Open Hearts and Open Minds: A Study of Jihad and its Importance in Afghanistan

Luke Schumacher

United States Military Academy

Recent radical Islamic terrorist attacks, most notably the attacks on September 11th in the United States and in London on July 7, 2005, have brought Islamic terrorism and the doctrine of jihad that motivates it to the forefront of the Western political agenda. Arguably, the most notable reaction to the attacks is the NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to defeat the Taliban regime and destroy al-Qaeda terrorist cells. Now the coalition governments must consider what is both necessary and feasible in their efforts to combat radical Islamic ideology and establish an effective Afghan government hostile to it. While some believe that this is impossible given the nature of Islam and jihad, a close study of the situation indicates otherwise. This paper argues that radical Islamic ideology is not at the heart of the insurgent violence in Afghanistan, and that in conjunction with traditional counter insurgency operations, by ensuring that the basic needs of the Afghan populace are met and enacting policies aimed at co-opting insurgents who lack strong ideological ties to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, an Afghan state hostile to and effective against radical Islamic ideology can be established and maintained.

On September 11, 2001, over 2000 people were murdered in New York City.[1] On October 12, 2002, two-hundred-two Indonesian and foreign nationals lost their lives on the Indonesian island of Bali as three bombs consumed them and injured 152 more. The scene was reenacted at the cost of 26 more lives on October 1, 2005. Prior to that, on March 11, 2004, a coordinated subway bombing in Madrid killed almost two-hundred and injured 1800 more. In November 2004, Theodoor van Gogh, Dutch filmmaker and great-nephew of the world-famous Vincent van Gogh, was murdered in mid-morning daylight on his route to work in response to his production of a film critical of Islam. On July 7, 2005, fifty-six lives were claimed in London as militants detonated four bombs throughout the London transportation system. Following this, nearly 1000 were killed in riots after depictions of the prophet Mohammed were printed in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* on September 30, 2005. November 6, 2009 was the day an Islamic physician in the United States Army killed thirteen fellow soldiers in an attack in Fort Hood, Texas. On Christmas day less than two months later, 290 more came close to losing their lives on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 as a Nigerian national attempted to set off a bomb sewn to his underwear.[2]

These attacks and many more, having been planned and executed by radical Islamic groups, attempting to create Islamic states through violent means using the Islamic doctrine of *jihad*, have brought the concept of jihad to the forefront of the Western political

[1]Center for Disease Control, "Deaths in World Trade Center Attacks --- New York City," 2001, *Center for Disease Control*, September 11, 2002, http://www.cdc.gov /mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm51SPa6.htm.

[2] Unless otherwise stated, all death figures come from BBC News articles. For a complete list, see references.

agenda. Many academics and political leaders claim that these groups are not acting in accordance with Islam; instead, they believe they have twisted the doctrine of jihad to create an interpretation of Islam that is vastly different than the original teachings. Others, most notably Samuel Huntington, disagree, and go so far as to claim that Western society and Islamic society are irrevocably at odds due to this doctrine.[3] However, these two understandings are not necessarily mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily the only possibilities; jihad could simultaneously represent an internal struggle to some, an external struggle to others, and to the rest a concept whose constant reification makes it difficult to pin an exact or eternal definition to.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the multiple conceptions of jihad throughout the Western and Islamic worlds, and by using Afghanistan as a case study, determine the current and future ability of the doctrine to shape peoples' actions and sentiments. The first section of this essay illustrates the various opinions Western political leaders and non-Muslim academics hold on the connection between Islam, terrorism, and the Muslim world. The second section of this essay aims to clearly lay out the differences between the competing internal and external definitions of jihad, and give some discussion of the implications of each separate meaning. Building upon these definitions and using Afghanistan as a case study, the third section of this essay attempts to determine the actual effect of these dueling interpretations of jihad on Muslim populations, the strategic implications on the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, and subsequent additional non-military strategies that can be implemented along with traditional military strategies to combat insurgent ideology in Afghanistan.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

Conceptions of Islam in the West

The terrorist attacks previously mentioned have brought Islamic terrorism into the forefront of the Western political arena. In their public announcements, most Western political leaders demonstrate a tendency to proclaim Islam to be a peaceful religion, highlighted by a separation between "authentic Islam" and "radical Islam."

British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed his frustration at hearing bin Laden and his associates "described as 'Islamic terrorists'," maintaining that "the acts of the [9/11 terrorists] are wholly contrary to the teachings of the Koran."[4] The next evening, U.S. President George W. Bush echoed these statements in an address to Congress and the American people, declaring Islamic teachings to be "good and peaceful," dissociating the religion with the perpetrators of violence who "blaspheme the name of Allah," and further cautioning his audience to "recognize that [radical Islamic ideology] is very different from the tenets of the great religion of Islam."[5]

Looking back a presidency, President Bill Clinton shared similar sentiments in August 1998 when defending the cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan. He explains, ". . . [the United States'] actions were aimed at fanatics and killers who wrap murder in the cloak of righteousness; and in doing so, profane the great religion in whose name they claim to act."[6] Hillary Clinton backed her husband's statements when she

[4] Tony Blair, "On the Initial U.S. and British OPs in Afghanistan," *American Rhetoric*, October 7, 2001, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ speeches/tblair10-07-01.htm.

[5] George W. Bush, Address to Congress, *CNN*, September 21 2001, http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/us/gen.bush.transcript_1_joint-session-national-anthem-citizens?_s=PM:US.

[6] Bill Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan," *The American Presidency Project,* August 20, 1998, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=54799&st=islam&st1=#axzz1GIbfn9Ab.

professed her admiration of Islam's universal values of "love of family, and community, mutual respect, the power of education, and the deepest yearning of all: to live in peace."[7] Most recently, in a speech to Indian Hindus, President Barack Obama declared that "the overwhelming majority [of Muslims] want peace, justice, fairness, and tolerance," further adding that "all of us recognise [*sic*] that this great religion, in the hands of a few extremists, has been distorted."[8]

These and similar public announcements have led to criticism from populist authors, scholars, and average citizens alike whom are concerned with the threat Islamic terrorism poses and whom will not dismiss the recent terrorist acts as merely acts of radicals. Robert Spencer, one of the populist authors who writes about Islam, criticizes the speeches, urging politicians to "stop insisting Islam is a religion of peace."[9] He advises politicians to make no assertions on the nature of Islam and instead argues that they should simply declare their enemies "wish to impose sharia rule upon their countries and the world, and that they are going to lead the resistance to that."[10] Richard Lowry, a conservative political analyst, argues that while the idea that Islam is a religion of peace "seems a polite fiction, it is an important one," insisting that, "influential Muslims believe it . . . and it is crucial that they prevail in the Muslim struggle for self-definition."[11] He further suggests that "rather than scorning them, we should be doing what we can to support the likes of King Abdullah of Jordan, who has launched an anti-terror initiative, and Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani, who has been consistent in condemning terrorism."[12]

Still some, such as Patrick Lang who served as the chief Middle East analyst for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, contend that these declarations of Islam's peacefulness may not truly reflect the views of those who express them. Instead, he suggests that pronouncements may be thought-out and calculated by politicians in order to secure coalitions.[13] Journalist Judith Miller expands on these points, arguing that statements proclaiming an incompatibility between Islamic and Western principles "would surely antagonize American allies such as Saudi Arabia, an avowedly Islamic state that denies basic human rights to half its population, and all religious minorities but is dependably pro-Western, considerably less harsh and repressive than many of the states that surround it, and also America's major source of foreign oil."[14] She further argues that "American administrations, fearful of being accused of cultural imperialism, have remained silent about denials of basic human rights in the Middle East" and anti-Western mentality.[15] In concurrence, Lang insists that the recent political pronouncements present "a burden on sound analysis of the actual threat" facing the West and thereby it cannot understand its enemy.[16]

Jihad as a Justification for War

[7] Gregory Davis, *Religion of Peace?: Islam's War Against the World* (Los Angeles: World Ahead Publishing, 2006), v.

[8] Indo-Asian News Service, "Islam great, but distorted by few extremists: Obama," *Hindustan Times*. November 7, 2010. http://www.hindustantimes.com/Islam-great-but-distorted-by-few-extremists-Obama/Article1-623013.aspx.

[9] Robert Spencer, *The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World's Most Intolerant Religion* (Washington, DC: Regnery Pub., 2007), 192.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Richard Lowry, "The 'To Hell with Them' Hawks, "*National Review*, 27 May 2006, 4.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Patrick Lang, "Wahhabism and Jihad," *America: The National Catholic Weekly*, March10, 2003. http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=2832 .

[14] Judith Miller, The Challenge of Radical Islam, Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (spring 1993): 54.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Patrick Lang, "Wahhabism and Jihad."

Jihad is the concept that is at the heart of all the aforementioned comments questioning the nature of Islam. The term, translated as "holy war," "struggle," or a variety of other not-so-similar synonyms depending on who one talks with, is considered by academia to carry two definitions. One definition of jihad refers to the internal struggle that Muslims experience in their effort to live their lives as pious Muslims. As a pillar or ancillary, this aspect of jihad is meant to be maintained and practiced at all times. However, it is the second definition of jihad – a holy war– that has brought the concept to the forefront of the Western political agenda.

Within this second definition of jihad there are two types: defensive and offensive. Defensive jihad is considered by many in the Islamic community to be an individual duty of all Muslims when their people or their religion is under attack. Offensive jihad, on the other hand, is highly regulated and centralized, must be authorized by a legitimate authority, and is considered a collective rather than individual duty as the society as a whole can elect members to fight for it.[17]

The offensive type is most often associated with the ideology of radical Islamic groups attempting to spread Islamic law over either the Islamic or the entire world. However, in recent times, many radical Islamic groups have claimed that actions impeding the formation of such a world are hostile actions, and subsequently, have invoked the doctrine of defensive jihad in order to justify attacks in defense of the establishment of their desired Islamic state. But regardless of which definition an individual believes is the driving force behind modern radical Islamic groups, there is Islamic scholarly justification for both types of jihad, and it is often difficult to distinguish which type a scholar is talking about.

In his essay "The Meaning of Jihad," John Perazzo notes that the justification of jihad used by terrorist groups is not new. In fact, Perazzo argues that if one were to consider jihad to be invoked only in defense of a physical attack, then seventy-seven of the seventy-eight battles led by the Prophet Mohammad were offensive. But more to the point, he sarcastically criticizes those who separate jihadist attacks from Islam, asking, "How many slaughtered innocents might still be alive today, if only such warriors had understood jihad to mean what our priests, ministers, and professors claim it means?"[18]

Dr. Andrew Bostom, a researcher who has devoted a great deal of attention to the development and evolution of the concept of jihad, echoes Perazzo's sentiments. In his work, *Legacy of Jihad*, he speaks of Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, a Maliki school jurist, who calls jihad a "precept of Divine Intervention," and states that according to Maliki tradition, war may be initiated against non-Muslims as soon as they have received the "call to Islam."[19] He continues by saying that after receiving the invitation, the conquered have a choice of converting to Islam, accepting execution, or paying the *jizya*, the poll tax, and living as *dhimmis*, a protected legal group, if they were Jewish, Christian, Sabian, or eventually members of a variety of other specific non-Muslim groups.[20] In elaborating on this process, Paul Heck states that the status of *dhimmi* could only be granted "by acknowledgement of Islamic law and self-annexation to the Islamic polity, which did not require conversion to Islam, but admission to Islamic hegemony."[21]

A Hanbali exegete, Ibn Taymiyyah, echoes many of al-Qayrawani's beliefs, arguing that "since lawful warfare is

[17] Philip S. Salter, interview by author, 26 March 2011.

[18] John Perazzo, "The Meaning of Jihad," *FrontPageMagazine.com*, November 25, 2002, http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=20994.

[19] Andrew G. Bostom, *The Legacy of Jihad: Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims* (New York: Promentheus Books, 2005), 27.

[20] Annemarie Schimmel and Burzine K. Waghmar, *The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art and Culture* (London: Reaktion Books, 2004), 107.

[21] Paul L. Heck, "*Jihad* Revisited," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 32, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 111.

essentially jihad and since its aim is God's entirely . . . those who stand in the way of its aim must be fought."[22] However, he expands his definition of legitimate targets in a holy war to a level that most in liberal democracies would disagree with, stating, "women, children, monks, old people, the blind, handicapped and the likes," shall be killed if they fight with "words" and "acts."[23] The dialogue on the acceptability of killing these categorized groups "should not be seen as an odd twist on the categories of . . . soldiers and civilians, but rather as a real concern to debilitate the enemy's capacity for attacking in the future."[24]

Shaik Burhanuddin Ali of Marghinan of the Hanafi school of Islam also encourages these sentiments in the *Hidaya*, the classical manual of Hanafi law, when he too states that offering the "call to Islam" is what is required prior to waging war upon non-Muslims. He warns though, "If the infidels, upon receiving the call, neither consent to it nor agree to pay the capitation tax, it is then incumbent on the Muslims to call upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them."[25]

Shafi'i jurist Muhammed Ibn Al-Mawardi, writing in 1058 CE, further elaborates on the two types of enemies a Muslim warrior may face: "first, those who the call of Islam has reached, but they have refused it and taken up arms . . . Second, those whom the invitation to Islam has not yet reached." However, he also makes the significant claim that people who have not received the call to Islam "are few nowadays since Allah has made manifest the call of his messenger."[26]

The recent terrorist attacks have indicated that neither the sentiment that war should be waged against non-Muslims nor the belief that most have received the call to Islam is dead. Osama Bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda and primary planner of the September 11th terrorist attacks, is probably the most recognized proponent of this belief.

In his 2002 "Letter to America," he gives three reasons justifying his attack. The first reason he gives is the United States' support for Israel. The second cites the United States' support of secular governments in the Middle East. And his third reason simply references the definition of jihad, as he states, "Allah, the Almighty, legislated the permission and the option to take revenge."[27]

Osama bin Laden clearly states that "the first thing we are calling [the American people] to is Islam." He has also issued a *fatwa*, an Islamic legal ruling, in which he states "[t]he ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."[28]

To reiterate what was said in the previous section, while some believe that the preponderance of Muslims are sympathetic to bin Laden's views, others believe that he and his followers are an isolated subsection of society, or even a fringe of a fringe of Islam. The purpose of the following section is to analyze the applicability of these two views in Afghanistan and discuss their implications on coalition strategy.

Looking Beyond Jihad in Afghanistan

A primary goal of coalition forces in the War in Afghanistan has been to undermine jihadist doctrine and eliminate bases of support and toleration among the Afghan people. In pursuit of this goal, the coalition has assumed several strategies

[22] Andrew G. Bostom, *The Legacy of Jihad*, 27.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Paul L. Heck, "*Jihad* Revisited," 112.
[25] Andrew G. Bostom, *The Legacy of Jihad*, 27.
[26] Ibid., 28.

[27] Osama bin Laden, "Full text: bin Laden's 'Letter to America,'" *Guardian.co.uk.* 24 November, 2002. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver.
[28] Michael Kronenwetter, *Terrorism: a Guide to Events and Documents* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 12.

aimed at weakening the influence of jihad and diminishing participation in and support of the insurgency. In accordance with existing counter insurgency doctrine, this section argues that a strategy of providing necessities, goods, and services for the population, combined with reclaiming reconcilable Taliban leaders, can be used to supplement the military approach to the war, strengthen the fledgling Afghan government, and create an environment unaccommodating to extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda.

Despite Osama bin Laden's rhetoric, the motivating factor behind insurgency in Afghanistan is more likely a desire for the population to secure basic needs, as predicted by Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.[29] This is demonstrated in the cliché label of the War on Terrorism as a war over "hearts and minds" rather than a conventional war – which would be appropriate were coalition forces only dealing with irreconcilable ideologically motivated fighters. In agreement with this, counter insurgency expert and retired Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl suggests "[i]n this kind of conflict, development and reconstruction aid are perhaps our most valuable resources."[30]

Engaged in an ambitious nation-building project, the coalition has given considerable effort to providing for the people of Afghanistan. Many scholars and military strategists believe the key to combating jihadist ideology rests in the coalition's ability to provide the constituents of Afghanistan with basic needs that the current government of Afghanistan cannot provide. Referring to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, Nagl proclaims that the hierarchy "propounded decades ago . . . is never more applicable than in [today's] combat zone."[31] Applying it to the struggle in Afghanistan, he believes that if coalition forces are able to provide for Afghans' food, water, and shelter, as well as security needs, including the security of body, employment, family, health, and property, Afghans will be more willing to support the coalition and the Afghan state in its efforts against terrorist and Taliban forces. Indeed, the argument suggests that if offered the opportunity to find agricultural, government, or other work, many recruited insurgents would have little need to resort to violence. Thus, many attacks in Afghanistan may be less about ideology and instead based on other motivations.

The National Solidarity Program is one initiative that has been fairly successful at satisfying the basic needs. Under the program, local Afghan Community Development Councils choose infrastructure projects to construct, ranging from drinking water pipes, to electricity generators, to roads and schools, and then receive a construction grant of up to $60,000 provided the locals contribute 10% of the construction cost. In his forty-seven page study of the program, Hamish Nixon of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit concludes that where "resources have been converted to successful sub-projects, the acceptance and legitimacy of the programme, and by extension the government, has been strengthened."[32] Furthermore, Rich Lowry of *National Review* reports that because Afghans respond favorably to coalition forces when they sense the coalition is truly invested in their well being, the project "has proven one of the most successful ways to extend the reach of the government on the local level."[33]

Attempts at economic development, governance, and the promotion of the rule of law have also been made. Provincial Reconstruction Teams have been designed and

[29] John A. Nagl, "The Expeditionary Imperative," *The Wilson Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 55-58.

[30] Ibid., 56.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Hamish Nixon, "The Changing Face of Local Governance? Community Development Councils in Afghanistan," *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Working Paper Series* (February 2008), 8.

[33] Richard Lowry, "The New Afghan War: With Patience and the Right Strategy, We Can Win," *National Review*, April 20, 2009, 34.

employed by many of the coalition's governments, the U.S. Army National Guard has focused teams on agricultural development, and the U.S. government has created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to regulate development.[34]

Subsequently, some argue that the war would be better fought by focusing on programs that provide Afghans with services and luxuries that its previous political entities did not and cannot provide. However, it is believed that these programs are not getting the resources their potential necessitates. [35] Furthermore, many soldiers argue that current training does not prepare the military leaders with the ability to manage resources and civil affairs.[36] Thus, one resource that needs to be increased is the presence of civilian agencies and officials in addition to the military forces already on the ground. If the appropriate resources are given to these programs, then many believe the insurgent ideology and goals will lose their legitimacy for most Afghans.[37]

Likewise, if insurgent efforts succeed and the Taliban repossess lost territory and gather resources that allow them to provide for locals, they could gain credibility and legitimacy among the population. Prior to the 2010 troop surge this was exactly the case; counter insurgency efforts suffered until troop levels and subsequent capabilities were increased. But since then, some argue that instead of playing "whack-a-mole" with insurgents, community and building projects are able to exist with less expectation of Taliban return.[38]

Another portion of the battle is retaining quality Afghan leaders who may have once served with or supported the Taliban or other insurgents. The coalition will not be able to create a legitimate, effective, and lasting Afghan government solely by hand-picking all its candidates. As Fotini Christia and Michael Semple argue, if former and current Taliban elites can be convinced to "switch sides" and work with, rather than against, the new Afghan government and coalition forces, Taliban forces may be more likely to support the new Afghan government, making a transition more feasible.[39]

Despite how radical this plan may appear, white papers on President Obama's foreign policy in the region and his speeches concur that integration of reconcilable insurgents is a necessary component of lasting peace in the area.[40] Indeed, the study of Afghan history illustrates that one of the tendencies of Afghanistan's warring tribes is to willingly realign to the winning side.[41] Even the Taliban, who pride themselves as the Afghan faction that best maintains internal solidarity and least suffers from desertion has lost the allegiance of notable members since the beginning of the war.

Some prominent examples of this "flipping" tendency include Abdul Salam Rocketi, who formerly served as the Taliban's corps commander in Jalalabad and is now a member of the democratic parliament,[42] and Arsala Rahmani, past deputy minister to the Taliban and current senator of the new

[34] John A. Nagl, "The Expeditionary Imperative," 56-58.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Volker Franke and Karen Gutteri, "Picking up the Pieces: Are United States Officers Ready for Nation Building?," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 31, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 1.

[37] John A. Nagl, "The Expeditionary Imperative," 55-58.

[38] Richard Lowry, "The New Afghan War, 32.

[39] Fotini Christia and Semple Michael, "Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 34-45.

[40] Audrey Gillan, "Barack Obama Would Welcome Talks with Taliban in Afghanistan," Guardian.co.uk, 8 March 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/08/barack-obama-talks-taliban-afghanistan.

[41] Fotini Christia and Semple Michael, "Flipping the Taliban": 34-45.

[42] M. K. Bhadrakumar, "Afghan Battle Lines Become Blurred," *Asia Times Online*, May 19, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IE19Df03.html.

government.[43] Most recently, General David Petraeus stated that "some 700 former Taliban have now officially reintegrated . . . [and] some 2,000 more are in various stages of the reintegration process."[44] Possibly the most notable example of this is former Taliban commander Abdul Wahid, who in December 2004 formally announced his realignment with the Afghan government. He justified himself by stating that he had effectively been released of duty by Mullah Omar, when in December 2001 Omar "asked him to lead the delegation that would surrender Kandahar to pro-coalition forces and thereby forsook his exalted position as 'Commander of the Faithful.' "[45] The statement allowed Wahid to confirm his commitment to an Islamic Afghan state, even while proclaiming Afghan President Hamid Karzai the new leader.

In light of these examples, a key part of winning over insurgents is to make it easier for members of the Taliban to borrow Wahid's argument. This may entail depicting those who realign with the new government as committed to Islam while portraying those who oppose the new regime as anti-Islamic or misinformed. But also, another key component of this strategy remains enticing local warlords and Taliban leaders in the decentralized Afghan society to relinquish local power bases and personal political goals in return for social and economic benefits.[46]

For Karzai's administration, this necessitates expanding the reach and capacity of the Afghan government in Kabul across the full extent of Afghan territory.[47] The National Ring Road, constructed in Afghanistan to connect rural areas and cities together through the rugged terrain, is one of the primary components of this effort, and has proved a colossal victory for the national government, as leaders managed to finish the project amidst Taliban insurgents' threatening, capturing, and beating of many involved in the project. After critical donations from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in its construction, the government is now tasked with developing methods of sustaining the roads, as annual maintenance is estimated at $1 billion, an even larger test of competency in a nation that has an annual total budget of about $7 billion.[48,49]

As the national government's influence spreads over the extent of Afghan territory, the new task for it and coalition forces is enticing the local insurgents and elites to support the new Afghan state. Some recommend monetary incentives or land grants for peace agreements, while others stalwartly oppose doing business with "corrupt, brutal, or fanatical opponents" of the Afghan government, and prefer to kill or capture all those who will not change sides without such incentives.[50] This latter opinion is not unenlightened; many local power holders and Taliban members in question are oftentimes brutal thugs and drug-lords with reputations of violating the human rights of their constituents. Nonetheless, considering that the returns of reintegrating former Taliban members can be significant, and that order, stability, and growth are contingent upon the success of a strong national

[43] TOLO*News*, "Peace Council Demands US to Release Top Taliban Leader," *TOLO News*, February 8, 2011. http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/1810-peace-council-demands-us-to-release-top-taliban-leader.

[44] United States of America, Armed Service Committee, U.S. Senate, *Statement of International Security Force NATO before the Senate Armed Service Committee*, by General David H. Patraeus, 8.

[45] Fotini Christia and Semple Michael, "Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 37.

[46] Sheri Burman, "From the Sun King to Karzai: Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 2 (March/April 2010): 8.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Matthew Nasuti, "The Ring Road: A Gift Afghanistan Cannot Afford" Sept 29, 2009, Kabul Press, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article4093

[49] CIA, "CIA - The World Factbook: South Asia: Afghanistan," *CIA*, March 22, 2011, https://www.cia.gov /library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

[50] Ibid., 8.

government, the risks and sacrifices may be worth making.[51]

Conclusion

Despite the claims of various mainstream academics, populist writers, and radical Islamic elites, the doctrine of violent jihad, although justified by a variety of Islamic scholars and radical Islamic groups, does not appear to be the primary motivating force behind the insurgency in Afghanistan. Indeed, an approach focused merely on destroying those believed to be influenced by radical Islamic ideology will not solve the security problems in Afghanistan as it does not attack the root cause of the insurgency. Instead, by understanding the basic needs and desires of the population, and subsequently by providing goods and services to the general Afghan population while providing incentives for insurgents without strong ideological ties to the insurgency to reintegrate with the general Afghan populace, the coalition forces will better be able to combat insurgent ideology and build a strong government hostile to it in Afghanistan.

But perhaps the end state is best described by Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute Philip H. Gordon when he states:

> Victory will come not when foreign leaders accept certain terms but when political changes erode and ultimately undermine support for the ideology and strategy of those determined to destroy the United States . . .when the ideology the terrorists espouse is discredited, when their tactics are seen to have failed, and when they come to find more promising paths to the dignity, respect, and opportunities they crave . . . At that point, even the terrorists will realize their violence is futile.[52]

REFERENCES

Asser, Martin. "What the Muhammad Cartoons Portray." BBC News. January 2, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ 4693292.stm.

"Bali Death Toll Set at 202." BBC News. February 19, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2778923.stm.

Bhadrakumar, M. K. "Afghan Battle Lines Become Blurred." Asia Times Online. May 19, 2007. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IE19Df03.html.

Blair, Tony. "On the Initial U.S. and British OPs in Afghanistan." *American Rhetoric*. October 7, 2001. http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/tblair10-07-01.htm.

Burman, Sheri. "From the Sun King to Karzai: Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 2 (March/April 2010): 2-9.

Bush, George W. "Address to Congress" *CNN*. September 21, 2001. http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-20/us/gen.bush.transcript_1_joint-session-national-anthem-citizens?_s=PM:US.

Center for Disease Control. *Deaths in World Trade Center Attacks --- New York City, 2001*. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly. September 11, 2002. http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm51SPa6.htm.

CIA. "CIA - The World Factbook: South Asia: Afghanistan." *Central Intelligence Agency*. March 22, 2011. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

Christia, Fotini, and Semple Michael. "Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan." *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July/August 2009): 34-45.

[51] Sheri Burman, "From the Sun King to Karzai: Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 2 (March/April 2010): 9.

[52] Philip M. Gordon, "Can the War on Terror Be Won?: How to Fight the Right War," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 6 (September/October 2007): 54.

Clinton, Bill. "Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan." *The American Presidency Project*. August 20, 1998. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=54799&st=islam&st1=#axzz1GIbfn9Ab.

Davis, Gregory. *Religion of Peace?: Islam's War Against the World*. Los Angeles: World Ahead Publishing, 2006.

Dudley, William, ed. *Islam: Opposing Viewpoints*. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2004.

"Fort Hood Massacre: Court Hearing Delayed in Texas." BBC News. October 12, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11525574.

Franke, Volker, and Karen Gutteri. "Picking up the Pieces: Are United States Officers Ready for Nation Building?" Journal of Political and Military Sociology 31, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 1-27.

Gillan, Audrey. "Barack Obama Would Welcome Talks with Taliban in Afghanistan." Guardian.co.uk. March 8, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/08/barack-obama-talks-taliban-afghanistan.

Gordon, Philip M. "Can the War on Terror Be Won?: How to Fight the Right War." Foreign Affairs 86, no. 6 (September/October 2007): 53-66.

"Gunman Kills Dutch Film Director." BBC News. November 2, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3974179.stm.

Heck, Paul L. "*Jihad* Revisited." *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 32, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 95-128.

Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

Indo-Asian News Service. "Islam Great, but Distorted by Few Extremists: Obama." *Hindustan Times*. November 7, 2010. http://www.hindustantimes.com/Islam-great-but-distorted-by-few-extremists-Obama/Article1-623013.aspx.

Kronenwetter, Michael. *Terrorism: a Guide to Events and Documents*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004.

Laden, Osama bin. "Full text: bin Laden's 'Letter to America.' *Guardian.co.uk*. November 24, 2002. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver.

Lang, Patrick. "Wahhabism and Jihad." *America: The National Catholic Weekly*. 10 March 2003. http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=2832.

"London Rocked by Terror Attacks." BBC News. July 7, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4659093.stm .

Lowry, Richard. "The New Afghan War: With Patience and the Right Strategy, We Can Win." *National Review*, April 20, 2009.

Maley, William. "Afghanistan in 2010." *Asian Survey* 51, no. 1 (January/February 2010): 85-96.

Miller, Judith. "The Challenge of Radical Islam." *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993), 43-56.

Nagl, John A. "The Expeditionary Imperative." The Wilson Quarterly 33, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 55-58.

Nixon, Hamish. "The Changing Face of Local Governance? Community Development Councils in Afghanistan." *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Working Paper Series* (February 2008).

Perazzo, John. "The Meaning of Jihad." *FrontPageMagazine.com*. November 25, 2002. http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=20994.

Philip S. Salter. Interview by author. March 26, 2011.

"Rail Line Bomb 'matches Madrid'" BBC News. April 3, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3596455.stm.

Senate Armed Services Committee. *Statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Commander, International Security Assitance Forces NATO, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*. March 15, 2011. http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Transcript/Petraeus%2003-15-11.pdf.

Schimmel, Annemarie, and Burzine K. Waghmar. The Empire of the Great Mughals: History, Art and Culture. London: Reaktion Books, 2004.

Spencer, Robert. *Onward Muslim Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the*

West. Washington, DC: Regnery Pub., 2003.

Spencer, Robert. *The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World's Most Intolerant Religion*. Washington, DC: Regnery Pub., 2007.

TOLO*News*. "Peace Council Demands US to Release Top Taliban Leader." *TOLO News*. February 8, 2011. http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/1810-peace-council-demands-us-to-release-top-taliban-leader.

"'Underwear Bomber' Abdulmutallab Faces New Charges." BBC News. December 16, 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12014683.

Author's Note:

My sincere gratitude is owed to Professor Philip Salter of the United States Military Academy for his invaluable guidance that directed much of the research involved in the essay. I thank also my editor Ryan Waldorf, for his structural assistance from the beginning and keen eye in realizing the finer nuances of issues. Ryan's recruitment of undergraduate Duncan Aylor, whose aid in focusing and arranging the essay is much appreciated, proved crucial to its realization. Lastly, I remain indebted to Joseph Horvath of the Culver Academies for his personal counseling and commitment to my development as a writer that made this essay possible.