by themselves, as with al-Qaeda and its allies throughout the Middle East, that cost is rather small – which is another reason why the proxy approach appeals to Washington.

In terms of pacifying the country, and in the crucial game of winning over the hearts and minds of the Somali people, however, the proxy approach has proven somewhat ineffective. Individual national interests of Kenya and Ethiopia seem to have gotten in the way of a genuine peacekeeping effort – at least in the eyes of large part of the Somali population. In the province of Jubaland, for example, Kenya installed a proxy administration, whose purpose – rather than providing safety and stability to Somalis – seems to be safeguarding Kenyan economic interests around the town of Kismayo with its important port and charcoal resources.\(^\text{17}\) International efforts as a whole might have been too focused on backing a centralized government that lacks popular support, which in turn might have opened up additional opportunities for recruitment.

In his 2013 book, *The World’s Most Dangerous Place*, British freelance journalist and author James Fergusson examines the factors underlying Somalia’s tragic contemporary history, but also evaluates perspectives for the country’s future. One of the biggest challenges he identifies is the loss of the young generation to radicalization and violence at the hands of the al-Shabab. Fergusson emphasizes that the structure of conflicts in Somalia is often more complicated than reports seem to convey. The struggle between the Somali government and al-Shabab, for example, is not as clear cut as it appears to be on the surface, a conflict between a political and religious insurgent organization. In reality, there are clans and sub-clans questing for power on both sides, for positioning in a new government, and for control of resources.\(^\text{18}\) This makes the political future of Somalia highly uncertain: disputes over control of local administrations in key

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\(^\text{17}\) Bruton, Bronwyn; Williams, Paul D. “Cut-Rate Counterterrorism. Why America can no longer afford to outsource the war on al-Shabab.” *Foreign Policy*, October 7, 2013

cities and towns recaptured from al-Shabab may imperil the longevity of the gains toward stability in Somalia. These local disputes could provide al-Shabab with an opportunity to re-establish itself, especially if it is able to co-opt support from one of the parties to the conflict. 19

Covert operations, targeted killings, and drone strikes – the more conventional tactics in counterterrorism – have been and will continue to play an important role in decimating and frightening al-Shabab leadership. The same goes for like cutting the group’s foreign funding lines. Nonetheless, a holistic counterterrorism approach will also have to include some form of interaction: al-Shabab is not a monolithic organization, and it may be well worth to seek dialogue with the more moderate cells of the group, rather than focusing all resources on destroying them militarily. This is not to say harnessing the group’s ideological divides is the easy path to pursue, but it may be one of the more promising ones.

The problems of Somalia, to some extent, have also been shaped by the sense of disengagement and resignation that accompanies our thinking about the country, perhaps because a lot of what has been written on Somalia was a sequence of ever more ghastly tales of war, famine, and violent extremism. Fergusson’s Somali account, too, describes with a shocking vividness the daily horrors ordinary Somalis have faced since the day they were born. As he puts it, “fatalism of the deepest, darkest kind was inevitable in such a place – and who knew what long-term effect that might have on a person’s mental wellbeing?” 20 In an environment like this, it is understandable that thoughts of a coming apocalypse or that of salvation through martyrdom may not be the least appealing ones. But Fergusson’s Somali story also includes some bright notes: he talks about forms of business, law enforcement and local politics that were beginning to establish themselves, and members of the international Somali community that were returning to their homeland. These Somali exiles, “through their discovery of a viable alternative to the stultifying clan system that had perpetuated the violence here for so long, could have a civilizing, almost revolutionary influence on the home country.” 21

One of the ways the West can help is by supporting these Somali individuals and communities that are seeking to build a better future for their country. This will also have to include some of the young Somalis that have – often reluctantly – taken up arms to fight for al-Shabab. If a credible alternative to the clan system and perpetual circle of violence can be created, and if real opportunities for moderate young fighters to exit the organization without having to fear repercussions can be offered, al-Shabab in Somalia will ultimately lose their appeal. Changing the terms of our debate might help, too. In light of the recent military successes against al-Shabab – which creates somewhat of a contrasting picture to the spread of ISIS and the upsurge of publicly displayed violent extremism all across the Middle East and Northern Africa – Somalia suddenly does not seem like the most hopeless case anymore. Perhaps we can stop thinking about it as a failed state, but rather as a country where alternatives to Islamic extremism are within reach.

21 ibid., p. 82
“As we peer into society’s future, we—you and I, and our government—must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without asking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage.”

-Dwight D Eisenhower’s Farewell Address January 17, 1961

If ever there was a time when states, businesses and the global community as a whole could operate in a vacuum; where decisions and actions had limited consequences on a global scale, that time has surely past. The planet is changing. Political and ideological arguments aside, a changing planet brings with it instability.

For those whose job it is to provide security and promote peace, instability takes on a more central role; strategy, forethought, historical precedence and tradition are all swept aside when the very stage on which global actors perform is so drastically altered.

Floods, drought, famine, disease, poverty, human rights abuses; leaders have struggled with these issues and will continue to struggle with these issues; however, if given the opportunity to reduce these challenges, if only incrementally, one less refugee crisis or one major epidemic averted, who would not seize that opportunity? The fact of the matter is there will always be a level of instability in the world, but that is no excuse for inaction, especially at a juncture when so much is at stake. The path to greater stability is found through sustainability.

Sustainability is not a buzz word, agenda driven catch phrase or political slogan; sustainability is the basic act of survival. At West Point, on the plateau that General George Washington considered to be the most important strategic position in America, it is pertinent to reflect on the synonyms of sustainable: defendable, defensible, justifiable, maintainable, supportable and tenable.

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sus·tain·able

adjective \sə-ˈstā-nə-bəl\
: able to be used without being completely used up or destroyed
: involving methods that do not completely use up or destroy natural resources
: able to last or continue for a long time

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22 CEO of B. Accountability and Facilitator for Global Compact Board Programme, and Grant Gibbs, Marketing Manager at B. Accountability
When planning for a sustainable future, an area of particular concern is sustainable energy. The U.S. Department of Defense is a giant consumer of energy by its very nature. In the past, cheap and reliable fuel sources meant that little concern had to be paid to maintaining the energy needs of this vast institution, but those days have gone and sustainability is of the upmost importance. In April of 2011, the Association of the United States Army in their Torchbearer National Security Report comprehensively outlined how energy security and sustainability are vital to national defence; “the sustainability principle seeks to instill Army-wide change in both culture and practice with regard to energy consumption and generation. Technological investments and developments, operational training, education and facilities management are all critical aspects of instilling a mindset of conservation, efficiency and sustainability.”

Clearly, the mindset and resources are in place to drive sustainability initiatives within the defense industry, what still remains is the opportunity to enhance programs and relationships with the private business sector and implement Integrated Reporting throughout the various branches and arms of the industry.

The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) defines Integrated Reporting (IR) as “a process that results in communication by an organization, most visibly a periodic integrated report, about how an organization’s strategy, governance, performance, and prospects lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long-term.” IR builds upon currently utilized reporting methods, such as annual earnings reports and sustainability reports, to present additional information about a company’s strategy, governance, and performance. The overall goal of IR is to provide a complete picture of a company, in the social, environmental and economic context within which it operates.

IR incorporates material sustainability information equally alongside financial information, and which embodies a truly multi-stakeholder approach, provides reporting organizations with a broad perspective on risk and opportunities in both the short and long term.

IR can provide a window through which the defence industry can better view opportunities for greater sustainability in its operations. Procurements and contracts with businesses that produce Integrated Reports will allow for a greater understanding of their long-term viability. Does a business rely too heavily on climate sensitive materials? Are they prepared for unforeseen challenges? Will they be able to deliver on their mandate in the face of natural disasters, economic turmoil and other risks? An IR from an affiliated business is a strategic document and the defence industry knows better than anyone about the value of sound strategy and strong allies.

The challenge many businesses face with IR is centered around decision makers and conflicting time frames on strategy. Some say that CEOs are concerned primarily with increasing shareholder profits in the short-term; however, it has never been more important to think long term than it is today. Therefore, the Board of Directors and senior management should, and need to be, drivers of long-term positive change. Many businesses have joined the UN Global Compact initiative “Business for Peace”, and others have started the journey towards IR and Integrated Thinking, both within the company and the society they are part of; we, the current and future generations, need more individuals and organizations to take steps towards
sustainability. IR is a long-term investment that often requires upfront costs. Investing in systems and technology can hurt in the short-term, but it is an investment that is crucial for sustained success.

Sustainability requires outside-the-box thinking and strong strategic leadership; searching for opportunities and applying successful methods from other sectors can make all the difference down the line. Often the best learning comes from other industries. The defense industry, the businesses, the organizations and the countries they operate in need to aim to see the total picture and value natural capital, accountability and integrated thinking while reporting on the impact and progress they are making. All strategies and actions have an impact. Make sure your strategy and actions, as an individual, a leader or an organization are sustainable; defendable, defensible, justifiable, maintainable, supportable and tenable.
Introduction

Six years after the end of the George W. Bush Administration, the military strategy known as counterinsurgency (COIN) is the subject of fierce and often emotional debate. COIN doctrine suggests that an insurgency can be gradually eliminated with a population-focused control strategy combined with reconstruction and political measures designed to enhance the legitimacy of the incumbent government. This doctrine is closely associated with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and disputes over its effectiveness are often inextricable from debates over the G.W. Bush and Obama Administrations’ policies in those regions.

There are strong arguments both for and against COIN; to proponents, the effectiveness of “The Surge” in drastically reducing violence in Iraq proves that counterinsurgency can work if given sufficient time and resources. To critics, COIN’s lackluster performance in Afghanistan demonstrates that its effectiveness is overblown, and that it is too slow and risky to be acceptable to an American public which is tired of foreign interventions. As the US presence in Afghanistan winds down, there is a need for serious scholarship that objectively weighs both arguments to evaluate the effectiveness and costs of COIN as a future policy option.

Douglas Porch’s Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of a New Way of War is not that book. His work is a one-sided, 350-page diatribe on COIN largely absent of the objective critical analysis that is desperately needed in the debate over COIN. Instead, Porch largely relies on statements of opinion to make his argument and attempts to tear down the opposing viewpoint with a litany of insults and unsubstantiated accusations directed at COIN practitioners. Over the course of the book, the author labels “COIN-dinistas” with nearly every academic pejorative imaginable, including racism, paternalism, imperialism, colonialism, orientalism, as well as accusing them of being murderers and the inheritors of a legacy of rape and internment. To Porch, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were “murderous errands,” counterinsurgency is a “counterfeit doctrine” and a “race to the bottom,” and its practitioners are “losers and sometimes war criminals.”

Porch seems unconcerned with the large number of contradictions and logical inconsistencies in

2 Ibid. at 319.
3 Ibid. at 191.
4 Ibid. at 76.
5 Ibid. at 318.
6 Ibid. at 21, xi.
7 Ibid. at 21.
8 Ibid. at xi.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. at 71.
11 Ibid. at 162.
his work. He on one hand professes concern for the welfare of civilians in insurgencies and on
the other questions the effectiveness of non-punitive measures of control.12 He is a civilian
instructor in a military school who complains about the blurring of lines between civilian and
military spheres.13 Porch has never served in a war zone, but yet makes sweeping
generalizations about how all veterans feel in retrospect about their role in those operations.14
And most importantly, Porch accuses COIN advocates of poor sourcing and “misusing history”
in their research15 while at the same time ignoring competing facts and analyses which counter
his narrative.16

While there is much in this book that is misleading, factually questionable, or self-serving, this
article will focus its inquiry on five major fallacies. First, Porch insists that COIN is often
unsuccessful, an assertion that runs contrary to quantitative research that indicates
counterinsurgents have a historical win rate better than their insurgent opponents. Secondly,
Porch insists that COIN is “updated Imperialism”—an insult dependent on his conception of
these operations being solely limited to western intervention in the Islamic world. In actuality, a
substantial number of COIN cases are in fact domestic operations where an incumbent
government faces an internal challenger within its sovereign territory. Thirdly, Porch argues that
COIN operations politicize non-combatants, ignoring the large body of academic research and
historical accounts which substantiate that civilians are often active participants in the political
dynamics that sustain and facilitate internal violence. Fourth, Porch argues that COIN damages
civil-military relations while ignoring the US military’s proven record of working well with
civilian organizations and the growing convergence of political factors into modern warfare.

Porch’s fifth fallacy is by far the most important: his failure to define a coherent alternative to
COIN. It is a testament to the emotionality of the debate over counterinsurgency—and by
extension, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—that a book that focuses only on attacking the
opposing view has a place in the scholarship. The issue of how to deal with insurgencies in the
Middle East and elsewhere is an important problem for US national security policy, and pointing
out problems without suggesting solutions is not productive to improving US strategy. It is not
the intent of this article to defend COIN doctrine or the campaigns in which was employed; even
COIN’s proponents agree that the strategy has many drawbacks. Instead, it is the author’s view
that there is room for reasonable and informed debate over whether its problems outweigh its
potential utility. But any counter-argument to COIN has the burden of identifying a more viable
alternative; Porch’s inability or unwillingness to address this issue head-on represents his book’s
largest failing.

Fallacy 1: COIN Has a Poor Success Rate
One of the major tenets of Porch’s argument is that COIN is not typically successful. Several
times throughout the book he cites a long list of problems which he claims often prevents
counterinsurgents from being successful, or achieving their objectives only at an unacceptable

12 Ibid. at 319.
13 Ibid. at 98-99.
14 Ibid. at 336.
15 Ibid. at 180.
16 Ibid. at 332, 337.
While the definition of “unacceptable cost” is entirely subjective, quantitative studies of internal conflicts suggest that counterinsurgents not only frequently win but do so more often than their opponents. A RAND analysis of 89 separate post-World War II insurgencies found that the counterinsurgents win more often than not—28 victories, compared to 26 for the insurgents. Porch is correct that COIN campaigns waged by a third party state often struggle to overcome a number of important disadvantages, including “legitimacy gaps that are exploited by insurgents.” But RAND concludes that these challenges were in the long-run outweighed by the material benefits of the greater resources available to the incumbent state, noting that “most insurgencies fail, since states, no matter how weak or feckless, are typically stronger, better organized, and more professional than non-state forces.” Moreover, RAND noted that many government losses resulted from departure from the accepted tenets of COIN doctrine, leading it to conclude that “only the direct and consistent application of basic COIN methodology” of the type proposed by Galula, Kilcullen, Petraeus and others is likely to lead to a government win. COIN’s 28 to 26 win advantage contradicts Porch’s assertions that it is a losing gamble. With typical bombast, he dismisses all attempts to prove him wrong as fraudulent, insisting that “assertions of COIN success based in shoddy research and flawed and selective analysis of cases” are not only historically erroneous but dangerously misleading for policy.

One factor contributing to the gap between RAND’s statistical analysis and Porch’s views is that the latter bases his assessment of COIN effectiveness on an artificially narrow definition of victory. The fact that 35 of 89 cases in the RAND data set failed to achieve a conclusive result demonstrates the difficulty of “winning” an insurgent conflict. Both sides face daunting obstacles to victory; the government must locate and eliminate an elusive band of rebels within the population, while the insurgents have to overcome their huge military disadvantage against much larger and more powerful government security forces. Should the government fail to achieve victory directly, Porch opines that it can do so indirectly, “play[ing] for time and hop[ing] that the insurgency will implode because it miscalculates levels of popular support.”

This implies that he believes that “playing for time” until the other side makes a mistake is not a real victory but instead a second-best result. In doing so, he betrays a lack of understanding of a key dynamic of insurgent conflicts—because outright victory is so difficult to achieve for both sides, ‘holding on’ until the other side makes an exploitable mistake is a legitimate path to victory. This scenario is so common that iconic counterinsurgent Robert Thompson listed taking advantage his opponents’ mistakes—which he described as “playing for the breaks”—as one of the three main elements of successful counterinsurgency strategy.

The importance of “playing for the breaks” is an important—but rarely studied—component of

17 Ibid. at 177.
18 Ben Connable & Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End, RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE 5 (2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG965.pdf [hereinafter RAND]. Another 19 conflicts were inconclusive and 16 more were ongoing. Ibid. at xviii.
19 PORCH, supra note 1, at 338.
20 Ibid. supra note 18, at 14.
21 Ibid. at xviii.
22 PORCH, supra note 1, at 337-338.
23 RAND, supra note 18, at xviii.
24 Ibid. at 321.

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counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{26} The difficulty of these types of conflicts mean they are typically long, averaging 10 years, with as many as a fourth of RAND’s cases lasting two decades or longer.\textsuperscript{27} As a result, there are plenty of opportunities for insurgents to make mistakes, often at strategic junctures in the conflict.\textsuperscript{28} While one expert on this phenomena notes that “it is safe to say there has never been a mistake-free insurgency,” the risk of an insurgent blunder appears to increase over time.\textsuperscript{29} RAND has identified a slow growth in government win rates starting at the 12 year point,\textsuperscript{30} and concludes that this increase is the result of the growing possibility that insurgents overreach in a way that allows the government to gain the upper hand.\textsuperscript{31} Typically, the insurgents go “off message” in a way that alienates their supporters in the populace, use indiscriminate terror tactics against their constituency, or fail to counter the government’s social or political reform programs.\textsuperscript{32} This tendency to overreach seems to be a common failure among insurgent groups; counterinsurgency expert Lincoln Krause notes that “most insurgent leaders overestimate their own capacity with respect to the level of popular support for the movement and the government’s capacity to respond in a forceful and effective manner.”\textsuperscript{33} RAND reaches a similar conclusion, noting the tendency of insurgents to “sometimes defeat themselves…falling victim to their own violent tendencies or near-pathological need to invest the populace with strict dogma.”\textsuperscript{34}

One good example of an insurgent mistake that allowed the counterinsurgents to break a deadlock was Al Qa’ida in Iraq’s (AQI) coercive tactics in Al Anbar province. AQI needed Sunni acquiescence in Anbar to establish an internal haven where it could recruit, rearm, and stage attacks into Baghdad. The group was initially successful in obtaining this foothold by leveraging Sunni resentment over the US occupation and domination by a majority-Shia government in Baghdad. Three years into the conflict, however, AQI wore out its welcome in Anbar through a pattern of violence and coercion against the same Sunnis it relied upon for support. In seeking to realize its goal of an Islamic Caliphate in western Iraq, AQI sought to destroy the sources of traditional Sunni tribal authority it could not co-opt—such as tribal leaders, security forces, and local government officials. Moreover, AQI relied almost entirely on coercion to govern those areas in which it had successfully assumed control. Sunnis under AQI rule quickly grew to resent its financial extortion, the harsh penalties of Sharia law—such as breaking the fingers of those caught smoking cigarettes—and the forced marriages between AQI fighters and Anbari women.\textsuperscript{35} In the end, a single murder helped catalyze this resentment into a broad anti-AQI uprising. In August 2006, AQI murdered an Anbari tribal shaykh for urging his tribesmen to join the police, hiding his body in the underbrush so it could not be buried within the 24 hours specified by Islamic law.\textsuperscript{36} This insult proved to be too much to bear for his

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{26}Ibid.
\bibitem{27}RAND, supra note 18, at 28. \textit{See also Ibid.} at xvi.
\bibitem{28}Krause, supra note 25, at 49-50.
\bibitem{29}Ibid. at 49, 59.
\bibitem{30}RAND, supra note 18, at 28-29.
\bibitem{31}Ibid. at 31.
\bibitem{32}Ibid.
\bibitem{33}Krause, supra note 25, at 50.
\bibitem{34}RAND, supra note 18, at 153.
\bibitem{35}BING WEST, THE STRONGEST TRIBE 199 (Random House, 2008).
\end{thebibliography}
kinsmen, who openly denounced AQI and rallied other tribes to the cause. Within six months AQI was facing a full-blown tribal revolt. While the US did not precipitate this movement—commonly known as the “Awakening”—it quickly moved to capitalize on the sudden change in circumstances. US commanders helped facilitate the uprising and defended their new Sunni allies against AQI retaliation. As the movement spread, anti-US violence rapidly declined. “Whenever a tribe flipped and joined the Awakening,” explained one US Commander in Al Anbar, “all the attacks on Coalition forces in that area would stop.”

It is unclear whether Porch’s dismissal of capitalizing on insurgent mistakes as a second-class result contributes to his belief that Iraq was a “failed COIN experiment.” He argues that “the Surge impacted hardly at all the strategic dynamic of [the] conflict,” citing the consolidation of Shia political power. Porch is certainly correct that the Surge did not achieve one of its primary goals, creating the space for a national political reconciliation. It’s inaccurate to suggest that the Surge had no strategic effect at all, however. The “synergistic effect” of the increase in US forces and the emergence of the Awakening movement largely dissipated a cycle of year-long violence that had become self-sustaining. Pre-surge violence was at historic highs; civilian casualties by May 2007 had reached 1,700 month, with 126 US soldiers killed. A year later that violence had plummeted nearly 90 percent, with only 200 civilians and 11 US soldiers killed per month. It’s hard to see how this is not a success, both on humanitarian grounds and those of US policy. The major drop in violence not only saved countless lives but allowed a US departure—a key strategic goal for Washington—and sustained a political order in Baghdad which, while not perfect, was relatively stable. Unfortunately, the emergence of a large-scale civil war next door the following year undid these gains, pushing the country back towards conflict.

Another instance in which Porch seems to misread history is in his discussion of the “stab in the back” phenomena. Porch insists that counterinsurgents’ complaints about a loss of either domestic political support or that of an external sponsor is merely an excuse for the ineffectiveness of their tactics. He insists this argument “should be highly suspect if for no other reason that it celebrates a COIN-dinista pantheon filled with losers and sometimes war criminals who claimed that they…could have won the whole enchilada but for a government/people/conventional military establishment that knifed them in the back.”

The reality is that the length of insurgent conflicts makes maintaining political support a critical vulnerability for both sides. RAND suggests that a loss of domestic support for either the government or the insurgents often results in a loss by that side—or put simply, whoever blinks first, loses. The problem is especially acute for counterinsurgents and their external backers,
given that their cost and effort for sustaining the conflict is much more than their opponents. Noting that “lack of patience” is often endemic among counterinsurgents, RAND notes that “just as the withdrawal of external support...can cripple the insurgents...inopportune withdrawal of support for a government can, and very often does, lead to defeat or at least a mixed settlement.”

The vulnerability caused by overreliance on external support is so pronounced that RAND found that governments with foreign backers actually had a slightly lower chance of victory than those without.

Porch cites the US loss in Vietnam as an example of a conflict in which he believes the “stab in the back” theory is used to deflect attention from a failure of COIN tactics. He highlights a series of structural and organizational problems that impaired the US pacification effort and concludes that the “US military was defeated in Vietnam because by the 1960s the strategic environment had deteriorated beyond a point that any COIN tactical configuration could have redeemed.” He continues by insisting that US tactics “made no difference to the outcome in Vietnam, where the real problem was the political and strategic context in which the war was fought.”

While Porch is correct that US COIN tactics made no difference in the eventual outcome, his assertion that those tactics could not redeem the situation on the ground is factually incorrect—because they did so by 1970. While the fact that the US lost the war is indisputable, Saigon fell to a conventional military invasion from North Vietnam, not from the pressure of a domestic insurgency.

Max Boot and Lewis Sorley both describe how the US had reversed the balance of power in the insurgent conflict in the south after 1968. The VC, like AQI, had overreached—launching four failed military offensives in 1968-69 which allowed US and South Vietnamese forces to wipe out the bulk of their insurgent fighting strength. At the same time, the US Army under GEN Creighton Abrams adopted a new dispersed strategy intended to maximize its effectiveness at pacification, severely limiting the capabilities of the remaining VC cadres. In combination, these two factors allowed the US and South Vietnamese Armies to secure over 90 percent of South Vietnam by 1970, “essentially eliminating the guerrilla problem in most of the country.”

This was a dramatic change from the dire security conditions prior to the Tet Offensive, where the VC controlled much of the countryside, including villages within 40 miles of Saigon. This dramatic turnaround in the security condition led Lewis Sorley to conclude that the North Vietnamese shift to conventional operations—such as the 1972 Easter Offensive—was because its insurgent capabilities had been largely destroyed.

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46 Ibid. at 30, 50.
47 Ibid. at xvi.
48 Porch, supra note 1, at 202, 208.
49 Ibid. at 325.
51 Ibid. at 310. See also Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam 64-66 (Harcourt Brace and Company, 1999).
52 Ibid. at 305.
54 Sorley, supra note 51, at 305-307.
The addition of this crucial historical context makes the ‘stab in the back’ theory much more plausible as an explanation for the outcome of the Vietnam War. While Saigon in the wake of the Easter Offensive was in its best military position since 1956, it remained dependent on US financial and military aid. The loss of US resolve made the military defeat of the VC insurgency irrelevant, with the US Congress’s termination of US financial support in June 1973 serving as a “significant casual factor” in the collapse of the South Vietnam.\(^{55}\)

**Fallacy 2: COIN is an “Updated Imperialism”**

Porch’s conceptions of counterinsurgency are inextricably linked to the US campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and he focuses his criticisms on what he believes to be ‘Imperial’ attempts to install democratic governance in those countries. The reality of how COIN strategy is used is more complex, however—with many counterinsurgency operations having no foreign involvement at all. As a result, Porch’s sweeping characterization of all counterinsurgency as imperialist foreign occupation is misleading and inaccurate. His inability to distinguish between ends and means is especially ironic given that he often accuses COIN proponents of confusing a tactic with a strategy.\(^{56}\)

Porch makes no secret of the fact that his book is intended as an attack against “those who advocate future imperial adventures in the manner of the George W. Bush wars of the last decade.”\(^{57}\) Drawing a direct line between 19\(^{th}\) Century European colonial conquests and US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan,\(^{58}\) Porch flings all manner of insults on COIN and its practitioners before finally concluding that counterinsurgency is “updated imperialism.”\(^{59}\) The core of Porch’s complaint—at times difficult to spot beneath all the name calling and unsubstantiated accusations—is that COIN institutionalizes “foreign occupation anchored in minority rule”\(^{60}\) and that it “projects quintessentially western values, and western prejudices, onto non-Western societies.”\(^{61}\) This is not as clear-cut as Porch insists; even in the context of US policy in the Middle East it is debatable whether US policy is in fact “Imperial.” Some academics have pointed out that “American unilateralist policy today differs in fundamental respects from previous imperial processes and structures,” namely its preference to install a friendly government and then withdraw.\(^{62}\) Porch does not seem overly concerned about the lack of definitional precision in his usage of the term, however, using it as a general criticism of US foreign intervention.

More damaging to Porch’s argument is his apparent lack of understanding that a foreign occupier is not a prerequisite for counterinsurgency. There are a wide variety of COIN cases that are fought purely between an incumbent government and one or more domestic resistance groups. The rebels come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes, from Marxist rebels to drug gangs and everything in between. Despite the difference in the nature of the rebels, incumbent

\(^{55}\) RAND, *supra* note 18, at 55-56.

\(^{56}\) PORCH, *supra* note 1, at 9.

\(^{57}\) *Ibid.* at xii.

\(^{58}\) *Ibid.* at xi.


\(^{60}\) *Ibid.* at 319.


governments often use the same set of COIN tactics we associate with modern US doctrine—such as a focus on population control, efforts to enhance government legitimacy through reconstruction, civilian-military unity of effort, and intelligence-driven operations.63 While different governments emphasize some elements over others, the mere existence of a robust set of domestic COIN cases demonstrates that Porch’s conception of counterinsurgency as purely ‘foreign domination’ is flawed and one-dimensional.

One of the most successful COIN examples in recent years has been the Brazilian Government’s pacification program in the 1,000 hillside slums—known as favelas—of Rio de Janeiro. The government had effectively abandoned as many as 1,000 of these slums in the 1980s, and after almost 30 years outside of state control, they had become one of Rio’s primary sources of crime and violence. Many were havens for criminal gangs such as the Terceiro Comando Puro (Third Command) or Comando Vermelho (Red Command), who used them as a staging area for criminal activity elsewhere in the city.64 By the 2000s much as 20 percent of the city’s 9 million people lived in the favelas, and the presence of so much non-state space undermined security city-wide.65 Violence gradually spiraled until by 2008 Rio had one of the highest homicide rates in the world, with most of the city’s 5,717 murders occurring in the favelas.66

The awarding of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics to Rio—and the much publicized shooting down of a police helicopter by drug gangs several weeks after—marked a psychological watershed for Brazilian authorities.67 The crime coming out of the favelas posed a major threat to the success of the games, and federal and city authorities realized they must be returned to state control. The Brazilian strategy closely resembled US COIN practices in Iraq and Afghanistan, with one US military analysis concluding that they had employed 11 of the 13 elements recommended by the US counterinsurgency manual.68 The Brazilians first used overpowering military force to seize the favelas and then gradually transitioned the occupation into a reconstruction effort that teamed infrastructure repair with educational and assistance programs.69 The Brazilian campaign was incremental, starting with the smallest favelas before moving into large ones, a process that the city’s chief policeman, Public Safety Secretary José Mariano Beltrame, called “eating porridge from the edge of the bowl.”70 The program started

66 Karim, supra note 64.
67 Ibid.
68 Burgoyne, supra note 63, at 51.
70 Margolis, supra note 65.
with the Santa Marta favela in November 2008 and since then has taken over 100 others, totaling several hundred thousand residents. The operation culminated in a January 2012 operation in Rocinha—a sprawling district with a population of over 100,000, often described as the biggest slum in Latin America.

The program has resulted in a remarkable improvement in the security situation, although not without hiccups. The homicide rate has dropped by half over the last five years and some favelas have not seen a single killing since the program started in 2008. While there have been periodic protests over uneven provision of government services, the program is supported by the majority of Cariocas. One prominent Brazilian television producer noted that during several operations to retake favelas from the drug gangs the residents “came out to the streets to cheer the police and celebrate.” The process of pacification is by no means complete, however, and periodic flare-ups of violence continue as gangs seek to regain a foothold in their prior havens.

The Rio case study demonstrates how Porch’s narrow conception of COIN as western intervention in the Middle East and North Africa is an inaccurate depiction of a data set that often has tremendous diversity. Colombia, for example, has been fighting leftist insurgencies and drug gangs since the 1960s. In 2009, its “Integrated Action” program used many of the same tools as the Brazilians to combat the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The program has been relatively successful, resulting in a 25 percent drop in homicides and 90 percent drop in kidnappings, as well as a 20 percent reduction in the size of FARC territory. India faces similar problems with continuing ethnic and tribal violence, fighting dozens of COIN campaigns in its territory since independence in 1947. In recent years, Delhi has struggled to counter a growing Maoist-Naxalite insurgency that has affected 20 of its 28 states in the country. Indian Prime Minister Singh described the uprising as “the biggest internal security challenge faced by our country,” with violence increasing approximately 63 percent since 2008.

**Fallacy 3: COIN Politicizes Non-Combatants**

A third complaint of Porch’s is that COIN tactics politicize civilians. His arguments run along two lines. First, COIN doctrine subjects the civilian population to “force and coercion” by bringing them into the conflict and forcing them to pick sides. Counterinsurgency, argues Porch, is “heartless and inhumane” to civilian population because it “place[s] the crosshairs on the people in a process of escalation inherent in war.” Porch seems to assume non-combatants

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71 Karim, supra note 64.
72 Arsenault, supra note 69.
73 Bowater, supra note 64.
74 BBC NEWS, supra note 64.
75 Bowater, supra note 64.
77 RAND, supra note 18, at 59.
79 Ibid.
80 PORCH, supra note 1, at 328.
81 Ibid. at 327.
are apolitical and uninvolved absent the actions of the counterinsurgent—visualizing them in an idealized Scottian apolitical state of nature.

The reality of non-combatants’ role in internal conflict is very different, however. A large body of academic literature and historical studies demonstrate that civilians are often active participants in the political dynamics that surround and sustain internal violence. They voluntarily pick sides and actively support the armed groups that either best align with their group identities or are most capable of meeting their needs for protection and consistent governance. David Kilcullen describes this “complex two-way interaction” between civilians and combatants where the two groups seek to engage and manipulate the other in a way most likely to meet their goals. In engaging with combatants, civilians seek to trade support to a combatant in return for maintenance of a security situation that maximizes predictability and minimizes risk.\(^\text{82}\)

Non-combatants are more than just “rational peasants” driven solely by the calculus of survival, however.\(^\text{83}\) Like all people, their loyalties are shaped by political preferences drawn from their ethnic, tribal, or group identity, as well as situational factors such as relative balance of control, competitive service provision, and history of relative victimization.\(^\text{84}\) These preferences help steer non-combatants towards specific alliances; academics have documented that intra-ethnic networks are frequently the primary source of support for most insurgent groups.\(^\text{85}\) Recent field research in Afghanistan demonstrates how these preferences play an important role in affecting support for combatants. If civilians were by nature apolitical or passive—as Porch suggests—their responses to combatant actions should be symmetric, with their responses consistent without regard to the identity of the group that hurt or helped them.\(^\text{86}\) A survey of nearly 3100 Afghan villagers revealed that villagers’ response to harm is largely asymmetric, with the degree of change in villagers’ support for a combatant group after that group harmed them hinging on their group affiliation.\(^\text{87}\) In one Pashtun village, for example, harm inflicted by ISAF forces resulted in reduced support for the ISAF and increased support for the Taliban. In contrast, Taliban-inflicted harm did not have the opposite result, resulting in no increase in support for ISAF and having only a “marginally negative effect” on support for the Taliban.\(^\text{88}\) Lyall emphasizes that although this finding does not mean that the Taliban are immune to blowback from violence committed against non-combatants, it does suggest the villagers’ clear preference for Taliban rule gives the militants a clear “home team discount.”\(^\text{89}\)

Porch seems to believe that the counterinsurgent is the only source of the political contamination of non-combatants. But in reality the support of non-combatants so crucial to the outcome in


\(^\text{84}\) Ibid.


\(^\text{86}\) Lyall, supra note 83, at 680.

\(^\text{87}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{88}\) Ibid. at 679.

\(^\text{89}\) Ibid. at 691.
internal violence is that it is implausible to suggest that insurgents would not solicit the support of the populace even if the government opted not to do so. Stathis Kalyvas, one of the leading academic experts on internal violence, describes popular support as the “sine qua non of victory,” a prerequisite for both incumbent and rebel wins.90 Jason Lyall makes a similar argument, noting the existence of “a near consensus…that counterinsurgency wars are decided by the relative success each combatant enjoys in winning popular support from the civilian population.”91 Historical accounts support this interpretation of the role of civilians. One Irish Republican Army gunman stated that “without the community we were irrelevant. We carried the guns and planted to bombs but the community fed us, his us, opened their homes to us, turned a blind eye to our operations.”92

Porch’s second criticism about the effect of COIN on civilians focuses on the effectiveness of ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. He questions the effectiveness of reconstruction and other cooperative measures to secure non-combatants’ loyalty, challenging the idea that civilians are “biddable if promised security and a higher standard of living.”93 It is “paternalistic,” argues Porch, to provide material benefits to non-combatants and then require populations “to show gratitude for their improved conditions by outing…insurgents in their midst.”94 This is an counterproductive argument for Porch to make, because given his apparent concern for civilian welfare, if ‘hearts and minds’ tactics were ineffective then incumbent governments would focus more on coercive measures to maintain control. More importantly, however, Porch’s assertions seem out of sync with the consensus in academic and practitioner research that establishes that civilians are indeed biddable. Most data suggests that non-combatants are responsive to actions taken by the counterinsurgent to secure their loyalty, although the exact degree is often dependent on the intra-group dynamics described above. One good explanation of this dynamic is David Kilcullen’s Theory of Competitive Control.95 Kilcullen argues that non-combatants are indeed responsive to cooperative measures, but also to coercive ones.96 The strongest persuasion campaigns use some mixture of both to secure the support of the population.97 As proof of the malleability of non-combatant loyalties, Kilcullen cites Kalyvas’s research that establishes that combatant support follows insurgent control, not the other way around. “Armed groups in civil war don’t become strong because people support their ideology,” Kilcullen argues. “On the contrary, people start supporting a given group’s ideology in places where they are already strong.”98

**Fallacy 4: COIN Politicizes Military Relations**

Porch’s fourth critique of COIN doctrine is its effect on civil-military relations. He argues that COIN is dangerous because it blurs the lines between civilian and military spheres of responsibility, making the soldier excessively political. He complains of the absorption of

91 Lyall, supra note 83, at 680.
92 KALYVAS, supra note 90, at 92.
93 PORCH, supra note 1, at 191.
94 Ibid. at 319.
95 KILCULLEN, supra note 82, at 150.
96 Ibid. at 114.
97 Ibid. at 136.
98 Ibid. at 125.
civilians by military officers, including police, judicial, and administrative functions. He also opposes the intrusion of civilians into military operations, condemning the “strategy of attrition, often at high human and moral costs, which invites civilian intervention into the operational and tactical spheres.” His concerns at times border on the conspiratorial, although his language is so internally contradictory it’s unclear who he thinks is the real danger. On one hand, Porch warns of the dangers of greater military influence, warning that COIN is a dangerous “flight from democratic civilian control.” Four pages later, he accuses the civilian political leadership of a “deceitful manipulation of civil-military relations, subterfuge, dishonesty, and betrayal, not only of one’s own citizens, but also of one’s own soldiers.”

Porch’s paranoia about the dangers of military-civilian collusion is incoherent and unsubstantiated. First, his views on this issue are blatant hypocrisy—as a civilian working for the military his warnings of the dangers of blurring the lines between those two spheres lacks credibility. Secondly, it’s an irony that an author who repeatedly accuses others of ignorance of Clausewitzian values can at the same time complain about soldiers becoming ‘too political.’ He seems to forget the single most recognized Clausewitzian principle—that soldiers and the use of force are instruments to achieve a political aim. In this context, a counterinsurgent is no more political than a conventional soldier—both are instruments of national policy used to achieve a strategic end.

The most telling shortcoming of Porch’s concerns on civil-military relations is that he fails to provide any real evidence that civil-military relations have been damaged by COIN operations, or that this cooperation in any way damages civilian control of the military. The US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests in fact the opposite is true—that civilians and the US military are working more productively together than they have at any time since Vietnam, and with no apparent harm to civilian control of the military. A wide variety of governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations now routinely and productively work alongside uniformed servicemen, including humanitarian workers, academics, diplomats, intelligence officers, and members of the media.

Porch’s warning of the danger of a loss of civilian control are also inconsistent with the historic US military tendency to resist adopting COIN techniques, rather than to lobby for them. In both Vietnam and Iraq US military commanders failed to embrace COIN doctrine until the situation had turned so grave they had no other choice. During GEN Westmoreland’s tenure in Vietnam, for example, the US Army “simply performed its repertoire” of conventional military operations, despite the fact that they were “frequently irrelevant to the situation.” This ‘Big Army’ abhorrence of COIN in that war was epitomized by an iconic quote by an anonymous senior US commander in Saigon, who grumbled that “I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war.”

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99 Porch, supra note 1, at 156.
100 Ibid. at 2, 334.
101 Ibid. at 330.
102 Ibid. at 334.
103 Ibid. at 175, 319, 333.
104 Robert M. Cassidy, Prophets or Praetorians? The Uptonian Paradox and the Powell Corollary, Parameters, Autumn 2003, at 136.
105 Ibid.
commanders in Iraq also shared this preference for conventional ‘big sweep’ operations—with the exception of a handful of pioneering officers, it was not until 2006 that the Army was forced to change tactics by their civilian masters in Washington. Porch’s implication that the military is using COIN as a vehicle to threaten civilian control is inconsistent with the historical reality that the G.W. Bush Administration’s decision for the Surge in Iraq was largely made over the opposition of the military hierarchy, not at the request of it.  

Porch’s vehement reaction to the blurring of the civilian and military spheres may be at least in part a reaction to emerging trends in warfare. A number of important global dynamics over the last two decades—such as “globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, [and] violent transnational actors” are combining to shape conflict in a way not previously seen. A wide variety of defense thinkers in the US and other countries have suggested these dynamics are leading towards greater ‘convergence’—the blending of formerly distinct types of conflict. The distinctions between wars, terrorism, and criminal activity are blurring, and future adversaries may take elements from each in order to develop a strategy that exploits the vulnerabilities of states who rely primarily on conventional tactics. In contrast to previous wars where the armed forces set military conditions for a political solution, in future wars military action may not be “clearly distinguishable from political activity.” Instead, both may be “used simultaneously within conceptual domains that are not clearly military or political; neither war nor peace.” One example of this type of conflict was the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizbollah in southern Lebanon. Hizbollah fighters successfully fended off a modern conventional force using a mix of guerrilla tactics and technology in the dense urban terrain. Its fighters skillfully employed a variety of technologies previously only available to national militaries, including advanced anti-tank weapons, drones, night vision goggles, and a possible signals intelligence and cryptologic capability. At the same time, Hizbollah conducted an effective media and social media campaign which put Israel on the defensive on the international stage.

If these predictions about the context of future warfare are correct, Porch’s insistence on clear divisions between the military and civilian spheres will be out of sync with the threats the US faces. David Kilcullen notes that any theory of conflict which deals with a single type of enemy is “unlikely to be very helpful in a conflict environment that includes multiple overlapping threats and challenges.” He continues by suggesting strict insistence on maintaining the legal and doctrinal distinctions between civilian and military authorities could narrow US responses,
meaning Washington “may find it impossible to act with the same agility as irregular actors who can move among these artificial categories at will.”

A Final Fallacy: Failure to Define an Alternative

A glaring omission in Porch’s work is his failure to define an alternative to counterinsurgency. While his lengthy condemnations of COIN and its practitioners runs to almost 350 pages, the author never identifies alternative ways to deal with the problem that COIN attempts to solve. The essential national security challenge for the US is that terrorist groups like Al-Qa’ida use under- and ungoverned spaces as safe havens where they can arm, recruit, and plan operations. While Porch never specifically defines ways to counter this dynamic, his sweeping condemnations of US intervention in the Middle East creates the impression that the author believes avoidance is a viable strategy. Porch would presumably oppose all direct US intervention in the region withdraw from those countries in which our presence stirs local resentment and violence. Underlying this is his assumption that counterinsurgency is a voluntary exercises of power against peripheral threats—an argument he makes several times throughout the book. “The colonial worldview which infuses modern COIN,” Porch argues, “requires a global inchoate threat that makes peripheral wars central, not marginal, to national security.”

Unfortunately, avoidance is not a viable strategy because counterinsurgency is not always a voluntary exercise. As stated before, many COIN cases involve the defense of an incumbent government against rebel groups which hope to depose them or secure the independence of a portion of their territory. Few of these governments have the luxury of avoidance—for them, the mere existence of an internal challenger is an existential threat. Moreover, from the perspective of the US, the collapse of a state to an internal challenger can have disastrous ripple effects throughout the international system. The ongoing civil war in Syria, for example, has had major second-order effects, namely the growth of Islamist territorial control into neighboring Iraq. Even if you limit the COIN case set to just Iraq and Afghanistan—as Porch does—his strategy of avoidance only works for one. Iraq was arguably an unnecessary war, but Afghanistan was not. The 9/11 attacks were conceived, planned, and staged from Afghanistan, and a failure to address that problem would have simply invited more attacks. While Porch dismisses COIN threats as “peripheral,” it is hard to apply that term to an attack on American soil that killed 2,977 innocent people and resulted in over $40 billion in property damage and cleanup costs, as well as an additional $157 billion in direct economic costs in the US alone.

Of all Porch’s arguments, the one that has the most validity is his charge that regardless of the effectiveness of COIN tactics, the US public is no longer willing to accept the cost and time commitment. It certainly seems that after nearly 15 years at war, the US’s threshold for “unacceptable costs” has declined. This heightens the importance of identifying an alternative, which Porch fails to do. He specifically challenges the utility of the two most commonly cited alternatives, drone attacks and special operations—which he suggests are

115 Ibid. at 112.
116 PORCH, supra note 1, at 76.
118 PORCH, supra note 1, at 327.
strategically counterproductive because they rally anti-American sentiment and damage our relationships with our allies.\textsuperscript{119} In eliminating all the identified options, Porch essentially returns to avoidance by default. Perhaps he thinks that if we ignore the problem it will go away; that non-involvement in the Middle East will exempt us from attacks by terrorist groups. Military strategists such Emile Simpson highlight the inherent dangers of this approach. He argues that a national choice to fight only traditional wars with “clear military solutions would mean to decline involvement in several situations in which enemies, especially non-state actors, refuse to engage in conventional battle against Western military forces.” This refusal “might in reality mean not fighting at all, and thus to accept risk on those security concerns.”\textsuperscript{120} Simpson’s reference to “accepting risk” makes an oblique reference to history: a strategy of US avoidance of dealing with the growth of Islamic fundamentalist rule in Afghanistan during the mid-1990s gave al-Qa’ida the space it needed to conceive and plan the 9/11 attacks.

In the end, the US faces an important and as yet unsolved strategic dilemma. A failure to fill ungoverned spaces in the Middle East or elsewhere may lead to another devastating terrorist attack. COIN doctrine can resolve this problem if given the necessary time and resources to do so, but it is costly, risky, slow, and controversial. Other options—such as drone attacks—have high second-order effects while not directly addressing the core problem. While Porch is entitled to his opinion that COIN can only achieve victory at unacceptable cost, responsible scholarship has an obligation to provide plausible alternatives. Porch fails to do so, instead opting to insult and accuse those whose views differ from his own. As a result his work does not constructively contribute to the debate surrounding COIN, and only serves to testify to Porch’s personal inability to overcome his political biases. In the future, he might be well served to consider the words of President Theodore Roosevelt, who describes the weakness of the pure critic:

\begin{quote}
It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.\textsuperscript{121}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid. at 335, 345.
\textsuperscript{120} SIMPSON, supra note 109, at 11.

Narinthon Luangrath

Introduction

While waiting for their asylum applications to be evaluated, the living arrangements for asylum seekers in Ireland vary considerably: some are detained in prisons, while others are held in direct provision housing accommodations, or placed in alternative forms of housing with periodic reporting requirements to immigration officers. I will focus on direct provision housing, or full-board accommodation, a system which was established by the Irish Government in 2000. Direct provision was originally envisioned as a more appropriate housing arrangement, when compared to prison detention, for asylum seeker families and others who do not pose security or flight risks. Residents’ housing, meals, heat, and other basic necessities are provided. The Reception and Integration Agency (RIA) oversees direct provision housing sites. RIA also developed the Child Protection Policy concerning asylum seeker children, defining different types of child abuse and outlining procedures for housing staff to follow in the event of suspected abuse in housing centers.

Despite these services, the direct provision system is controversial and faces strong opposition from migrant rights groups. According to a 2012 report by the Irish Refugee Council (IRC), direct provision accommodations – some of them built as early as 1999 – were only designed to house asylum applicants for up to six months. The average stay today, however, is four to six years due to the overwhelming number of asylum applications awaiting processing. The upkeep of these facilities is typically poor, as the IRC has repeatedly received complaints from residents concerning the cleanliness and safety of the accommodations. Cases of children being injured by damaged property (including on-site play structures), crumbling ceilings, and faulty plumbing and electrical systems are particularly concerning. Additionally, while waiting for their claims to be evaluated, asylum seekers are not permitted to work. The weekly cash allowance provided for direct provision housing residents is small, and asylum seekers have reported difficulty purchasing appropriate food, medication, toiletries, and other necessities for

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1 At the time this article was written, the author was a student at Boston College, studying International Studies and Political Sciences. She is a 2013 2013 Truman Scholar.
4 Ibid.
their children which are not otherwise provided by housing staff. In direct provision centers, parents have little or no control over the contents or preparation of the food served.

Given well-founded concerns over the health and safety of the children of asylum seekers, why is the system of direct provision still in place? If direct provision was originally envisioned as a more “humane” system for housing asylum seeker families, which articles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) does the system of direct provision uphold, and to what extent does it do so effectively? Which articles does direct provision fail to uphold? Although direct provision accommodation centers are overseen by the RIA, the Irish government contracts private companies to perform the day-to-day operations, while restricting asylum seekers and their children’s freedom of movement outside of the accommodation centers. In doing so, the government symbolically – and to some extent, literally – relieves itself of its responsibility of the care and integration of asylum seeker children into the Irish education system and mainstream society. This paper will assess the government’s rationale regarding “safety” and “humanitarian” concerns to answer the above questions, evaluate their justification for the continuation of direct provision, and articulate why the system of direct provision is violating the CRC, rather than upholding it.

Rationale for Direct Provision Housing: A “Humane” Alternative to Prison Detention

The system of direct provision is promoted by the Government of Ireland as a more “humane” housing alternative for asylum seekers, especially those with families, when compared to prison detention. Direct provision housing often takes the form of hostel-like arrangements clustered in enclosed areas, often located in rural parts of the country or otherwise outside of city centers. Because direct provision housing is not prison detention (another commonly used method of “housing” asylum seekers), it is also promoted by the government as supporting Article 37 of the CRC, which forbids the punishment of children in a cruel or harmful way in the context of prison detention. Additionally, Articles 9 and 37 of the CRC discuss a child’s right to live with their parent(s), thus, direct provision avoids the incarceration of children and/or the separation of the child from the incarcerated parent.

The government argues that asylum seeker children in direct provision housing are better protected from harm due to the Child Protection Policy implemented through RIA. A vetting process is conducted through RIA of all hires working in these housing centers. All hires are then trained by RIA to detect cases of child abuse, and are educated on reporting procedures in cases of abuse. Such protection would almost certainly be unavailable in prison. Thus, these child protection initiatives can be considered to be in-line with Article 22 of the CRC, which states that children have the right to special protection and help if they are refugees – broadly defined by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to

8 Ibid, 230.
9 Ibid, 228.
include asylum seekers – as well as all of the other rights listed in the CRC. It could also be argued that Article 34 is upheld by the government through RIA protection; RIA oversight can protect children from sexual exploitation they could potentially face in an environment without the presence of specially trained staff, including in prisons, where children risk rape and other forms of sexual abuse. The abuses that asylum seekers in general, not just children, face in mainstream Irish prisons have led migrant rights and other human rights groups to push the government for non-prison alternatives.

In addition to greater safety, direct provision housing was intended to provide asylum seekers with basic dietary and accommodation needs, thereby disobliging the State from providing supplementary welfare benefits. Thus, direct provision is touted by the government as the most cost-effective means of housing asylum seekers; housing systems are managed by private companies contracted by the government, and over €650 million has been paid by the state to these companies over the past decade. Despite criticisms of conditions in direct provision housing, Alan Shatter, Ireland’s Minister for Justice and Equality, argued that there was no cheaper alternative to the program. He also argued that operating a system that allowed asylum seekers to live independently and with social welfare support would cost the government double what is currently being paid under private contracts and the direct provision system.

**Violations on the Rights of the Child: Lack of Safety for Children in Direct Provision Housing**

There are approximately 8,083 asylum seekers comprising 96 different nationalities living in 59 accommodation centers in 22 counties in Ireland, and about 30% of those living in direct provision housing are 17 years of age or younger. Given these diverse national origins, ages, and corresponding accommodation preferences, the governments’ “one size fits all” direct provision housing policy neglects the unique needs of different asylum seekers, particularly those of children.

Direct provision is promoted by the government as accommodation on a full-board basis, in that it provides meals and utilities, while affording allowances at €19.10 per adult and €9.60 per child per week to help pay for child care items and other needs. Allowance rates, however, have not been adjusted to account for inflation in over fourteen years. Because asylum seekers assigned to the direct provision housing system are not allowed to work or seek alternative housing options while waiting for their claims to be processed, those living in direct provision centers must rely solely on the meager weekly allowances provided by the government. Even

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14 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
after taking these funds into account, the “incomes” allotted for asylum seeker families place them 20 percent below the poverty line.\textsuperscript{21} These small cash allowances also force trade-offs among items like non-prescription medicines, toiletries, diapers, and nutritious food for children.\textsuperscript{22} Notably, 92\% of asylum seekers living in direct provision housing believed it was necessary to buy extra food to supplement the meals provided by the housing staff; often, such meals did not meet the dietary needs of their children.\textsuperscript{23} Dr. Joan Giller, who provides medical care to asylum seekers housed in a direct provision site in Cork, elaborates on the interconnectivity of various problems facing asylum seekers and their children:

Not being able to work is devastating to people whose worth in the structure of their family system is based on their ability to provide; being forced to live as a family in one room is anathema to most families, for whom privacy is essential; not being able to cook for the family and having to exist on food that is often barely edible is torturous; living in poverty is degrading and demoralizing […]. waiting, often for many years, for a decision on your asylum application in a system that appears to dispense arbitrary justice is demoralizing.\textsuperscript{24}

The poor health of many asylum seeker children is largely due to the low cash allowances provided to their parents. Asylum seeker children are often found to be in extreme material deprivation, despite their parents’ best efforts to afford necessities like baby formula, diapers, clothes, and non-prescription medicines on meager weekly allowances.\textsuperscript{25} Malnutrition, in both parents and children, is common in direct provision centers due to household rationing. Despite being promoted by the government as a housing system that ensures the health and safety of asylum seeker children, it is clear that direct provision fails to meet its obligations with regards to children’s rights to adequate food. An excerpt from \textit{Beyond the Pale: Asylum-Seeking Children and Social Exclusion in Ireland} profiled a father who explained how “he and his wife had to ration the powdered milk for [their] babies to ensure that [they] did not run out and their other needs could be met […] He explained […] how he was compelled to ration bottle feeds to [his] twins.”\textsuperscript{26}

As Dr. Giller notes, along with material deprivation, direct provision produces social isolation. Accommodations are often located far from city centers, and asylum seekers

\begin{footnotes}
\item[22] Ibid, 209.
\end{footnotes}
consequently have limited contact with Irish citizens. If an asylum seeker’s application for refugee status is eventually granted, those years in isolation end up making integration into Irish society difficult. Liam Thornton writes:

The Irish reception system separates asylees from mainstream welfare provision. It denies an asylum seeker the right to be self-sufficient. The reception regime insists that the asylee reside in particular locations, away and apart from the host community. The asylum seeker is viewed as neither a citizen nor a warranted class of individual deserving of social rights on par with others in need. The development of a separated social welfare regime for asylum seekers was not inevitable. (Author emphasis)

I argue that such isolation is a violation of Article 6 of the CRC, which pertains to the healthy development of children. Brian Fanning and Angela Veale argue that children experience non-material poverty when they lack the resources to participate in activities with other children. They contend that children should possess an equitable standard of living conditions and amenities that are “customary, or at least widely encouraged” for children in the societies in which they live. Therefore, because it is customary for children in Irish society – native Irish or not – to experience regular, healthy social interactions, the isolation of asylum seeker children in direct provision housing directly contributes to the social exclusion that negatively impacts their well-being and development.

The rural locations of most direct provision accommodation, coupled with a lack of transportation infrastructure, make it difficult for asylum seeker children to utilize resources like schools, parks, and playgrounds, and thus gain the interaction with Irish children that comes with those settings. Due to the systemic poverty caused by direct provision, asylum seekers find it difficult to enable their children to continue their education, as schools are often inaccessible if they lack access to a car or money to afford public transportation. I argue that these barriers to schooling are a violation of Article 28 of the CRC, which articulates children’s rights to primary education. Additionally, the lack of suitable play areas, childcare facilities, and other resources in direct provision centers, as well as the lack of freedom to associate with children outside of the housing accommodation, are arguably in violation of Article 31 of the CRC which

31 Ibid, 243.
details children’s rights to “leisure, play, and culture” and the right to join in a wide range of “cultural, artistic, and other recreational activities”.34,35

The overcrowded living quarters in direct provision housing constitute a violation of Article 16 of the CRC, which articulates children’s right to privacy. Shared accommodation proves to be a concern; due to limited space, some asylum seekers and their families are required to share one bedroom or one hostel-like room with other families (non-relatives). One asylum seeker noted: “Living with different people you have to be very careful…we have different cultures, we have different ways of living.”36 The lack of privacy in these accommodations can be stressful and dehumanizing. Furthermore, there are concerns about mixed-sex accommodation among non-family members, as well as the safety of unaccompanied teenage children living in direct provision housing.37 Such accommodation styles and close quarters make children vulnerable to verbal, physical, or sexual abuse by others, undermining the “protection” that they supposedly receive under the RIA’s Child Protection Policy.38

Relieving Responsibility: Direct Provision as Social Exclusion

Although direct provision is a relatively recent policy creation by the Irish government, anti-refugee and anti-asylum seeker sentiment has historical roots, and was evident long before the introduction of direct provision. In the early 1900s, Fr. John Creagh stated that “[Jewish refugees] were leeches that sucked the lifeblood of the Irish nation.”39 In 1997, the arrival of a few thousand asylum seekers was reported as a “national crisis,” as news headlines proclaiming that Ireland was being “flooded, swamped or invaded by an influx of asylum seekers” tapped into visceral fears of migrants.40

There are policy-level consequences for the “otherization” of asylum seekers, in this case, via their isolation in poorly maintained direct provision housing sites. Challenging racism against asylum seekers in Ireland is best achieved through integration, not segregation. Article 2 of the CRC obliges state parties to address the needs of all children within their jurisdiction, not just children who are citizens.41 Unfortunately, the direct provision system effectively segregates asylum seeker children from the general Irish population, and this segregation has negative impacts on upholding children’s rights under the CRC. Although the Irish government notes that asylum seeker children are permitted to attend primary school, their isolation and restricted movement in and out of their housing sites amount to a passive denial of these

38 Ibid.
40 Ibid, 364.
children’s right to an education. In December 2007, approximately 30% of asylum seekers living in direct provision centers in Ireland were under 12 years of age. Thus, around 1,964 young children had limited access (if any access) to schools, play areas, and social interactions outside of their housing sites. Access to education – particularly English language training – is an important avenue through which children can become integrated into Irish society, a factor which becomes more crucial if they are eventually granted refugee status in the country.

Lack of access to education and healthy social interactions outside of the housing sites – despite Ireland’s commitment to the CRC – results in the inferior position of asylum seeker children relative to Irish children. Asylum seeker children are dehumanized and designated as “the other,” and the State absolves itself of its responsibility for their care by hiring for-profit private businesses to run the day-to-day operations of direct provision housing centers. These private contractors do not have the expertise to respond to asylum seeker children’s unique needs. Moreover, some parents have described their children as becoming psychologically withdrawn due to living in close quarters with non-parental adults, experiencing severe poverty, and having inadequate nutrition. In addition to the human costs associated with direct provision centers, it is costly and logistically difficult for the government to employ medical specialists and caregivers for children, especially since these centers are often located in rural areas. The ability for asylum seeker children to exercise personal autonomy in the forms of play, social interaction, and education is undermined through the restrictive nature of direct provision housing. The deprivation of education, health care, privacy and other rights belonging to children signal a failure by the Irish government to meet its responsibilities under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the CRC.

Assessment of the Government’s Position in Light of Criticisms of Direct Provision:

If the right to adequate housing consisted only of as having a roof over one’s head, then direct provision housing would meet the basic needs of Ireland’s asylum seeker children. However, international standards emanating from the CRC require a more holistic understanding of “appropriate” housing, while illustrating that Ireland’s current approach to meeting asylum seeker children’s rights to adequate housing, food, education, and healthcare is severely lacking. Although direct provision housing is safer than prison detention, the inhumane conditions that asylum seekers and their children are kept in warrant a reassessment of the government’s policy. Direct provision housing is arguably a “modified prison,” since children are limited in their movement within the housing confines and in their movement outside of the

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accommodation center. The social and educational development of these children is also being hindered by their lack of access to affordable preschool education, language classes, and afterschool clubs and activities that Irish children normally have available to them.47

Asylum seeker children are kept with their parents (per Article 9) and not in prison detention (per Article 37) through direct provision housing, and I grant this as a positive step towards finding alternatives to the inhumane practice of prison detention. In some cases, direct provision housing may provide a greater sense of safety and security, especially if asylum seekers and their children are not being housed in mainstream Irish prisons with convicted criminals. Unfortunately, the overcrowded housing and lack of privacy that often come with direct provision accommodations present numerous other problems. Alastair Christie writes:

Conditions in [direct provision housing present] a range of day-to-day tensions and pressures that affect the psychological well-being of parents and children. The lack of privacy [makes] family life extremely difficult and the chronic overcrowding posed health and safety risks to parents and children. For example, dangerous items such as kettles and utensils could not be left out of the reach of children due to the lack of space and facilities.48

Lack of privacy would undoubtedly strain children’s relationship with their parents, while making them vulnerable to physical or sexual abuse from relatives, non-relatives, or other asylum seeker adults living in the same housing accommodation, a violation of Article 34. I argue that the use of direct provision housing over prison detention allows the government to portray itself as being in compliance with the Refugee Convention and the CRC. The subversion of dialogue regarding the injustice of asylum seeker detention is managed by pointing to the more “humane” option of direct provision, and by promoting the narrative that all “good,” “non-threatening” asylum seekers are not being housed in prisons. Apart from being false (there are cases of asylum seeker families being housed in mainstream Irish prisons), touting direct provision as an alternative to prison detention excuses the poor quality of these housing sites and the damage that it does to asylum seeker children’s health and development.

Asylum seeker children face many barriers when trying to participate in Irish society, and children living in direct provision housing face social exclusion. However, concepts like “social participation” and “social exclusion” should not be assessed as a zero-sum equation; the ability of children to achieve some level of enrichment through social interaction with other children at a direct provision housing site is still helpful. . For example, in his case study on a direct provision housing center in Glengarry, Allen White finds that although asylum seeker children were isolated from the Irish community, they developed strong relationships with other children within the accommodation center. Viewing Glengarry and other accommodation centers simply as a space where children live disconnected lives separate from their local communities neglects ways in which “the spaces, routines, and daily interactions in Glengarry offered the children tangible opportunities for developing and cultivating important and significant peer

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48 Ibid, 228.
friendships.” Despite this more “nuanced” understanding of asylum seeker children’s lives in direct provision centers, their physical segregation and accompanying passive denial of their rights to education, proper food, and recreation illustrate that they are not afforded complete human rights. Consequently, the positive integration of these children is never fully realized.

This raises questions about Justice Minister Shatter’s argument that the low cost of direct provision housing makes it the only feasible option for the Irish government. If asylum seekers held in these housing accommodations are eventually granted asylum, then the long-term cost of integrating this population will be high. For example, if asylum seeker children are kept segregated from the mainstream Irish population for four to six years while receiving little to no schooling, it will be much more difficult for them to acquire necessary English language skills, excel in school (if they go back at all), and socially and culturally integrate into Irish society. Lack of educational opportunities will also lead to fewer employment opportunities in the future, further decreasing the avenues for asylum seeker children to advance economically. Thus, the systemic poverty caused by direct provision housing will continue to impact an asylum seeker child well into his or her adulthood.

Conclusion

With the damaging effects of direct provision housing in mind, it is difficult to see how Ireland is upholding Article 22 of the CRC regarding special protection to refugee children as well as other rights that children possess, according to the CRC. The government’s fears of asylum seeker abscondence during claims processing are rational, and it may be politically and logistically difficult to end the long-standing system of direct provision yet, the small number of social workers and health care providers assigned to work with asylum seeker children ensures that Ireland continues to fail in its commitment to these children per the Refugee Convention and the CRC. Although repeatedly touted as a humane alternative to prison detention, direct provision housing has contributed to the poor physical and mental health of many asylum seeker children. Direct provision has also been used politically to subvert public criticism over Ireland’s practice of detaining asylum seekers in prisons, while perpetuating a host of new problems for children held in this type of housing accommodation.

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U.S. Intelligence and the First Soviet Nuclear Weapon Test: What Elements Contributed to the U.S. Intelligence Failure? 
by Felipe Umaña

INTRODUCTION

The secret detonation of the first Soviet atomic weapon on August 29, 1949 caught the U.S. off-guard largely as a result of a number of collection and analytical issues faced by its intelligence apparatus. This U.S. intelligence failure rested primarily on a number of inexact intelligence estimates, which likely stemmed from problems related to intelligence collection, issues with the analytical mindset, and intelligence community-wide structural or organizational issues. The goal of this paper is to examine the issues that contributed the U.S.’s intelligence failure, focusing on why the U.S. was unable to adequately predict a Soviet nuclear test timeline based on estimations on nuclear capabilities and overall intentions. This assessment will draw primarily from historical and declassified analytical sources exploring the development of the Soviet atomic weapon program and U.S. intelligence on the subject. Particular attention is paid to estimates from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE).

Firstly, this paper will briefly explain the historical context right up to the first Soviet nuclear bomb detonation in 1949, as well as discuss the U.S.’s surprise discovery of the secret test. Then, the paper will evaluate the reasons for why the U.S. intelligence apparatus failed to accurately assess the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapon capabilities and foresee the nuclear test in August 1949. Lastly, after analysis of the contributing factors for the U.S. intelligence failure, the paper will conclude with an analytical overview of the evaluated elements.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Political relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Second World War were salutarily preserved despite their differing politico-economic ideologies, distinct long-term strategic goals, and mutual distrust, mostly due to the common threat of a bellicose Nazi Germany. Yet, the convenient wartime collaboration was primarily just that over the years. For many American political elites, opinions on the Soviet leadership gradually changed as the war went on, and many began viewing the USSR as a country beleaguered by the challenges posed by fascism and communism. Both were pitted more directly after the conclusion of the war – specifically as the groundwork for a new international system was being laid out by the Allied victors – as both nations, evaluating their burgeoning power, positioned themselves as the promulgators of the two most predominant and competing ideologies in the newly crafted bipolar world.

The U.S. began its pursuit of a nuclear research and development program in 1939, but fully galvanized in 1942 with the support of the United Kingdom and Canada. Termed the “Manhattan District,” and later, the “Manhattan Project,” the secret program grew to employ over

1 At the time this article was written, the author was a student at Columbia University’s School of International & Public Affairs.

130,000 people at over 30 sites in the three aforementioned countries.³ Capitalizing on the war in Europe, the U.S. sent spies to collect intelligence on the German nuclear energy program and continued to bolster its research and development. By July 16, 1945, the U.S. tested the world’s first atomic device, and less than a month later, the U.S. dropped two bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively – the only offensive use of nuclear weapons to date.

The U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons on Japan dramatically altered Josef Stalin’s position on his country’s then small-scale nuclear ambitions and convinced the USSR to fully pursue its own weapons program. Indeed, Stalin demanded that an atomic weapon be developed to restore the balance of power that, in his mind, had been destroyed when the U.S. revealed its newfound nuclear capabilities.⁴ Though the USSR was indubitably powerful and had the resources to execute its nuclear program, the successful development and test of the Soviets’ first atomic weapon – nicknamed “Joe-1” by the Americans in reference to Stalin – would probably not have occurred as early as it did if not for the USSR’s robust spy network and the role of German scientists.

After a few years of development, Joe-1 was successfully detonated on the morning of August 29, 1949, much to the surprise of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) and political and military elite who learned of the fact a day later. In fact, the U.S. only came to discover the detonation after a Boeing B-29 Superfortress aircraft, outfitted with special filters and operated by the U.S. Air Force Weather Service, returned from a routine flight over the Bering Sea and was discovered to have picked up traces of radiological debris.⁵ In his headline-making speech on September 23, 1949, nearly a month after the Soviet nuclear bomb test, President Harry S. Truman revealed to the American people that the USSR had secretly tested an atomic weapon a few weeks prior, making no mention of how the U.S. detected the test, and, most relevantly to this paper, the fact that the test was a surprise to U.S. intelligence.⁶

Despite its infancy, the U.S. intelligence apparatus by the 1940s had become one of the world’s most potent intelligence structures, yet the Soviet test clearly invalidated previously established intelligence estimates and common beliefs. This paper will focus on the reasons for the U.S. IC’s failure to accurately assess the Soviet Union’s nuclear progress and capabilities, as well as its inability to correctly predict the Soviets’ eventual development and detonation of its first atomic weapon.

REASONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE FAILURE

First and most broadly, the U.S. had difficulties collecting information on Soviet activities, which led to impaired judgments arising from intelligence gaps. Inadequate penetration of the Soviet Union by U.S. intelligence-gathering disciplines was a main contributor to a lack of direct


intelligence, and this was likely due to the formidable defenses of the Soviet Union after the closure of the Second World War and during its posturing against the U.S. The few known nuclear facilities within the USSR were managed directly by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and tended to be isolated, as some were wholly surrounded by barbed wire fences and guards that patrolled 100-square-mile stretches of land.\(^7\) Even if penetration by a human agent were conceivable, it would have been nearly impossible to infiltrate facilities or covertly interrogate scientists. Signals intelligence was equally as difficult, seeing as few opportunities availed themselves for American phone taps to eavesdrop on conversations between key people in the Soviet Union, let alone listen in on critical actors in its dauntingly defended nuclear program.\(^8\) Overall, it is evident that the U.S.’s inability to directly infiltrate Soviet borders for intelligence collection put it at a disadvantage, especially when compared to the success of Soviet intelligence penetration.

Yet, the U.S. was not completely bereft of critical information important for intelligence analyses on the Soviet nuclear capabilities, though it is possible that the information was not analyzed or linked effectively and readily appreciated to satisfy intelligence gaps. It is therefore unclear how much the U.S. incorporated intelligence coming from or regarding European, primarily German, scientists. For instance, it was common knowledge that the Soviet Union was intent on exploiting German scientific expertise during and after the war. Austrian physicist Lise Meitner, for example, in conversation with a Strategic Services Unit (SSU)\(^9\) agent, intimated that her colleague Gustav Hertz, a Nobel prize-winning physicist, “most likely went to Moscow against his desires.”\(^10\) An SSU agent in East Germany, moreover, caught wind of the locations for German scientists within the USSR: some in the city of Elektrostal just east of Moscow and others in Anaklia and Poti on the eastern shore of the Black Sea.\(^11\) Furthermore, a chemical engineer from Bitterfeld, Germany readily reported to American sources that the plant he worked at was producing substantial amounts of distilled metallic calcium, which was later shipped to the Soviet Union. Though other engineers were interrogated and the purpose for calcium was determined through persistence, it is possible that more information could have been acquired from sources in Bitterfeld. Donald P. Steury from the CIA History Staff writes:

“In retrospect, it seems incredible that [the] ORE…paid so little attention to information …coming out of Bitterfeld. The reporting was timely, detailed, and derived from a source with excellent access that was undeniably compatible with the kind of data he was providing.”\(^12\)

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\(^7\) Richelson, Jeffrey, *Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea* (New York: Norton, 2006), 66.

\(^8\) Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb*, 77.

\(^9\) The Strategic Services Unit was an American intelligence agency and predecessor to the National Clandestine Service.

\(^10\) Richelson, *Spying on the Bomb*, 69.

\(^11\) Ibid., 69-70.

Additionally, Adolf Krebs, a German-born British physicist, was a particularly important source that revealed to American intelligence that he had traveled to Moscow for a job interview with the Soviets in 1946. After changing his mind and returning to the West, he was able to report on the activities of several important German scientists, including Hertz’s work on isotope separation in Sukhumi (approximately 80 miles north of Anaklia); the location of physicist-chemist Manfred von Ardenne’s institute near Hertz’s; cyclotron expert Max Vollmer’s heavy-water production projects (a Soviet development unknown to U.S. intelligence at the time); and Nikolaus Riehl’s progress on uranium metal production. Concerning Soviet access to uranium, Krebs also disclosed that a certain “Dr. Patzschke” – the former director of the Joachimsthal mines in Czechoslovakia – was prospecting for uranium ore in Tashkent, modern-day Uzbekistan.

But even prior to Krebs’ tapping, the U.S. had knowledge of German scientists’ assistance in the Soviet atomic bomb project. For instance, as early as June 1945 the U.S. had knowledge of Riehl’s departure to the USSR. Later that year, U.S. intelligence had discovered, often through intercepted letters, that Hertz, physical chemist Adolf Thiessen, Vollmer, von Ardenne, radiation biophysicist Hans Born, and at least 18 other respected German scientists were under Soviet direction, as corroborated by Krebs. This information could serve to illustrate the serious ambitions behind the Soviet’s nuclear development program. Likewise, though this information seldom offered details about broader Soviet capabilities and actual progress, it could have indicated the level of scale and scope of the Soviet research effort and the magnitude at which German scientific expertise helped jump-start Moscow’s nuclear program. Ultimately, it is not entirely clear if American intelligence readily appreciated the significance of German scientific expertise in Soviet nuclear development or intelligence from multiple sources in Europe.

However, a general reliance on weak direct intelligence certainly impaired estimations, which progressively began to overlap and include caveats relating to the foundations of the analyses. Uncertainty in intelligence reports abounded, and intelligence bodies like the CIA and its own ORE, began to heavily caveat their judgments on a possible Soviet test date with loose guesses and ambiguous language. For example, a 1946 ORE report stated that:

“All [attempt to estimate Soviet production capacity over the next 10 years] is at best educated guesswork. An estimate of capabilities [ten] years hence obviously cannot be based on evidence, but only on a projection from known facts in the light of past experience and reasonable conjecture.”

In the same report, a guess for a test date between 1950 and 1953 was suggested. Additional reports were no more certain, and many intelligence agencies and actors arrived at distinct ranges or approximations for a Soviet nuclear bomb detonation. That same year, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), while noting that “[its] real information…[was] relatively meager,” also assessed that the Soviet Union would first test an atomic weapon sometime in the aforementioned time range. A few months later, the Air Staff (then still part of the U.S. Army) predicted a Soviet test

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towards the end of 1949. In 1947, intelligence chiefs at the U.S. Army and Navy concluded that it was likely that the Soviets could possibly have the bomb by 1950 and would “most probably” have one in 1952.\textsuperscript{17} The assistant chief of the Air Staff for intelligence expanded this prior timeline by one year earlier that same year, extending the date as falling somewhere between 1949 and 1952.

Over the winter of 1947-1948, analysts grew more confident in their timeline assessments, but were not any more exact or correct. In 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Intelligence Committee agreed upon mid-1950 as the earliest possible date, and in July of that year, the CIA’s \textit{Estimate of the Status of the Russian Atomic Energy Project} settled on a probable date of mid-1953 and set a feasible test date projection for the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{18} This CIA estimate, however, acknowledged the difficulty in forecasting by indirectly alluding to the general lack of intelligence on the subject.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, in March 1949 – about five months before the Joe-1 test – the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee timeline estimate mirrored the CIA’s report time range – that of a possible mid-1950s date and a more probable date of mid-1953.\textsuperscript{20} The ORE revisited its calculations several times in light of the other evaluations, but it never departed from its original ranges. Embodying the mood at the time of analysis where gaps of information existed, the ORE report concluded with: “...[I]t is doubtful that the Russians can produce a bomb before 1953 and almost certain they cannot produce one before 1951. [Nevertheless,] a probable date cannot be estimated.”\textsuperscript{21} This same projection last appeared in a CIA report disseminated on August 24, 1949 – \textit{just five days before the actual nuclear test}.

Also occasionally plaguing the U.S. IC at the time was contradicting intelligence, which hampered the analytical process and befuddled information known about the Soviet nuclear program. In January 1946, the SSU was in contact with a source that had recently provided intelligence on a uranium mine in Joachimsthal, which was the subject of a secret “Czech-Russian Treaty.” The source said the treaty stipulated that Czechoslovakia was to extract uranium ore for Soviet use.\textsuperscript{23} However, by March 5, 1946, information conveyed presumably by another “trusted source” contradicted this information, casting heavy doubt on the quality of the uranium mining machinery in Joachimsthal and putting into question the actual number and size of the railway cars used to ship materials to the USSR. In fact, this source had not observed any activity that would indicate the restarting of the mine, maintaining that the mining area was not being served by Russians and that the mine itself was idle.\textsuperscript{24} Such contradictions are likely to have delayed the

\textsuperscript{17} The U.S. Army and Navy intelligence chiefs firmly believed that the Russians “could not have atomic weapons” at the time of the assessment, a belief not unheard of at the time.

\textsuperscript{18} Richelson, \textit{Spying on the Bomb}, 76.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 77.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{23} Richelson, \textit{Spying on the Bomb}, 69.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 70.
analytical process and may have even steered some analysts to discard related information from either intelligence thread. Additionally, contradictions like these may convince analysts to distrust intelligence more than they should, in order to compensate for potentially flawed information. As evidenced by the overlapping and occasionally contradicting analysis when data was available, it is possible that analysts had trouble sifting through information to establish a precise level of Soviet nuclear capability and possible test date. For many people following the issue closely, these estimations may have appeared to essentially be unsupported guesses. Atomic Energy Commission chairman David Lilienthal, for instance, commented on this: “In my opinion our sources of information about Russian progress are so poor as to be merely arbitrary assumptions.”

Next, some analysts likely relied on erroneous assumptions on the Soviet Union’s nuclear program, exacerbating the U.S.’s intelligence lag on the issue and leaving many of the analyses vulnerable to analytical biases and errors. The structuring of the ORE’s estimates on the USSR, for example, left reports susceptible to unsupported assumptions and errors in analysis. It has been noted that three elements defined many of the ORE’s estimates on the Soviet nuclear program. The first two were the evidentiary base from which the ORE defined its image of the Soviet nuclear weapons program: estimates on existing Soviet scientific and technical capabilities and the known past performance of Soviet scientists or any Soviet-controlled proxies, such as captured German scientists. The third element – the incorporation of the U.S.’s own “past experiences” and capabilities – was also taken into account as a framework measure that shaped the image organized by the first two foundations. This outline, however, proved inadequate, as what was known about the Soviet program had to be “tugged and stretched” to fit this constructed mold. Though helpful for scientific and technical measures, the variable of U.S. experience did not ultimately help analysts derive more precise timelines for the USSR’s nuclear development, and indeed, failed to consider whatever benefits the Soviets acquired from information made public after the war, spying, and other means. Lastly, this latter element erred on the side of mirror imaging, which presumed that Soviet capabilities could be directly compared to what was imagined to be a “superior” American program. By doing so, differences in nuclear weapon development, planning and designs, and other factors that could vary between both programs were ignored.

It was also erroneously assumed that the USSR did not have adequate access to uranium ore or capabilities in extracting and refining it for consumption. In fact, the mistakenly perceived lack of access to uranium was seen by American intelligence as a principal handicap for Moscow’s atomic energy program. This belief likely came about for a number of reasons. First, in 1944 the Americans and the British jointly organized the Anglo-American Combined Development Trust to keep high-grade ore from Soviet acquisition. Feelings of superiority abounded between both allies, and confidence in the success of this plan was very high. Secondly, geological and topographical analyses conducted by the U.S. determined that the Soviet Union did not have direct

25 Ibid., 93.
access to high-grade uranium ore, and had to make due with uranium ore with low content at 1-2% (high-grade uranium is defined as 50% or higher). The U.S. assumed this put the Soviets at a considerable disadvantage. 29 Lastly, comprehensive trade restrictions on uranium production equipment and related paraphernalia were put in place in 1946 under the backing of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). U.S. intelligence was thusly convinced that these COCOM controls would successfully isolate the Soviet Union, and in tandem with the previous two factors, furthermore, stagnate the Soviets’ nuclear development. The American IC was so convinced that Soviet uranium extraction would be lower because of these three reasons that it negated any advantage won by the recruitment or capture of German scientists or even any possible successful espionage on the Manhattan Project. This opinion was shared by the British Joint Intelligence Committee, which further strengthened the U.S’s view.30

This, nevertheless, was a dangerously specious assumption. Against the odds perceived by U.S. intelligence, the Soviet Union was indeed importing uranium and other related elements at even greater amounts than analysts thought probable. In 1946, British intelligence discovered that one ten-ton freight car carrying uranium ore was transported from Joachimsthal to Elektrostal every ten days. Furthermore, calcium was also moved in large amounts from a mine in Bitterfeld to the Soviet Union, where, by 1947, approximately 30 tons of calcium were being shipped to the Soviet Union per month; this was discovered at a time when American extraction hovered between three to five tons per year.31 By 1948, American and British intelligence efforts in Europe gradually collected information indicating that the Soviets were actually extracting five to eight times as much uranium than Britain had originally speculated, and between four to six times as much as British experts imagined possible, based on prior assumptions of Soviet capabilities and access.32 This new evidence, thusly, implied that prior estimates were too low and that the postulations had been imprecise.

Despite evidence contrary to their beliefs, intelligence analysts also stuck firmly to their assumptions and preconceptions. This led to stubborn estimates and predictions on Soviet nuclear bomb capabilities. Citing discussions with “geological consultants, literature studies, and new information from the field,” a CIA memorandum written for the president as late as 1948 concluded that the Soviets did indeed have greater uranium reserves than previously noted.33 ORE test date estimates, nonetheless, were not reappraised six months later as it was believed they did


32 Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 74-75.

not need a reevaluation.\textsuperscript{34} In a similar vein, many analysts discounted the contribution of German scientists to the Soviet atomic bomb program, saying that their “low level of effort” should be assessed as “extremely limited.”\textsuperscript{35,36} These instances are facets of mental anchoring in intelligence, where analysts firmly attach themselves to a certain idea or outcome, and allow it to influence analysis.\textsuperscript{37} Relatedly, the previously discussed high levels of confidence in U.S. intelligence efforts, COCOM export controls, and belief in the apparent lack of uranium ore access may have also led many analysts at the ORE to conclude that that the Soviets had, at best, a minor pilot reactor set up by 1947 – a feat that the U.S. had accomplished by December 1942. Once again erroneously extrapolating from the U.S. experience, ORE analysts assured those concerned that a Soviet bomb was farther away in the future than in reality.\textsuperscript{38} For analysts, the mood at the time was likely one replete with unease, which was abated only by an unfounded and dangerous level of optimism in the IC’s own analyses. This firmness and over-confidence in judgments, therefore, may have arisen due to analyst arrogance stemming from an adherence to patriotic sentiments. Many estimates were predicated on the USSR’s perceived inferior engineering and technical expertise, for example, when compared to the U.S.’s, and it is possible that analysts may have given evaluations on Soviet capabilities more wiggle room to “accommodate” for this imagined inferiority.\textsuperscript{39}

Likewise, analytical issues involving layering may have played a considerable role in the U.S. IC’s failure to establish a more accurate date for the Soviet Union’s first nuclear test. In several occasions, intelligence analysts relied on the layering technique, which built on past judgments on Soviet nuclear capabilities without carrying uncertainties and ambiguities into later assessments. This was problematic as earlier judgments were based on erroneous assumptions, outdated information, and suspect or insufficient collection sources, which convinced analysts to disregard information that contradicted their assessments. The reliance on pre-war figures to evaluate Soviet capabilities after 1945 on a number of estimates illustrate this foundational problems with layering and demonstrate how the accumulation of assumption layers can lead to inaccurate conclusions about future data. Of course, this is not to say that previous examples on analytical assumptions have no place in intelligence analysis. Analysts, as Mark M. Lowenthal states, “are allowed – and are expected – to make assumptions,” but to use them as factual bases from which to form further assumptions is poor tradecraft and an example of layering.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{34} CIA Memorandum for the President, “Estimate of the Status of the Russian Atomic Energy Project.”
\textsuperscript{35} Cochran, \textit{Making the Russian Bomb}, 16.
\textsuperscript{36} Yuli B. Kharitan, the chief designer of Joe-1, stated publicly that the German physicists involved in the development of the nuclear weapon were not directly involved in the design and actual development and that their work was “subsidiary.” Please see: Khariton, Yuli and Yuri Smirnov, “The Khariton Versuib,” \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS)}, May 1993, 24.
\textsuperscript{39} Richelson, \textit{Spying on the Bomb}, 76.
\textsuperscript{40} Lowenthal, Mark M., \textit{Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy}. Los Angeles: SAGE/CQ, 2012, 130.
Similarly, over time, many intelligence estimates likely lost credibility up the intelligence food chain due to their variability across agencies and actors, as many reports and estimates differed in time ranges, capabilities, and a projected year for a Soviet nuclear test. Some reports may have been ignored, while others were subject to harsh criticisms; Lieutenant Colonel Edgar P. Dean, a Manhattan Project liaison in London, for example, once described SSU estimates as being “ignorant[t] of facts and only conjecture.” Moreover, complacency in the absence of a steady flow of information and efforts to “soften the blow” of shifts in data may have also played a part in the U.S. intelligence failure. Nobel Prize-winning physicist Isaac Rabi, for instance, discussed how estimates started to slip and a mood of complacency emerged after end of the Second World War; after analysts made an estimate in 1945 that the Soviet Union could get a bomb in five years, he said that “every year that went by you kept on saying five years.” Though unlikely to have been as strong as other contributing elements, it is possible that certain levels of complacency may have set in at varying levels of the intelligence process, such as amongst analysts, or arguably more dangerously, at more senior levels. Additionally, intelligence estimates were particularly susceptible to shifts in conclusions, especially those written on a recurring basis, like the ORE’s in the late 1940s. In the absence of adequate information, it is possible that any new intelligence developments led to a moderate shift of data so as to not invalidate past estimates, not confuse or shock intelligence consumers, and in order to allow analysts to introduce new information whose reliability had not entirely been verified but appeared to be plausible and workable.

Next, the inexperience of some of the U.S. intelligence analysts may have contributed to Washington’s incomplete picture of the Soviet atomic weapon program. This lack of analytical familiarity may have resulted in missed connections between intelligence points, key to the analysis of intelligence from different collection means and sources. Many of the analysts recruited from other entities were nuclear physicists and engineers by trade, and were primarily accustomed to working with hard data. This may have created analytical problems with the “softer” information garnered from most sources. On September 29, 1949 – exactly a month after the detonation of Joe-1 – Willard Machle, assistant director for scientific intelligence at the CIA lamented to CIA Director Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter about the near “total failure of conventional intelligence in estimating the Soviet development of an atomic bomb.” In conversation, Machle pointed out that the inexperienced analysts had grounded their estimates on the USSR’s uranium supplies on pre-war data. Machle blamed a lack of strong analysis, and not a lack of intelligence collection, as the source of this intelligence failure. Fueling this issue further was a lack of coordination and organization. The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Committee, summoned to investigate the ORE in early 1949, in fact, indicted the organization for a “lack of coordination” in its scientific intelligence

41 Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 70.


43 Steury, "How the CIA Missed Stalin's Bomb: Dissecting Soviet Analysis, 1946-50."

One final consideration for the failure of U.S. intelligence concerning the Joe-1 test in 1949 may have been that intelligence analysts, such as those from the ORE, were balancing multiple current event issues in tandem with synthesizing estimates on the Soviet nuclear program. Records show that the organization was preoccupied with analyzing other pressing issues like Soviet national political intentions writ large, evaluating political events unfolding throughout Europe – including the escalation of the Berlin blockade and possible communist electoral victories in Hungary and Italy, among other examples – and critical U.S. commitments in the Pacific, both during and after the war. Interestingly, according to Steury, not a single ORE report out of the approximately 80 estimates written between 1946 and 1949 is wholly dedicated to the subject of the Soviet nuclear issue, supporting this notion. Steury further notes that the ORE’s “single, coordinated judgment” on the nuclear question disseminated on October 31, 1946 was “part of a larger estimate” on Moscow’s weapons programs over all, and not specific to a prediction of a test date on nuclear capabilities. It is possible that attention to other topics may have compromised more nuanced and sophisticated analytic penetration on this issue, though this is often the fact of the matter in the intelligence process.

CONCLUSION

This paper sought to assess the several factors that likely contributed to the U.S.’s failure to correctly estimate Soviet progress in its nuclear weapon program and predict a timeline and test date for the Joe-1 atomic weapon. Though the paucity of information leading to critical intelligence gaps is probably the most obvious and important element behind this intelligence failure, the other possible considerations – namely the overlapping estimates and other contradictory information; erroneous assumptions and analytical biases and errors, notably firmness and over-confidence in mistaken assumptions, layering, issues with credibility, complacency, and issues that arise when “softening the blow” of data shifts; the inexperience of many analysts; and the fact that U.S. intelligence was balancing the nuclear issue with other priorities – must not be overlooked, and indeed help, in part, to explain why the U.S. IC was caught off-guard by the Soviet test.

As mentioned before, the absence of adequate intelligence is probably the most critical culprit in explaining why the Soviet test came as a total surprise to the U.S. Though the U.S.’s growing intelligence apparatus had key sources throughout Europe, it was largely unable to penetrate the Soviet Union’s borders, which put its HUMINT and SIGINT capabilities at a strong disadvantage. Moreover, this lack of direct intelligence supply lines originating from the Soviet Union created intelligence gaps that appear to not always have been effectively satisfied by information from sources elsewhere. This, in turn, led to impaired estimations that reluctantly warned about the reliability of their judgments. The visibility and awareness of these intelligence gaps may have, furthermore, put analysts in a delicate position, particularly with how to process the role of primarily German scientists in the Soviet nuclear program and intelligence coming from “reliable” sources from Europe. In some cases, it can be argued that this information was not readily appreciated, though it is ultimately unclear how American analysts reappraised their

45 Memorandum, Machle to Hillenkoetter, 905.

estimates to accommodate these facts. In cases like the ORE’s, it is clear that no reevaluations were done.

Next, it is likely that from these clear and visible intelligence gaps arose a number of analytical problems, like the overlapping and contradicting of intelligence judgments, and errors in analysis. Likely conditioned to think twice when presented with new information – as adequate intelligence was rare and difficult to retrieve – many analysts and other intelligence actors possibly became susceptible to errors in judgment. Erroneous assumptions were created to fill intelligence gaps, and many became too attached to certain assumptions or were “afflicted” with hubris and further relied on erroneous postulations. Still, other analysts continued to build from incorrect assumptions (layering); struggled with issues of credibility – mostly due to the variety of estimates from different actors in the mid-to-late 1940s; and became complacent or relied on “softening” possible shifts in assessments in order to compensate for a lack of intelligence. Lastly, the inexperience of newly recruited analysts and the fact that the U.S. IC had to balance other important priorities simultaneously with the nuclear bomb program, may help explain some of the overall structural and organizational issues that support the erroneous assumptions and errors in analysis mentioned before.

Ultimately, it is most likely that all of the elements contributed to the U.S.’s intelligence failure. It is easy to lay blame on these factors in hindsight, yet research and analysis for this paper has shown that the intelligence failure in the late 1940s arose likely as a direct result of the IC’s inability to collect reliable intelligence to satisfy gaps in intelligence and address some of its analytical and structural or organizational faults.

Despite the surprisingly vast amount of literature on the topic, many of the assessments carried out by the U.S. IC remain classified, and in fact, many key documents may have been taken up by the reclassification efforts of the National Archive between 1999 and 2006.47 As William Burr notes for the National Security Archives, it is still not possible to create a complete picture of what occurred during the late 1940s, and it may take time before scholars and analysts gain access to this information to build a more thorough historical account. However, it is fair to say that the factors assessed above very likely contributed to one of the U.S.’s least understood intelligence failures.

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47 Burr, "U.S. Intelligence and the Detection of the First Soviet Nuclear Test, September 1949."
Interviews

The US Army: Past, Present, and Future
An Interview with General (Retired) David Petraeus
(West Point, New York, April 23, 2014)

JoSH: How do you see the Army and the Armed Forces in general, being shaped in the years to come? What kind of challenges do you see on the horizon, and do you think that the United States is adequately preparing to handle them?

DP: (laughing) Oh that’s an easy one, thanks for starting me off with an easy one. I mean the shaping of the army will be a result of the interplay of a variety of factors. Certainly there will be the national security strategy, the defense strategy, the national military strategy that will again be the foundation for this. But of course we have seen that the budgetary realities intrude on this as well, and sequestration is the ultimate budget intrusion, and frankly an idea that was designed to be so terrible that it would not be implemented and yet it was. So the impact of that can be very disruptive and that potential is still there, although it has been reduced for this year, that it is still there for this year and the years to come.

Informing the strategy itself and also decisions on the employment of our forces, I think understandably will be our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how costly, how challenging, how frustrating endeavors like that can be. We do this while still recognizing that there are still cases which forces need to be committed, and that we will still need to train, equip and prepare our forces for the full spectrum of operations. I think that will be certainly one of the foremost challenges for individuals like you who will be leading elements that will likely have to prepare for a wide range of contingencies. In all likelihood we will have, as we’ve always had, less than complete resourcing for what it is that you want to do; that’s been a reality forever, with the exception perhaps for some of the war years where we had considerable operational funding.

JoSH: While you were the commander of Multi-National Forces Iraq in 2007, you and LTC (ret.) Ralph Peters wrote competing articles for the American Interest in which you debated the relative merits of the value of higher education in the profession of arms. What does graduate school education contribute to the professional development of our military? Does having more service members in graduate school help or hurt civil/military relations?

DP: Well first Ralph is a friend for whom I have considerable respect, and to provide context, we talked a little bit past each other because his focus was on the fact that soldiers need to focus on soldiering first and military tasks during their foundational training and development. My assumption was that someone didn’t go to graduate school until he or she had actually received a good solid grounding in those types of activities, so that it was not an either or. My concept is that you do your time in the field, the basic course, the advanced course, perhaps command and

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1 General (Retired) David Petraeus is a retired Army officer who commanded the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is also a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
then go to graduate school, so that you are a taking advantage of what really is an out of one’s intellectual comfort zone experience and is of enormous developmental value. People used to ask me for example, “What was it that helped you in northern Iraq to react quickly to a situation that was very different than anyone we had been in, in that scale, for decades, where there was no ready expertise in the area in which we were operating from any other element of our government, and where there was frankly, relatively little guidance for quite some time?” I used to say it was my graduate school experience, because that was where I had this recognition that there are seriously bright people out there who do not think the same way we do, come at problems from a different perspective, and that is of course what we encountered on the streets of Mosul and Ninewah province and throughout Iraq. So I think that the, graduate school in many cases for those who have gotten grounded in their basic branch and the tasks associated with that can be an enormously developing experience, and in fact I think Ralph himself has had graduate school experience as part of his foreign officer training.

**JoSH:** Is the civil-military divide a significant problem in current military policymaking? And as someone who has commanded in the Army and led a civilian agency, what experiences have you had that can inform us on the state of American civil-military relations?

**DP:** Well, when I’m talking about civil-military relations, I’m talking about the relationships between the senior civilian leaders of our government and the senior military leaders of our government. There is another whole issue about the relationship between the military and civilian society, which I will leave aside. And my sense is that there has been a good civil-military relationship. There have been periods which there have been moments of tension if you will. There have been issues at various points in time, but by and large, I think that the relationship between the senior civilians and the senior military has been constructive, one of mutual respect, and generally productive.

**JoSH:** Earlier today in your conversation with cadets here at West Point you outlined four goals or tasks of a strategic leader. Can you comment on those tasks for the cadets, and especially the cadets as well as us rotating faculty going back, we are joining an interagency process can you talk about the different ways in which you applied those tasks in the culture of a military organization versus the culture of the CIA where you were with a civilian organization that had the same national security goals.

**DP:** Sure. A strategic leader is someone who is really charting the direction, determining the azimuth for a particular large organization. For example, Multinational Forces Iraq, International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, these were big, large, huge organizations. And the commander really could very much shape that azimuth, and especially in Iraq during the surge just because of how desperate situation was when we commenced the surge.
The first of the four tasks is to get the big ideas right, to get the overarching strategy, the concepts, and so forth right. In the surge in Iraq it was that the human terrain was a decisive terrain, and we must secure it, i.e. the people. We must serve and secure the people. In fact, and the only way you could do that was by living with them. So we had to stop the consolidation of big bases that was going on prior to the surge in 2006. And then reverse that and actually go back out 77 different locations, new locations just in Baghdad alone just during the course of the surge. The first one went in just as we were bringing in the new forces.

Then you have to realize that you can’t kill or capture your way out of an industrial strength insurgency; you have to reconcile with as many of insurgents as you can to turn them from being, continuing part of the problem to being part of the solution. But then there are irreconcilables and you have to redouble or increase the OPTEMPO of the elements that are specifically going after them. That we had to clear and hold and build, not clear and hand off prematurely to Iraqi forces that couldn’t handle it. The concept of even greater civil-military unity of effort and on and on, there were a whole host of these different ideas. So you’ve got to get those right, you have to communicate them effectively through the breadth and depth of the organization.

The second task is you’ve got to get the word out, you’ve got to make sure the word is understood, so the big idea is that my level could be translated into what we needed to have done at ground level, company commanders and so forth, platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, squad leaders cause in a counterinsurgency in particular tactical actions can have strategic consequences very quickly. In the case of Iraq that meant literally the letter I sent to all of our troopers on the very first day, the change of command remarks, the huddle with commanders right at the end of the change of command and the changes I made to the mission statement and the base document for our campaign plan for our first week, counterinsurgency guidance that was published, ultimately changes that were made to the overall campaign plan and on and on.

The third task is you have to oversee the implementation of the big ideas. You have to go out, see it for yourself, walk patrols, that kind of thing. We did it a minimum of twice a week, meet with company commanders, platoon leaders, troopers on the ground, collaborate with Iraqi security forces, and then the whole rhythm of everything from the daily meeting you had for an hour each morning to start the day, to the quarterly campaign review that you did with the ambassador, and all of your commanders and all of the civilian leadership, so and a whole host of others in there with metrics and reviews, periodic reviews of all the different lines of operation individually and so on.

Finally, the fourth task is you have to determine, identify lessons that need to be learned, i.e. changes that need to be made to the big ideas, a lesson is only learned when its actually incorporated as a change to the big ideas. A lesson is not learned by being identified or captured.

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It’s learned when it brings about a change in a plan, SOP, policy, practice, what have you. And to do that you have to communicate it, oversee it, and do it all over again. And you know the truth is that, gosh, you know first of all I was privileged enough to have six straight commands at the end of my career, five of those were in combat. The one that was not, out at Fort Leavenworth, overseeing all of our schools and centers, and doctrine and everything else was the year we did the counterinsurgency field manual. And you know they were all certainly challenging and all, you know incredibly stimulating, it was just an enormous privilege to have those kinds of positions.

**JoSH:** Did those rules hold true both in the military and during your tenure as head of the CIA?

**DP:** The CIA obviously has a different workforce. It’s a very high grade civilian workforce. But, at the end of the day it’s a strategic organization and the same concepts apply, albeit the leadership style that you might use may be a bit different in some cases, then in say as a rifle platoon leader. But the truth is in the military; your leadership has to evolve with each position, with each person, with each organization anyway. And in fact what you are always trying to do, you shouldn’t have any one set leadership style, it should be a leadership style that determines what this individual needs in terms of leadership to enable him or her to be all that he or she can be, and to do the same for the unit. To enable the unit to be all it can be and what is provided in terms of leadership is often different to do that.

**JoSH:** You also mentioned that a leader should not have one set leadership style. I was just curious what you thought were a few key characteristics for future leaders?

**DP:** There are a lot of essential qualities and attributes that a leader should possess, everything from physical and mental toughness to analytical ability to integrity to determination and just sheer capacity for work. But at the end of the day, I think the quality that folks look for in senior leaders, and probably all leaders, is getting the big ideas right. Keep in mind that big ideas don’t hit you fully formed like Newton’s apple if you sit under the right tree. What happens is you get hit by a little kernel, a seed of an idea and then you have to sort of develop it, and bat it around with other people. You have to be inclusive, and recognize that no one of us is smarter than all of us together. You try to make the process transparent and inclusive, and if you can do that, then I think you can get success in that. Call it operational judgment; that ability to look at a situation and determine the right course of action to take, particularly when it’s in a crisis situation, when you are under enormous pressure, to respond, to act, to do something effective.
JoSH: The “big idea” that you talked about getting right in 2006 and 2007 Iraq was the counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. Where is that big idea going in the future, especially with a military personnel drawdown, budget reductions, and sequestration?

DP: I think COIN still remains really relevant. The counterinsurgency era is not over, and the reason it is not over is because the insurgency era is not over. There are numerous insurgencies around the world, and at least in some cases we care about the outcome. And therefore we presumably will need a government, a country that is trying to counter insurgents. And while we obviously always want to pursue these kinds of activities with a light footprint, that’s always the right answer until it’s not the right answer until it’s not enough. And then you have a very tough decision on your hands because we have been reacquainted recently, of course in Iraq and Afghanistan, about the sacrifice required, the time the cost, etcetera to conduct a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. But, I think again we should not be overly hasty and jettisoning in all that we have learned, in some cases very much the hard way and with considerable sacrifice. Rather we have got to ensure that we keep what is relevant and make sure that we don’t, just, as a knee jerk become a “no more Iraq, no more Afghanistan” - that leads us to do no more of anything when there is a clear recognition that US leadership is critically important throughout the world.

JoSH: What are the really big challenges for junior leaders coming into an Army during a period similar to the post-Vietnam era in which you spent your first years in the Army, especially when it comes to maintaining those lessons we are learning?

DP: Well I think it’s different because I entered an army that was just transitioning to a professional force. And the Army that the young men and women of today will enter will have a much greater reservoir of experience among its noncommissioned and commissioned officers who are above them. I’d say to them you will have commissioned officers above you who will have had two, three, four tours, full year tours in combat, some maybe even a fifteen month surge tour. You will have noncommissioned officers who have had the same. We didn’t have that in the Army I entered. There were relatively few, even the squad leaders, a lot of them had entered after Vietnam or after we stopped sending combat troops to Vietnam. And we didn’t have, we really lost a lot, of really good noncommissioned officers over the course of Vietnam anyway. And the officers at most, generally had no more than two tours, if that. So it was not the kind of just continuous fighting experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, every now and then you had somebody that had three tours in Vietnam, but relatively rare.

So the challenge that you will have is how do you keep people fired up, how do you keep them enthusiastic if you will or at least completely focused. To use a training analogy, before you can pull a trigger you have to raise a red range flag, and call into range control, and brief people on left limits and right limits, and watch your lane. This will be tough for people who have spent
most of their careers in… a little less restrictive environment to put it mildly. But the truth is, I think, it very quickly can get back into the kinds of foundational skills, and you know the business in any of these branches is much more complex than people recognize; if you really apply, if you really get into the employment of indirect fire for example. If you really learn about the different fuses, the different fuse settings, the different munitions, the different types of calibers the different ranges, the accuracy, the responsiveness, all of this and then how to adjust it in the case of the non-smart munitions and so forth.

All of which is enhanced by new communications, new digital mapping and so forth and so on. This is complex stuff, and then think about trying to bring all of the other assets to bear that would help you in terms of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. The employment of the advanced communications we have for everyone. Other enablers that would be around, this is very, very complex stuff, and getting into that, almost with an academic approach, while doing it on the ground in training, and trying to do as much live fire and as realistically as possible. [jokingly] Maybe not so realistic that the battalion commander gets shot in the way I did. (Editor’s note: General Petraeus was shot and gravely wounded in a training accident while serving as a battalion commander at Fort Campbell, Kentucky)

JoSH: Sir, we appreciate your time and we’re sorry to have to end our conversation, but we know you have other commitments this afternoon. Do you have any other comments you’d like to make before you go?

DP: Well I think JoSH (the Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities) is a wonderful project. I must confess, when I worked in the Department of Social Sciences here at West Point I wondered a number of times over the years why we didn’t have a project like this, why there wasn’t some sort of outlet for publication for cadets and indeed for faculty that would like to share, and nowadays with the ability to do this digitally through internet communities of interest I think it will be a great contribution to continue the civil-military discussion.

Interview conducted by Adam Scher, Francis Ambrogio, William Moore, and Taylor Wilby
Transcribed by Taylor Wilby
From the Front Lines to the Home Front:
An Interview with Pulitzer Prize winner Dexter Filkins
(2 April 2014, West Point, New York)

JoSH: Mr. Filkins, welcome to West Point and thank you for taking the time to sit down with us today. I thought we’d start with a question related to your background and profession, and how you got into the journalism career field. Phillip Bennett, the managing editor of the Washington Post, once described you as “the premier combat journalist of his generation.” For our readers who might not know, can you describe what a combat journalist does? What attracted you to that career field?

DF: (laughs) Well, I think that Phillip Bennett was being extremely generous with those remarks. Look, I don’t know that there is any such thing as a combat journalist. I was a reporter and my first jobs were covering the police beat and county commission in south Florida and that is how I trained. I was, as we all were, thrust into these wars. I got sucked into the middle of them and I stayed with them for a long time. I saw a lot of combat and I did my best to try to convey what that was like, as I would do with everything. I think what I tried to do when I was covering anything combat-related, I tried always to remind myself that the important thing to convey to other people is what it’s like to be in the middle of it and what it does to the human condition.

I always tried to remember that and keep my eye on the ball. It is not about what kind of weapon you have, and even who is winning, it is about being in the middle of an incredibly violent situation in which you may be killed or wounded, so I wanted to convey the emotional intensity of that experience. I did my best. I studied politics in college and graduate school, and I subscribe to the Clausewitzian dictum that “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” In that sense, I have always understood war in a broader universe of politics: it is about power, and political bargaining that breaks down and becomes violent. I have never looked at war as some unique thing all by itself, existing between two groups of crazy human beings. It is part of a very intelligible political universe that you can make sense out of. This is the background that I’ve brought to war and how I have tried to look at it.

JoSH: You have spent an enormous amount of time in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and partly due to your job as India bureau chief for the LA Times you are one of the relatively few Americans who visited Afghanistan immediately prior to 9/11. What was Afghanistan like back then?

DF: It was such an extraordinary time, I have never forgotten it. What you have to remember about that time is that no one knew what was going to happen, but I was in the place where all of this militant Islam was brewing, and all of this was coming together—which is to say, the attack on the United States. I was watching the Taliban and they were mystifying, and fascinating, and terrifying. I did not have any idea where it was ultimately going. What I remember about that time is how utterly devastated Afghanistan was, physically destroyed. But also how weird it was. The Taliban were so strange. I mean strange in a literal way; they felt like visitors from another planet, certainly visitors from another century. I would come out of Afghanistan and I had felt like I had been on another planet, and I would call my editors back in the US and say “I don’t

1 Dexter Filkins is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and war correspondent, and is the author of The Forever War.
know what’s going on over here and I don’t know where this is going, but it’s really weird.” I first went to Afghanistan in 1998, and I had been there six times before 911. The last time I was there—about a year before the attacks—I was arrested by the Taliban; I had been beaten up really badly and my translator had been thrown in prison. I had this increasing sense of foreboding about the place. It was so troubling what all of us were seeing, whether it was the Taliban carrying out a public execution and amputation or the madrasas that were turning out thousands of 15-year-old illiterate fighters who wanted to do jihad, or just the political dynamics, in which Afghanistan was a failed state and Pakistan an enabling force. In retrospect, of course, what I had been witnessing is all very clear. But at the time it was really strange.

JoSH: Your book The Forever War was published in 2008. In it, you said that due to numerous missteps and miscalculations made by the US and Coalition forces, in 2004 “Iraq disappeared for us then, and it never came back.” A lot of time has passed since the book was printed, if you were to update it today, would that part change? Has Iraq “come back?”

DF: I meant something very specific. It was not necessarily because of policy missteps, but what I meant in particular was that Iraq had largely disappeared to the reporters who were trying to cover it. That was because of the danger. It used to be that, in the beginning of the war—in May 2003—I could drive anywhere I wanted in the country, I could go out at night, I could see anybody I wanted to see. Over the course of the next year, it completely changed, to the point now where I have 17 or 18 colleagues who were killed there or in Afghanistan. The same thing happened in Afghanistan: journalists became targets themselves, which was not something any of us were used to. It made covering the war, and trying to understand the place, that much more difficult, often times impossible. If we look at the arc of the war, what we had was this: the Americans invaded, destroyed the Iraqi state in all of about three weeks, and they spent the next 9 years trying to put it all back together.

I was in Iraq in 2008, and saw with my own eyes that the surge HAD succeeded by any measure. Against all odds, the Americans had been able to put together an Iraqi state that more or less functioned… not very well, but well enough. The tragedy now, several years later, is that Iraq has fallen apart again. After the Americans departed in 2011, the Iraqi state that we had largely built all came apparat again. That’s another story. But it’s very sad.

JoSH: In The Forever War, in the chapter 'The Man Within,' you write that, "The struggle for the country was mirrored in the hearts of the men. Sassaman himself sometimes seemed like two people, the visionary American officer setting up a city council, and the warrior who took too much joy in the brutalities of his job." This dichotomy seems to be presaged at the very beginning of the book with the epigraph from Cormac McCarthy about the "diverging equity" between beauty and pain (and indeed one of the people featured in the chapter ends up committing an armed robbery after he returns to the US.) How can people who have experienced combat manage the "Jekyll and Hyde" dilemma inherent in counterinsurgency warfare?

DF: I don’t know. And I think that dilemma, which I have no good answer for, is really indeed inherent in the person of Nathan Sassaman, an incredibly impressive guy—AT that point the most impressive guy that I had met in Iraq. He was a battalion commander in the Sunni triangle, and he was in an impossible situation. He didn’t have enough resources, his men weren’t trained to do what they had to do. Things ended up going terribly wrong for him. I think he made a lot of
bad decisions, but I had a lot of sympathy for him because I am not sure I would have made better ones myself. That is one of the great dilemmas of these wars: the American military was trained to destroy its enemies. And then suddenly, in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, its primary goal was to set up a city council, and build irrigation projects, and hope that the enemy withered away. The American experience over the past twelve years is, I think, that parts of that strategy have proven to be true and have worked, while other parts haven’t worked. These are really difficult ideas and we haven’t remotely begun to sort through them all. The evidence from both wars is extremely mixed.

JoSH: In the chapter 'Pearland', in a brief aside you note that, "Sometimes I got frustrated with them [Marine enlisted men]; sometimes I wished they asked more questions. But things were complicated...I was happy they were in front of me." What did you mean by that? Should soldiers, particularly officers, ask more questions during war time? Did soldiers in Iraq fail to ask questions they should have? Or should we focus on remaining out in front?

DF: I think that statement was a reflection of the enormous cultural divide that separates most Americans, and particularly reporters—who are told to question everything—from the American military, which is a hierarchical and disciplined organization where people always follow orders. There are no other institutions like that in America. In combat, I can see why the military is designed the way that it is, because you are in a life-or-death situation. Having said that, the cultural difference that I am speaking of is impossible not to notice, and impossible not to feel. And to notice how much different the lives of the Soldiers are than everyone else’s in American life. I never resolved it, but I wanted to make note of it because it was something that I felt a lot.

JoSH: In 2009 you were part of a team from the New York Times that was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. Was there ever an international story that you wanted to cover but never got?

DF: There were lots of them. I remember when the Berlin Wall came down, I was a nobody in the Miami Herald. I called the editor and he didn’t even know my name. I begged him to go to Berlin, he said no. And the war in Bosnia came, I wanted to see that. I wanted to see the collapse of the Soviet Union, didn’t get to see that. I think if you are a journalist and you love history, particularly live history, then you want to witness these giant historical events. What I love about my job is that I have seen these enormous historical events unfolding right in front of me. I have been extremely fortunate, I have seen these extraordinary, dramatic events. I got my fill and then some.

JoSH: You have a long history of reporting on the ground in highly volatile conflict areas. Any plans to cover Syria or Ukraine?

DF: I’ve been to Syria and in fact, one of the craziest moments I have ever had was in Syria. I was in Damascus in the summer of 2003 and I was sent there by my bosses at the NYT, just to go in and see what I could do. At the time, the war in Iraq was raging at full force. I wanted to figure out if everything I was hearing was true – if there was a pipeline of foreign fighters coming across the border. So I asked to go to the border. The Syrian officials never said no, but they never said yes either. They kept saying, “not today, but come back tomorrow” for about 11 days in a row. Finally I stopped waiting for permission, took a taxi, and went to the border myself. It was absolutely insane. It was like the jihad highway, there were hundreds of guys
trying to go across the border, there were American helicopters right on the border. I ended up having lunch with this crazy guerilla commander who was trying to recruit people. He showed me a beheading video over lunch and I was lucky to get out of that place with my life. Since 2011, I’ve written a couple stories about Syria, but I think right now Syria is as impossible to cover as it has ever been. This is in part because the moderate opposition has been taken over by lunatics, and more than a dozen reporters have been kidnapped. I’ll probably sit that one out until it is a little more peaceful.

JoSH: Today you met with West Point cadets in a class called “Media and Politics.” In your opinion, what is the roll of the media during war?

DF: Well first, let me just say that I was very happy to come here, and I was amazed at how polite everybody was, everybody called me “sir,” which has never, ever happened. So, that’s a really, really good question. Whenever I write a story, my job, as I see it, is to help the people who read my work make informed decisions as citizens. That’s something I would do if I were covering a city council meeting… if I were covering Congress. Covering a war is the same thing: trying to explain to people, as best you can, what you think is going on. It’s just a lot harder to do that in a war, for all the obvious reasons: it’s dangerous, you’re getting shot at, the people speak a different language, the enemy doesn’t want to talk at all, that kind of stuff. But at the end of the day it’s basically the same.

JoSH: The mission of our Journal is to promote civil-military relations. What do you think the average American needs to know about the average member of the military, and vice-versa?

DF: That’s a really great question. One of the most important aspects of these American wars over the past 13 years has been the detachment that most Americans feel from them. I think that’s unique and unprecedented in American history. And by that I mean because we have an all-volunteer military, and do not have a draft, and so unless you are part of the 1% of citizens who are members of the armed services, or a family member, then you probably have had no contact with these wars at all. Therefore, you don’t have to think about them, you don’t have to talk about them, you don’t have to read about them, you’re not paying for them, your kids aren’t fighting there. That, for me, says something very troubling about the state of our country. I feel like the debate we’ve had about these wars has been shrill, it’s been uniformed, it’s been often stupid… and you can say that whether the conversation is being held on the right or the left, the pro-war or anti-war sides. And the discussion that often takes place is being held by people who otherwise have no connection to these wars, and therefore talk about them as if they were nothing more than abstractions, as though it’s just another thing to argue about at dinner. And I think that’s been harmful for the country. To me that’s kind of the broader universe that these wars have taken place in. No one benefits from that, and I think it’s made the country poorer. Regardless of the job that the individual soldiers have done, this has not been a healthy experience for the country.

I live in New York City now, and I think what I often find is most of the people I know, who I work with, don’t have family members in the military and don’t know much about these wars. Consequently, they often approach them from a quite different perspective. They tend to be quite disconnected from the wars. So what they think about the military often just strikes me as bizarre. It’s really detached; it speaks to their isolation and detachment. So while I’m certainly
not a spokesman or an apologist for the military, I often find myself trying to explain it to people who otherwise just don’t have contact or context. And I think that’s just inevitable. I sat on a panel the other night with Phil Klay, who is a former Marine who has written this really great book of short stories called *Redeployment*. He went to Dartmouth. What’s interesting about that is you don’t meet a lot of former Marines who end up going to Dartmouth, and people who go to Dartmouth tend to not join the Marines. And Phil will tell you the same thing: he, like me, often has to explain this kind of stuff to people. The kinds of ideas that Americans have about these wars, and the people who are fighting them, is detached and immature, so we often find ourselves trying to provide context or nuance, a sense of reality.

Whenever I’d talk to people when I was embedded, I always asked “where are you from?” And it seemed that the answer was almost always some little town I’d never heard of before. These wars are being fought largely by unknown people from unknown places. The New York Times ran a box every couple of weeks called “The Names of the Dead,” where they list the names, the towns, and the age of everyone who is killed in the wars. Just take a look at the towns where these people are from, and it’s just unbelievable, they’re just places that are off the map—and not just literally, but also in the minds of the decision makers. And these people are tough, they’re smart, they’re cool, but they’re people no one has ever heard of, largely from places no one has ever heard of, and that’s a problem for the nation.

Much of the criticism I hear about the war is from the left. But there is this chickenhawk criticism we get from the right, like “We should go fight in Syria!” And I always kind of wonder, who is this “we” you’re talking about? I think if we as a country were more engaged, it would just be a much more intelligent conversation.

**JoSH:** What other projects are you working on, that you’d like to share with our readers?

**DF:** I just got back from IRAQ. I was working on a story about the head of the Iranian paramilitary force, Qassem Suliemani. One of the things I came to know about the war in Iraq, which I didn’t really completely understand until I started doing this story, was that the United States was at war with Iran in Iraq. Iran was responsible for hundreds of US casualties, and I don’t think most people know that. I didn’t even know that, and I was there! Of course I knew that they were deeply involved, but it was very hard to track any of that. But what I was able to do with this STORY is to really get down into what they were doing when the Americans were there, and it was really extraordinary. I had no idea how aggressively the Iranians were coming after US forces.

I was in Iraq for a couple of weeks in January and February and I wrote a long piece on Nuri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq, a story about what’s happened to Iraq since the Americans left. And that took me a long time, not just to write about Maliki but also to understand how we left, and the way that we left, and whether we left in the right way, or whether we left in a rather ill-considered way. I think the piece will probably show that it was the latter, that we left in kind of a hurry without caring too much about what we were leaving behind. I have to do something next, but I haven’t yet figured out yet what that is.

*Interview conducted and transcribed by Charles Faint.*
Disaster, Intervention, and Innovation:
An Interview with Ambassador William Garvelink
29 April 2014 (West Point, NY)

JoSH: Your lengthy career in government service includes an enduring relationship with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which you first joined in 1979. What attracted you to USAID and a career in development, diplomacy, and humanitarian assistance?

WG: Well, in a nutshell, it all started when I lost my job on Capitol Hill, but I’ll lead into that. My goal in life was to be a Colonial Latin America history professor, I did my masters and started my PhD work in that field, but like lots of folks I never finished my dissertation. But a friend of mine that I went to college with was working for a congressman and I thought that looked interesting. So I would go from Chapel Hill, North Carolina to Washington, D.C. on Monday morning and sleep on the floor of his efficiency apartment until Friday and then go home, where my wife was working at the university. And after about a month of that we thought, “this isn’t going to work” so we just packed up and moved to Washington. My wife found a job right away and I job hunted for a few more months and ended up working for a congressman named Don Fraser from Minnesota, and was on his International Organizations subcommittee staff. There I did human rights and Law of the Sea work for my first year, and fortunately I got a chance to work with Hubert Humphrey and Senator Kennedy as well as Senator Francis from California so it was a great experience.

And then there was something that followed the Watergate scandal called “Koreagate,” where the Korean government was trying to bribe members of Congress to keep troops in Korea. As a result there were two investigations, one of which was an ethics committee investigation, and Don Fraser did a study on US/Korea relations, so I worked on those things for about three years. But then Senator Humphrey died, and Don Fraser ran for that Senate seat, and lost, and so I lost my job. But I knew some people at USAID through the investigation since I was looking at development in Korea, and they said “why don’t you come work at USAID?” They weren’t hiring many people at the time, but they offered to hire me as an auditor.

But that’s not the way it worked out. I remember coming home to my wife that night after my first day on the job and saying “Linda, guess what? I’m a foreign service officer!” And she said, “What’s that,” and I answered, “I don’t know!” and somehow I was sworn in. It was an absolute mistake the way I got in the door, but I was with State for 37 years, and I wouldn’t change any of it. But it wasn’t planned, it wasn’t deliberate, I hadn’t considered any of this stuff. I was going to be a teacher. But things worked out, and like I said, I wouldn’t change any of it.

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1 Ambassador (Retired) William Garvelink is a career diplomat with extensive experience in Africa, the Middle East, Europe, the Caribbean, and South America. He was appointed Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo by President George W. Bush in 2007 and served in that capacity until 2010.
**JoSH:** Part of your duties at USAID included leading disaster assistance response teams (DARTs) to a host of very diverse countries ranging from Albania to Rwanda to Iran. What was the purpose of the DARTs, and what were they able to accomplish?

**WG:** In the early days, foreign assistance response to disasters was rather simply defined. If it was a natural disaster, OFDA and AID took care of it. If it was a refugee emergency, the PRM, the Refugee Bureau, and the State Department that would fund that. And we had all of our assistance geared towards that. For example, if it was an earthquake, we’d send out the Search and Rescue Teams for two weeks, and that was about it. After that, our role in the response to the earthquake was over. And then in 1990, after the first Gulf War, a lot of Kurds moved up into Turkey and we were dispatched there to help. And purely by coincidence, we ran into the military there, who were on their way home. So we fumbled around a bit and put together a team and we kept people out there a lot longer than we normally would for something like a simple earthquake relief.

So after we were done we sat down and realized that we needed to put together a management team, consisting of people with the right skills, and is flexible enough to respond to different types of disasters. So we began training people in the seven or eight core skills that would be part of these new disaster teams, and these would be the teams dispatched, sometimes in a matter of hours, to a disaster site. We had teams that were three or four people, and teams that were several hundred people, depending on the need. For example, if we needed an immunologist, we’d send one; when that person’s job was over they would come home, and we’d send out someone with a different set of needed skills. The management team would handle things like finance, overall management, dealing with governments and so forth, and they stayed part of the team. So the DARTs were elements we could move to the site of a disaster of any type, and they would manage the US response. We kind of modeled this on the US military; the US military is one of the only ones that can project out and go anywhere in the world. In our little way we’re like that; we’re the only element that can dispatch a team like that.

So what would happen when we’d send a team out, and soon everyone would start coming to us, because we might have eight or ten people out there on the ground, and everyone else kind of gravitated to us. It turned out to be a very useful way to manage resources and personnel on the site. The team leader would be given “X” number of dollars, and he or she would spend them in an appropriate matter and keep Washington informed, but not have to ask for permission. And so the DART program turned into a very effective management tool for any kind of disaster.

**JoSH:** What role does the Department of Defense play in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions run by organizations like the State Department and USAID?

**WG:** The relationship between us and DoD has changed significantly. Until the latter 1980s or maybe early 1990s, the role of the military was quite clear: we needed airlift, we needed medical assistance, we needed engineering support. And we had an informal arrangement with the Joint Staff, and we’d call them up and outline a need, and they’d provide it for us through the Political/Military Bureau at State, and we’d follow up with the paperwork after. And that was pretty much the relationship and it worked well. Then after Somalia and in northern Iraq with the
Kurds, the relationship between the military and not just us but non-governmental organizations began to change. That was when we became more involved in actual war zones; previously, we’d wait for people to become refugees, and once they were out of the war zone we didn’t have to worry as much about security and related issues. But when you take, for example, Somalia security is of course a big concern. And the military isn’t just providing security, they’re providing assistance as well, and the relationship started getting a little murky and I think we’re still sorting it out, because every disaster is different, and every disaster requires different kinds of relationships. So I thought we were pretty close to getting it sorted out, but then we had Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which added yet another new dimension to working together. So it’s a constantly-evolving relationship, but I think my State Department colleagues may or may not agree with this, but on the Humanitarian Assistance side, sometimes we get along better with the military than we do with the State Department. So we’ve all come a long way, there have been some rough spots, but the relationship between USAID and the DOD is usually a pretty good one.

Another dynamic is the NGO/DOD relationship. NGOs can be an interesting bunch. The one I now work for, the International Medical Corps, works with the military all the time, it’s not a problem. Sometimes it’s a bit of a headache for the military, simply because there are so many of us. And I might get into a little bit of trouble with some of my NGO friends for saying this, but I think there are maybe only 10-15 really good NGOs. Sometimes we have lots of these little ones that are really trying to do good, but sometimes are more trouble than they are worth, because they really don’t know what they’re getting themselves into. But the really experienced ones like CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, the IRC, the IMC… these organizations are professional, they know what they are doing, and they all work well with the military.

JoSH: Later on in your career you worked in the Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM). What was your role in BPRM? Was working for State much different than working with USAID?

WG: Yeah it is a little. When I worked for BPRM, that was back in the mid-1980s, so it was called the Refugee Bureau (RB) back then, and it was much smaller than it is now. There was a woman named Margaret McKelvey who was my boss, and we drew a line through Africa. I had responsibility for refugee issues in the southern half of Africa, and she took the north. I was there for about a year and a half and really learned a lot about the humanitarian side of things, and particularly the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and how these organizations operate. And the other big recipient of PRM funds is the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is the premier response organization, in my mind, in the world today. No one else comes close to the way the Red Cross operates, they are terrific. So I learned a lot about the humanitarian business, and it was very interesting. I had been posted in Bolivia for five years and my wife wanted to come back to the States to do her master’s degree, and I was an assistant program officer there in Bolivia, which is a pretty low-ranking assignment, and I couldn’t find another one that I liked. And then out of the blue I get a call saying “Hey, why don’t you take a job over here?” and so I did. I was about three and a half years into it and got a call summoning me back to USAID. I became sort of the operations director for OFDA and stayed for about 13 years. This was not normal for foreign service; you’re supposed to rotate every three or four
years. But in Iraq in 1990 I suffered a detached retina, which required something like a dozen operations over the next year or so. So, in good State Department fashion, I couldn’t get a medical clearance to get assigned overseas permanently. Nonetheless, I was temporarily assigned to Somalia for a year.

But it worked out quite well. As I said I stayed in OFDA for 13 years, and really enjoyed myself. At one point I was in Albania and the Africa bureau of USAID called and said, “How about being an aid mission director in Eritrea?” And that sounded fun, so I called my eye surgeon, and he wrote me a letter clearing me for service overseas, and then I went to Eritrea. This was during the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1999-2001, so it was an interesting time. So I stayed in my position in OFDA much longer than anyone normally would have because of my eye injury. But when I started the budget was $25 million a year. When I left, if you add supplements it was $700, $800, $900 million dollars a year. So I was there during kind of the “golden age” of disaster response.

I was mentioning to some other folks today that I would never be allowed to do what I did in the late 1980s and 1990s. In those days there were a lot of rebel movements in Africa and the state department would say, “We can’t talk to those people.” But when I was in Africa I spent a lot of time dealing with leaders of these groups, and when they came to the US I carted them around to meet people, and these days a mid-level guy in OFDA would never be allowed to do this. My instructions were usually something like “Don’t screw it up!” and that was sometimes the extent of the interaction we’d have with the State Department unless we needed help. These days there are a lot more people involved, the visibility is much higher, and there’s a lot more paperwork.

**JoSH:** You served as ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo for three years. How were you chosen for that position? What was your experience like there?

**WG:** Well, when the Bush folks came in, Andrew Natsios became the head of USAID, and he was the OFDA director when I was there. So he called me up, and he said “I want you to come back and be the deputy senior administrator.” So I would have oversight of OFDA, the Office of Transition Initiatives, Food for Peace, Democracy and Governance, and that sort of thing. So I did that, and that’s about as far as a career foreign service officer can go before they become a political appointee. So I thought this was a good way to wind up my career. But in 2007, Ambassador Don Yamamoto called me up and said “What about an ambassador’s job?” He suggested either Angola or Congo, and I had done a lot of work in both of them so I said “sure!” I went through the process, it’s about a year and a half long, and I ended up in the Congo. And at one point I asked Don, “Why me?” And he said, “You know, one day I was driving into Washington, listening to NPR, and on Morning Edition I heard you interviewed about some disaster and it kind of stuck with me.” So that’s really how it happened. Strange things happen when you’re in Washington!

**JoSH:** Over the course of your career, did you have a “favorite” job? A “least favorite?”

**WG:** Ambassador is a good job, if you can take it, get it! On a serious note, Congo is so complicated, there are so many problems, there was something going on there all the time. From environmental issues, to the fighting, I was deeply involved in all of these issues. Sometimes it
was frustrating but we made progress on a number of points, and I really felt like I could “do things” there and be very much engaged in what’s going on. It was an interesting time; Africa Command was just coming into existence and General Ward took a big interest in Congo and came out often. When Congo was part of European Command, it was an afterthought. But when Africa because its own Combatant Command, Congo stands out large, especially now that since Sudan is broken up, Congo is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa. So it was a very interesting place to work.

While I was there I didn’t do much with the USAID side of things, as I worked mainly with political/military stuff and negotiations with the various rebel organizations and that sort of thing. It turned out to be a really interesting job.

There were aspects of certain jobs I didn’t like, but there was never a job I didn’t like. They’ve all been interesting and rewarding; I’ve been lucky.

JoSH: Recently, you returned from a humanitarian assistance visit to Syria. What can you tell us about the situation on the ground there? From your perspective, what else could or should be done?

WG: For the past year I’ve worked for an NGO called the International Medical Corps. It’s based in Los Angeles but all of the operations are run out of Washington. Interestingly, I think I gave them their first grant, through OFDA, back in 1987 when they were a $1 million-a-year NGO. Now they’re about a $300 million-a-year organization. I bumped into them in Eritrea, they were there when I was in the Congo, they work in the toughest places. I bring this up because I think IMC is (or was) the only NGO registered inside Syria, working in Damascus. We also have programs in every country surrounding Syria, working with refugees who come across the border.

The politics of this is such a crazy evolution to watch; it started as a peaceful movement, the government over-reacted, there were more demonstrations and the government over-reacted again, and then the different movements started. Some of these are backed by the US or other Western governments, but there are also the Islamic movements. Then there is ISIS, which in contrast to the others is not a nationalist movement, they have international ambitions and want to set up their Islamic caliphate. And these folks are so bad that even Al Qaeda disowned them. So there are people caught in between all of these fighting groups and it’s a horrendous problem. The impact on surrounding countries is also huge. In Lebanon, there are a million Syrian refugees, and that doesn’t include the Palestinians who have been there for decades, and the Iraqis who have ended up there. There’s not enough medical care, there’s not enough schools, there’s no housing. What housing is available is now double or triple the cost it used to be. The wealthy people are moving away and the local families are getting displaced. This is causing a rather dramatic impact on local communities in countries surrounding the conflict area.

So what we were doing is talking to the US government, the British development folks and the UN, and while our focus remains on the refugees, we’re starting to look much more closely at what’s happening to the local populations as a result of the influx of Syrians. Unfortunately I
have a feeling that four or five years from now it’s not going to be much different, in fact it might be worse. Those governments are fragile and aren’t well positioned to handle these issues. IMC are big players in the area, trying to figure out what to do next. So this isn’t purely a humanitarian crisis, there are huge economic issues as well, and we have to start thinking about things in a totally different way. There are no short term solutions; this is a long term economic problem and frankly, politically I don’t know what you do. There are so many factions, and so much infighting between the Gulf states and unfortunately a lot of people are making a lot of money on the conflict in Syria and a lot of people with vested interested who see no reason to rush to make it end. And Assad appears to have the upper hand right now, so he’s not in any rush either. So it’s a very difficult situation. I think the best we can do right now is to focus on the development stuff for the medium to long term.

**JoSH:** Many of our readers either are or will become military officers. What advice would you offer them in terms of preparing for humanitarian and disaster relief missions which many of them will likely carry out over the course of their careers?

**WG:** First of all, there is a fairly well established humanitarian community out there. So when you’re a young officer and you’re given this assignment, there are places to go and people to talk to, you don’t have to start from scratch. The NGO community and the UN are pretty diverse groups, and there are organizations that are very uncomfortable working with the military, particularly the US military, and others aren’t. I think finding those out quickly, and finding those organizations that are willing to work with everybody, is important. And I think for the US government, the first stop might be a DART team. If there is a DART team on the ground, that group is coordinating with all donors, all NGOs, and they have a direct reporting line to the ambassador of that country. So that’s probably the best source of information. I suggest you link up with those folks. If there is no DART team on the ground, you would find the humanitarian arm of the Secretary General there, and they have similar teams. In fact the person in charge is former OFDA and a former Army officer. So those are good places to start.

In any disaster, especially in a major one, one of the first questions someone in the military will ask is “Who is in charge?” Don’t waste your time with that, because the answer is “nobody.” While we hope everyone is cooperating, you shouldn’t try to tell NGOs what to do; that will get everybody’s back up. You want to coordinate with them and not manage them.

Also, every government hast their own priorities, so getting to know the players is important. For me, if you want one-stop shopping for the United Nations, it’s OCHA, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The other group is the Red Cross with their policy of impartiality and neutrality they probably know more about what’s happening on the ground than any other organization. And the DART can get you into the NGO community and can help you get the most information in the shortest period of time on any disaster situation.

**JoSH:** We’ve certainly covered a lot of ground today. What do you see as the future of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance?

**WG:** A pet interest of mine, in the next coming years we will see more natural disasters or “complex emergencies.” I expect we’ll see these more in cities than we will in rural areas.
While it’s relatively easier to set up relief in a rural area like say Darfur, where you set up the entire infrastructure, in built up areas it’s more complex. For example, in the urban areas of Haiti, if you provide free water you put someone out of business. If you set up free schools, someone’s out of business. The relationships are all different in cities. You’ll have gangs, and violent extremism, so it’s going to be a different kind of disaster. So my suspicion is that cities will be more affected, and I think more technical expertise will required. Often, that expertise is inherent within the military. So I think civil-military coordination will become even more important than it has been in the past. And whenever you get in high stress situations in this big urban areas, there’s potential for misunderstandings and all kinds of other stuff. I think civilians and military have done a good job of getting to know each other in disaster settings, but I think we need to spend more time on it because it’s going to get much more complicated and dangerous in the future.

This article was conducted and transcribed by Charles Faint.
Cyber, Civil Liberties, and Strategic Communication

An Interview with Dr. Emily Goldman
(6 March 2014, West Point, New York)

JoSH: Dr. Goldman, thank you for talking to us today. We have some questions related to your experiences with Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and your long and lengthy career. Let’s start off with one about your current position: you’re currently a member of the Combined Action Group for CYBERCOM where you serve as Strategic Advisor to the Commander. What does a job like that entail?

Goldman: First, thanks, and it’s good to be here speaking with you today. The first thing I think it’s important to realize is the Combined Action Group responds to both CYBERCOM and the National Security Agency (NSA). Typically, in a military command, there’s a Commander’s Action Group, or a CAG, but, at Fort Meade, it’s a combined one: there are both military and civilian members. In other words, there are CYBERCOM detailees as well as NSA detailees. We respond to both the dual-hatted Director of NSA and US Cyber Command as well as the senior leadership of both organizations, Deputy Director and Deputy Commander. We write strategic papers for them; we’ll work on any project that they want; we typically write most of their speeches and talking points; and, in the current period that we’re in, we do a great deal of work for the Media Leaks Task Force, which was stood up within NSA to deal with the unauthorized disclosures of classified material that occurred in June of 2013.

JoSH: Your previous assignments include a tour as Strategic Communications Advisor in the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. How did this job prepare you for your current assignment with CYBERCOM?

Goldman: Cyber is a very interesting area that General Alexander is fond of saying is a “team sport,” meaning no one agency or organization, public or private, has all the resources, authorities, or authorization to be able to manage the challenges of the cyber domain – we have to work together. That’s true in counterterrorism as well. Your ability to work across the interagency and understand the culture and the language of other organizations is incredibly important for our nation. And I think, increasingly as well, to understand the public and private: in terms of cyber, we deal with industry because they have a big role in that, too. I think, on the one hand, working across the interagency has been invaluable to me to understanding our partners in this endeavor. The second piece of it, unbeknownst to me at the time, was working on communication outreach/engagement, and that’s something, certainly, CYBERCOM and NSA have to deal much more now, particularly in two key parts. One of those parts is explaining to the American people that, although they are co-located, CYBERCOM and NSA are different agencies with different authorities and capabilities. With the media leaks, of course, we have to be much more open and transparent with the public, our stakeholders, and members across the interagency. Having the experiences of thinking about how you communicate strategically (not just tactically but how you think about your goals and objectives and who your target audiences

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1 At the time of this interview, Dr. Emily Goldman was a member of United States Cyber Command’s Combined Action Group (CAG). She previously served in Central Command and in the US Department of State.
are) in the context of counterterrorism, translates to how we think about communication at CYBERCOM and NSA.

JoSH: Over the course of your career, you’ve closely worked with military personnel and their civilian counterparts. Are there fundamental differences in the cultures, goals, and *modus operandi* of the Department of Defense and the Department of State or any other agencies?

Goldman: Yes – can I leave it there? One of the stories I like to tell is that I worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) – Policy in a directorate called “Support to Public Diplomacy,” which was Department of Defense (DOD) support to the public diplomacy apparatus of the State Department. We were all involved across the interagency in countering violent extremism; it’s what they call the “softer side of counterterrorism.” I then transitioned over to the State Department, and, it took me about a good month to realize, whenever I said “strategic communications,” State thought I meant “public diplomacy.” That really hit me because, in DOD, “strategic communications” referred to public affairs, influence operations, effects-based operations, and psychological operations, which all fall under strategic communications. In State, only public diplomacy experts performed strategic communications: they have a very distinct set of tools that they use and objectives that they view as their role and mandate. Part of dealing with outreach and engaging with communication is trying to understand those pockets of excellence across the interagency and how they can fit together. In terms of a bumper sticker, some of the public diplomacy advocates in the State Department, when I was there, believed, *We have to get the rest of the world to like us; we have to get them to understand us.* From the DOD’s side, it’s, *I don’t care if you like me; I just don’t want you to kill me.* It’s a very, very different orientation from how you engage based on what you’re trying to achieve. It’s very important to place students into interagency, cross-cultural environments really early: you’ve got to get them sitting around the table, in the classroom, so that they can become familiar with the process of enculturation across different organizations.

JoSH: You once said, “Not all communication is strategic.” Can you explain what that means?

Goldman: Communication is “strategic” when it is “receiver-centric” vs. “sender-centric.” For example, as professors used to stand behind a lectern and lecture, they would transmit – that was very sender-centric: *this is the information that I need to impart.* Receiver-centric understands your audience, namely the effects you want to achieve, and tailors your message, means, and techniques to creating that effect within your target audience’s mind and behavior. The relationship between our beliefs and actions is often contested, but how do you incentivize people? Communication, ultimately, understands the effects you are trying to achieve in your audience. It includes not only what we say, but also what we do because, after all, our actions speak louder than our words – everything we do communicates something.
JoSH: What do you see as the “greatest cyber threat?” More specifically, what are the greatest cyber threats that are most on your mind?

Goldman: I believe there are nation-states, some broader and deeper than others, and non-state actors who wield cyber capabilities, but we have to ask ourselves, *who has the intent to actually use cyber against us?* That’s classical political science: a threat is not so much about capabilities but the *will* to use those capabilities. I would argue the other great cyber challenge is that we, as a national security community, do not understand what “cyber” is. We use the term differently; we are just beginning to think of how cyber could be connected with kinetic operations; and our military leaders need to understand the risks and benefits of using cyber rather than not using it. I think there’s a series of strategic and doctrinal questions that we know other nation-states are looking into: they’re educating and even operating. We need to mentally place ourselves in the 1920s and determine how to integrate air power with land operations – that’s where we are. If I recast the phrase as “cyber challenge,” it’s the intellectual challenge of understanding the domain and being able to operate effectively against adversaries who are doing the same thing but, based upon perspective, may approach cyber from a different angle.

JoSH: When you were with the Department of State in 2008, you emphasized a certain level of anti-Americanism will exist. You also stressed the importance of understanding the cultures, political and social structures, languages, and religions of others. How do you feel America currently understands other cultures? Is it helping mitigate anti-Americanism?

Goldman: I think there’s still a large amount of anti-Americanism that exists: some of it is inherent in some of the policies that we have instituted, but great powers, no matter the political regime or economic policy, face a certain amount of animosity. We need to understand how much is based in situations we cannot change versus the amount we can change. Fundamentally, we need to ask ourselves, *why? Why do we care?* From a strategic perspective, anti-Americanism affects our ability to implement policies or move global norms in a particular direction. There’s a great deal of political capital that can be expended without a clear sense of what we’re trying to achieve. Would it be different with a different administration? We’ve had two administrations with very different postures towards the world, and I’m not sure to what extent we’ve seen, based upon those policies, a change in attitudes.

JoSH: Your most recent book is titled *Power in Uncertain Times: Strategy in the Fog of Peace.* You seem to reference Clausewitz’s “fog of war” – was that intentional? What can decision makers do to manage risk and see through the “fog of peace”?

Goldman: Of course it was intentional. The book attempts to historically look at countries, including the United States, and the policies and strategic choices made by those countries during periods between major conflicts. We can talk about if the U.S. is currently at peace or not, but I defined it in the context of between Great Power conflicts or major kinetic war. I think countries succumb to particular biases during periods where the threat is not clear. Traditionally, with the U.S., downscaling the size of our armed forces and moving more towards broader economic concerns rather than the defense budget. I see this cycle as persistent across various nation-states and regimes. The other question becomes, *to what extent do you have peacetime*
commitments? Great Powers typically become distracted by those commitments and don’t think strategically. In America, in particular, we’ve had hard times thinking strategically during these periods and there are cultural and political reasons about that. What can decision makers do? They can learn from the past: as they say, the past doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes, right? Understand that we aren’t the first ones to live through these experiences; others have and we can learn from them. At institutions such as West Point, your students should be struggling through these questions – what do we do during peacetime? Is peacetime the opportunity to think not about other types of threats to the internationals system, or is peacetime the opportunity to think strategically beyond the next threats? How do we posture ourselves to extend that peace into the future?

**JoSH:** What other projects are you working on that you would like to share with our readers?

**Goldman:** We brought a group of scholars to USCYBERCOM for a project called “Cyber Analogies.” You obviously need to be very careful with analogies in terms of how you use them, but people tend to learn through connecting new things to what they already know. The scholars looked at questions concerning strategy, doctrine, and operations in the cyber domain and then reflect back on their respective areas. For example, an article was written on surprise attack in the physical domain – what about surprise attack in the cyber domain? What does pre-delegation of authority in the nuclear domain lead us to think about pre-delegation in the cyber domain? This project was launched in response to senior leaders discussing a “cyber Pearl Harbor.” Was that a good analogy or a bad analogy? Was that enabling or paralyzing? If not “cyber Pearl Harbor,” what other analogies may be useful? We’re excited about this project – it’s in its early stages, and we would love to have an institution such as West Point expand upon it and add to our repertoire of cyber analogies.

**JoSH:** The talk you’re giving at West Point is titled “National Security and Civil Liberties in the Age of Terror and Cyber Threats.” Is there a fundamental tension between these national security and civil liberties when it comes to the concepts of terrorism and cyber threats? If so, what can be done mitigate that tension?

**Goldman:** Thanks for the question – I had a terrific discussion with the cadets on those issues. I think there is not a fundamental tension between national security and civil liberties; we need both. Over time, we’ve become more secure while protecting civil liberties. If you look at the greatest transgressions against civil liberties, they typically followed a major security event like Pearl Harbor. This notion that there’s a trade-off is invalid: we have to have both; we need to have both. There is a trade-off, but it’s not between security and private and civil liberties. It’s between secrecy and transparency. The question we need to ask is, how much of what we do, in the intelligence community, must remain secret? How much do we need to be transparent? We certainly need to be far more transparent to engender the trust of the American people. Additionally, we need to demonstrate to our overseers that we are following the law and meeting our mission requirements while protecting civil liberties. First, understand that tension, and then educate and inform. Right now, there’s a tremendous amount of misinformation about this entire process to the public. That’s one of the reasons why it’s important to come to places like West
Point: to talk to the future leaders of our military and impress upon them the importance of having these conversations in an informed manner.

JoSH: One final question: what do you see as some of the most frustratingly persistent myths about NSA and CYBERCOM?

Goldman: Probably the quip that everybody makes: *I know you’re reading my e-mail.* We’re not reading your e-mail; we’re not interested. It’s just that one false story—“The NSA is a rogue agency doing whatever it wants. It’s ingesting and sweeping up everything on the Internet. You’ve been reading it all!” – it’s flatly not true. This notion conflates the capability to do something with what actually occurs. A large part of this depiction is the way that the leaks have been framed in the media. Assuming we would use a capability, like nuclear weapons, against the American people is patently absurd. Being an informed citizen is part of our obligation.

*Interview conducted by Charles Faint and transcribed by Francis Ambrogio.*
Realism in a Changing World

A Discussion with Professor John Mearsheimer

30 April 2014 (West Point, NY)

JoSH: The 1970 Howitzer, the yearbook of West Point, calls First Class Cadet John Mearsheimer a “truly outstanding blind athlete and an acid critic of the ‘engineering mentality’” at West Point. How has your West Point education, “engineering mentality” and all, shaped your career as a scholar?

JM: The whole subject of “engineering” and how I have thought about it over the years is an interesting one. My criticism of engineers is mainly due to the fact they are not very creative individuals. To put it in slightly different terms, engineers are not very “theoretical.” They’re very practical; they are pragmatic but not theoretical. My father was an engineer, by the way. In fact he was a superb civil engineer. But my father did not have a creative bone in his body. So in that sense I was always critical of engineers. But I’m very glad that I had so much training in engineering when I was a cadet because engineering taught me to think systematically. I think almost all human beings are born with an inability to think systematically. You have to be trained to think that way. One of the advantages of getting a serious education – which you certainly get at West Point – is that you learn to think systematically, and that has proven invaluable in helping me become a top-notch scholar.

JoSH: In your 1997 “Aims of Education” speech to new freshman at the University of Chicago, you argued that Chicago “is a remarkably amoral institution” like “about all other major colleges and universities and this country.” Our alma mater, of course, is the exception to this rule—West Point teaches cadets morality and makes them live by a set Honor Code. In the speech, you passed no judgment on Chicago’s immorality. In West Point doing it right, or is individual moral development best left as an individual task?

JM: The argument I was making about Chicago and other elite universities is that what they do is teach students to think critically, which in effect means teaching them to question all conventional wisdoms. We don’t teach students what to think, we teach them how to think. Some people interpreted what I was saying to mean that the University of Chicago is an immoral institution and other elite universities are in the same category. But that was not the argument I was making. I was not saying Chicago is immoral, just that it is amoral; it doesn’t teach students what to think, which I think is essentially correct.

West Point is a very different kind of place because West Point is an institution that not only teaches students to think critically, but also places a premium on three core concepts: “Duty, Honor, Country.” There is not a lot of individualism at West Point in the way there is at the University of Chicago. At West Point, you’re trying to teach people to operate as a collective and to be willing to fight and die for the country. In that process you teach certain moral values

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1 Dr. John Mearsheimer is a renowned political scientist famous for his pioneering work on the concept of “offensive realism.” He is a West Point graduate and former Air Force officer, and is currently a tenured professor at the University of Chicago.
that are indispensable in the making of a successful officer and more generally for making the Army work. But that’s not the mission of the University of Chicago, which has a different mission from West Point. Of course, at a place like West Point there is a certain tension in the educational process. On one hand you are trying to emulate Chicago in certain ways, and teach people to think critically and question conventional wisdoms, while at the same time teaching them to accept certain principles, and to recognize that they have to obey unfailingly in certain circumstances. That’s a different way of approaching life. So as I said, I think there is a real tension between the academic and military sides of life at West Point, which is not the case at a place like the University of Chicago, where there is obviously no such tension.

JoSH: When you were a cadet, did you give preference to one of those two sides? Were you more academically oriented or militarily oriented?

JM: Well, I think that when you are a cadet it’s impossible not to be affected by both sides of that divide. I took classes at West Point that were not different in any meaningful way from the classes I teach at the University of Chicago. We cover a lot of the same material, and back in the day we were encouraged in those classes at West Point to think critically, and to question the conventional wisdom. But at the same time I was socialized at West Point to understand that I was part of this institution called the US Army, and that maybe at some point in my life I would be called upon to fight and die for the country, which I would just do because that is what being a West Point graduate is all about. And again, that kind of thinking is nonexistent at civilian institutions of higher learning. That’s neither a good or bad thing; it just indicates that West Point is, in some ways, similar to schools like Harvard and Yale but in other ways, it’s fundamentally different.

JoSH: You’re a respected strategic thinker who left the military long before you had enough seniority to do any strategic thinking in uniform, and you’ve taught some distinguished soldiers at the University of Chicago. Some today argue the military struggles to keep its brightest minds. How do you think the military can best develop and keep strategic talent?

JM: I think one of the best ways the military can develop strategic talent is by sending young officers to graduate school to get masters degrees and in some cases PhDs. The Army has historically done well in that regard and as a result there have been over the years large numbers of officers who were first-rate strategic thinkers. The question of how to retain them is not an issue I know much about. I think it’s largely a function of the state of the Army at specific points in time. I know that when I was a cadet in the late 1960s, the Vietnam War had become extremely unpopular, and the Army had a very hard time holding onto strategic thinkers because the Army was not a very attractive institution at the time. Plus, those officers who had advanced degrees from first-rate institutions had other options in the civilian world, and they exited the force in large numbers. Obviously this was not good for the Army. But, fortunately, that period went away and things improved dramatically in the late 1970s and especially in the 1980s. I think that oftentimes forces that are beyond the Army’s control are largely responsible for
whether it can hang onto its best and the brightest officers. But it’s definitely imperative for any institution to have top-notch strategic thinkers.

**JoSH:** Your most recent work has focused on understanding how China’s rise will affect the global order. Do you think that China will continue to rise? How long are its current growth rates sustainable?

**JM:** I don’t know the answer to that question. When you think about the rise of China there are two big questions. One is: “Will China continue to rise?” The other is: “Can it rise peacefully?” I tend to focus exclusively on the second question, but I don’t deny that the first question is of enormous importance. I just simply assume that China will continue to grow economically, and therefore militarily. The reason I don’t have a good answer to that first question is I have been unable to determine, even after talking to experts, what is the right answer. You can find very smart people who insist that China cannot sustain healthy growth rates over the next 30 years, but you can also find very smart people who say the opposite. And determining who is right is almost impossible, at least for me. So I don’t know what the answer is to that very important question, even though I’ve looked at it quite carefully. I will say, however, that I hope China does not continue to grow. I hope that the Chinese economy slows down significantly, because if that happens, we won’t have to worry about China’s rise, which I don’t think will be peaceful, and will certainly be bad for the US.

**JoSH:** Well, I’m curious then, might we then also find lots of smart people who disagree with you on that second question, that China can rise peacefully? If we can find smart people on both sides of the debate when it comes to the first question, can we find smart people who say China can rise peacefully?

**JM:** (Laughing) Well, yes, there are a lot of smart people who disagree with me, but they’re wrong.

**JoSH:** In the past you’ve argued that understanding China’s military force is key to understanding their power in the world. Do you see the potential for a China to “surprise” the world as it did in 1951 with a weak, yet aggressive military?

**JM:** I’d put it in slightly different terms. I think it’s possible the US could end up in a shooting war with China even though the latter is still relatively weak. I think the best evidence of that is the current conflict over the Senkaku (or, Diaoyudao) Islands in the South China Sea. I think it’s not likely, but it is possible, that Japan and China could end up at war over those islands in the near future. And I think it’s possible the US could get dragged in on Japan’s side, and thereby the US and China would be shooting at each other. I am not saying this is likely, I am just saying that it is a plausible scenario. Similarly I think it is possible to have a war over the South China Sea or Taiwan in the next few years. All of this is to say there are significant tensions between China and its neighbors that could create a conflict that drags in the US.

**JoSH:** Do you think the US should care about its reputation and credibility when it comes to going to war with China over something involving one of the US’s allies?
JM: I think the US has to care deeply about its credibility in this case. In fact, I think it is concerns about credibility that might get it dragged into one of these wars. Let me explain what I mean by that. The US is deeply committed to ensuring that South Korea and Japan do not acquire nuclear weapons. And to prevent that outcome the US has extended its nuclear umbrella over those two countries. That means Japan and Korea have to believe the US commitment to defend them – with nuclear weapons if necessary – is credible. The US, in other words, has to convince its Asian allies that its promise to use its nuclear weapons to defend them is meaningful and not an empty threat. The problem that the US faces today is that our East Asian allies question the credibility of our commitment to defend them. They look at our behavior regarding Syria and Ukraine, and they wonder if the US will have their back in a crisis. They wonder if the US nuclear umbrella will be there on a rainy day. This means the US has to worry greatly about its credibility, which ultimately means that if Japan or Korea get into trouble Washington will have powerful incentives to come in quickly on their side. The same thing is largely true of Taiwan. If there is trouble over Taiwan, there will be powerful incentives for the US to come to its defense immediately if for no other reason than to send a message to South Korea and Japan that the US commitment to those countries is credible.

JoSH: Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey claimed that we are living in a world that is “more dangerous than it has ever been." Do you think he’s right?

JM: No. I think General Dempsey was probably born around 1953, and therefore came of age during the Cold War. He grew up in a much more dangerous world than the one that exists today. I think there are remarkably few serious threats to the US today. Let me put it in slightly different words: there are no threats in the world today that represent an existential threat to the US. We live in the most secure great power in the history of the world, period. And today the US is more secure than it has ever been in its entire history. We’re separated from Europe and Asia by two giant moats, we have thousands of nuclear warheads, and – according to most experts – we live in a unipolar world, which means we have no great power competitors. So where are the serious threats to the US? It is possible, as I said before, that we could get dragged into a shooting match in East Asia, but in no way is that an existential threat to the US. I think the main concern that people like General Dempsey have is terrorism. And terrorism is not a major threat; it is a minor threat that our leaders have blown out of proportion. So I think General Dempsey is wrong when he says the world is more dangerous now than at any point in his lifetime. The world was much more dangerous during the Cold War.

JoSH: In your article, “America Unhinged,” published in the National Interest, you wrote: “There are sound reasons to limit how much criticism military commanders can direct at civilian leaders and their policies. At the present moment, however, the generals should push their outspokenness to the limit.” What are those limits?

JM: Well, I think it’s hard to say exactly what they are. But I do think general officers – when they testify to Congress, talk to the media, or speak with their political supervisors – should say what they really believe. If a general officer thinks that a proposed military operation makes no
sense from a military point of view, that general officer should make his or her point of view very clear. Why? Because we have a civilian leadership that is powerfully inclined to use military force in circumstances where it is not only unnecessary, but also likely to end up producing a military failure. In those instances I think general officers have a serious responsibility, if they agree with what I just said about the likely downside of an operation, to make their views clear. And in some cases I think they should resign. In short, if the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs thinks the President is about to do something militarily that will have disastrous consequences, it is his or her responsibility to make that assessment clear and resign if necessary. I think that more behavior of this sort would be good for the US, not bad.

**JoSH:** The mission or our Journal is to help promote civil-military ties, with a special focus on academia. What do you think the right relationship between the military and academia? Do you think it’s where it needs to be?

**JM:** I think the military has an excellent relationship with academia. The only time in my life where the relationship was strained was during the Vietnam War, when the military became very unpopular on college campuses, and indeed, ROTC was pushed off a number of elite campuses and was not brought back until recently. It was also difficult in those years for West Point to send officers to certain elite graduate schools. West Point had to work hard to get officers into those schools. But I think the situation today between academia writ large and West Point is excellent. The military pays a lot of attention to what academics say, places like West Point and the War College bring academics to speak and to teach, and the military sends lots of officers to graduate school. And of course many officers in the military went to civilian institutions as undergraduates. So I think we now have a healthy relationship. Hopefully things will remain that way and we will avoid a situation like the one we had during the Vietnam War, which was surely strained, if not poisonous.

**JoSH:** We’ve talked a lot about the relationship between academia and the military, but what about academia’s interaction with policy makers? Should academics try to influence the policy process?

**JM:** I think academics are especially good at is criticizing existing policy, and thinking about new ways of approaching foreign policy issues. The great advantage academics have is they have tenure. This means you are free to say whatever you want, and you won’t be punished, because tenure is designed to protect you from being punished for voicing unpopular or controversial views. I think in a democracy it is very important to have institutions that are created to allow large numbers of individuals to speak truth to power. One of the reasons you want to have a press that is free to say what it wants is so that its members are free to criticize and challenge the government. The reason you want tenured professors is so they too can criticize the government and not be punished. It is very important to understand that no government is perfect; there has never been a country that has consistently had a flawless foreign policy. All countries make mistakes, and because of that, it’s important that there be institutions that can engage in high profile public debates, where they criticize the government. The other
thing academics do, because it is part of their job description and because they are not involved in the day to day business of running the government, is come up with new ideas, new ways of thinking about international politics. If you look at the literature on nuclear deterrence, for example, it’s quite clear that academics, broadly defined, came up with many of the major theories that have influenced US nuclear policy since the 1950s. And in recent years, academics have thought carefully about nation building, civil wars, and counterinsurgency, which is hardly surprising given the various conflicts the US has fought in the greater Middle East. Relatedly, much has been made in the media about all of the attention senior officers like General Petraeus have paid to academics broadly defined, and of course their ideas. This is not to argue that academics are geniuses that come up with all the right answers, which military officers themselves cannot figure out. The point is that academics can think independently about these issues and add their voices to the debates that are taking place inside the policy world.

JoSH: Speaking of academia and its influence on the military, in a recent article you published with Stephen Walt on theory development and hypothesis testing in international relations scholarship, you argued that “effective policy evaluation depends on good theory,” and cited the example of theories of counterinsurgency warfare. Do you think that the military is uniquely prone to developing and testing explicit theory?

JM: I don’t think it’s unique. I think that all organizations that deal with policy problems come up with theories that help them deal with the issues at hand, and they then invariably test those theories against the real world, and then hopefully improve the theories over time so they are better able to address the problems facing them. I think that if you’re in the American military and you’re tasked with dealing with any one of a broad variety of issues, you have to come up with theories to help you think about those issues and help formulate policies that will help you deal with them. And then of course you constantly run those theories up against the evidence to test them, or to put it differently, see if they make sense.

So I think the military as an institution is deeply embedded in a theoretically oriented world. Now, if you said that to your average officer, he or she would look at you like you’re crazy, because most officers, like most policy makers in Washington, think that theory is simply an academic enterprise and has nothing to do with policymaking, which is what they do. This is a wrongheaded way to think about the world. Theory and policy are inextricably bound up with each other, and there’s no way that a policymaker in Washington or any officer in the Army can engage in his or her daily life without theories. We need theories just to navigate the incredibly complicated world we live in. So the bottom line is that military lives in a very theoretically oriented world and it makes imminently good sense to recognize that fact, and act accordingly.

JoSH: So are American policy makers simply reacting to the wrong theories right now?

JM: Absolutely. There is no question about that. When it comes to international politics, American policymakers have not been thinking in theoretically smart ways for a long time. And I think the present mess in trouble over Ukraine, not to mention the mess we have created in the Middle East, illustrates my point.
JoSH: On that note, do you think Russia is trying to achieve regional hegemony right now, or reassert its sphere of influence through its ongoing actions in Ukraine?

JM: I do not think Russia is trying to establish hegemony in Europe. I think what’s going on regarding Ukraine is that Russia is reacting to NATO expansion, and more generally the effort of the US and its European allies to make Ukraine part of the West. Since the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration began pushing NATO expansion, Russian leaders have made it perfectly clear that it is unacceptable to them. They greatly fear NATO expansion, which is designed to peel Ukraine away from Russia’s orbit and make it a Western bulwark on NATO’s doorstep. So when we talk about expanding NATO and the EU eastward to include Ukraine, it is important to recognize that the ultimate goal is to separate Ukraine from Russia and to make it part of the West. The Russians understand this, and they’ve made it clear from the beginning that it is categorically unacceptable to them. In 2008 when NATO categorically announced that both Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become part of NATO, the Russians responded by saying that this would lead to big trouble, because Russia would not tolerate it. NATO made that announcement in April 2008 and not surprisingly a couple of months later there was a war between Georgia and Russia over this very issue. So we should have foreseen what was coming in Ukraine, but we did not. Why? It’s because we do not have leaders who understand “Geopolitics 101.” The Ukraine crisis is a prime example of how a country gets itself into a lot of trouble if its leaders don’t have the right theories in their head.

And, of course, the Obama Administration and many European leaders were completely surprised by the Ukraine crisis, because their thinking about international politics was governed by flawed theories.

JoSH: I’m reminded of Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks on Russia’s move. He claimed Russia was displaying “really 19th century behavior in the 21st century.”

JM: Well, the hypocrisy here on Secretary Kerry’s part is quite stunning. He also said that Russia was conducting an act of aggression “completely trumped up in terms of its pretexts.” And he condemned the invasion of a country “on phony pretext in order to assert [one’s own] interests.” This is exactly what we did in Iraq!

JoSH: If you were to describe “Joe Policymaker’s” view of the world, and what’s wrong with it, what is that?

JM: There is some variation in how American policymakers think about the world, but I think most policy makers in Washington believe – to put it in Madeline Albright’s terms – that the US is the “indispensable nation,” and that we stand taller, and we see further than other countries. And therefore they believe we have both a right and a responsibility to interfere in the politics of every country on the planet. And because they think we are a “benign hegemon” other countries are not expected to put up much of a fuss. They will understand that our motives are good, if not pure, and what we are doing is for their benefit. Just to go back to the Ukraine case: many policy makers believed that NATO expansion was good for Russia, and that Russia should welcome it.
Indeed, key US policymakers tried hard to assure Russia that NATO expansion was not directed at them and there was no reason for them to be concerned. This is a remarkably foolish way of thinking about the world. No country is “indispensable,” no country “stands taller” or “sees further” than the rest; and the Russians are perfectly capable of determining what are their own interests. In fact, the Russians have told us repeatedly since the mid-1990s that they did not agree with us that NATO expansion was good for them, and that if we persisted it was going to lead to trouble at some point. But, of course, we refused to believe them, because we have this view of ourselves that is deeply engrained in the policy-making establishment and is hard to challenge.

JoSH: What do you do for fun? What are your hobbies?

JM: (Laughs). I have no hobbies. I love my work so much; it’s really all I do. I love reading, and thinking, and writing, about important issues of international politics, and sometimes even issues that don’t involve international politics. My great regret in life is that there are not more hours in the day so I could read more, think more, and write more.

JoSH: You’re currently working on a book on nationalism. How your study of nationalism fit into your model of global politics?

JM: My book is about both nationalism and liberalism. I’m interested in the question of how liberalism and nationalism interact with each other to affect foreign policy. I believe that nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on the planet, and I believe that it has a great deal in common with realism, because realism is all about how nation-states interact with each other. When you talk about nation-states, you’re talking about nationalism. So these two isms are very similar. Liberalism, on the other hand, has a powerful universal dimension to it that is at odds with both nationalism and realism, both of which are particularistic ideologies at their core. Liberalism emphasizes the universal rights of human beings. “All people are created equal.” In liberalism, everyone has equal rights. That’s a very different way of thinking about the world from nationalism and realism, which both focus on a world populated by particular states.

President Obama likes to talk about the “international community,” but that’s very different from talking about “national security.” So there’s this real tension between “liberalism,” which has a universal dimension, and “nationalism,” which is particularistic all the way down. I’m interested in how the two relate in terms of American foreign policy and international politics more generally.

JoSH: What other projects are you working on that you’d like to share with our readers?

JM: I would at some point like to write an article about West Point and how it fits into a liberal society. It’s a very interesting question that I never thought about as a cadet. In fact many of the topics we have discussed in this interview I never thought about as a cadet. I only thought about them years after I graduated. The more I’ve gone along in life, the more I’ve wondered about how an institution like West Point fits into a liberal society like the US. After all, America is a
thoroughly liberal country and West Point is certainly not a liberal institution. Indeed, it can’t be. So I find this question of how West Point fits into liberal American society to be a fascinating one that I would like to write about.

*This interview was conducted by T.S. Allen and Luke Schumacher, and was transcribed by Charles Faint.*
Speeches

Security Threats Past, Present and Future:
2014 West Point Graduation Speech
by President Barack H. Obama

Thank you, General Caslen, for that introduction. To General Trainor, General Clarke, the faculty and staff at West Point: you have been outstanding stewards of this proud institution and outstanding mentors for the newest officers in the United States Army. I’d like to acknowledge the Army’s leadership: Secretary McHugh, General Odierno, as well as Senator Jack Reed, who is here, and a proud graduate of West Point himself.

To the class of 2014, I congratulate you on taking your place on the Long Gray Line. Among you is the first all-female command team: Erin Mauldin and Austen Boroff. In Calla Glavin, you have a Rhodes Scholar. And Josh Herbeck proves that West Point accuracy extends beyond the three-point line. To the entire class, let me reassure you in these final hours at West Point: As Commander-in-Chief, I hereby absolve all cadets who are on restriction for minor conduct offenses. (laughter and wild cheering) Let me just say that nobody ever did that for me when I was in school.

I know you join me in extending a word of thanks to your families. Joe DeMoss, whose son James is graduating, spoke for a whole lot of parents when he wrote me a letter about the sacrifices you’ve made. “Deep inside,” he wrote, “we want to explode with pride at what they are committing to do in the service of our country.” Like several graduates, James is a combat veteran. And I would ask all of us here today to stand and pay tribute -- not only to the veterans among us, but to the more than 2.5 million Americans who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as their families.

This is a particularly useful time for America to reflect on those who have sacrificed so much for our freedom, a few days after Memorial Day. You are the first class to graduate since 9/11 who may not be sent into combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. When I first spoke at West Point in 2009, we still had more than 100,000 troops in Iraq. We were preparing to surge in Afghanistan. Our counterterrorism efforts were focused on al Qaeda’s core leadership -- those who had carried out the 9/11 attacks. And our nation was just beginning a long climb out of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.

Four and a half years later, as you graduate, the landscape has changed. We have removed our troops from Iraq. We are winding down our war in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s leadership on the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been decimated, and Osama bin Laden is no more. (Applause.) And through it all, we’ve refocused our investments in what has always been

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1 President Barack H. Obama is the 44th President of the United States.
a key source of American strength: a growing economy that can provide opportunity for everybody who’s willing to work hard and take responsibility here at home.

In fact, by most measures, America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world. Those who argue otherwise -- who suggest that America is in decline, or has seen its global leadership slip away -- are either misreading history or engaged in partisan politics. Think about it. Our military has no peer. The odds of a direct threat against us by any nation are low and do not come close to the dangers we faced during the Cold War. Meanwhile, our economy remains the most dynamic on Earth; our businesses the most innovative. Each year, we grow more energy independent. From Europe to Asia, we are the hub of alliances unrivaled in the history of nations. America continues to attract striving immigrants. The values of our founding inspire leaders in parliaments and new movements in public squares around the globe. And when a typhoon hits the Philippines, or schoolgirls are kidnapped in Nigeria, or masked men occupy a building in Ukraine, it is America that the world looks to for help. (Applause.) So the United States is and remains the one indispensable nation. That has been true for the century passed and it will be true for the century to come.

But the world is changing with accelerating speed. This presents opportunity, but also new dangers. We know all too well, after 9/11, just how technology and globalization has put power once reserved for states in the hands of individuals, raising the capacity of terrorists to do harm. Russia’s aggression toward former Soviet states unnerves capitals in Europe, while China’s economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors. From Brazil to India, rising middle classes compete with us, and governments seek a greater say in global forums. And even as developing nations embrace democracy and market economies, 24-hour news and social media makes it impossible to ignore the continuation of sectarian conflicts and failing states and popular uprisings that might have received only passing notice a generation ago.

It will be your generation’s task to respond to this new world. The question we face, the question each of you will face, is not whether America will lead, but how we will lead -- not just to secure our peace and prosperity, but also extend peace and prosperity around the globe.

Now, this question isn’t new. At least since George Washington served as Commander-in-Chief, there have been those who warned against foreign entanglements that do not touch directly on our security or economic wellbeing. Today, according to self-described realists, conflicts in Syria or Ukraine or the Central African Republic are not ours to solve. And not surprisingly, after costly wars and continuing challenges here at home, that view is shared by many Americans.

A different view from interventionists from the left and right says that we ignore these conflicts at our own peril; that America’s willingness to apply force around the world is the ultimate safeguard against chaos, and America’s failure to act in the face of Syrian brutality or Russian provocations not only violates our conscience, but invites escalating aggression in the future.
And each side can point to history to support its claims. But I believe neither view fully speaks to the demands of this moment. It is absolutely true that in the 21st century American isolationism is not an option. We don’t have a choice to ignore what happens beyond our borders. If nuclear materials are not secure, that poses a danger to American cities. As the Syrian civil war spills across borders, the capacity of battle-hardened extremist groups to come after us only increases. Regional aggression that goes unchecked -- whether in southern Ukraine or the South China Sea, or anywhere else in the world -- will ultimately impact our allies and could draw in our military. We can’t ignore what happens beyond our boundaries.

And beyond these narrow rationales, I believe we have a real stake, an abiding self-interest, in making sure our children and our grandchildren grow up in a world where schoolgirls are not kidnapped and where individuals are not slaughtered because of tribe or faith or political belief. I believe that a world of greater freedom and tolerance is not only a moral imperative, it also helps to keep us safe.

But to say that we have an interest in pursuing peace and freedom beyond our borders is not to say that every problem has a military solution. Since World War II, some of our most costly mistakes came not from our restraint, but from our willingness to rush into military adventures without thinking through the consequences -- without building international support and legitimacy for our action; without leveling with the American people about the sacrifices required. Tough talk often draws headlines, but war rarely conforms to slogans. As General Eisenhower, someone with hard-earned knowledge on this subject, said at this ceremony in 1947: “War is mankind’s most tragic and stupid folly; to seek or advise its deliberate provocation is a black crime against all men.”

Like Eisenhower, this generation of men and women in uniform know all too well the wages of war, and that includes those of you here at West Point. Four of the service members who stood in the audience when I announced the surge of our forces in Afghanistan gave their lives in that effort. A lot more were wounded. I believe America’s security demanded those deployments. But I am haunted by those deaths. I am haunted by those wounds. And I would betray my duty to you and to the country we love if I ever sent you into harm’s way simply because I saw a problem somewhere in the world that needed to be fixed, or because I was worried about critics who think military intervention is the only way for America to avoid looking weak.

Here’s my bottom line: America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else will. The military that you have joined is and always will be the backbone of that leadership. But U.S. military action cannot be the only -- or even primary -- component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail. And because the costs associated with military action are so high, you should expect every civilian leader -- and especially your Commander-in-Chief -- to be clear about how that awesome power should be used.
So let me spend the rest of my time describing my vision for how the United States of America and our military should lead in the years to come, for you will be part of that leadership.

First, let me repeat a principle I put forward at the outset of my presidency: The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it -- when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions about whether our actions are proportional and effective and just. International opinion matters, but America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life. (Applause.)

On the other hand, when issues of global concern do not pose a direct threat to the United States, when such issues are at stake -- when crises arise that stir our conscience or push the world in a more dangerous direction but do not directly threaten us -- then the threshold for military action must be higher. In such circumstances, we should not go it alone. Instead, we must mobilize allies and partners to take collective action. We have to broaden our tools to include diplomacy and development; sanctions and isolation; appeals to international law; and, if just, necessary and effective, multilateral military action. In such circumstances, we have to work with others because collective action in these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more likely to be sustained, less likely to lead to costly mistakes.

This leads to my second point: For the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains terrorism. But a strategy that involves invading every country that harbors terrorist networks is naïve and unsustainable. I believe we must shift our counterterrorism strategy—drawing on the successes and shortcomings of our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan—to more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold.

And the need for a new strategy reflects the fact that today’s principal threat no longer comes from a centralized al Qaeda leadership. Instead, it comes from decentralized al Qaeda affiliates and extremists, many with agendas focused in countries where they operate. And this lessens the possibility of large-scale 9/11-style attacks against the homeland, but it heightens the danger of U.S. personnel overseas being attacked, as we saw in Benghazi. It heightens the danger to less defensible targets, as we saw in a shopping mall in Nairobi.

So we have to develop a strategy that matches this diffuse threat -- one that expands our reach without sending forces that stretch our military too thin, or stir up local resentments. We need partners to fight terrorists alongside us. And empowering partners is a large part of what we have done and what we are currently doing in Afghanistan.

Together with our allies, America struck huge blows against al Qaeda core and pushed back against an insurgency that threatened to overrun the country. But sustaining this progress depends on the ability of Afghans to do the job. And that’s why we trained hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers and police. Earlier this spring, those forces, those Afghan forces,
secured an election in which Afghans voted for the first democratic transfer of power in their history. And at the end of this year, a new Afghan President will be in office and America’s combat mission will be over.

Now, that was an enormous achievement made because of America’s armed forces. But as we move to a train-and-advise mission in Afghanistan, our reduced presence allows us to more effectively address emerging threats in the Middle East and North Africa. So, earlier this year, I asked my national security team to develop a plan for a network of partnerships from South Asia to the Sahel. Today, as part of this effort, I am calling on Congress to support a new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund of up to $5 billion, which will allow us to train, build capacity, and facilitate partner countries on the front lines. And these resources will give us flexibility to fulfill different missions, including training security forces in Yemen who have gone on the offensive against al Qaeda; supporting a multinational force to keep the peace in Somalia; working with European allies to train a functioning security force and border patrol in Libya; and facilitating French operations in Mali.

A critical focus of this effort will be the ongoing crisis in Syria. As frustrating as it is, there are no easy answers, no military solution that can eliminate the terrible suffering anytime soon. As President, I made a decision that we should not put American troops into the middle of this increasingly sectarian war, and I believe that is the right decision. But that does not mean we shouldn’t help the Syrian people stand up against a dictator who bombs and starves his own people. And in helping those who fight for the right of all Syrians to choose their own future, we are also pushing back against the growing number of extremists who find safe haven in the chaos.

So with the additional resources I’m announcing today, we will step up our efforts to support Syria’s neighbors – Jordan and Lebanon; Turkey and Iraq – as they contend with refugees and confront terrorists working across Syria’s borders. I will work with Congress to ramp up support for those in the Syrian opposition who offer the best alternative to terrorists and brutal dictators. And we will continue to coordinate with our friends and allies in Europe and the Arab World to push for a political resolution of this crisis, and to make sure that those countries and not just the United States are contributing their fair share to support the Syrian people.

Let me make one final point about our efforts against terrorism. The partnerships I’ve described do not eliminate the need to take direct action when necessary to protect ourselves. When we have actionable intelligence, that’s what we do – through capture operations like the one that brought a terrorist involved in the plot to bomb our embassies in 1998 to face justice; or drone strikes like those we’ve carried out in Yemen and Somalia. There are times when those actions are necessary, and we cannot hesitate to protect our people.

But as I said last year, in taking direct action we must uphold standards that reflect our values. That means taking strikes only when we face a continuing, imminent threat, and only
where there is no certainty -- there is near certainty of no civilian casualties. For our actions should meet a simple test: We must not create more enemies than we take off the battlefield.

I also believe we must be more transparent about both the basis of our counterterrorism actions and the manner in which they are carried out. We have to be able to explain them publicly, whether it is drone strikes or training partners. I will increasingly turn to our military to take the lead and provide information to the public about our efforts. Our intelligence community has done outstanding work, and we have to continue to protect sources and methods. But when we cannot explain our efforts clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda and international suspicion, we erode legitimacy with our partners and our people, and we reduce accountability in our own government.

And this issue of transparency is directly relevant to a third aspect of American leadership, and that is our effort to strengthen and enforce international order.

After World War II, America had the wisdom to shape institutions to keep the peace and support human progress -- from NATO and the United Nations, to the World Bank and IMF. These institutions are not perfect, but they have been a force multiplier. They reduce the need for unilateral American action and increase restraint among other nations.

Now, just as the world has changed, this architecture must change as well. At the height of the Cold War, President Kennedy spoke about the need for a peace based upon, “a gradual evolution in human institutions.” And evolving these international institutions to meet the demands of today must be a critical part of American leadership.

Now, there are a lot of folks, a lot of skeptics, who often downplay the effectiveness of multilateral action. For them, working through international institutions like the U.N. or respecting international law is a sign of weakness. I think they’re wrong. Let me offer just two examples why.

In Ukraine, Russia’s recent actions recall the days when Soviet tanks rolled into Eastern Europe. But this isn’t the Cold War. Our ability to shape world opinion helped isolate Russia right away. Because of American leadership, the world immediately condemned Russian actions; Europe and the G7 joined us to impose sanctions; NATO reinforced our commitment to Eastern European allies; the IMF is helping to stabilize Ukraine’s economy; OSCE monitors brought the eyes of the world to unstable parts of Ukraine. And this mobilization of world opinion and international institutions served as a counterweight to Russian propaganda and Russian troops on the border and armed militias in ski masks.

This weekend, Ukrainians voted by the millions. Yesterday, I spoke to their next President. We don’t know how the situation will play out and there will remain grave challenges ahead, but standing with our allies on behalf of international order working with international institutions, has given a chance for the Ukrainian people to choose their future without us firing a shot.
Similarly, despite frequent warnings from the United States and Israel and others, the Iranian nuclear program steadily advanced for years. But at the beginning of my presidency, we built a coalition that imposed sanctions on the Iranian economy, while extending the hand of diplomacy to the Iranian government. And now we have an opportunity to resolve our differences peacefully.

The odds of success are still long, and we reserve all options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. But for the first time in a decade, we have a very real chance of achieving a breakthrough agreement -- one that is more effective and durable than what we could have achieved through the use of force. And throughout these negotiations, it has been our willingness to work through multilateral channels that kept the world on our side.

The point is this is American leadership. This is American strength. In each case, we built coalitions to respond to a specific challenge. Now we need to do more to strengthen the institutions that can anticipate and prevent problems from spreading. For example, NATO is the strongest alliance the world has ever known. But we’re now working with NATO allies to meet new missions, both within Europe where our Eastern allies must be reassured, but also beyond Europe’s borders where our NATO allies must pull their weight to counterterrorism and respond to failed states and train a network of partners.

Likewise, the U.N. provides a platform to keep the peace in states torn apart by conflict. Now we need to make sure that those nations who provide peacekeepers have the training and equipment to actually keep the peace, so that we can prevent the type of killing we’ve seen in Congo and Sudan. We are going to deepen our investment in countries that support these peacekeeping missions, because having other nations maintain order in their own neighborhoods lessens the need for us to put our own troops in harm’s way. It’s a smart investment. It’s the right way to lead. (Applause.)

Keep in mind, not all international norms relate directly to armed conflict. We have a serious problem with cyber-attacks, which is why we’re working to shape and enforce rules of the road to secure our networks and our citizens. In the Asia Pacific, we’re supporting Southeast Asian nations as they negotiate a code of conduct with China on maritime disputes in the South China Sea. And we’re working to resolve these disputes through international law. That spirit of cooperation needs to energize the global effort to combat climate change -- a creeping national security crisis that will help shape your time in uniform, as we are called on to respond to refugee flows and natural disasters and conflicts over water and food, which is why next year I intend to make sure America is out front in putting together a global framework to preserve our planet.

You see, American influence is always stronger when we lead by example. We can’t exempt ourselves from the rules that apply to everybody else. We can’t call on others to make commitments to combat climate change if a whole lot of our political leaders deny that it’s taking
place. We can’t try to resolve problems in the South China Sea when we have refused to make sure that the Law of the Sea Convention is ratified by our United States Senate, despite the fact that our top military leaders say the treaty advances our national security. That’s not leadership; that’s retreat. That’s not strength; that’s weakness. It would be utterly foreign to leaders like Roosevelt and Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy.

I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being. But what makes us exceptional is not our ability to flout international norms and the rule of law; it is our willingness to affirm them through our actions. (Applause.) And that’s why I will continue to push to close Gitmo -- because American values and legal traditions do not permit the indefinite detention of people beyond our borders. (Applause.) That’s why we’re putting in place new restrictions on how America collects and uses intelligence -- because we will have fewer partners and be less effective if a perception takes hold that we’re conducting surveillance against ordinary citizens. (Applause.) America does not simply stand for stability or the absence of conflict, no matter what the cost. We stand for the more lasting peace that can only come through opportunity and freedom for people everywhere.

Which brings me to the fourth and final element of American leadership: Our willingness to act on behalf of human dignity. America’s support for democracy and human rights goes beyond idealism -- it is a matter of national security. Democracies are our closest friends and are far less likely to go to war. Economies based on free and open markets perform better and become markets for our goods. Respect for human rights is an antidote to instability and the grievances that fuel violence and terror.

A new century has brought no end to tyranny. In capitals around the globe -- including, unfortunately, some of America’s partners -- there has been a crackdown on civil society. The cancer of corruption has enriched too many governments and their cronies, and enraged citizens from remote villages to iconic squares. And watching these trends, or the violent upheavals in parts of the Arab World, it’s easy to be cynical.

But remember that because of America’s efforts, because of American diplomacy and foreign assistance as well as the sacrifices of our military, more people live under elected governments today than at any time in human history. Technology is empowering civil society in ways that no iron fist can control. New breakthroughs are lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. And even the upheaval of the Arab World reflects the rejection of an authoritarian order that was anything but stable, and now offers the long-term prospect of more responsive and effective governance.

In countries like Egypt, we acknowledge that our relationship is anchored in security interests -- from peace treaties with Israel, to shared efforts against violent extremism. So we have not cut off cooperation with the new government, but we can and will persistently press for reforms that the Egyptian people have demanded.
And meanwhile, look at a country like Burma, which only a few years ago was an intractable dictatorship and hostile to the United States—40 million people. Thanks to the enormous courage of the people in that country, and because we took the diplomatic initiative, American leadership, we have seen political reforms opening a once closed society; a movement by Burmese leadership away from partnership with North Korea in favor of engagement with America and our allies. We’re now supporting reform and badly needed national reconciliation through assistance and investment, through coaxing and, at times, public criticism. And progress there could be reversed, but if Burma succeeds we will have gained a new partner without having fired a shot. American leadership.

In each of these cases, we should not expect change to happen overnight. That’s why we form alliances not just with governments, but also with ordinary people. For unlike other nations, America is not afraid of individual empowerment, we are strengthened by it. We’re strengthened by civil society. We’re strengthened by a free press. We’re strengthened by striving entrepreneurs and small businesses. We’re strengthened by educational exchange and opportunity for all people, and women and girls. That’s who we are. That’s what we represent. (Applause.)

I saw that through a trip to Africa last year, where American assistance has made possible the prospect of an AIDS-free generation, while helping Africans care themselves for their sick. We’re helping farmers get their products to market, to feed populations once endangered by famine. We aim to double access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa so people are connected to the promise of the global economy. And all this creates new partners and shrinks the space for terrorism and conflict.

Now, tragically, no American security operation can eradicate the threat posed by an extremist group like Boko Haram, the group that kidnapped those girls. And that’s why we have to focus not just on rescuing those girls right away, but also on supporting Nigerian efforts to educate its youth. This should be one of the hard-earned lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, where our military became the strongest advocate for diplomacy and development. They understood that foreign assistance is not an afterthought, something nice to do apart from our national defense, apart from our national security. It is part of what makes us strong.

Ultimately, global leadership requires us to see the world as it is, with all its danger and uncertainty. We have to be prepared for the worst, prepared for every contingency. But American leadership also requires us to see the world as it should be -- a place where the aspirations of individual human beings really matters; where hopes and not just fears govern; where the truths written into our founding documents can steer the currents of history in a direction of justice. And we cannot do that without you.

Class of 2014, you have taken this time to prepare on the quiet banks of the Hudson. You leave this place to carry forward a legacy that no other military in history can claim. You do so as part of a team that extends beyond your units or even our Armed Forces, for in the course of your
service you will work as a team with diplomats and development experts. You’ll get to know allies and train partners. And you will embody what it means for America to lead the world.

Next week, I will go to Normandy to honor the men who stormed the beaches there. And while it’s hard for many Americans to comprehend the courage and sense of duty that guided those who boarded small ships, it’s familiar to you. At West Point, you define what it means to be a patriot.

Three years ago, Gavin White graduated from this academy. He then served in Afghanistan. Like the soldiers who came before him, Gavin was in a foreign land, helping people he’d never met, putting himself in harm’s way for the sake of his community and his family, of the folks back home. Gavin lost one of his legs in an attack. I met him last year at Walter Reed. He was wounded, but just as determined as the day that he arrived here at West Point -- and he developed a simple goal. Today, his sister Morgan will graduate. And true to his promise, Gavin will be there to stand and exchange salutes with her. (Applause.)

We have been through a long season of war. We have faced trials that were not foreseen, and we’ve seen divisions about how to move forward. But there is something in Gavin’s character, there is something in the American character that will always triumph. Leaving here, you carry with you the respect of your fellow citizens. You will represent a nation with history and hope on our side. Your charge, now, is not only to protect our country, but to do what is right and just. As your Commander-in-Chief, I know you will.

May God bless you. May God bless our men and women in uniform. And may God bless the United States of America.

Transcript courtesy of the West Point Public Affairs Office
Defending Our Values and Interests:
2014 Thayer Award Acceptance Speech
by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

Good evening. General Odierno, General Caslen and Mrs. Caslen, Command Sergeant Major Byers, and especially the Corps of Cadets, thank you so much for having me and thank you for the Thayer Award. I am so grateful to receive the Sylvanus Thayer Award. I walked today in the Thayer Award room and looked at the portraits of others who have received this great award. And it’s one of those moments when you think, “Do I really belong in this list?” because there are some exceptional folks in that room, and I am just very grateful that from now on I will be counted among them. That’s thanks to you, and I just can’t tell you how grateful I am for this honor and how much I enjoyed the wonderful review earlier today. So, to the Corps of Cadets, thank you for that as well. [Applause.]

Now, I am also really glad to be here at West Point. I am going to have to ask you to help me out with something. You see, I was recently appointed to the college football playoff committee, and as a member of that committee, which will choose in about seven or eight weeks four teams that will compete in the first national semi-finals playoffs leading to the first true national championship game—as a member of that committee I have to maintain absolute impartiality, I am sure you understand that. So I am only going to say half of this phrase, and I want you to say the rest. “Go Army!” [Corps of Cadets: “Beat Navy!” Applause.]

West Point is a very special place. It’s a place of tradition, a place of honor and duty. It’s a place that recognizes that the United States of America, this very special and exceptional country, must have very special and exceptional people to lead it and to defend it. As a university professor, I am incredibly impressed with what the Corps of Cadets does as students. I know that a university life is difficult enough. I know that you have chosen concentrations and majors about which you are passionate. I know that you do hard work every day to make yourselves experts in those concentrations and majors. I know that sometimes the studies come easily because it comes naturally to you, and I know that it sometimes is hard because no one can only do what comes easy; you also have to do that which is hard. And indeed sometimes overcoming that which is hard is more fulfilling than always doing that which comes easily. And so I know that you expand and push yourselves to get outside of your zones of comfort, to expand your talents to become better at what you do in the classroom every single day, and I admire that. I know too that, just like any other college student, it requires a lot of time—a lot of time for books, a lot of time in the lab, a lot of time in the study hall, a lot of time with professors—and that’s not easy.

But, of course, here at West Point more is demanded of you. More is asked of you: to keep your physical readiness to defend this country, to keep your moral compass, to lead those who will defend this country. And I want you to know that your peers appreciate that. When the Stanford football team played here last year, they all came back filled with stories of how inspired they were by what you do at West Point. Perhaps people don’t tell you that very often. But you set an example for your college peers around the country about what “honor” and “duty” can mean as you prepare to take on the challenges and the tasks ahead of you. As future officers, I know too that you work hard to develop leadership skills, to act with integrity, to act in a way that those

1 Secretary Condoleezza Rice was the 66th United States Secretary of State.
who we will lead will always know that you would never ask them to do anything that you
yourself would not do. To me that is the definition of integrity. Because the people you lead must
know that you have it, you must never lose their confidence that you have it, because you will
never get it back. And so to lead with integrity is a challenge and a trust, and I know that you
work at it every day.

Our country has depended on very special men and women who volunteer to defend us at the
front lines of freedom. They volunteer to defend our interests, and they volunteer to defend our
values. America has always been at its best when it leads both from power and from principle,
and that is what you represent here at West Point. There has probably never been in the history
of humankind a more powerful military force than the United States of America’s
military. Global in its reach, capable beyond much of human comprehension, it is indeed a
powerful, powerful force. But it has been dedicated to using that power to try and make the
world a better place. To see the world not as it is, but the world as it should be. America has
always led from the core belief that people have a right to live in freedom. That there is no corner
of the earth where people should be condemned to live in tyranny. That men and women are only
afforded human dignity when they can say what they think, worship as they please, be free from
the knock of the secret police at night and the arbitrary power of the state, and when they can
demand that those who would govern them would have to ask for their consent to do it.

We have always believed that there is no man, there is no woman, and there is no child who
doesn’t desire those basic rights as we do. And we have set aside those who would argue that
there are cultures, peoples who just don’t have the DNA for democracy. We believe that it is the
God-given right, indeed it is the highest form of human potential to be governed in a democratic
fashion. And we have fought for that. And we believe too that when men and women are free,
we are safer. You see, our values and our interests are inextricably linked because we know that
societies that treat their people badly, that oppress women and minorities, that are ruled by the
arbitrary hand of authoritarians are dangerous societies. We have seen it throughout history. And
that is why our belief in a more democratic and freer world is also a belief in a safer world.

Now the United States of America has been willing to sacrifice on behalf of that belief. We’ve
been animated to stand for those values and to defend them. And that has meant that we have
behaved like no ordinary country would behave. It has meant that we have sent young men to
storm the beaches of Normandy and fight for people that they would never meet. It has meant
that we stood vigilant in Asia for more than 70 years now so that democracy could triumph in
Japan and in South Korea, and so that those people of those great countries could remake
themselves into democratic societies. And, of course, we stood vigilant in Europe until the Soviet
Union could be defeated and rolled back to the shore of Russia, and Europe could emerge whole,
free, and at peace. And then we would try to give people a chance in Baghdad and Basra, in
Kabul and Kandahar, because we knew that if they could come to decent lives and decent
governance, then we, too, would be safer.

9/11, that awful day that took place more than 13 years ago now, required a different and new
call to Americans to serve our country. We had become awfully accustomed to our threats being
“out there,” but on that day evil would visit our very shores. I will never forget standing at my
desk in the White House; my young assistant coming to me and saying that a plane had hit the
World Trade Center, and I thought what a terrible accident that must have been. President Bush was at an education event in Florida. To show our pre-9/11 thinking, he was only going to be gone a few hours, so I was not with him as the National Security Advisor and neither was the Deputy National Security Advisor, and I got on the phone with him and told him what had happened, and he said, “What a terrible accident.” And then a few minutes later, my assistant handed me a note that said a second plane had hit the World Trade Center. I thought, “My God, this is a terrorist attack.” And then I went into the Situation Room to try and reach the other national security principles: Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, was in Peru; George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, had already gone to a bunker; and I tried to reach Secretary Rumsfeld, and his phone was just ringing and ringing and ringing—and I looked behind me and a plane had hit the Pentagon. Now about that time the Secret Service came and said, “Dr. Rice you have got to get to a bunker because planes are flying into buildings all over Washington, DC. The White House has got to be next.” Now when the Secret Service wants to escort you under those circumstances, they don’t escort you; they pick you up and they carry you. And I remember being levitated toward a bunker, getting there, talking to the President, having him say, “I’m coming back,” and telling him, “Stay where you are. It’s not safe here. The United States of America is under attack.” From that day forward, nothing would ever be the same. Our conception of security would never be the same. We knew that, yes, we would have to protect the homeland, but if we were not to once again become “Fortress America”, we would have to take the fight to the terrorists too. We would have to defeat them where they are, where they were, so that they could never again visit that kind of chaos and wreak that kind of havoc on our home soil.

The men and women of West Point answered that call with many other young volunteers. And I know that West Point lost a disproportionate number of young lives in that struggle. I want you to know, as those who follow them, that they will never be forgotten for what they did; that they will always be an inspiration as we remember what service really is, and their sacrifice was worth it. Because nothing of value is ever won without sacrifice.

I was National Security Advisor on that day, and from that day on every day after seemed like September 12th. We would worry more about ungoverned spaces like Somalia, Yemen, and the high mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And, yes, today an ungoverned swath of territory larger than the state of Indiana between Iraq and Syria, where a force so brutal and so barbaric that Al Qaeda expelled them is operating. The challenges go on. The threats remain. But one thing is certain: we are up to the task because we have on our side not just what we’ve done for the world, as much as we have done—it is a lot—but it is not just what we have done, but who we are.

You see, remembering who we are is really the core of our inspiration. “We the people” is not an exclusive concept. “We the people” is not bound by ethnicity or nationality or religion. Ours has been a history of expanding the conception of “We the people” to become ever more inclusive every day. “We the people” has meant a creed, a creed that we believe that you can come from humble circumstances and do great things. That it does not matter where you came from, but where you are going. That is who we are as “We the people.” It has been a hard struggle to expand this concept. We are not a perfect country. No human institution is perfect. But what
makes us special is that we keep striving each and every day to become a little bit better at who we are.

We have had and were bequeathed a remarkable document, the Constitution of the United States of America, which has helped us to expand “We the people,” step by step, brick by brick, along the long journey toward inclusion. That remarkable Constitution which you have vowed to defend is a Constitution that began with my ancestors counted as 3/5ths of a man in the compromise that allowed the United States of America to be born. And yet it was that same Constitution to which Martin Luther King would appeal when he said that segregation was wrong in my home state of Alabama. It was the Constitution that would eventually make it possible for women to vote, and it was the Constitution, that remarkable evergreen document that keeps expanding the conception of “We the people,” to which I would take an oath of allegiance as the 66th Secretary of State, despite the fact that I had grown up in a hometown where I couldn’t go to a movie theater, where I couldn’t go to a restaurant, where segregation was legal and where blacks were second-class citizens. When you defend America, remember that you are not defending a country that claims perfection: you are defending a country that simply promises to try to get better day after day.

“We the people” is not only not a conception of nationality, ethnicity or religion, it is what has allowed people to come here from every corner of the earth and be a part of it. But “We the people” must also not be bound by class. You were not to be a prisoner of the circumstances of your birth, but rather through hard work and through energy and, ultimately, through a high quality education, you were to be able to access that belief that it doesn’t matter where you came from, it matters where you are going. We have work to do to make sure that this remains the case. Today I can look at your zip code and I can tell whether you are going to get a high quality education or not and for our “We the people,” that is a terrible thing to say. So each and every one of us as we defend our values and our interests need to remember that our work here at home is done to make certain that this concept is as inclusive as possible, that class is not a barrier to inclusion.

Now, as we go out into this troubled world, as we go out to defend our values and our interests, as we remember the history and tradition of what we have done, and as we remember who we are, we must never forget why we do what we do. We do what we do because there has always been in international politics a country that had a view of how human history ought to unfold and was willing to sacrifice on behalf of it. For many years now, that country has been the United States, and we have said that human history will unfold toward free peoples.

I know that the burdens of leadership are sometimes heavy. I know too that Americans are sometimes tired of those burdens of leadership, wondering can’t someone else take this mantle and move it forward? But we know that there is no one else to take up this mantle of leadership. We know that those who might take up the mantle of leadership are not those who share our values and our interests. Perhaps we are tired after the 13 long years since 9/11 of war, terrorism, and vigilance. Perhaps we are tired of trying to extend to peoples who are not free freedoms, so that we might be more secure. But let me assure you of one thing: the terrorists are not tired. Great powers that behave badly, like Vladimir Putin’s Russia, are not tired. Countries that would challenge the order in Asia, like China, are not tired. And we cannot afford to be tired either.
The mantle of leadership is ours. And I do believe that we will once again answer the call and take it up. And if, at times, that burden seems too heavy, let’s just remember the times when the impossible now seems inevitable in retrospect. I was the White House Soviet specialist at the end of the Cold War. It frankly doesn’t get better than that. I had a chance to be there for the liberation of Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany and the beginnings of the peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union. But every day as we harvested the good decisions that had been taken long, long before, I asked myself the following question: “what if.”

What if in 1946 when the Italian communists won 48 percent of the vote and the French communists 46 percent of the vote, what if America had been tired? What if in 1947, when there was civil war in Greece and civil conflict in Turkey and 2 million starving Europeans necessitating the Marshall Plan, what if America had been tired? What if in 1948, when President Truman risked recognizing Israel and war broke out in the Middle East the next day, what if America had been tired? Or the Berlin airlift of 1948 or when the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear weapon five years ahead of schedule or the Chinese communists won when the Korean War broke out in 1950, what if we had been tired and unwilling to take the mantle of leadership? Would we have been able many years later to say here is what had happened: Eastern Europe was liberated and Europe was whole and free; Germany was unified fully and completely on Western terms—NATO survived; the Soviet Union, by the way, collapsed, the hammer and sickle coming down for the last time; and in 2006 an American president would attend a NATO summit in Latvia. What would have happened had America been tired?

And so, we will take up that mantle again, and we will do so with inspiration and we will do so with a sense of purpose. And you, the men and women of West Point, will help to inspire us. You will inspire us by the traditions of this place that has inspired you. You will inspire us by the heritage to which you are the rightful heirs. And you will inspire us because you believe in Duty and Honor and Country. You will take on the obligation to defend this exceptional country called the United States of America, and your fellow citizens will always be grateful that you answered the call. Thank you very much. [Applause.]

Transcript courtesy of the West Point Association of Graduates
A Sailor’s Perspective on the United States Army
Address to West Point Class of 2015, “500th Night”
by Admiral William H. McRaven

Good evening General and Mrs. Caslen, General and Mrs. Clarke, General Trainor, Col Brazil, Command Sergeants Major Duane and Byers, distinguished guests and most importantly Class of 2015. I am truly honored to be here tonight to address the future leaders of the United States Army.

But, as a graduate of a state school in Texas, who majored in journalism because I couldn’t do math, or science, or engineering or accounting, I am somewhat intimidated by the thought of giving any advice, to any cadet, on anything. Nevertheless, after almost 37 years in the service, much of that time with the Army, there may be something I can offer.

So tonight, as you begin the final 500 days of your time at the United States Military Academy, I would like to give you a Sailor’s Perspective on the Army; not the Army of the Hudson, not the Army of the history books, not the Army portrayed in the countless murals across campus, but the Army you will enter in 500 days—the Army upon which the future of the Nation rests; the Army that you will shape and the Army that you will lead. So, if you will humor this old sailor, I will tell you what I’ve learned in my time serving with the Army.

In the past twelve years I have worked for the great Generals of this generation; Dempsey, Petraeus, Odierno, McChrystal, Austin, Rodriguez and Dailey. All graduates of the Military Academy, each man, different in his own way.

Dempsey, a man of great humor and compassion, whose quick wit, and keen tactical sense allowed him to secure Baghdad as a Division Commander, lead the Central Command as a three star, and today, as the Chairman, he presides over the greatest change in our military since WWII and he does so with tremendous reason, intelligence and with a song in his heart.

Petraeus, whose understanding of the strategic nature of war was unparalleled. Who saw opportunity in every challenge and who dared greatly in hopes of great victories. His daily command decisions in Iraq and Afghanistan unquestionably saved the lives of thousands of young soldiers.

Odierno, a soldier’s soldier, who as a Division and Corps commander in Iraq, fought with a fierceness one would expect of a great warrior and then as the Commander of all forces in Iraq combined that fierceness with the diplomat’s subtle hand to lead and shape the future of a sovereign Iraq. And today, he leads the greatest Army the world has ever known.

Austin, the quiet bear of a man, whose deep intellect and incomparable combat experience allowed him to think through every complex problem and to succeed where others might have failed.

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1 At the time of this speech, Admiral William McRaven was serving as the 9th commander of US Special Operations Command. He has since retired from the military and now serves as the chancellor for the University of Texas system. This speech was given at West Point on 18 January 2014.
McChrystal, whose creative mind and intense drive for perfection, changed forever how special operations would fight on the battlefield and changed how SOF would forever be perceived by the Nation—and in doing so, likely changed the course of the Armed Forces as well.

Rodriguez, the everyman’s general who proved time and again, that character matters—that hard work, perseverance, persistence, and toughness on the battlefield are always traits of success.

And Del Dailey, whose boldness and innovation, coupled with a Night Stalkers sense of teamwork and aggressiveness, began the revolution in special operations.

What did I learn about the Army in watching these men and other great leaders like Keith Alexander, Chuck Jacoby, Mike Scaparrotti, John Campbell, Bob Caslen and Rich Clarke?

Well, I learned first and foremost that your allegiance as an officer is always, always to the Nation and to those civilian leaders who were elected by the people, who represent the people. The oath you took is clear; to support and defend the Constitution, not the institution— not the Army, not the Corps, not the division, not the brigade, not the battalion, not the company, not the platoon, and not the squad—but the nation.

I learned that leadership is hard. Karl von Clausewitz once said that “everything in war is easy, but the easy things are difficult.” Leadership sounds easy in the books, but it is quite difficult in real life. I learned that leadership is difficult because it is a human interaction and nothing, nothing is more daunting, more frustrating more complex than trying to lead men and women in tough times. Those officers that do it well earn your respect, because doing it poorly is common place. You will be challenged to do it well.

I learned that taking care of soldiers is not about coddling them. It is about challenging them. Establishing a standard of excellence and holding them accountable for reaching it. I learned that good officers lead from the front. I can’t count the times that I saw Petraeus, without body armor, walking the streets of Mosul, Baghdad or Ramadi, to share the dangers with his men and to show the enemy he wasn’t afraid.

Or McChrystal, jocking-up to go on a long patrol with his Rangers or SEALs in Afghanistan; Dempsey on a spur ride in Iraq; Austin at the head of his Division during the invasion of Iraq; Odierno, cigar in mouth, rumbling through the streets of Basrah; Rodriguez and Dailey always center stage during the tough fights in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I learned that if you are in combat, move to where the action is the hottest. Spend time with the soldiers being miserable, exhausted and scared. If you’re a Blackhawk pilot or a tank commander, spend some time on the flight line or in the motor pool with the maintainers and the wrench turners. Whatever position or branch you are in, find the toughest, most dangerous, job in your unit and go do it.

I learned that you won’t get a lot of thanks in return. I learned that you shouldn’t expect it. Your soldiers are doing the tough job every day, but I guarantee you, you will learn a lot about your troops and they will learn a lot about you.
I learned that the great leaders know how to fail. In the course of your Army career you will likely fail and fail often. Nothing so steels you for battle like failure. No officer I watched got it right, every time. But the great ones know that when they fail, they must pick themselves up, learn from their mistakes and move on.

Rudyard Kipling, the great British storyteller, poet and studier of soldiers once wrote, in part, “If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs and blaming it on you. If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you, but make allowances for their doubting too. If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster and treat those two imposters just the same. Yours is the earth and everything that’s in it and which is more—you’ll be a man, my son.”

If you can’t stomach failure, then you will never be a great leader. I learned that great Army officers are risk takers, but the greatest risk is not on the battlefield, but in standing up for what’s right.

I have seen a young lieutenant stand up to a colonel when that officer’s behavior was out of line. I have seen a captain challenge a general about a flawed battle plan. I have seen many a general privately confront their civilian leadership and question the merits of the national decisions. All Army officers are expected to take risks in battle. The truly great officers know that real victory is achieved when men and women of character take professional risks and challenge the weak-kneed, the faint of heart, the indecisive or the bullies.

And finally, in watching Army officers, young and old, I learned that the great officers are equally good at following as they are at leading. Following is one of the most underrated aspects of leadership and each of you will be asked to follow someone else. The strength of a good unit rests more on how well the officers follow the commander, than how well they lead their own soldiers. I have seen many a good Battalion and Company underachieve because someone in the officer ranks thought the Commander was incompetent and quietly worked to undermine his authority.

I guarantee you, that in the course of your career you will work for leaders whom you don’t like and don’t respect. It will be easy to make fun of their idiosyncrasies, their receding hair line, their soft chin or their spouse. Be very careful about getting too smug, too opinionated and too righteous. As long as the actions of your commander are moral, legal and ethical, then do everything you can to support the chain of command and avoid the rolling eyes, the whisper campaigns and junior officer dissension.

I learned that the great Army officers know how to follow. And what about the soldiers that you will lead? In my career I have been fortunate to have served beside soldiers from the Screaming Eagles of the 101st Division, the paratroopers of the All American Division, the 1st Armored Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, the 1st, 3rd and 4th Infantry Division, all Groups of the Special Forces Regiment and my beloved Army Rangers.

I learned that the greatest privilege the Army can bestow upon you is to give you the opportunity to lead such magnificent men and women. These soldiers are not without their challenges. Your soldiers will, at times, question your authority. They will undermine your actions. They will
mislead you, frustrate you, disappoint you, and occasionally fail you. But, when the chips are down, I mean really down, your soldiers will be there and they will inspire you with their courage, their sense of duty, their leadership, their love and their respect.

In difficult times, your soldiers will be everything you dreamed they would be—and more. All one has to do is look at the citations that accompany the actions of Sergeants Sal Giunta, Leroy Petry, Robbie Miller, Ty Carter, Jared Monti, Ross McGinnis, Paul Smith, and Clinton Romesha. Men whose unparalleled heroism, above and beyond the call of duty, was only apparent moments before their brothers were threatened. I learned that your soldiers are at their best when their brothers and sisters in arms are threatened. They are at their best when life deals them the hardest of blows and their indomitable spirit shines through.

In 2007, I visited the intensive care unit in Landstuhl, Germany, where the Army was sending all of its most critically injured soldiers from Iraq. As I walked into the sterile room, clad from head to toe in clean white garb, a man lay naked on the bed in front of me. Missing one leg above the knee and part of the foot on the other leg, he was swollen beyond recognition from the blast of an IED.

The doctor in attendance didn’t know the man’s unit or service. I asked the man in the bed if he was a Marine or a Soldier. Unable to talk, he pointed to his thigh. There on what was left of his thigh, was a tattoo; the 1st Infantry Division. “You’re a soldier,” I remarked. He nodded. “An infantryman.” I said. He smiled through what was left of his face and then he picked up a clipboard upon which he had been writing notes. He looked me in the eye and wrote on the paper. “I—will—be—infantry—again!” Exclamation point. And somehow I knew that he would.

Just like the young Ranger in the combat hospital at Bagram who had both his legs amputated and was also unable to speak. The nurse at his bedside said that he knew sign language. His mother was deaf and the soldier had learned to sign at a young age. He was so very young and a part of me must have shown a small sign of pity for this Ranger whose life had just been devastated. With a picture of hand gestures in front of me, the Ranger, barely able to move and in excruciating pain, signed, “I will be okay.”

And a year later I saw him at the Ranger Regimental Change of Command. He was wearing his prosthetic shorties, smiling from ear to ear and challenging the Rangers around him to a pull up contest. He was okay. Just like the young female sergeant who I just visited at Walter Reed this week. She was seriously injured in a parachute accident. With her father by her side, she laughed off the injury like it was a scratch. She’s been in the hospital for two months and has years of rehabilitation ahead of her. She has no self-pity, no remorse, no regrets, just determination to get back to her unit.

These soldiers and tens of thousands like them will be the warriors you lead in 500 days. You had better be up to the task, because I have learned that they expect you to be good. And, most importantly, I also learned that your soldiers expect you to hold them to high standards. These soldiers joined the service to be part of something special and if they are not held to a high
standard, if their individual efforts are no more important, no more appreciated than the efforts of a slacker then it will directly affect the morale of the unit.

_And I learned that nothing is more important than the morale of a unit._ MacArthur once said of morale, “…that it cannot be produced by pampering or coddling an Army, and it is not necessarily destroyed by hardship, danger, or even calamity…It will wither quickly, however, if soldiers come to believe themselves the victims of indifference or injustice on the part…of their leaders.”

The great leaders in the Army never accept indifference or injustice and they only judge their soldiers based on the merit of their work. Nothing else is important. Not the soldier’s size, not their color, not their gender, not their orientation, not their religion, not their ethnicity—nothing is important, but how well your soldiers do their job.

I am confident that history will reflect that the young American’s who enlisted in the Army after September 11th, were equal in greatness to their grandfathers and their great grandfathers who fought in the World Wars—and in 500 days you will inherit these incredible soldiers. Be ready.

Finally, in watching the Army for most of my career, _I learned that no institution in the world has the history, the legacy, the traditions, or the pride that comes from being a soldier._ I am envious beyond words. I learned that whether you serve 4 years or 40 years you will never, ever regret your decision to have joined the United States Army. You will serve beside the finest men and women in America. You will be challenged every day. You will fail. You will succeed. You will grow. You will have adventures to fill ten life times and stories that your friends from home will never be able to understand. Your children and their children and their children’s children, will be incredibly proud of your service and when you pass from this earth, the Nation that you served so very well will honor you for your duty. And your only regret will be that you could not have served longer.

And if for one moment you believe that because Iraq is over and Afghanistan is winding down that the future holds few challenges for you, then you are terribly, terribly mistaken. Because as long as there are threats to this great Nation, the Army upon which this Nation was founded, will be the cornerstone of its security, it’s freedom and its future. And you, as Army Officers, will shape that future, secure our freedoms and protect us from harm.

So what has this sailor learned? _That there is no more noble calling in the world than to be a soldier in the United States Army._ Good luck to you all as you complete your final 500 days. May God bless America and may we always have the privilege to serve her. Thank you very much.

_Transcription provided by West Point Public Affairs Office and is printed here with the permission of both West Point and Special Operations Command._
We Can Never Do Enough:  
2015 Thayer Award Acceptance Speech  
by Mr. Gary Sinise

Lt. General Caslen and Mrs. Caslen, Brigadier General Thomson and Mrs. Thompson, Brigadier General Trainor and Colonel Brazil, Command Sergeant Major Clark, West Point Association of Graduates Board Chairman Lt. General Retired Larry Jordan, Colonel Robert McClure, Distinguished Guests, and the Corps of Cadets of West Point:

It is impossible to adequately put into words what it means to receive this prestigious award from the West Point Association of Graduates, but I will do my best to speak from my heart and share my thoughts and feelings with you for a moment. Reviewing the Corps of Cadets on the Plain earlier today will be a magnificent memory that I will cherish always, and to stand in this sacred hall, and to now be among such a distinguished list of recipients who have stood here in the past, addressing you as I am now, is overwhelming, and I am deeply grateful.

And while I do not seek acknowledgement, and it is hard for me to imagine myself deserving of such a tribute, as there are so many who inspire and motivate me each day by their courage and selflessness, it is my hope that, by shining a light on me tonight, we will help to raise a deeper awareness for the many sacrifices that our military, and our military families, continue to make each day in our nation’s defense.

Wanting to know more about the man this award is named for, Sylvanus Thayer, Class of 1808, I did a bit of research. What an amazing person he was. Dedicated to service, well respected by the Corps of Cadets at that time, during his 16-year tenure as superintendent, he instituted a rigorous four-year regimen of study and instruction in order to instill the very best in every student. He drilled into each cadet the essentials for a military leader: discipline, precision, reliability, and honor.

In one article I read, the writer, while staring up at the serious face of the statue of Sylvanus Thayer, wondered if Thayer had a sense of humor. I’m sure he must have, as I understand Thayer Week is one of the most enjoyable and funnest times of year for the cadets.

And even though West Point began 15 years prior to his becoming superintendent, Sylvanus Thayer is known as “the Father of the Military Academy.” He lived a life of service. To Duty. To Honor. To Country. And I am deeply moved to receive this acknowledgement in his name.

I grew up in the city of Chicago, in a working-class family, surrounded by veterans: WW I, WW II, Korea era, Vietnam, Cold War Europe, and a nephew currently on active duty in the Army today. Go Army! Army Strong!

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1 Mr. Gary Sinise is a highly acclaimed actor known for his work in support of the military. This speech was given at West Point on 22 October, 2015.
My wife’s two brothers served in the U.S. Army in Vietnam, as did her sister’s husband as a combat medic. The younger of the two brothers, served there as a helicopter pilot and left the Army shortly after returning home.

The eldest brother, Boyd McCanna “Mac” Harris, a West Point graduate Class of ’66, served two tours in Vietnam, once as a lieutenant, a platoon leader, and then again as a captain, a company commander. During his time in country he was presented the Silver Star for gallantry in action, one of many awards received during his outstanding career. In 1975, back at West Point, he was promoted to major and served here as a tactical officer until 1977. I have met many great leaders currently serving in high command that served under Mac during those years, and they all speak of him with great admiration, appreciation, and respect. He taught behavioral sciences and leadership from ’77 to ’78.

He attended Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas as a student, and, upon graduation in June of 1981, because of his extensive knowledge, experience, and Army-wide reputation as the authority on creative leadership, he was selected to head the Center of Leadership and Ethics at Fort Leavenworth. As a young man in the early 80s, I remember learning that Mac, now a lieutenant colonel, had begun work as the project officer and author of the United States Army Manual on Leadership, FM 22-100. This was an 18-month effort that resulted in a manual that represented a positive philosophy of leadership and became widely used as standard doctrine throughout the entire United States Army. It was published 32 years ago this month, in October 1983, the same month that, sadly, his promising career was cut short, as he would pass away from cancer at age 39. For his exceptional work on FM 22-100, he would receive the Legion of Merit Medal.

I always remember: What does a leader need to “Be, Know, and Do?” This principle was conceived and authored by my brother in law, Mac Harris. His dear friend, a lieutenant colonel at the time, Herbert J. Lloyd, gave the eulogy at his funeral. He wrote, “Mac will continue to live in all of us who knew him. As we read his leadership manual, his influence will be felt for decades to come.” And I am proud to say that, at both Fort Leavenworth and here at West Point, excellence in leadership awards are presented in his name annually to an outstanding student leader. It is certainly a tremendous achievement, and our family is so proud that Mac is forever linked to both these esteemed colleges in such a prestigious way.

Last year, the summer of 2014, we had the great pleasure and privilege of dedicating a suite at the Thayer Hotel in Mac’s honor. A true blessing as he loved West Point so dearly. Duty. Honor. Country. Lieutenant Colonel Boyd McCanna Harris lived a life of service to others. I was inspired by him and learned much from him in the short time I knew him. As he attended these ceremonies himself as a young cadet, and now that I am standing here tonight, I know he is here with me. I am grateful that his wife Anne and daughter Katie are here tonight, and I thank them both so much for being here.

It was in the late 1970s, and into the early 80s, that I began to receive an education from the Vietnam veteran side of our family as to how bravely they had fought and how they felt at the way they were treated when they returned home. Our country was divided over the war and had
turned its back on the returning warrior. It was a shameful period in our nation’s history, as many Vietnam Veterans would disappear into the shadows.

As a young teenager in high school, I was not paying much attention to what our Vietnam veterans, many just slightly older than I, were going through. But listening to them, I felt a sense of guilt at having been so unaware. So, in the mid-80s, I began supporting local Vietnam veterans’ groups in the Chicago area, and, over the years, have tried to do my best to welcome them home as our country had neglected to do that at the conclusion of the war. I am currently a spokesperson for the effort to build the Education Center at the Vietnam Wall in Washington DC, which will tell the stories of the over 58,000 who gave their lives during that war. The names of the fallen are currently on display here at West Point on the traveling exhibit, the Wall that Heals. I encourage each of you to view it. We must never forget the cost of freedom.

In 1987, wanting to branch out in my acting career, my wife and I moved to Los Angeles and, after many auditions and landing a few small roles, in 1993 I had the opportunity to audition for a little movie called Forrest Gump. Anyone here see Forrest Gump? So, I have to take the opportunity to do this: to have the entire Corps of Cadets at West Point, on my mark, say “Lieutenant Dan.” One, two, three...[Audience responds.] Now, I know that MacArthur never did that during his speech! That’s probably a first.

Well, having spent years supporting Vietnam veterans, I desperately wanted to play the Vietnam veteran Lt. Dan Taylor and was lucky to land the part. Lt. Dan of course is a disabled veteran who faces the challenge of losing both his legs in battle. But it is also a beautiful story of resilience, of moving beyond the war experience, and succeeding in life. And that is the story we want today for all our warriors returning from the battlefield. We must do better to make sure that stories of success for our veterans after they have faithfully served our country are not the exception to the rule, but is the rule itself.

In 1994, a few weeks after the film opened I was invited to receive the Commander’s Award from the Disabled American Veterans organization for playing Lt Dan. It was the beginning of a relationship that has lasted for the past 21 years and during that time, in supporting DAV and other efforts, I have met many “real life” Lt. Dan’s, who have inspired me to service by their example of never giving up, no matter how difficult the challenges of their injuries might be.

Seven years later, on that dark day of September 11, 2001, our nation was attacked. Our way of life was threatened and America was called to arms to defend freedom once again. As our men and women in uniform stood to answer the call of duty to preserve our country and destroy our nation’s enemies, my heart went with them, and I was called to a “new” action, to support them in any way I could. To make sure that our service members responding to the 9/11 attacks would never be forgotten or neglected, as our Vietnam veterans had been. There’s a healing power in service work. And as my heart was broken after that terrible day, as fear crept in as to what the future would hold for our country, for my family, I needed to do something to help assuage that fear, to help heal that broken heart, to stand behind our country. And so I began to take action and employed my efforts towards serving those who would answer our nation’s call.
And what can an actor do? I volunteered for the USO. And on my first trip to Iraq in June of 2003, I met a man named John Vigiano, a former Marine and retired New York City fire fighter, who lost both his sons at the World Trade Center. Over the years, he and his wife Jan have become very dear friends. Their strength and resilience have been an inspiration to me. John introduced me to many members of the FDNY who were there on that terrible day, and who lost friends and loved ones, and who have also inspired me with their selfless service to help those in need, especially those wounded in battle in Iraq and Afghanistan. These dear “pals of mine” have honored me by attending tonight, and I’d like to ask them to please stand. My friends, thank you.

Inspiration and mentoring are so important in our life’s journey. We can all point to men and women throughout our lives that we have learned from, and who, by their example, have inspired us to be better people. There are many friends and distinguished graduates here tonight, and I thank you all for being here.

Let me also take this time to acknowledge my family, for all your love and support. And especially, the greatest inspiration for me, for her strength, her courage, her faith in God, and her love. She has selflessly served herself, as I have spent many hours away from home over the years. Without her beside me, I simply would not be the man I am today. She is my best friend, my guardian angel, and the love of my life, my beautiful wife, Moira.

Wanting to do more to entertain in the spirit of the great Bob Hope, the 1968 recipient of the Thayer Award, in 2004 I formed a band, “The Lt. Dan Band.” Everywhere I was going in the military, they were calling me “Lt. Dan,” so I just went with it. Over the years we have performed hundreds of concerts for our troops all around the world. Supporting many military charities became another way to serve and learning much along the way, and with a full acceptance that this service work was a passionate and important part of my life, as the general mentioned, in 2011 I decided to bring all these endeavors to serve our veterans together under one umbrella, launching the Gary Sinise Foundation. Each day we strive to serve and honor the needs of our defenders, our first responders and their families.

It is said that people don’t care how much you know, until they know how much you care. And that actions speak louder than words. It is clear that after the attacks of September 11th, there are those who saw the challenge our country faced, and surely wanted to take action, and to show how much they care. I know that was the case for me. I have tried to do everything in my power to pitch in to serve and support those who were answering the call to defend our nation against the evils in the world. In this dangerous 21st century, is there any doubt that the call will come again, and again, and again?

As the many enemies of freedom are getting stronger, America is at risk, and if less than one percent our citizens, if you, our honored corps of cadets, are willing to serve, then I believe that we, as citizens, must I try to do our very best to serve you back. I often cite a powerful quote from the 30th President of the United States, Calvin Coolidge, that speaks volumes, when he said, “The nation which forgets its defenders, will itself be forgotten.”

The cadets here tonight were just 9 years old, or younger, 14 years ago at the time of the attacks. Many of you, I’m sure, too young to even remember anything of that terrible day in 2001. Yet, it was so moving to me to learn of a tradition that began here at West Point that very same year, the
“Ring Melt.” [WPAOG’s Ring Memorial Program] Since then, it’s not just any gold that goes into the rings of each of the seniors, or “Firsties,” as you are called. They’re made of gold from class rings that were worn by earlier graduates who have donated them back to West Point, melted, and then mixed with new gold to make rings for the following year’s graduating class. This is a beautiful tradition, among many special traditions here at West Point. Generations of the past locking arms with a new generation of leaders as the gold contained in these donated rings is melted and passed on.

And for the class of 2016, there is additional important and sobering ingredient. For the very first time, steel from the World Trade Center was included in the Ring Melt. Each member of the Class of 2016 wears a ring in honor and remembrance, not only of the graduates who have come before them, but of all those lost on that terrible day, 14 years ago. It is a powerful reminder from this new generation of leaders that we must never forget. One day, your rings may be melted and passed to another “new generation,” and that steel will be carried on into battle, as the leaders who wear those rings go on to achieve great things defending freedom and liberty throughout the world, passing the steel from the World Trade Center on again.

Many years ago, when I began this journey, it became abundantly clear that we can never do enough for those who serve and who sacrifice, defending and providing our precious liberty and freedom. But I also learned that we can always do a little more.

At the powerful conclusion of the film Saving Private Ryan, having fought through and survived the terrible world war of the 1940s, now an old man, the elderly James Ryan stands among the thousands of graves of our buried dead in Normandy. After looking down at the grave of the man who gave his life to save him, his own life now near its natural end, Ryan looks into the eyes of his wife and says to her, “Tell me I’ve led a good life... Tell me I’m a good man.” She answers him with a quiet and passionate, “You are.”

I pray that we always remember the fallen, we never take their sacrifices for granted, that we all learn from the selfless service of the brave heroes who have given their last full measure of devotion, and that we all hear that same response from our peers, and from history, that the elderly James Ryan heard when the question is asked of us.

That we endeavored to be, and were indeed, good people; that we led good lives, not only for ourselves, but also for our fellow man, a life of service; that we did our bit, to make this world a better place.


And this magnificent Corps of Cadets, you will carry that motto with you for the rest of your lives, as you enter a life of service to others, and endeavor to lead good lives, strengthening our nation as the leaders of tomorrow. My family and I thank God for you. You make us all proud to be Americans, and you give us hope for a better future for our country.

Thank you to the West Point Association of Graduates for extending me the privilege of speaking to you tonight and for acknowledging me with the Sylvanus Thayer Award. As long as
I live, I will work hard on behalf of our defenders and try to be worthy of this special honor. May God bless you and all those still serving in harm’s way. And may God continue to bless, and watch over, our America.

_Transcript courtesy of the West Point Association of Graduates._
A Solid Spirit, And A Solid Heart
A “Fireside Chat” with the Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASH CARTER: Hello everyone. What a fantastic looking audience you are and how proud I am of you. More about that in a minute. Let me thank General Bob Caslen, my old friend. We’ve done a lot together. He's done a very great deal for our country and our security and our Army.

And Bob, thanks for that introduction. And thanks to [Commandant of Cadets] General Holland also, for welcoming me here today.

And to all of you, first of all, thank you. Thank you for joining our family, our mission. The profession that you represent, you're doing with your lives the noblest thing that you can do, which is to protect our people and make a better world for our children.

That's why you're here. That's why you're here, that's why I'm here, that's why everybody in our magnificent Department of Defense is there, because we wake up every morning with that mission in mind.

And it feels good. It feels good to be part of something bigger than yourself. And it's hard work, but it's the most important and noble thing you could be doing with your lives. So I want you know that you should be proud of yourselves. I, as the Secretary of Defense, am incredibly proud of you.

I can't tell you what it's like to be able to go out and talk to public audiences in the United States and say just look at how magnificent are the people who make up our armed forces and to see in their eyes the tremendous pride that they have in you. And they don't pay attention to what you do every day, and in a way, that's the flip side of being in the business of protection, which is the better you do it, the less people have to think about it. That's the whole point. But in their hearts, they know you're there, they know they can count on you.

Pretty soon, you'll be joining that noble mission with all of your time and you'll also be assuming the awesome responsibility that goes with it, the responsibility of leadership and the responsibility of holding in your hands the security of so many in America and around the world.

Yesterday's attacks in Brussels were a grim reminder of how serious are the dangers we face, how dangerous -- the dangers that civilization and our country face, challenges of this complex world. Our thoughts and prayers are with all of those who were affected by this tragedy, who include, particularly worth noting, a US military family that was affected by these attacks.

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1 The Honorable Ashton Carter is the 25th US Secretary of Defense. This speech was given at West Point on 23 March 2016.
And I, in that connection, want to assure you—and soon you'll be doing this with me—that we do everything we can to help protect these families, and we will to help this family in this instance and to protect our service members, wherever they are, and their families, protect them as they protect us.

In the face of these acts of terrorism, the United States stands strongly in solidarity with our ally, Belgium. Brussels is an international city. The host to NATO, to the European Union, to great institutions that represent people working together for a better future, and the opposite of what the people who conducted this attack represent and stand for. So together with them, we must and we will continue to do everything we can to protect our homeland and defeat terrorists wherever they threaten us. No attack, no attack, can shake our resolve to accelerate the defeat of ISIL.

I know that yesterday's news only galvanizes our determination, yours too, to serve our nation and join those who came before you in this mission of defending our people and the values we share.

So before I get to your questions, I want to take some time to talk about the strategic landscape as we see it from the Pentagon, me and your Army leadership. And after that, take a moment to discuss several of the lessons that I hope you'll carry with you from this extraordinary institution here at West Point, to the great challenges that are going to confront you in your career.

The Army, like our entire joint force, is in the process of turning a corner from an era when we were, and I was very much a part of this, very singularly focused upon our counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We had to be. We did an excellent job. Military execution was superb.

And we're now entering a different strategic era. And I'm asking the Army and our military to change and evolve. And it is. And as we look out, the leadership of the department, your senior leaders, we see no fewer than five challenges, big challenges, evolving challenges. And these are, namely, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and terrorism. We don't have the luxury of choice among them. We need to deal with them all.

Two of them represent in a way a return to great power competition. One is in Europe, where we're taking a strong and balanced approach to deterring Russian aggression -- the kind we saw in Ukraine. We haven't had to focus on that very much for the last quarter century since the Soviet Union ended, the Berlin wall came down, but now we do.

Our second challenge is in the Asia-Pacific region. The single most consequential region to America's future because it's half of where humanity lives and where half of economic activity on the planet is. And that's only growing. And there, China is rising, which is fine, but behaving aggressively, which is not. Meanwhile, two other longstanding challenges pose specific threats
in specific regions. North Korea is one. And that's why, and I know some of you will be going there—I mean, not North Korea, going to South Korea shortly. A little slip there. (LAUGHTER)

But that's the very reason why, as they say over there and you'll soon say if you go there, the slogan is to be ready to fight tonight. It's not what we want, but to deter, we have to be ready.

And the other is Iran, because while the nuclear accord, which was reached last year on nuclear weapons, is a good deal in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, we must still deter Iranian aggression, counter its malign influence in the region, and continue standing by and standing up for our friends and allies in the region.

And then the fifth challenge, very different from the other four and critically important, is our ongoing fight against terrorism, and especially ISIL. We're accelerating our campaign against ISIL, most immediately in Iraq and Syria. That's where the parent tumor is of this cancer.

And we need to defeat it there. That is necessary, not sufficient. We need to defeat it in other places as well where it's metastasizing, like North Africa, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

And make no mistake, we will defeat ISIL. I'm completely confident in it. We want to get it done as soon as we can. But we will destroy ISIL. But we don't have the luxury, as I said, of choosing among these five challenges. We have to deal with them all and you're part of our plan to do so.

The Army is transitioning, as I said, to full-spectrum readiness. The force you lead is stronger than ever. It's capable of more kinds of operation than ever. To deter and win in a conflict, potential enemies have to know that we will dominate them. Your service will—and I hope it does—span many decades.

A future chief of staff of the Army, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may very well be in this room, 10 years, 20 years from now, new challenges will almost certainly arise.

To help you win now and to deal with that complex and uncertain future, you. The world may change, but I think that you'll find that there are four things that will remain constant, that I predict will remain constant for you. I want you to keep it in your mind.

The first is this. Our primary mission will always be the defense of our country and our people. And I sit with the president in the situation room. We're always focused on America's national interests, because that's what matters most.

And while all the capabilities and capacity of our fantastic institution are enormous and immense, what we commit ourselves to is something we think about very carefully. We also recognize, at the same time, that protecting American interests often means leading by example.
Ever since the graduates of this institution led the United States to victory in World War II, America has stood as the world's foremost leader, partner and underwriter of stability in every region of the world. It is a mantle we embraced, again, following the end of the Cold War and one that continues today to the great benefit of our nation and also the global community.

The positive and enduring partnerships the United States has cultivated with other nations around the world are built on our values. They reflect the way we conduct ourselves. Nations know what we stand for. They know how we do things and why.

They know we treat them as equals, but we take their interests into account. That creates opportunities to defend American interests wherever and whenever necessary. When I travel around the world, what I hear always from foreign leaders is how much they like working with you.

You're capable, competent, like no other military. But you represent values that they like. They want to work with you and you conduct yourselves in a way that is attractive to them. This is important because in order to do the business of protecting the United States, we want others to help in that mission of creating a better world.

We don't want to have to do everything ourselves.

So it's important that you have those values and that they like working with you. And if you think about it, our enemies don't have any friends. We have all the friends and allies. And that's because of who you are and what you represent, as well as how good you are.

So whether your responsibilities take you to train local, capable forces fighting ISIL in Iraq, say, which is what the 101st [Airborne Division] is doing in Baghdad, or strengthening our posture in the Asia Pacific with the Stryker Brigade in the Philippines, take another example. You'll see many opportunities where the U.S. military can make a difference around the world.

I want your good ideas. Our nation needs your good ideas. When you bring them forward—and this is important—always be able to explain how they benefit America's interests, and by extension the American people.

Another constant, and one that has echoed through the generations is what makes our military great is our people. It was a former cadet, Dwight Eisenhower, who said, "Guns and tanks and planes are nothing unless there's a solid spirit and a solid heart."

That lesson was reinforced for me several weeks at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. While I was there I met with two soldiers, Sergeant First Class Hastings and Sergeant Campbell. Both were seriously wounded in Afghanistan while accompanying Afghan forces, one in a close-grenade exchange with the Taliban; the other after taking five shots, three to the SAPI [protective vest] and two to the body.
I spoke to them in that hangar. They were each driven by a single goal, which was getting back to their unit, back in the fight. So don't ever forget the caliber of the soldiers you will lead as a brand-new second lieutenant.

Don't ever forget the quality of that experience of the NCOs under your command. Don't ever forget the families of every soldier, the sacrifices they make. And regardless of what branch you've selected or will select in the future, don't ever forget that there are soldiers like Sergeants Hastings and Campbell who count on you, too, to do your utmost.

My first, highest commitment as Secretary of Defense really is to our people. We have other things that make our military great, but it's our people that make it the finest fighting force the world has ever known. It is because of that commitment that I am committed to building what I'm calling the force of the future.

In the future, we have to continue to recruit and retain the very best talent for future generations. We're an all-volunteer force. We like it that way. We want to pick the members of the military, not have them given to us. But we have to compete for them. And I recognize that.

That is, by the way, the reason why we're opening all combat positions to women. It provides them an opportunity. But the real point from my perspective is it provides us the opportunity to have access to another half of our population who can meet the standards for those branches.

It's important. We have to compete for good people everywhere for an all-volunteer force, and that's a critical part of our military edge. And everyone should understand this need and my commitment to it. As you go through the ranks and make sure the younger generation is coming in that is as good as you, as good as the ones you see to your left and right today, that needs to be true tomorrow, 10 years from now, 20 years from now. I feel that responsibility. You will soon have that same responsibility.

So when you select and assign people, remember that experience, courage on their part, courage for their part to speak up, the diversity of the experiences they've had and that they represent, all of that will make whole team stronger. That's a lesson as old as the Army itself and one that actually echoes across this campus I was learning this morning. From the memorial to Margaret Corbin, who kept her cannon firing to preserve the Continental Army, to the bust of Henry O. Flipper, born a slave and graduated an officer, to the crest of the class of 1980, where men and women served together -- 1980 -- for the first time with pride and excellence here.

I just came from lunch with a dozen cadets who have branched infantry, including the first women to do so. And just remember that it's not only them who are making history, it's you as an institution that are doing so. First in training and then battle, you'll demonstrate that the women who recently graduated from ranger school, who've accompanies our special operations forces and led convoys in combat and flown helicopter for the past 15 years are not just a news story, they're a vital part of our ability to defend our country.
Next, I want you to remember that our nation's defense rests in being able to find solutions to seemingly intractable problems. In any situation, you will encounter unexpected challenges that have to be solved at a moment's notice. I can't tell you what they are now. I've told you what we're facing today. I can't tell you with confidence what we'll be facing in the future. You have to have -- I want you to have the courage to accept risk, to solve those problems, and the wisdom to determine when a risk becomes a blind gamble.

You're responsible for the lives of your soldiers and for accomplishing your mission. That's the burden of command. Let me give you a recent example from a West Point graduate, and that's Lieutenant General Sean MacFarlane, who's serving as our coalition commander in Iraq. When he got there last year, he found a fractured Iraqi army on the defensive, one that was trained for a narrow set of threats that didn't include the kind of unconventional military tactics that the enemy ISIL was using, or even their conventional tactics that were being used effectively to stymie the Iraqi forces in the field.

Providing the same training over and over again, that same training wouldn't accomplish the mission. General MacFarlane saw this as an opportunity to provide advanced training and engineering capabilities to effectively change the way the Iraqi army operated. All of you, like Sean, are capable of this.

I'm proud to say we saw the results of this in December, when the Army re-took Ramadi, reaching the Euphrates, conducting combined arms breaching, and ultimately clearing the city with the assistance that we provided.

When you plan, rehearse and execute your missions, you must always be willing to reevaluate the situation and take a new course of action when the situation demands it. In order to do that, you have got to be open to new ideas.

At the Pentagon, I've made it a priority at all levels that to think, as I say, outside of our five-sided box, to be open to new ways of thinking, operating and innovating. It's the only way to be the best in a competitive world.

You're warriors first, but as I saw today in the Physics lab, the Counterterrorism Center, your Cyber Center, you're also scientists, political scientists and so much more. Every day, you crack the code in some way. And we need you to continue to do so.

This should be a lesson for our enemies. Never underestimate the ingenuity of the American soldier. We need to maintain that advantage, forever. That's why as part of the Force of the Future Initiative, we're building greater opportunities, as you advance through the ranks, for you to work in industries, advanced industries outside of DOD, just for a time.
Partner with tech companies and get out and learn enough about how the rest of the world works, while continuing to achieve the breakthroughs and uphold the profession of arms that makes the finest fighting force the world has ever known.

And finally, I want to discuss with you the importance of being a leader of character. Character is the difference between George Washington—remembered on this campus with that iconic, equestrian statute—and Benedict Arnold, recalled with an unnamed plaque in the old chapel.

Both were gifted warriors of great, technical skills. But only one had the strength of character to, in the words of the Cadet prayer, "choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong." You don't know when, where or how. You may not even know it at the time, but your character will be tested against these words. And your reaction will be a reflection of your true self.

In my time working with some of the finest alumni of this institution, I've observed that combat doesn't as much build character as it does reveal it. There's a big world out there when we're a great nation with great responsibilities and we stand on the foundation of character that both you and this institution provide around the world.

Those of you who will be commissioned this spring are about to join the noblest profession there is, a profession that will have you waking up every day to help defend this country and make a better world. As you embark on this, know that our nation is 100 percent behind you. I'm 1,000 percent behind you, although we know that's not really possible. But you know what I mean.

We know what you're putting into this, we know what you'll sacrifice. And we know what you're able to achieve. There's nothing that we appreciate more. There's nothing that makes me prouder to be where I am than to look out and to be with you.

Thanks for having me. Today I look forward to answering some of your questions.

(APPLAUSE)

Moderator: Sir, thank you for those remarks. And thank you for spending time with us. I think we have a few minutes for some questions, but before we turn it over to the corps, we I were just going to ask you a couple of questions to get things started.

SEC. CARTER: Okay.


SEC. CARTER: It's a good question, and you'll all face it. And I know as I talk to folks who get to the point where they're trying to decide whether they're going to stay in or not. You all will
reach that point. You know, one of the things that they ask themselves is can I do this, and did the family support it.

I'm lucky at the moment, and here's why. And I've wrestled with this all the time I've been part of this wonderful institution. And I've got to tell you, when my kids were really little, there were times when I didn't feel like that balance was right, but I had to keep doing what I was doing.

So it's tough. But right now, I'm lucky. My kids are grown up and I have this -- this is important; you all know this -- but this kind of service becomes a family affair. And my wife is so into -- she loves the troops. She loves our military. She's very patriotic.

And so she understands, and she can't do things with me all the time. She works. She has a job and so she can't travel with me. And so we're apart a lot. We miss each other and so forth. But I always know she's part of it when she can be part of something, she's just all in. So it makes a difference.

And so you can -- you can deal with the conflicting pressures as long as there's kind of a unifying theme to it. And in most cases, military service becomes a family affair. If your family is with you, you'll be Okay.

Q: My question is kind of on a different side of things. We hear a lot here at the academy about how technology has changed and shaped our future and continues to do so. We had a lecture yesterday where, again, it was brought up about technology and its effect on us being able to execute our mission effectively abroad. And I was wondering from your perspective, for the military, specifically the Army, how does technology help and hinder us as we progress towards executing our mission?

SEC. CARTER: It does both, and your world is going to change fundamentally in your lifetime. You will continue to be, and this is essentially what the Army's mission is, to dominate physical and human terrain. And particularly that human terrain will change in the course of your lives, as it's changing already.

Now, I'm confident that that will give us more opportunities than it will give us challenges. But that's up to us. And that's why it was so great to see the ingenious people around here that I was with today, and why I stressed ingenuity. Keep thinking. Be open to things. Challenge your leaders. Good leaders respect that. They know that. They want that. They want that ventilation and that upward stream of young people with different ideas.

Because remember, I grew up in a different world. So I'm different from you. You grew up in a different world from me. I've got to understand that as leader. So if I'm going to relate to you folks and get you to join us and stay, I need to understand how you see life. And, you know, it's different.
SEC. CARTER: And you'll have to look back at other generations. That's why it's so important to me to keep changing how we do things, at least be open to change things.

I can't change the profession of arms, I can't change its basic ethos, and I don't want to. I can't change the fact that you need to go where we tell you to go, mostly, because we need you where we need you. And so you're not like any company.

But that doesn't mean we can't learn from what else goes on in society and bring in their best ideas wherever they apply to us. We've got to be open to that and we've got to be open to the fact that not everybody is like us, but we need everybody to be part of the team.

Q: Sir, I'm a member of the class of 2016 and Company I-1. My question for you is you started your career studying theoretical physics at places like Yale and Oxford, and now you're the secretary of defense. In your experience, what have you learned about finding your true calling in life, and what advice can you give us about doing the same endeavor ourselves?

SEC. CARTER: It's a good question, and I also studied medieval history, and the joke everybody says is well now, you're in the perfect combination of physics and medieval thinking doing what you're doing.

Now, but the reality for me, and this may be true of you too; I don't know how you came here, whether it was somebody you knew who inspired you or something you saw and said I want to be part of. I didn't know I'd end up working in defense, I certainly didn't know I'd end up being the secretary of defense. And I talk to a lot of young folks all the time because I like to do that, and they ask me advice in that regard, and here's the piece of advice I can say. I can't say for you what's right for you, but I always tell people if you're making a choice, there are a lot of people who are very calculating. They say well, I need to go do this because then that will lead to that and that will lead to that and that will lead to that.

And I say when you come to those branch points and you really can't figure out which way to go, the way I always did it was I went with what I thought I'd enjoy most. I looked down that road and I said do I want to wake up every morning and be doing that, or do I want to wake up every morning and be doing that hoping it leads somewhere else. And the logic of that is that if you like what you're doing and you think it's significant, you'll do well at it, and, therefore, you'll do okay. But it's really important.

And I got into this business, in physics, it was the height of the Cold War and I was working on problems related to nuclear weapons and strategic competition with the Soviet Union. And as a physicist, I found that when I worked on these issues and was part of decision making about them, I had something I could bring to the table, and that was, I had technical knowledge. And other people didn't have it and that meant I had something to say. I had some angle on it that they didn't have. I could make a contribution. And it was the most important thing I could be doing.
So you put those two things together, it doesn't get any better than that, right, if you feel like you can make a contribution and what you're doing is really significant. That was the magic combination for me, and I've loved it and I love it to this -- to this day, and I love every day in this job. I'm so proud of this institution. It's so wonderful to be part of it.

Q: Good afternoon, sir. My question is, what do we have to gain or lose from our relations with China? And how is the Army adapting to President Obama's policy of shifting to the Pacific, sir?

SEC. CARTER: Well, an excellent question. And if you think about it, the Asia-Pacific, I said it's the most consequential region for America's future. Just do the math.

If you think about it, it's not in the headlines all the time right? You get the Middle East in the headlines. You've got Eastern Europe in the headlines. And the Asia-Pacific isn't. Why? If it's so important, why isn't it?

Well, the reason for that is that it has generally been an area of peace and stability for 70 years. And during that time, all the countries there have risen and prospered. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, now China and India. And that's good.

But they couldn't have done that without an atmosphere of peace and stability. What made that atmosphere of peace and stability in a region that has no NATO, no formal structure, where the wounds of World War II never really fully healed. What keeps the peace?

Well, the important ingredient has been the pivotal role of the United States' influence and the United States' military there. That is what we aim to keep going with the rebalance. And it's not about keeping China down. It's about continuing an environment in which everybody can rise, including us.

That's our approach. And to the Army's part, it is a very important thing. You might look -- you know, you look at a globe and you look at the Asia-Pacific, and you say, gee, it's all ocean. What am I going to do in the Army out there? It's all water. I can see why the Navy's out there, but why would we be out there.

And the reason is this. I mean, first of all, conflict will always be where the people are, and they're not out in the ocean, they're on the land and that's what you're about. Right?

(APPLAUSE)

SEC. CARTER: And second, a lot of the militaries in the region are commanded by your Army counterparts and that's an important thing. I want to commend the Army and the secretaries of
the Army and the chiefs of staff of the Army who have been sticking with the rebalances all these years.

I can single out one guy that I think has done a great job. And I single him out simply because he just got promoted. And that is General Vince Brooks, who has been really leading Pacific pathways in the Pacific. That is a real achievement. It has been ingenious and extremely influential.

And you may know that the president has just nominated Vince to be the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, a very senior position in view of his skill, military skill and political military skill. So the Army's all in out there and it's incredibly important. Of all the things I named, the Army's central to each and every one of those challenges.

And I'm confident we'll be central to all of the challenges that I cannot predict now, but that you'll have to deal with in the course of your career.

Q: Sir, Cadet Wyatt Frazier, class of 2017, company G-1. As a younger generation of millennials enters the work force, American corporations are shifting towards a less hierarchal and more flat and casual organizational structure. What is the Department of Defense doing to stay competitive in this new work environment?

SEC. CARTER: Well, it's a good question, and we've got to stay competitive. And it gets to attracting and recruiting people. And it means we're going to have to keep thinking and keep changing about how we manage people. Let me give you a few examples of things that we're doing now that -- where we're taking lessons from the private sector that I think we can apply to us in order to better bring in their best practices.

I'll give you a couple of examples. One, I have a major effort department-wide to reach out to the technology sector, so that we can increase the pace at which we innovate technologically. If you think about the vehicles that you'll be driving, the armored vehicles that you'll be driving, a lot of these things are decades old, right?

And that doesn't mean they don't have any value, but we need to constantly upgrade your equipment. And if we operate programs on 10-year time scales and the technology world is changing every year, guess what? We're going to fall behind. So we've got to be defter. That's a big push.

Another one is to draw in some of what you're calling exactly right, flatter, more mobile institutions. Now, I want to be careful because as I said, you are the profession of arms. And I can't put a newspaper ad in for a colonel in the air defense artillery, right?

You have to get them through the Army. So there's a certain amount of our profession which is a profession and can only come about that way. But that doesn't mean we can't learn things.
For example, I'm finding ways to send more of you out in the course of your career, out to the private sector so you can see how they do things and bring back the best of those practices. Just recently, I changed our policies in a number of ways on family programs, things like maternity and paternity leave. Now, that may seem in the future to you all, but there will come a time if you decide to have a family where it's a pretty big deal.

And I want to be competitive at that time, so you don't have to feel that you have to choose. Sometimes it's going to be tough for you, but I don't want to make it impossible for you to have a family that you'd like, and also continue to serve us. So where I can make that easier, consistent with readiness, I want to do that. And we're making a lot of changes of those kinds.

The way we promote people and how we give you opportunities along the way, so we're not so rigid about, say, you have to punch this ticket and then punch that ticket, and then punch that ticket. And you find that all you're doing is punching tickets. And that's not really giving you the opportunity to grow in the way that we need you to grow.

We're thinking about how to change your career path. So I think we do need to keep thinking about the career path. You'll always be the profession of arms. We're not Wal-Mart. You know, we're not Google. We're the United States military. But that doesn't mean we can't change and adapt.

And we have to because I need good people like you. And once I get you, I've got to keep you.

*Transcript courtesy of the Department of Defense.*
“A Speaker of Words and a Doer of Deeds:”
_Literature and Leadership Lessons_
_by Harvard University President Dr. Drew Frost_1

Thank you, Colonel Harper, and Lieutenant General Caslen for inviting me today. And thank you to the Zengerle family for making this occasion possible. It is a great privilege to launch this series and I know it will have a wonderful trajectory here at West Point. I also want to thank Professor Elizabeth Samet and Major Adam Keller of the Department of English and Philosophy here for hosting me and making so many of the arrangements today and giving me such a wonderful view of West Point.

It is a supreme honor for me to be here today at West Point. I come from a family with deep roots in the military, and it is a great source of family pride that my great-grandfather graduated from West Point in the Class of 1883. His name was Lawrence Davis Tyson, and it wasn’t till I recently received a copy of his transcript that I discovered he was 51st in his graduating class.

Now that doesn’t sound too bad, except that in the Class of 1883 there were 52 students. Great-Grandfather Tyson must have been deeply grateful for Clarence B. Edwards, cadet number 52, who saved him from being the “goat.” Now, of course, his ranking was better than that of George Armstrong Custer, who was the goat in 1861, but worse than that of Ulysses Grant, who was 21st out of 39 in the Class of 1843. And Grant confessed to spending a good deal of his time here devouring novels. Now, in fact, as I found reading through my great-grandfather’s papers, he seems to have shared with Grant something of an affinity for language. As a young second lieutenant, my great-grandfather was stationed in the West, where he met my great-grandmother and began writing her passionate and quite poetic love letters.

He confessed in one: “I fear I should weary you if I wrote oftener.” For their first Christmas of knowing one another, they sent each other identical scarf pins in the shape of a sword — and they crossed in the mail. My great-grandfather took this as an “omen” of their unity, a bond that would bring him, he said — in his words, “No more quarrels or wars … each of us has surrendered to the other his sword.”

He was trying to win with the pen what he had not yet won with the sword. His advances — on all fronts — raise a larger question. West Point cultivated in my great-grandfather a considerable capacity for leadership: He commanded a regiment in the Spanish-American War, and then in 1918 he served as a general on the Western Front, where his brigade took terrible losses as it broke through the Hindenburg line. While he was with his troops in France, his only son, a naval aviator, was killed when his plane crashed into the North Sea. Only after the Armistice did General Tyson go to England to claim the body. Tyson was later elected to the United States Senate, where he was serving at the time of his death. Now, given his low marks as a cadet in almost every subject, the evidence provided by his eloquent letters might suggest that his way with words played a role in his eventual successes. Including, of course, with my great-grandmother, who he clearly hoped would surrender more than her sword pin. And here I am.

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1 Dr. Drew Frost is the 28th President of Harvard University. This speech was given at West Point on 24 March 2016.
I want to focus for a few minutes here today on the importance of language to leadership, on the interpretive and empathetic power of words on which leaders rely, and on the necessity of the humanities and the broad liberal arts education that nurture these indispensable qualities. Now, it is daunting to talk about leadership at West Point, which has been training leaders since 1802, while much of the rest of the world has merely been talking about it. Starting in the late 19th century, the word “leadership” in English-language books climbed rapidly, until today a search for the word yields more than 180,000 entries for books on Amazon and 1.7 million entries in the Harvard University Library catalog. As someone said, so many books, so few leaders.

Two millennia of wisdom and more than a century of analysis leave us with enduring questions: What makes a leader? Are leaders decisive or flexible, are they visionary or pragmatic, are they for themselves or for others? And how do we create more of them? It would seem we agree on little, except that a leader inspires others to do what they might not otherwise do. At the same time, I look out today on one of the finest leadership training grounds in the world and I see something of an answer: This is not just the nation’s first college of engineering, the school of my great-grandfather (and I still, in fact, have the leather case that holds his engineering tools). This is now an institution deeply and deliberately committed to the liberal arts.

There is very good reason for that commitment. A recent British Council study shows that more than half of leaders around the world hold humanities and social science degrees. Seventy-five percent of business leaders say that the most important skills in their work are the ability to analyze, communicate, and write, the skills at the heart of the humanities. And yet the liberal arts education that imparts these skills is under assault. Legislators dismiss anthropology, art history, and English degrees as impractical. They call for “more welders and fewer philosophers,” as one senator put it, while cuts in funding threaten humanities departments at colleges and universities across the country. Students are following suit. The proportion of bachelor’s degrees in humanities disciplines has declined to 6 percent nationwide, the lowest level since reliable records began in 1948.

How, then, do we explain West Point, and its thriving humanities departments? As other institutions drop liberal arts requirements, military academies have been adding them. Over the past 50 years, West Point has transformed its curriculum into a general liberal arts education, graduating leaders with broad-based knowledge of both the sciences and the humanities, and the ability to apply that knowledge in a fluid and uncertain world. Here, the humanities are resources that build “self-awareness, character, [and] perspective,” and enable leaders to compel and to connect with others. I want to touch on how that happens, in three crucial ways.

First, leaders need perspective. Novelist Zadie Smith, quoted in Professor Elizabeth Samet’s new anthology on leadership, calls the capacity for perspective, and I quote her, the “gift” of the “many-colored voice, the multiple sensibility.” The West Point system for leadership development describes it as “the expansion of a person’s capacity to know oneself and to view the world through multiple lenses.” We might call it a passport to different places, different times, and different ways of thinking.
Anthropologists give us perspective on the ancient enmity of Sunni and Shia Muslims; literature, on the seductiveness of war. Karl Eikenberry, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and West Point Class of 1973, describes a star on his team of diplomats named Laura Tedesco, an archaeologist who together with Afghans excavated an ancient Buddhist kingdom near Kabul. They unearthed, amidst landmines and passing Taliban fighters, precious evidence of a more inclusive and tolerant Afghan past that gave people hope. This work is a testament to what Eikenberry calls the “intrinsic value of the humanities” in successful global engagement. Such inquiry teaches us how to scrutinize the thing at hand, even in the thick dust of danger or drama or disorienting strangeness. It imparts skills that slow us down — the habit of deliberation, the critical eye, skills that give us capacity to interpret and judge human problems; the concentration that yields meaning in a world that is noisy with information, confusion, and change. The humanities teach us many things, not the least of which is empathy — how to see ourselves inside another person’s experience. How to picture a different possibility. As General Omar Bradley put it, “A leader must possess imagination.”

My own field of history offers perspective on ourselves and others, through interpretation of the evidence of the past. Data does not stand on its own; history does not actually “tell us anything.” Historians tell us. General Patton wrote to his son, then a West Point cadet in 1944, “To be a successful soldier you must know history … [D]ates and even the minute details of tactics are useless,” he continued. “What you must know is how man reacts … To win battles you do not beat weapons — you beat the soul of man.”

One of my own heroes is John Hope Franklin, a historian who — as he put it — “armed with the tools of scholarship,” deployed the past as a weapon against persistent racial injustice. “To confront our past and see it for what it is,” to use his words. The past lives, in what we see and do every day, in what he called the “historical traditions” that “have controlled … attitudes and conduct.” Franklin helped to change those traditions by overturning their falsehoods, by training a clear-eyed gaze at facts and evidence no one had yet dug out or wanted to admit. It took him a lifetime. Writing requires patience and resolve. But the rewards can be great. History shatters the dark glass of ignorance, it gives us the courage to challenge accepted truths and to open new paths to the meaning of our past. As John Hope Franklin remarked in 2003, “Good history is a good foundation for a better present and future.”

But, gaining perspective is not always easy. It can cost those who are brave. Chinese journalist Yang Jisheng documented the history of 36 million deaths from a human-caused famine in his recent book Tombstone. His employer forbade him to travel to the United States to accept an award for conscience and integrity in journalism, so instead he sent the speech he would have given. He wrote: “I want people to remember man-made disaster, darkness, and evil so they will distance themselves from man-made disaster, darkness, and evil from now on.” History not only tells us that things were once different, it tells us that they can and will be different again. And it reminds us that the nature of that difference is in large part man-made. It is up to us. If we can see contingency, we can identify the opportunity to act, and to change.

Second, beyond perspective, leaders need the capacity to improvise. I often point out that education is not the same thing as training for a job. Jobs change. Circumstances evolve. Certainly, soldiers know, in the chaos of battle, that our knowledge needs to be flexible, as we
grapple with complexity in an instant. If perspective opens eyes, its multiple lenses give us the ability to act creatively, to improvise in the face of the unexpected.

Craig Mullaney, West Point Class of 2000, writes in his gripping book The Unforgiving Minute that the first rule of warfare in Afghanistan was this, and I quote him: “The closer you look, the less you understand.” One sergeant’s motto, he says, became “Semper Gumby” because of the flexibility each new crisis required from the troops. Mullaney writes: “Problem: no armor. Solution: drive faster. … We did what every infantryman in history has had to do in combat: We improvised.” Improvisation. Flexibility. Contingency. The art of the possible. This lies at the heart of why we pursue the liberal arts. Where there is no rulebook, turn to philosophy, turn to history, to anthropology, poetry, and literature. Take the wisdom and inspiration of the great thinkers and leaders who went before you, and then create your own.

At West Point I understand that you are trained through what some here call “friction” — being in a situation that you realize is beyond you. This is how you learn to think past where you are. Literature, art, music, history — these are forms of friction because they are meant to be unsettling, stirring, mind-bending experiences that force us to question and push and to reinvent ourselves, and the world, in a new way.

Winston Churchill, one of the 20th Century’s greatest leaders, was a war correspondent before he turned 21. He recognized warfare as a kind of performance, wherein success can depend on the capacity to imagine ourselves into our roles. He wrote: “The courage of the soldier is not really contempt for physical evils and indifference to danger.” It is instead “a more or less successful attempt to simulate these habits of mind … to be good actors in the play.” Churchill soon found himself devouring books on history, philosophy, economics, and religion, driven by what he called “the desire for learning,” and because, as he put it, “I … had a liking for words and for the feel of words fitting and falling into their places like pennies in a slot.” Churchill put pennies in that slot again and again, delivering some of the most compelling words in the history of warfare. Which brings me back to now a third point — how leaders use the persuasive power of language.

Churchill understood this powerful tool of leadership at a very early age. In his last term as a cadet at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, he gave his first speech, standing on debris outside a row of London bars, rallying a rioting crowd against a movement to prohibit liquor. He said, to rapturous applause, “You have seen us tear down these barricades tonight, see that you pull down those who are responsible for them at the coming election.” Now, another young man had started the protest by poking holes in the barricade, but Churchill finished it by telling them what it meant. Decades later, he did the same for England in World War II, creating a narrative of resistance that defied German bombs. How appropriate that his Nobel Prize was not for peace, but for literature.

But sometimes it may seem that words fail us. The history of war is filled with invocations of the inadequacies of language to convey the truth of it. I have found such observations again and again in soldiers’ letters and diaries from the Civil War: Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. called the experience of war “incommunicable.” In 1862, a Confederate private wrote his father, “Language would in no way express the true picture as it really was.” As Tim O’Brien put it a little more than a century later in The Things They Carried, “You can’t even tell a true war story.
Sometimes it is just beyond telling.” The “real war,” as Walt Whitman had reminded us, “will never get into the books.” And yet, still they wrote. Poets and privates, struggling to derive and convey meaning from the chaos of experience.

We have been telling war stories for millennia, endeavoring to understand, to reconcile the inhumanity of war with the humanity of words. As literature has struggled to capture war, its leaders have armed themselves with literature — because leaders necessarily strive to understand well enough to know and to explain why and where, and to what end, and what next. According to Plutarch, Alexander the Great slept with two things under his pillow: a dagger, and a copy of Homer’s Iliad.

The power of language is undeniable, and irresistible. In no small part, changes that fundamentally shape the world we live in today resulted from leaders for whom language itself was a form of action. Those who inspire others to abandon the innate human resistance to change and risk a better future so often share an important common trait: a gift for language, and a capacity to compel others through the power of the spoken word. A leader must inspire others to believe in possibility in order to be able to motivate them to follow and to act.

Words served as indispensable weapons in the era of the American Civil War. The powerful liberation narratives of Frederick Douglass, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Abraham Lincoln articulated a logic of change and moral commitment. Douglass, an escaped slave and an abolitionist, transformed a celebratory Fourth of July address in 1852 in upstate New York into an impassioned demand for an end to slavery, and he did it by putting everyone in the audience into the shoes — or perhaps we should say more appropriately, the shoelessness — of a slave. He said: “[T]he distance between this platform and the slave plantation, from which I escaped, is considerable. … What,” he demanded, offering the perspective of different eyes, “What to the American slave is your Fourth of July? I answer: a day that reveals to him more than all other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim.”

Elizabeth Cady Stanton appealed similarly to fundamental values on behalf of women’s full inclusion in American life. Women deserved rights, she declared, because of the “individuality of each human soul,” inhering to each person, as she put it, a “birthright to self-sovereignty.” This was our religious idea, she said, “our Republican idea.” She used language that made the cause of women’s rights seem not just imaginable, but necessary, to fundamental national identity and purpose.

And Lincoln. Lincoln, whose ability to make a compelling case for the war and for the United States as the “last best hope of earth,” was no small part of why 2 million Northerners were willing to leave their homes and families to risk their lives for the Union. The Gettysburg Address, 272 words spoken in November 1863, created a different America. We know their cadence like a national poem: “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” and that “government of the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish from the earth.” War defined a landscape of unimaginable death. Lincoln defined the purposes of the war. He said what he wanted it to mean. As historian Garry Wills has put it, “Words had to complete the work of guns.”
Lincoln’s relationship to words illustrates another important aspect of language and leadership: the dynamic interconnection between the creators of words and their own language. Language often takes on a life of its own. Lincoln used the process of writing to clarify his thinking; to explore and pursue the logic and implication of ideas. I am sure you have had this experience in writing papers: Who has not written the introduction to a paper last? You finally know what it was you wanted to say once you’ve worked out all the intricacies of the language of saying it. As one novelist has put it, “How do I know what I think till I see what I say?” Lincoln embraced the emancipation of slaves gradually, through the words he shaped in a dialogue with himself. “I thought about it and studied it in all its phases,” he is said to have told a Union Army sergeant, “long before I began to put it [down] on paper.” A lifelong conversation is not a bad way to describe the study of the humanities, a path of discovery where we set our inner compass as we go. The ability to have a dialogue with oneself is also the ability to have dialogue with others, across time and space. Lincoln’s words live long beyond their delivery date, leading on without him. Words have implications — and consequences. We are still trying to live up to the Gettysburg Address. No one is in a position to know the power of language and leadership better than all of you, the women and men of West Point.

In 2008, before the ROTC program officially returned to Harvard’s campus after the end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” I spoke to five graduating Harvard seniors commissioned as officers that year. I thanked them for their service and their sacrifice, and I told them, “I wish that there were more of you.” I spoke that day in the spirit of inclusion, in the spirit of Douglass and Stanton and Lincoln, on behalf of every student who should have the opportunity to serve in the military regardless of background or sexual orientation. But to you at West Point, especially those of you who are cadets, I say those same words today in a different and renewed spirit: According to a recent Gallup poll, the military is the last institution in which Americans have high confidence. Not organized religion, not government, not newspapers, not banks. You. You and all you represent. We need you now more than ever — as thoughtful, disciplined improvisers, educated broadly in the arts and sciences, as leaders who include and create new spaces for the humanities. I wish there were more of you.

In Homer’s Iliad, a tutor comes to Achilles and his task is to teach the young man two vital things: “To be both a speaker of words and a doer of deeds.” A page on the West Point Department of English and Philosophy website opens with this quotation, and then adds, “This was Achilles’ ideal, and could be yours.” We share this call to action: To be speakers of words and doers of deeds. To lead, as my great-grandfather might have said, toward no more quarrels and no more wars.

In closing, I ask you to heed that call. Lead on behalf of each other and of the nation. Lead, also, on behalf of the liberal arts — of the traditions of human experience and humane insight that they represent. Recognize the importance of the attributes they have given you, mark their presence in your lives, advocate for them in the lives of others. Keep your own Iliad under your pillow. Be the world’s best force for the humanities, and thus for human possibility. Thank you.

Transcription courtesy of West Point Public Affairs Office.