Four Main Thrusts

- **Defense Budgets** – The Ability to Maintain Robust U.S. Military Capabilities in an Era of Sequestration

- **Ground Force Roles and Missions in a Time of Transition** – Finding the Army’s Heart and Soul – Post Iraq and Afghanistan
  - What’s the proper balance across the spectrum of warfare from counter-insurgency to high intensity fighting

- **The Implications for the Land War Industrial Base**
  - Maintaining the ability to produce innovation needed for future capabilities

- **The Role of Coalition Warfare in Land Power and More Generally**
  - Translating rhetoric into reality
Some Context: Is the Sky Really Falling?

**Declining Bang For Buck**

- The combination of sequester cuts and unaddressed cost increases will erode force readiness, stall modernization, and reduce the fighting forces by at least 50% by 2021.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>End of Reagan</th>
<th>Ground Divisions</th>
<th>End of Sequester</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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| AF Fighter/Attack | 2789 | 1666 | 1493 | 1157 |

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<th>Naval Combatants</th>
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<td>-330 ships; 15 Carriers to 7 Carriers</td>
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Sources: FY 2014 Greenbook, Shipbuilding History, DoD Service Budget docs, TPG & Consensus of Think-Tank analysts; BPC report

The Army After Vietnam and Afghanistan
“*It's like déjà vu all over again*” – Yogi Berra

- Situation Bears Some Similarities to Post-Vietnam Era
  - Army exhausted by inconclusive end of long, low-intensity conflict
  - Reduced budgets and manpower; resulting need to cut major programs
  - Some view low intensity conflict (LIC) and counter-insurgency focus as a distraction that has undermined our high intensity fighting capabilities
  - Institutional desire to return to “real war” and Army’s Core Competency – Fighting the “Big One”

- But Today is Different in Material Respects
  - In 1975, Cold War with the USSR, not Vietnam, was main security challenge
  - Today and for the foreseeable future, the primary threat to U.S. national security is low intensity and asymmetrical warfare

*While the United States Needs a Full Spectrum of Military Capabilities, We Must Draw Priorities; “Full Spectrum” Should Not Become Code Language for a Return to the Past*
Attempts to Return to the Past

- Renewed Focus on High Intensity Warfare
  - No Meaningful Changes in Force Structure Despite a Decade of Low Intensity Conflict
    - 1/3 of active component is heavy; only 1/3 is light
  - Acquisition Continues to Focus on Large Vehicle Programs
    - Ground Combat Vehicle (cancelled), AMPV
- Training
  - Reorientation to basic combat tasks
- Belief Conventional Forces Can “Step Down” to LIC More Readily Than LIC Forces Can “Step Up” to High Intensity combat
  - Vietnam and Iraq/Afghanistan show this is not the case
  - LIC has its own special skill sets and materiel requirements
- Some Observers Believe the Army is Ineffective at Counter-Insurgency, Stabilization and Reconstruction and Should Avoid These Missions
The Primacy of Strategy

- Doctrinal, Budgetary, Operational, Tactical and Acquisition Decisions Should Flow Down From an Objective Strategic Assessment

- High Intensity Regional Combat Remains Most Dangerous But Also Least Likely Conflict Scenario
  - U.S. preeminence in high intensity conflict deters most potential adversaries from competing symmetrically
    - Still maintained across the spectrum of air, sea and ground capabilities
    - Rise of terrorism, insurgency, cyber-warfare result of adversaries seeking asymmetrical approaches

- Only a Peer Competitor Could Threaten U.S. Preeminence in Conventional War, and the Only Near-Peer Competitor is China
  - Even resurgent Russia cannot challenge U.S. supremacy

- China Cannot Project and Sustain Large Land Forces Outside the Asian Mainland While the United States Cannot Project and Sustain Large Land Forces on the Asian Mainland
The Prospective Role of the Army

- Primary Role for US Ground Forces Will Remain Low Intensity Conflict – From Counter Insurgency to Humanitarian Assistance to Stabilization
  - Opportunities to employ heavy forces limited (Korea, Arabian Peninsula)
  - Continued erosion of nation state system points to future insurgencies, rogue states, rise of non-state players

- Principal Requirement for LIC: Deployable Light Infantry (Constabulary Forces) and Special Operations Forces, Civil Engineering and Civil-Military Affairs Units
  - Armor and heavy force requirement limited – a hedge again unlikely, but dangerous eventualities
  - Aviation useful principally for ISR, logistics, and close air support
Possible Implications for Army Force Structure

- **Move More Heavy Forces to the Reserve Component**
  - Retain 4 or 5 active heavy BCTs as Hedge
  - Reserve heavy BCTs as round-out or reinforcement

- **Transform Most of Active Component into Light BCTs Focused on Constabulary Tasks**

- **Establish Command to Institutionalize Focus on Low Intensity Warfare**
  - Focus on requirements, training, doctrine
  - Create clear, established career path

- **Carefully Paced Enlargement of Special Operations Forces**

- **Benefits of Force Restructuring**
  - More boots on the ground without increase in personnel top line
  - Reduced logistic footprint
  - Reserve components become true strategic reserve
  - Avoid forgetting the “lessons” of the last decade – Afghanistan and Iraq
Implications for Acquisition

- Technology Requirements of LIC are Relatively Modest
  - Focus on soldiers systems, intelligence, communications
  - Some useful advances likely to come out of commercial sector (e.g., smart phones, wearable computers)

- Platform-centric Acquisition Supplanted by Capability-Centered Acquisition
  - Less emphasis on Heavy or Medium Combat Vehicles for foreseeable future

- Continued RDT&E into Heavy Force Capabilities
  - Hedge against adversary breakthrough
  - Lateral technology insertion into existing platforms
Industrial Base Concerns

- A Decade Long “Bull Market” in Ground Tactical Solutions Has Wound Down; Largest and Most Open Market in History
  - Shift from rapid, large scale buying for operational needs back to traditional acquisition programs with lengthy gestation periods
  - Robust demand for armor, electro optics, counter-IED and other tactical capabilities has largely dried up
  - Firms that have provided innovation in jeopardy of surviving downturn

- Question is How to Keep the Industrial Base Warm in Absence of Substantial Procurement; Without Action, Capabilities Will and Are Eroding
  - Prime level capabilities in vehicles can be maintained through some R & D efforts
  - Harder to maintain innovative subsystem suppliers - perhaps some type of “capability” fund for this.

- Forcing the Pace of Technological Development in Cutting Edge Threats
- Transferring Innovation from Commercial Sector to the Army
Need for Enhanced Focus on Coalition Warfare

- United States Can No Longer Afford to Have Full spectrum of Capabilities Against Every Conceivable Threat – “Go It Alone” Unaffordable

- Types of Threats We Face – Focus on Low Intensity - Require Allies With Regional Capabilities, Proximity and Knowledge That Can Be Combined With U.S. ISR, logistics, special forces, and Other Capabilities

- 21st Century War Requires More Than Coalitions of the Willing – Careful Advance Planning Rather Than Pick Up Basketball
Spectrum of Interoperability

Most Ground-Based Contingencies Fall at the Bottom-Left
What Are the Challenges?

- No Clear U.S. Commitment to Coalition Warfare Despite Our Rhetorical Support
  - Doctrine, Training, Exercises & Acquisition Programs Largely National

- U.S. Institutional Resistance to Sharing Technical Information & Technology; Disconnect Between U.S. Policy & Tech Transfer Realities
  - National disclosure policy geared to ad hoc country-specific data sharing – not systemic long-term disclosure needed for joint planning and training in net-centric environment
  - U.S. export controls inhibit sharing of technology related to ISR enablers (sensors, etc.); favor protecting U.S. technology lead even vis-a-vis-close allies

- Limited Investment of Allies in Net-centric Warfare Creates Significant Technical Difficulties; Absent Strategic Action, “Interoperability” Gap Will Worsen Rather Than Improve

Current U.S. Rules & Policies Only Facilitate “Dumbed Down” Force Inter-Operability